Operation Sealion

[Bronsky]

Was that the "false" information.....?

For the reasons mentioned above, I believe that the figure of 1,000 available Ju.52s falls into that category.

I also think that there would be a dearth of prime movers to tow barges....

In meeting with Hitler Sept. 15th Raeder advertised that the KM would be ready by the 21st. Does that indicate there were any lack of tugs?

All it indicates is that Raeder didn't want to be on record as the one who would be responsible for postponment, as opposed to letting the Luftwaffe carry the buck.

What's your source for the Ju.52 figure you posted?

Robinson, in the back of his book, is outlining the weather ultimo September. It was nice....

Gale season starts in fall. There's a reason why Hitler wanted a kickoff date no later than 21 September. If the British don't collapse immediately, Germany will have to deal with the weather for its resupply effort.

In a gale, effective towing speed can be reduced a good 50% and then there's the problem of drift, which becomes significant when the convoy is only moving at 2-3 knots on the ground....

That depends, firstly, on the way the wind blows. It never cease to surprise me how you guys always reckon the Germans had a headwind......

Prevailing winds are westerly in the Channel, the invasion fleet would be blown eastward. If the winds are strong enough, a barge might be simply unable to maintain a northward course, the hull acting as a weather vane and being blown downwind. I've seen this happen on much larger, ocean-going, ships.

Not only does this increase travel time, it also increases the likelihood of navigation errors. Then you have to factor tidal currents...

Which can be with or against you. The German sea officers did have, and could read, naval almanacs. Of course, a lot s*** could have happened. The Germans expected that themselves.

Tidal currents would move the barges eastwardly, then westwardly. The problem is that the longer the trip, the more tides, and the more opportunity for navigational error. The Kriegsmarine was very short of trained navigation officers, what with the buildup of the U-boat force for one, providing enough of them for the invasion force was a problem historically. Even the Allies had that problem, and they had a larger pool to draw from, more time to train personnel and more ships to act as navigation beacons. They still managed to miss Utah beach, in conditions far more favorable than those facing the Sealion crews.

Additionally, even if the Germans found a midship to station on every barge (very doubtful), all he could use would be dead reckoning and if speed was down to 3 knots due to weather (waves slowing the barge down), then he would be lucky to make landfall at the right point. Assuming he could, of course (see drift).

[LWD]

Weather wouldn't need to be severe to cause considerable impact. For instance what happens if there is a heavy fog?

[fredleander]

In meeting with Hitler Sept. 15th Raeder advertised that the KM would be ready by the 21st. Does that indicate there were any lack of tugs?

All it indicates is that Raeder didn't want to be on record as the one who would be responsible for postponment, as opposed to letting the Luftwaffe carry the buck.

What is your source for that, please....

Robinson, in the back of his book, is outlining the weather ultimo September. It was nice....

Gale season starts in fall. There's a reason why Hitler wanted a kickoff date no later than 21 September. If the British don't collapse immediately, Germany will have to deal with the weather for its resupply effort. In a gale, effective towing speed can be reduced a good 50% and then there's the problem of drift, which becomes significant when the convoy is only moving at 2-3 knots on the ground....

That depends, firstly, on the way the wind blows. It never cease to surprise me how you guys always reckon the Germans had a headwind......

Prevailing winds are westerly in the Channel, the invasion fleet would be blown eastward. If the winds are strong enough, a barge might be simply unable to maintain a northward course, the hull acting as a weather vane and being blown downwind. I've seen this happen on much larger, ocean-going, ships.

Rather West-South-West. Most of the landing fleet actually came from South and South-East.

Not only does this increase travel time, it also increases the likelihood of navigation errors. Then you have to factor tidal currents...

Which can be with or against you. The German sea officers did have, and could read, naval almanacs. Of course, a lot of s*** could have happened. The Germans expected that themselves.

Tidal currents would move the barges eastwardly, then westwardly.

That would depend on when the sailing started, would it not..?

The problem is that the longer the trip, the more tides, and the more opportunity for navigational error. The Kriegsmarine was very short of trained navigation officers, what with the buildup of the U-boat force for one, providing enough of them for the invasion force was a problem historically. Even the Allies had that problem, and they had a larger pool to draw from, more time to train personnel and more ships to act as navigation beacons. They still managed to miss Utah beach, in conditions far more favorable than those facing the Sealion crews.

In what respect were the Seelöwe conditions worse......? If I remember correctly the Allies were in doubt as to initiate Overlord. It was postponed one day due to weather. Sept. 25th, the last day Seelöwe could have started before the repeated postponements the weather in the Channel was fair with light Northerly winds.... ... Regarding manning they did "borrow" from all sources. The regular naval building program was also delayed due to wharf space, materials and specialist capacity. That was how they prioritized......

Additionally, even if the Germans found a midship to station on every barge (very doubtful), all he could use would be dead reckoning and if speed was down to 3 knots due to weather (waves slowing the barge down), then he would be lucky to make landfall at the right point. Assuming he could, of course (see drift).

