What is the boards reason for the failure of operation Goodwood.
The allies had all that was needed to break through even if the one stays with the idea that the British attacks were only for locking and holding the Pz Div's, they still had the power to break through if the attacks had been properly mounted.
Col von Luck has stated that the defences in depth had been Rommels plan, and one that they countinued after he had left.
From what I remember the British assault was not one that was full of determination. They state that they believed the air bombing would of wiped out most of the defenders seems to be misguided.
There is more to this attack's failure than just a few simple things so I ask for opinions.
Goodwood
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StandartenfuehrerSS
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Re: Goodwood
An old hat. Read von Luck's book, he does wonders as to revealing the how and why of Goodwood. He is, however, very piece-mealed in relation to giving the Waffen-SS the credit it deserves. Overall, it is safe to say that the British were defeated by a much better and certainly more modest enemy, soundly canned by the real men on the field.
I managed to also read the book 2nd Panzer Corps or someting like this. It was a sister book to von Luck's. They fill in where von Luck was lacking.
But you are right von Luck did not pay the SS much credit for there roles. HJ was amazing in there battles., that is if one can put aside the war crimes.
Von Luck comes arcross as disliking the SS. Or that is impression I get from his book.
But then the German Army was split by the formation of the SS.
Maybe after Poland instead of making proper SS divisions they had made them along the lines of Gross Deutchland he would of thought more of them.
But you are right von Luck did not pay the SS much credit for there roles. HJ was amazing in there battles., that is if one can put aside the war crimes.
Von Luck comes arcross as disliking the SS. Or that is impression I get from his book.
But then the German Army was split by the formation of the SS.
Maybe after Poland instead of making proper SS divisions they had made them along the lines of Gross Deutchland he would of thought more of them.
You probably have answered your own question. The bombing was to soften up the forward positions and then mopping up would be easy to do. Obviously the Waffen SS moved back and just sat and waited for the British troops and tanks to advance.........you know the rest of the story. The field was taken from them by the stout defence of the W-SS panzers and anti-tank crews, and with it the defence stayed just as strong until Falaise.
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StandartenfuehrerSS
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- Location: Netherlands
supposed subject: Goodwood, actual subject: warcrimes
'HJ was amazing in there battles., that is if one can put aside the war crimes. '
Warcrimes, warcrimes and warcrimes, you yanks are so full of yourself and that, aren't you? Well, here is an update for you; the topic isn't about the run down topic of wacrimes, it is about Goodwood. I see that you immediatly link Waffen-SS to wacrimes, another poor soul captivated by the Zeitgeist. You are acting with malice now, so everything you say can be thrown in the dust bin. How about I link the U.S. 'armed forces' to My Lai, the incinerating of Tokyo and Hamburg, the use of weapons of mass destruction against civilian cities, napalm, agent orange and the countless times on which U.S. troops misbehaved?
'Von Luck comes arcross as disliking the SS. Or that is impression I get from his book.'
Perhaps not disliking as such, just failing to mention the Waffen-SS, a common trend among the lower-ranking Wehrmacht officers. I am sure you are aware of the praise which the Waffen-SS, and especially Totenkopf, recieved during the fight in Russia.
'Gross Deutchland'
I say, get yourself a German dictionary of all the German terms and names used during the conflict, and don't write in German anymore until you master them a hundred per cent.
Warcrimes, warcrimes and warcrimes, you yanks are so full of yourself and that, aren't you? Well, here is an update for you; the topic isn't about the run down topic of wacrimes, it is about Goodwood. I see that you immediatly link Waffen-SS to wacrimes, another poor soul captivated by the Zeitgeist. You are acting with malice now, so everything you say can be thrown in the dust bin. How about I link the U.S. 'armed forces' to My Lai, the incinerating of Tokyo and Hamburg, the use of weapons of mass destruction against civilian cities, napalm, agent orange and the countless times on which U.S. troops misbehaved?
'Von Luck comes arcross as disliking the SS. Or that is impression I get from his book.'
Perhaps not disliking as such, just failing to mention the Waffen-SS, a common trend among the lower-ranking Wehrmacht officers. I am sure you are aware of the praise which the Waffen-SS, and especially Totenkopf, recieved during the fight in Russia.
'Gross Deutchland'
I say, get yourself a German dictionary of all the German terms and names used during the conflict, and don't write in German anymore until you master them a hundred per cent.
Hey
Get off your high horse.
The only reason I mentioned the warcrime issue is so that I dont get accused of forgetting it.
As FOR YANKS.
