Origins of War in Europe 1939

[Musashi]

With Poland knocked out and its large army (equal in size to the German) eliminated as a factor, and no prospect of the

Uhm? Poland has about 1 million soldiers, while Germans about 1,8 million soldiers (Not to say that Germans had huge advantage in tanks, artillery and aircraft). How 1 million is equal to 1,8 million?

One don't need to be Einstein to know 1.8 million <> 1.0 million. It is a basic mathematics

[tonyh]

Neither of you are taking into account, the reserves Poland had.

Tony

[Musashi]

Neither of you are taking into account, the reserves Poland had.

Tony

Could you tell us what reserves you mean?
Do you know Poland announced a total mobilization, but our so called allies ordered us to cancel it not to provoke Germans? When Poland announced it again on September 31st it was too late. You should know it is impossible to mobilize ANYTHING under enemy bombs, especially if you are surrounded before outbreak of the war and your opponent has every part of your territory at the range of his aviation.

[tonyh]

According to Basil Liddel Hart, Poland could call upon 2.5 million men with reserves included.

Reserves a generally troops held in "reserve" to fill the ranks of frontline troops, when casualties, etc are incurred.

Tony

[Steve]

When looking at who said what and who promised what and interpreting the intentions you cannot take these negotiations out of the context of the period they were taking place in and that context is the breaking of the Munich agreement by Hitler.

The British decided that either they looked the other way or they opposed Germanies intention to dominate Europe and they decided to oppose. To oppose they decide they need an eastern front and ended up going with Poland a poor substitute for the USSR. Clearly a peaceful solution to Danzig needed concessions from Poland so how exactly could they have brought Poland into their camp if they told the Poles they had to make concessions. We know from the cabinet meeting of the 20 March that concessions were expected and Beck was right to be distrustfull of the British because what they were telling the Poles was not what was being said in private.

PRO CAB 23/98. Cabinet 13/39. 20 March 1939 (From Prazmowska's book)

Prime Minister "the declaration did not constitute a guarantee to the existing frontiers and the indefinate maintenance of the status quo. The declaration was concerned with a far wider issue, namely security and political independence of European states against German domination" It was also stated at the meeting that the definition of a threat was to be left vague.

Not being completly stupid Beck was able to tie the British down to a more specific wording. But the British went along because Beck lied to them on the state of negotiations so that the British assumed negotiations were not going that badly.

From memory the meeting between Beck and Kennard on the 21 March was about an agreement on consultation but the British whipped out the new proposal and Beck later said something along the lines of thinking about acceptance for as long as it took him to shake two ashes off his cigarette.

[Molobo]

All fine, but this is in March not in May when French signed other agreements with Poland.

According to Basil Liddel Hart, Poland could call upon 2.5 million men with reserves included

Those reserves were never available due to French insistance that Poland should call off mobilization.

[Serus]

According to Basil Liddel Hart, Poland could call upon 2.5 million men with reserves included.

Reserves a generally troops held in "reserve" to fill the ranks of frontline troops, when casualties, etc are incurred.

Tony

Poland had about 2,5 millions of trained reservists (not reserve troops) - but was never able to field such big army - some Polish military historians thought it was an error to train so much reservists - costs are big and they could never be used. So much reserves are needed in case of a long protracted war (many months at least) but were useless in 39 against Germany. In reality Poland never planned to mobilise more than 1,5 million at given time but was able to mobilise only ~1 million during the 39 campaign (due to late moblisation mainly - already mentioned).
Anyway its better to count military units, Poland mobilised 39 divisons (30 + 9 reserve divisions) + 11 cavalary brigades +1(2) motorised brigades + 3 mountain "brigades" + national defense battalions/brigades, all equivalent of less than 50 divisions. Germany (over 1,5 millions people) used the equivalent of more than 60 divisions (+2 slovakian divisions) + much stronger (and numerous) air forces. It hardly makes the armies equal in numbers.
Comparing pure numbers of trained reservists is plain silly - because they are an asset only in case of longer war, it wasnt the case in 39. (or in 40 in France...). Number of troops really mobilised and used by both sides clealry show German superiority in numbers.

But of curse "some" people on this forum claims that Poland had army as strong as Germany (the same people are insinuating that Poland was the agressive side in 39...).

Steve --> Why are you writing about "peacefull solution to Danizg" - it was already posted in this thread Danizg was only one of the issues - the second one (probably more important for both sides) was the exterritorial route through Polish Pomorze. You know it well - i know it well, but still it should not be simplified - Danizg was not the same thing as the so called "corridor".