This remark show that you know very little on how the advance of the landing fleet was planned, and to be executed. You really should study it better. I could have outlined all this but it is a book in itself. I recommend Schenk for this. Klee is best on the naval support for the transport fleet. Walter Ansel - "Hitler Confronts England" is also very good (and, seemingly, little known). He had a unique background as an admiral in the U.S. Navy with special assignments on Marine Corps landing operations. In the early fifties he interviewed more than 40 of the high and middle-rank German officers working with the Seelöwe planning. This give a very different impression than what is usually aired....

[fredleander]

Weather wouldn't need to be severe to cause considerable impact. For instance what happens if there is a heavy fog?

The invasion fleet would approach undetected......?....... .

[JonS]

Yes, but it'll be a bit embarrasing for them when they leap off their undetected invasion fleet and seize Cherbourg.

Besides, I'm pretty sure radar works just fine in fog.

[fredleander]

According to Schenk General Halder, on July 16th, reported that the Luftwaffe had available 1.000 transport aircraft, of which 750 were servicable. Also 150 gliders. I should think these numbers would have increased somewhat till ultimo September as no campaigns were ongoing in this period.......

We also know, without having to resort to sources, that there were droves of all sorts of transport aircrafts in various units and flying schools all around Germany. This is what was drawed upon when the going was getting rough around Narvik at the same time the Luftwaffe was busy with the Western campaign.

[fredleander]

And before I forget it, did Britain know where the Germans intended to land?

Links to websites are especially appreciated.

Markus

As the time of invasion approached the Brits had a pretty good idea of what they could expect. However, the Germans had planned quite extensive diversionary measures......

[RichTO90]

According to Schenk General Halder, on July 16th, reported that the Luftwaffe had available 1.000 transport aircraft, of which 750 were servicable. Also 150 gliders. I should think these numbers would have increased somewhat till ultimo September as no campaigns were ongoing in this period.......

We also know, without having to resort to sources, that there were droves of all sorts of transport aircrafts in various units and flying schools all around Germany. This is what was drawed upon when the going was getting rough around Narvik at the same time the Luftwaffe was busy with the Western campaign.

Wow, I want what you're smoking.

Rise and Fall of the German Air Force, 1933-1945, written by the RAF postwar using captured Luftwaffe documents, gives:

500 transports as of circa 1 April 1940
475 transports and 45 gliders as of 10 May 1940
530 transports and 100 gliders as of 20 May 1941 (Crete)

Where do 1,000 transports and 150 gliders come from - smoke and mirrors? It took drafting 340 aircraft and crews from twin-engine flight schools to even get the 500 operational in time for the Danish and Norwegian campaign and by the end of May nearly all of those except a few long-range types had returned to Germany for refitting in time for the campaign in the Lowlands. Operations to sustain Narvik were by the dozen-odd FW-200 and JU-90 aircraft available, which had the range to make the 1,000-odd kilometer trip there from Oslo.

And where did the 500-odd disappear to between 10 May 1940 and 10 May 1941?

[Deans]

I don't see how one can ignore logistics and only focus on the British army's ability
to repel an invasion. The issue here is - what type of invasion ?
The fact that the Germans had designated X no of divisions for the invasion is irrelevant.

What is relavant is how many divisions could have gone across the channel AND been
supplied in a sustained basis. Even assuming minimal interfearance from the RAF
and RN (say only 10% of the fleet is destroyed/ rendered unseaworthy in each
crossing), I dont see more than 5 German divisions (incl airborne) getting across.
Once in England, their supplies would be consumed faster than they could be
resupplied.
The British Army's role would therefore be only to contain the beachhead and not
throw the Germans back to the sea. This was very different from Normandy, where
Allied forces were growing (in men and supplies) faster than the Germans.
In this role the forces present in the UK would, IMO have been quite adequate.

[fredleander]

According to Schenk General Halder, on July 16th, reported that the Luftwaffe had available 1.000 transport aircraft, of which 750 were servicable. Also 150 gliders. I should think these numbers would have increased somewhat till ultimo September as no campaigns were ongoing in this period.......

We also know, without having to resort to sources, that there were droves of all sorts of transport aircrafts in various units and flying schools all around Germany. This is what was drawed upon when the going was getting rough around Narvik at the same time the Luftwaffe was busy with the Western campaign.

Wow, I want what you're smoking.

Rise and Fall of the German Air Force, 1933-1945, written by the RAF postwar using captured Luftwaffe documents, gives:

500 transports as of circa 1 April 1940
475 transports and 45 gliders as of 10 May 1940
530 transports and 100 gliders as of 20 May 1941 (Crete)

Where do 1,000 transports and 150 gliders come from - smoke and mirrors? It took drafting 340 aircraft and crews from twin-engine flight schools to even get the 500 operational in time for the Danish and Norwegian campaign and by the end of May nearly all of those except a few long-range types had returned to Germany for refitting in time for the campaign in the Lowlands. Operations to sustain Narvik were by the dozen-odd FW-200 and JU-90 aircraft available, which had the range to make the 1,000-odd kilometer trip there from Oslo.