Damn nice people, and NEIGHBORS.
You see Canada is north of the states and I am Canadian!
If you want to get offened about war crimes then go on. We are as guilty as any nation. In Normandy Canadians were ordered to quite outright killing of all SS.
Guess what, von Luck hold the German Officers partially responsible for not stopping the growth of the Nazi and SS, so this fits your comments,
"Perhaps not disliking as such, just failing to mention the Waffen-SS, a common trend among the lower-ranking Wehrmacht officers. I am sure you are aware of the praise which the Waffen-SS, and especially Totenkopf, recieved during the fight in Russia. "
But I do agree that some of the Waffen SS units were more than incredible. Did you notice my secound book after von Luck's, was all about the SS Pz Corps in Normandy. Who in there right mind could say the SS was not a effective fighting force?
The last comment:
"I say, get yourself a German dictionary of all the German terms and names used during the conflict, and don't write in German anymore until you master them a hundred per cent."
I am sorry to offend anyone who speaks the language. But on my defence I try to be accurate. Grossdeutschland, there happy.
So my spelling slipped.
Get off your high horse.
The only reason I mentioned the warcrime issue is so that I dont get accused of forgetting it.
As FOR YANKS.
Damn nice people, and NEIGHBORS.
You see Canada is north of the states and I am Canadian!
If you want to get offened about war crimes then go on. We are as guilty as any nation. In Normandy Canadians were ordered to quite outright killing of all SS.
Guess what, von Luck hold the German Officers partially responsible for not stopping the growth of the Nazi and SS, so this fits your comments,
"Perhaps not disliking as such, just failing to mention the Waffen-SS, a common trend among the lower-ranking Wehrmacht officers. I am sure you are aware of the praise which the Waffen-SS, and especially Totenkopf, recieved during the fight in Russia. "
But I do agree that some of the Waffen SS units were more than incredible. Did you notice my secound book after von Luck's, was all about the SS Pz Corps in Normandy. Who in there right mind could say the SS was not a effective fighting force?
The last comment:
"I say, get yourself a German dictionary of all the German terms and names used during the conflict, and don't write in German anymore until you master them a hundred per cent."
I am sorry to offend anyone who speaks the language. But on my defence I try to be accurate. Grossdeutschland, there happy.
So my spelling slipped.
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kellysartin
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- Location: staley , N.C.
War Crimes
Well one of the books that describes some of what I have been talking about is here at a Amazon:
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/searc ... 76-8864723
Two Sides of the Beach : The Invasion and Defense of Europe in
1944
The secound book I cannot find at Amazon. The 2 german books were lent with the allied books to my book dealer.
But the name of the secound book I believe is ' Canada A Nation Forged in Fire'
It deals with Canada from the mid 30's to the end of the war.
In 'Two Sides of the Beach' there is a descrition of french canadian troopers who take thier german prisoners out onto the beach and then return with out them. The person who is telling the story decided to go collect some souvenirs from the prisoners, but when he got there they were all dead. They had, had there throats cut.
One crime that stands out is from the conflict between the Canadains and Das Reich. Both sides claim the other started to kill prisoners so the killing became a practise in some units.
In the VHS set called Armor. I think it is vol 3 out of the 4. But in this seen it shot from across a small canal. There are two or three germans under a white flag surrendering to a american outfit. All of a sudden the first german seems to stumble then the othes follow.
Then it is apparent. They have been shot surrendering.
Why do people need to go looking for war crimes?
They are there right in front of you, all you hae to do is read the books.
Answer this, why is there a total lack of interest in the crimes committed by the Japanese?
As a German I would want to say, 'Look we are sorry and have paid, but know what of the Japanese?'
Dont give me a line about pointing fingers anymore just answer the question, seeing as though we are away from the origanal post.
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/searc ... 76-8864723
Two Sides of the Beach : The Invasion and Defense of Europe in
1944
The secound book I cannot find at Amazon. The 2 german books were lent with the allied books to my book dealer.
But the name of the secound book I believe is ' Canada A Nation Forged in Fire'
It deals with Canada from the mid 30's to the end of the war.
In 'Two Sides of the Beach' there is a descrition of french canadian troopers who take thier german prisoners out onto the beach and then return with out them. The person who is telling the story decided to go collect some souvenirs from the prisoners, but when he got there they were all dead. They had, had there throats cut.
One crime that stands out is from the conflict between the Canadains and Das Reich. Both sides claim the other started to kill prisoners so the killing became a practise in some units.