(2) Germany receives a route through the Corridor and a railway line at her own disposal possessing the same extraterritorial status for Germany as the Corridor itself has for Poland.

I find this simplification (war started over Danizg) very irritating - Danzig was one of TWO demands made by Hitler - the second one being (exterritorial route through Polish teritory cutting it form the sea) totally unacceptable to any country trying to remain independent.

[michael mills]

What all of you are failing to take into account in the dispute over the size of the Polish army in comparison with the German, and the degree of Polish mobilisation, is the general expectation of Poland and Britain as to how the desired military confrontation between Poland and Germany would begin.

The expectation was that the conflict would initially be limited, and confined to Danzig and the Corridor, involving the Polish Danzig Intervention Force and a small German force snet into Danzig.

I have enumerated the two ways in which the conflict was expected to begin:

1. German forces enter Danzig in response to a unilateral declaration of reunificatrion with the Reich by the Danzig Senate, followed by the counter-invasion of Danzig territory by the Polish Danzig Intervention Force.

2. The Polish Danzig Intervention Force enters Danzig territory on the pretext of a threat to its independence emanating from actions of the Danzig Senate, followed by a counter-invasion of Danzig by German forces.

In either case, the expectation was that the fighting would be limited to Danzig territory and the Corridor. That would give Poland time to mobilise its full armed force for the coalition war against Germany, which according to the agreement reached with France on 19 May was to commence with a French offensive 15 days after the outbreak of hostilities in Danzig.

What spoilt that plan, and prevented the full mobilisation of Polish forces, thereby giving Germany a strategic advantage, was Hitler's decision in April to prepare for, and eventually launch, a full-scale invasion of Poland using all Germany's total armed force, rather than just a limited action to occupy Danzig and perhaps the Corridor.

The German Blitzkrieg caught everyone off guard, and knocked Poland out before Britain and France could intervene effectively.

Furthermore, the announcement of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact on 24 August (one day after Voroshilov had finally postponed the military discussions with British and French representatives) put paid to any hopes of drawing the Soviet Union into the anti-German alliance, and thereby forced Britain and France to realise that preventing the German move to establish hegemony over Central and Eastern Europe would be much more difficult than they had thought.

[john2]

Mr. Mills, I have a few questions for you.

1. When did the allies decide they wanted to force Germany into war?
2. Why didn't the allies instantly declare war right away? They waited 2 days before they declared war.
3. Finally why didn't they help Poland like they promised?

Answering these questions would go a long way to supporting your view.

[Steve]

In reply to Serus's query (I only saw it today) as to why I was refering to Danzig rather than the problem of Danzig and the corridor which strictly speaking of course it was is because Danzig is where the explosion was going to happen. The situation in Danzig was complicated which gave many opportunities for creating trouble for anyone so minded. Hitler laid more stress on Danzig than the corridor and in his communication of August 23 to the British Prime Minister said "To these questions belong the German City of Danzig, and the connected problem of the corridor" he then went on to make several complaints about Polish behaviour over Danzig.

To digress slightly it would seem that the British had given the impression in the mid 30s that Danzig was of no interest to them. In 1937 in Germany Halifax later the Foreign Secretary had said that Britain was not interested in German expansion in eastern europe as long as it involved ethnic Germans and was part of a permanent settlement. The British ambassador to Germany also told Hitler in early 1938 that the British government was in sympathy with Hitlers desire for changes in europe to Germany's benefit. It seems the British wanted the League to end its responsibility in Danzig and leave it to the Germans and the Poles. It could be that if Hitler had not occupied Prague Britain would have stood aside from the quarrel over Danzig and the corridor.

[Serus]

What all of you are failing to take into account in the dispute over the size of the Polish army in comparison with the German, and the degree of Polish mobilisation, is the general expectation of Poland and Britain as to how the desired military confrontation between Poland and Germany would begin.
(...)

Ok lets see how the discussion has gone (off topic part about the size of Polish vs German army):

1. Mr Mills you said:

With Poland knocked out and its large army (equal in size to the German) eliminated as a factor
(...)

Emphasis is mine.

2. Some posters questioned this statement.

3. As answer you didnt gave any source of your claim... just another unrelated opinion.
Tonyh at least tried to defend your claim giving some facts (the number of 2,5 millions of "reserve troops") - but you just ignored the problem (again...).