And where did the 500-odd disappear to between 10 May 1940 and 10 May 1941?

As a matter of fact I do not smoke....... .....never did. My reference is stated above. Regarding the sustaining of Narvik the Germans upgraded the airport at Værnes outside Trondheim......

What I have seen confuse this particular item is the mix-up between the transports organic in the airborne system - and the rest.....could that be the case.....?

[fredleander]

I don't see how one can ignore logistics and only focus on the British army's ability
to repel an invasion. The issue here is - what type of invasion ?
The fact that the Germans had designated X no of divisions for the invasion is irrelevant.

What is relavant is how many divisions could have gone across the channel AND been
supplied in a sustained basis. Even assuming minimal interfearance from the RAF
and RN (say only 10% of the fleet is destroyed/ rendered unseaworthy in each
crossing), I dont see more than 5 German divisions (incl airborne) getting across.
Once in England, their supplies would be consumed faster than they could be
resupplied.
The British Army's role would therefore be only to contain the beachhead and not
throw the Germans back to the sea. This was very different from Normandy, where
Allied forces were growing (in men and supplies) faster than the Germans.
In this role the forces present in the UK would, IMO have been quite adequate.

If you disregard all the precautions taken by the Germans against such a development you might well be correct.... .....my efforts so far on this thread has been to try to show that there was a viable invasion apparatus. What happen after that is another matter....

[Andreas]

According to Schenk General Halder, on July 16th, reported that the Luftwaffe had available 1.000 transport aircraft, of which 750 were servicable. Also 150 gliders. I should think these numbers would have increased somewhat till ultimo September as no campaigns were ongoing in this period.......

We also know, without having to resort to sources, that there were droves of all sorts of transport aircrafts in various units and flying schools all around Germany. This is what was drawed upon when the going was getting rough around Narvik at the same time the Luftwaffe was busy with the Western campaign.

Wow, I want what you're smoking.

Rise and Fall of the German Air Force, 1933-1945, written by the RAF postwar using captured Luftwaffe documents, gives:

500 transports as of circa 1 April 1940
475 transports and 45 gliders as of 10 May 1940
530 transports and 100 gliders as of 20 May 1941 (Crete)

Where do 1,000 transports and 150 gliders come from - smoke and mirrors? It took drafting 340 aircraft and crews from twin-engine flight schools to even get the 500 operational in time for the Danish and Norwegian campaign and by the end of May nearly all of those except a few long-range types had returned to Germany for refitting in time for the campaign in the Lowlands. Operations to sustain Narvik were by the dozen-odd FW-200 and JU-90 aircraft available, which had the range to make the 1,000-odd kilometer trip there from Oslo.

And where did the 500-odd disappear to between 10 May 1940 and 10 May 1941?

The Halder diary reports 750 transport planes and 150 gliders in August, that is correct. Whether this was a correct entry into the diary is another question. Assuming it is correct, then my guess is that this would have included a range of planes not capable of carrying paratroopers (e.g. Ju 86, captured French kit, etc.pp). Basically anything that could fly and could be scraped together.

All the best

Andreas

[Andreas]

These two documents should be relevant:

http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/afhra/numb ... 468155.pdf

http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/afhra/numb ... 468156.pdf

All the best

Andreas

[fredleander]

The Halder diary reports 750 transport planes and 150 gliders in August, that is correct. Whether this was a correct entry into the diary is another question. Assuming it is correct, then my guess is that this would have included a range of planes not capable of carrying paratroopers (e.g. Ju 86, captured French kit, etc.pp). Basically anything that could fly and could be scraped together.

All the best

Andreas

That might well be. It could also mean dedicated FJ transporters. After all, only the 3 dedicated "Luftlande-geschwadern" would normally, if I remember correctly, consist of more than 300 planes. I am quite certain that the total tally of all kinds of transport assets would yield a much higher number than 1.000. There is also the possibility that this number could be higher 1 1/2 month later - after repairs of machines damaged on the ground or having made emergency landings in Norway, Holland and France...... .......and new production....

However, it is not that important because 500 52's would fill the actual need. It was planned two drops/towings for the morning attack with one hour in-between.....

P.S.: Those PDF's didn't work out on my machine.....

There it came - don't say they didn't have plans.......

[LWD]

Weather wouldn't need to be severe to cause considerable impact. For instance what happens if there is a heavy fog?

The invasion fleet would approach undetected......?....... .

Collisions along the way. Getting lost in the fog as has been pointed out. The casualties if the British get in amongst them or if the Germans even think the British are within their formation. The formation spreading out. Even if they get near the beach I wouldn't want to approach an unsean beach in a heavy fog (especially with an incomeing tide) in a barge. Then there is the problem of what it does to air ops especially the paratrooper drops but any ground support or interdiction missions.