In the VHS set called Armor. I think it is vol 3 out of the 4. But in this seen it shot from across a small canal. There are two or three germans under a white flag surrendering to a american outfit. All of a sudden the first german seems to stumble then the othes follow.
Then it is apparent. They have been shot surrendering.
Why do people need to go looking for war crimes?
They are there right in front of you, all you hae to do is read the books.
Answer this, why is there a total lack of interest in the crimes committed by the Japanese?
As a German I would want to say, 'Look we are sorry and have paid, but know what of the Japanese?'
Dont give me a line about pointing fingers anymore just answer the question, seeing as though we are away from the origanal post.
Hey admfisher,
Don't take it too personal, that's just StandartenfurhrerSS being himself.
As you can see his posts can be informative(his first post on this topic) and hilarious(his second post on this topic). This is the way he is, was, and always will be. This is nothing new for him, as he acted as such in the old forum. THIS is not a personal attack merely stating the obvious from many months of reading his posts.
The video was very good, it was the Discovery Channel's "Fields of Armor" series: Volume 3 "Battle Armor"; episode 1 "Nightmare in Normandy", I have Volumes 2 & 3. They did a good job presenting views from the Russians, Germans, British and Americans. I especially liked the veterans' interviews. I have watched both so many times, I can almost recite them by heart.
Japanese atrocities are occasionally mentioned in the Holocaust section of this forum.
I don't think anyone claimed to be perfect angles during the war. Like the one interview from "Nightmare in Normandy", when the one British tanker is relating an incident when prisoners weren't taken. As the British tanks were moving along, a German soldier fired a panzerfaust, at close range, into the lead tank. The surrendering German was then machine gunned by the tank following behind.
As for the "Goodwood", the British overestimated the usefulness of the air & ground bombardment, and underestimated the stregth and determination of the Germans holding the ground (Heer & SS). The attack took place on ground that was not good for a tank offensive. The German defence was well planned and successful. As an offensive it failed, but it did keep the bulk of German armor away from the American side, so it may be considered a strategic success. It all depends on how you look at the outcome.
Don't take it too personal, that's just StandartenfurhrerSS being himself.
As you can see his posts can be informative(his first post on this topic) and hilarious(his second post on this topic). This is the way he is, was, and always will be. This is nothing new for him, as he acted as such in the old forum. THIS is not a personal attack merely stating the obvious from many months of reading his posts.
The video was very good, it was the Discovery Channel's "Fields of Armor" series: Volume 3 "Battle Armor"; episode 1 "Nightmare in Normandy", I have Volumes 2 & 3. They did a good job presenting views from the Russians, Germans, British and Americans. I especially liked the veterans' interviews. I have watched both so many times, I can almost recite them by heart.
Japanese atrocities are occasionally mentioned in the Holocaust section of this forum.
I don't think anyone claimed to be perfect angles during the war. Like the one interview from "Nightmare in Normandy", when the one British tanker is relating an incident when prisoners weren't taken. As the British tanks were moving along, a German soldier fired a panzerfaust, at close range, into the lead tank. The surrendering German was then machine gunned by the tank following behind.
As for the "Goodwood", the British overestimated the usefulness of the air & ground bombardment, and underestimated the stregth and determination of the Germans holding the ground (Heer & SS). The attack took place on ground that was not good for a tank offensive. The German defence was well planned and successful. As an offensive it failed, but it did keep the bulk of German armor away from the American side, so it may be considered a strategic success. It all depends on how you look at the outcome.
I think Goodwood suffered from two fatal weaknesses. Firstly, this was a rare instance where the Germans had prior knowledge of the operation, and could prepare accordingly. Secondly, the basic plan suffered from many fundamental flaws going back to its basic inception. The idea was to use a corps of armored divisions, not because they were suited to the operation as it was conceived, but because it was what Montgomery had available. Not only would these be required to advance through a narrow corridor, one after the other, while vulnerable to enfilading heights, they also had no room to assemble east of the Orne prior to the operation. Thus, the follow-on units had to assemble west of the river and cross the Orne while the operation was in progress. The advance inevitably fell behind schedule, exacerbated by post-bombing ground conditions. Traffic jams inevitably ensued. The result was a thin trickle of units being fed into the corridor, with timing and alignment dictated by these constraints rather than tactical considerations. The constricted space also meant that the divisional artillery could not deploy east of the river, which again meant even more units to move across it during the operation, as well as lack of artillery support during critical phases. Also, the British Army under these conditions suffered even more than usually from the customary lack of balanced infantry/tank co-operation. The infantry quickly fell behind, and the result was large groups of tanks arriving sequentially, without much artillery or infantry support - the perfect match for a German defense relying on belts of AT guns and tanks. The massive bombing seriously disrupted the German defensive belt system, but did not destroy it, and much of the effect was only temporary. Goodwood was IMO a basically flawed plan, suffering from many foreseeable weaknesses, and one that fell victim to a combination of an unexpectedly tenacious German defense and frictional chaos the British were unable to overcome.
cheers
cheers
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StandartenfuehrerSS
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- Location: Netherlands
Operation Goodwood
'Firstly, this was a rare instance where the Germans had prior knowledge of the operation, and could prepare accordingly.'