Anyway its off topic - so probably this part off discussion should be dropped, or moved somewhere else... (any moderator ?)

In reply to Serus's query (I only saw it today) as to why I was refering to Danzig rather than the problem of Danzig and the corridor which strictly speaking of course it was

Steve, thank you - then you aknoweldge the fact that Hitler claim was about Danzig and exteritorial route through Polish Pomorze (so called "corridor") not Danizg only, both issues were negotiated. The rest is a matter of interpretation - maybe you are right about Danizg part being more important, maybe not - but i fear that many people (even on this forum) are unaware of the corridor part, they think a statement "Hitler demanded only Danizg" is correct, which "strictly speaking" is not.

[Andreas]

Serus

I think this is still on-topic, because the size of Poland's army is clearly a factor when considering the likelyhood that Poland, Britain and France were in cahoots to do in the Germans. It is therefore quite helpful to draw out the facts of the matter as you have done, namely that the 2.5m reservists appear not to have been a real potential for mobilisation.

It is quite clear from your, Musashi's and Tonyh's post that the Polish army had nowhere near the mobilisation potential and standing force of the Wehrmacht, and that therefore Michael Mill's assertion that the two armies were of the same size is just plain wrong.

All the best

Andreas

[michael mills]

My source on the relative sizes of the German and Polish armies is this book:

"Poland to Pearl Harbor : The Making of the Second World War", by William Carr
(London ; Baltimore, Md., USA : E. Arnold, 1985).

Carr states that the German and Polish armies were about equal in terms of manpower. Of course he also states that the German army was far more modern in terms of equipment such as armour and aircraft.

[Peter H]

Serus

I think this is still on-topic, because the size of Poland's army is clearly a factor when considering the likelyhood that Poland, Britain and France were in cahoots to do in the Germans. It is therefore quite helpful to draw out the facts of the matter as you have done, namely that the 2.5m reservists appear not to have been a real potential for mobilisation.

It is quite clear from your, Musashi's and Tonyh's post that the Polish army had nowhere near the mobilisation potential and standing force of the Wehrmacht, and that therefore Michael Mill's assertion that the two armies were of the same size is just plain wrong.

All the best

Andreas

This as well--Poland did not have the ammunition stockpiles for offensive operations:

In 1938 after theoretical exercises held under the auspices of the War College,it became obvious to the participants that a 24-hour successful counter-offensive carried out by an army-strength force(in Poland,3-6 divisions) would use the equivalent of a month's production of ammunition.After analyzing the possibilities,Smigly-Rydz stated,"Whatever happens,with or without ammunition,fight we must and fight we shall."The commentator,Litynski,writes,'these words had a deep impact on the audience.This was an expression of the real Polish Military Doctrine--the doctrine of poverty."

Source:Poland's Preparation for World War Two,Professor Michael Peszke,Military Affairs,February 1979.

[michael mills]

The point made by PeterH is only relevant in a situation where the Polish armed forces were facing the total armed forces of Germany unaided.

That is in fact what happened, but it is not what the Polish Government expected.

It expected that it would not be facing an all-out German attack, but rather limited fighting against only a part of the German forces in Danzig and the Corridor.

It also expected that the use of its armed forces against German forces in the Danzig area would trigger the 6 April agreement woith Great Britain, bringing Britain and France into war with Germany.

It also expected tha under its May military agreements with France, the French Army would launch an offensive against Germany 15 days after the start of fighting in the Danzig area, thereby taking the pressure off the Polish forces.

For all of those reasons, the Polish Government was quite confident that the outbreak of hostilities with Germany would rapidly lead to a German defeat; allowing the Polish Army to march into Berlin (even if not within a week as boasted by Ambassador Lipski) and achieve the long-cherished aim of the Dmowski wing of Polish nationalism of expanding westwards to the Oder.

[Note: Although Endecja was in opposition to Sanacja and oppressed by it, many of its ideas had been adopted in principle by the Sanacja leaders after the death of Pilsudski, including the idea of hostility toward Germany and westward expansion. The latter was only possible in the case of the defeat of Germany, which Poland could not possibly achieve on her own, but which had become a realistic option with the "blank cheque" from Britain.

Even after the Polish defeat, the Polish Government-in-Exile (non-Sanacja, but based on the Front Morges) continued to believe that Britain and France would soon attack Germany and defeat it. That belief was only extinguished with the German defeat of France in June 1940.]