Operation Sealion

[fredleander]

This is not correct (as to seaworthiness). In tests with the 17. division the barges proved much more seaworthy than originally hoped for. The minimum spec. was for sea state 2 (which isn't much). However, rebuilt barges were towed in sea state 6-8 with very few damages. This was also the experience when these were towed Westwards.

I understand how you could tow a barge in sea state 6-8 without it sinking, what I question is how fast that would go and how many prime movers the Germans would have for that purpose..

They had enough.....ultimo september the weather was nice.......

Regarding your comment about the number of barges, doing a back of the envelope calculation using average crossing speed and figuring 5% attrition per trip I come across to very low amounts of tonnage disembarked on British beaches, definitely not enough to sustain a 9+ division push.

What average carrying capacity per barge did you use when making this calculation, please.....and what do you mean by "attrition per trip".....?

[fredleander]

....
Why could the LW not disrupt internal logistics.....?

Too much else on it's plate to take on another very difficult task perhaps?

What were these tasks, please:.......? And, interdiction of logistics would be the easier part - nothing like attacking strong points like airports.....

Interdiction of British logistics were to be undertaken at S-1. Before that RN vessels, in our out of ports, were PRI1. You know, one doesn't need to do everything, with everything, all the time.....

Luftwaffe had available at least 1000 aircrafts for bombing and strafing mid-september....

[JonS]

Interdiction of British logistics were to be undertaken at S-1.

One day to interdict the British logistics system? That's it?

Oh dear. Where to begin?

"Logistics" isn't a point target, like a factory, that one can "destroy" in a single day's activity. It is a flow which can be temporarily slowed, and temporarily diminished, but it cannot be destroyed. To get any lasting effects it must be repeatedly targetted every day over the length of entire campaigns, and preferrably for months beforehand. Anything less is a mere inconvienience, that probably won't even be noticed at the front line.

As for how much effort is required to acheive anything meaningful, look at how much effort the Western Allies expended on just this throughout the second half of 1942, and all of 1943, 1944, and 1945.

If the GAF can equal ALL of that effort - in terms of tonnage AND applicability AND accuracy - on S-1 then you might be able to achieve what you seem to think you can. Otherwise you are pissing in the wind.

Regards
Jon

PS: For the record, the GAF in 1940 cannot equal that effort. Don't get wet.

[Andreas]

As most others your are mixing echelons and waves.

I am using the 1. Staffel because it is the only one that can benefit from surprise.

While the first echelon consisted of parties of stormtroopers, the second echelon (10-30 minutes after) in most divisions consisted of two reinforced regiments.

Err, no. Now you are confusing things. What I described was the whole 1. Staffel, not a bunch of advance stormtrooper commandos. The 1. Staffel was broken down again in two attack elements. Since the 2. Staffel was not on the same alert schedule as the first, I have my doubts that it would be there 10-30 mins later. Also, in this division the 2. Staffel consisted of the third regiment plus odds and sodds. When it would arrive is open to question from Teske's text.

The third regiment, and divisional and corps, units were approx. 1-2 hours after the second echelon or as fast as barges and transports could be unloaded on and off the beaches.

Not in 6. Armee, according to Teske. You are welcome to provide sources for your statement.

The second wave was planned 3 days after the first and consisted mainly of armoured and mobile units. The third wave was planned at S + 8 and consisted of occupation forces.

It should be noted that the first wave (S-day) was planned with only approx. 1.150 of the 3.000 assembled and rebuilt barges. What this means is that the barges of the first wave was dispensable.

Not correct - when 12. ID became a division of the second Treffen in September, it was supposed to go across in returning barges. The order says to expect returning transport in 5-7 days. No loading schedule could be devised, since it was not known what would come back from transporting the 1. Treffen. If your sources disagree, feel free to provide them.

All the best

Andreas

[LWD]

...
What were these tasks, please:.......?

Defending the invasion fleet and beaches from the RAF and the RN supressing the RAF airfields, that sort of thing
[/quote]
And, interdiction of logistics would be the easier part - nothing like attacking strong points like airports.....
[/quote]
Easy????
Interdicting a road net means you either have to have a huge number of planes or hit key points like bridges. And they are hard targets. If you just put a few craters in the roads you do nothing. Even rail lines can be repaired quickly.. In the combat zone trucks and trains can move at night so they aren't all that viable as targets.

Interdiction of British logistics were to be undertaken at S-1. Before that RN vessels, in our out of ports, were PRI1. You know, one doesn't need to do everything, with everything, all the time.....

Luftwaffe had available at least 1000 aircrafts for bombing and strafing mid-september....

And how many will they have left after a concerted effort vs the RN and RAF vs a RAF that has almost that many fighters? From what I recall it took more than a couple of days for the British, US, and French to bring down the transport net in France prior to D-day and they had air supremacy, a whole lot more aircraft of all types and the resistance.

[Jon G.]

Although only mildly on-topic, allow me to suggest this title once more -

Aerial Interdiction: Air Power and the Land Battle in Three American Wars which is available as a free, legal pdf download from the USAF Historical Studies website.

