On 15 September 1940 at the crucial point of the battle, the RAF only had 256 Spitfires operational. It doesn't take a genius to work out that the RAF couldn't afford to sustain such losses as displayed in the figures above.
The losses you posted are for all RAF fighters. The Spitfire was only the second most important fighter.
In total, the RAF had around 700 operational fighters, close to 400 Hurricanes, around 200 Spitfires, the rest a mix of Defiants, Blenheims and Gladiators.
The RAF serviceable aircraft states, as of the morning of 15th September:
* Blenheim - 47
* Spitfire - 192
* Hurricane - 389
* Defiant - 24
* Gladiator - 8
* Total - 660
That's serviceable aircraft, the operational total is somewhat larger.
Although the Luftwaffe sustained more losses, they also had more planes.
By this point in the battle, the Luftwaffe actually had less fighters. They had been suffering from low German production, and a poor repair network, and their operational fighters had declined to a low level. They had no reserves, whilst the RAF still had several hundred Spitfires and Hurricanes operational.
The full picture can be seen by looking at serviceable strength.
On the 17th July, just as the battle was starting, the RAF had 659 serviceable fighters. On the 15th September, which is towards the end of the battle, the RAF had 660 serviceable fighters. In terms of operational fighters, the RAF was even better off, the serviceable total was about the same because operations were running at such a high tempo.
On 31st October, the end of the daylight battle in RAF reckoning, the RAF had 684 serviceable fighters.
The Luftwaffe, in contrast, went from 856 serviceable Bf 109s at the end of June to 712 at the end of September. In terms of pilots, they suffered even more, with only 686 operational 109 pilots at the end of September (compared to more than 900 Spitfire and Hurricane pilots)
My second point is that Goering himself was responsible for Luftwaffe strategy during this period. Of course he is then to blame for the massive German aircraft losses which are double that of the British
Goering is to blame for not realising the task he set the Luftwaffe was beyond it's capabilities. He isn't to blame for the losses.
Indeed, if the German claim figures had not been so inflated, or the intelligence assesments better, he might have realised how badly the battle was going somewhat earlier, leading to a reduction in operations, and less losses.
His failure to takes a hands-on approach and his disastrous tactics during the Battle of Britain means that he has to take the blame for the Luftwaffe's failings.
What disaterous tactics?
With hindsight, certain targetting choices could have been better. But Goering could only operate on the intelligence he was getting, and that was poor.
Of course, you could argue he might have organised the intelligence branch better, and inculcated a different ethos in his fighter units (more team and less individual), but those are mistakes made pre-war, not operational failures during the battle.