Particularly the chapter on the Salerno landings gives some valuable insights into what interdiction can (& cannot) do at short notice - i.e. delay enemy troop movements, but not too much beyond that. By marked contrast, the chapter about the Transport Plan which was executed prior to D-Day shows how relatively much aerial interdiction can accomplish given ample time and resources.

[Yuri]

As is known, with summer of 1940 for participation in operation «Sea Lion» it was involved 6-n, 9-n and 16-n Armies. During this period the chief of a staff 6-th army was general - lieutenant Pauljus whom her commander in 1942 began and in such quality was taken prisoner Russian in Stalingrad in January, 1943.

On May, 3, 1946 taking place then in a captivity to fieldmarshal Pauljus have been set 25 question concerning operation «Sea Lion». Field marshal Pauljus has answered these questions, and besides he has written the notes on this question.
The volume of answers of field marshal Pauljusa and his note on operation «Sea Lion» make seven and a half of pages of the text.

If participants the form had no opportunity to get acquainted with these answers and remarks of field marshal Pauljusa I could try to print this information.
However, taking into account, that it rather great volume of the text, for its printing and translation (the text in Russian) is required many time. In this connection would like to ask participants of a forum – whether somebody knows – whether there is no already a site in the Internet on which this information is already placed?

[Bronsky]

The 7th. flieger-division had little losses during the Holland campaign. Most were carried by the the 22nd. September 1940 at least 1000 Ju52's were in the inventory. They should easily be able to muster 700. In addition approx. 150 gliders.

Please state your source for the 1,000 Ju.52s being on strength, as well as the 150 gliders.

The Luftwaffe had 530 transport aircraft as of early May, 1940 of which 228 were lost to the end of September. Transport production for the whole of 1940 (including up to May) was 390.

The figure I used for barges was 250 tons.

EDIT to add sources:
530 transports as of 4-5 May, 1940 and 228 losses up to September from Murray's "Luftwaffe".
Transport production from a a reference spreadsheet I built, IIRC the source is Overy's "The Air War".
I can find more precise figures, but those seemed enough for my point.

250 tons per barge: the most numerous river barge in Europe until the 1970s was rated at 200 tons. I assumed that the full load would be used (it never is, particularly in military operations) and further added 25% to account for larger ones. Please note that I don't ignore the larger vessels, they were featured separately in my calculation and the result didn't change: the Germans don't have the shipping.
5% attrition. Firstly, please note that "attrition" means "the vessels is no longer available for the time of the operation", this includes damaged barges. Secondly, this is less attrition than the Allies suffered during their own amphibious assaults and they had more experience than the Germans to draw from, as well as a greater measure of sea control.

[Andreas]

Leandros

I can only echo Bronsky's call for sources. Please provide sources for the claims you have already made, and for any new claims you may make, in line with forum rules.

Thank you.

Andreas

[Andreas]

This is not correct (as to seaworthiness). In tests with the 17. division the barges proved much more seaworthy than originally hoped for. The minimum spec. was for sea state 2 (which isn't much). However, rebuilt barges were towed in sea state 6-8 with very few damages. This was also the experience when these were towed Westwards.

I understand how you could tow a barge in sea state 6-8 without it sinking, what I question is how fast that would go and how many prime movers the Germans would have for that purpose..

They had enough.....ultimo september the weather was nice.......

How many did they have then?

All the best

Andreas

[fredleander]

How many did they have then?

All the best

Andreas

On Sept. 15th the KM stated: "We are ready on Sept. 21st". Wouldn't they know best....

[fredleander]

Leandros

I can only echo Bronsky's call for sources. Please provide sources for the claims you have already made, and for any new claims you may make, in line with forum rules.

Thank you.

Andreas

My sources are Klee, Schenk, Ansel, Robinson, Fleming, Alanbrooke, OKW KTB, etc. etc..(As Yul Brünner said)....

[Andreas]

How many did they have then?

All the best

Andreas

On Sept. 15th the KM stated: "We are ready on Sept. 21st". Wouldn't they know best....

So, you don't know then. That is hardly surprising given your performance on this thread so far. Your initial claim that the KM did have enough prime movers is therefore shown to be made up, as far as I am concerned.

If you don't start documenting your posts adequately, I am going to start deleting them, in line with forum rules. This forum is not a place to provide disinformation.

Thank you.

Andreas

[Andreas]

An unsourced post by Leandros which also contained false information was removed in line with forum rules.

All the best

Andreas

[Andreas]

Leandros

My patience has run out. Your post will be restored when you provide complete documentation. Your false claim about 12. ID not being part of second wave was the straw that broke the camels back.

If you want to have an idea how to do this properly, have a look at Shawn's post in this thread:

Hi! I found the OOB for Operation “Seelöwe” as it appeared in final form. This represents how it would have looked like if the invasion took place on 24 September 1940. This is compiled from Ronald Wheatley's excellent study Operation Sea Lion: German Plans for the Invasion of England 1939-1942.

SNIPPED

Army Group A

REMOVED DETAIL

16th Army

REMOVED DETAIL

SECOND WAVE

12th Infantry Division: Generalmajor Walter von Seydlitz-Kurzbach

REMOVED REMAINING INFO

Start providing valuable info, or stop posting on the matter.

Thank you.

Andreas