What utter nonsense, what's your source for this contention?
Exactly as von Luck says, the German defences were about 15 km in depth, they were build to sustain any attack. The British, using aerial scouting, had only mapped the German defences up until 7 km. This ment they tought they were up against German defences only half as elaborate as they were in reality.
Secondly, this dialogue between von Luck and Dietrich disproves your silly unfounded statement:
[...] In the late afternoon of 14 July, I was summoned to the HQ of SS-Obergruppenführer Sepp [Josef] Dietrich, our recently appointed corps commander. Sepp Dietrich knew me from the time I had asked him about advice about my problem of marriage to Dagmar.
It is a good time to pause here for a while and note two things.
i.) The date is 14 July 1944. Keep in mind Goodwood was launched 18 July.
ii.) So much for von Luck 'disliking the SS', also notice he names Dietrich by his nickname.
[Dietrich then informs von Luck he has been put forth for the Ritterkreuz]
[...] I know also that tomorrow is your birthday and that your financeé works in Paris. To give you a few days rest, I have decided to send you instead of one of my staff officers on a special mission to Paris. You will leave tonight and return in the early of the eighteenth. I wish you happy days. 'Obergruppenführer', I cried, ' I can't accept this, tempting though as it is. I can't leave my men on their own in this critical situation. I reckon the British will try their next breakout, or even breakthrough, in my sector. Thank you for your offer, but let me stay here please.
'Luck' said Sepp Dietrich, 'according to your information there's little likelihood for a fresh attack the next ten to fourteen days. After their costly Epsom offensive, the Britsh will first have to regroup and build up apropriate supplies, so it's alright to go'. [...]
This came from von Luck's 'Panzer Commander', p. 190. Should wipe these naive misunderstandings of you away.
'The idea was to use a corps of armored divisions, not because they were suited to the operation as it was conceived, but because it was what Montgomery had available.'
Nonsense. The British had the tendancy to assault with masses tanks. Epsom is another example of that. As von Luck remarks, that tactique was quite unfortunate, as the smallest nest of German PaK resistance slowed down the advance, and proved hard to be eradicated, certainly if the position was camouflaged as well.
There was a Canadian Infantry division on the right flank, and a British infantry division on the left flank, and the British armoured divisions had some organic infantry in Bren carriers and White halftracks.
[deleted hollow poetical talk]
Look here chum, its no use trying to polish up British defeats by putting the blame at the planners or at the oh so unfavourable terrain, as I said, Goodwood was canned by some excellent defensive battles.
Von Luck's book contains an authorative account by Major Bill Close, who was a commander of a tank Kp. in the 11th British Armoured division.
Here's his account, p. 197:
'We had warned the Guards Armoured division coming after us about Cagny. In spite of that they pushed on and within seconds lost about 20 tanks at Cagny. We could see how the front regiment tried to avoid the fire from Cagny. In doing so several tanks were again knocked out, this time from the woodland in the east. The attack came to a standstill. We were glad we had been able to turn off west and so escape the fire from your damned eighty-eights. We saw burning fires here and there in Caen, lying on our right, and in front of us, about 5 kilometres to the south, the Bourgebus hills, our first objective, which we should have reached early that morning.'
Does this seem like an unfortunate coinciding of events as you so elegantly decided to polish the situation, or does this look like a sound round of canning?
Here's another, from the same Major, same page, same passage;
[...] I got into my tank again and rolled cautiously into the village [Cagny]. By the church I stopped the tank and ran to the four guns, where an almost indescribable sight set my eyes:
- The 8.8cm cannons were firing one salvo after the other. One could see the shots flying through the corn like torpedoes. The men on the guns were proud of their first engagement as an antitank unit. All four guns were intact and had not been attacked.
- In the extensive cornfields to the north of the village stood at least 40 British tanks, on fire or shot up. I saw how the tanks that had already crossed the main road were slowly rolling back.
So so, does this still look like rugged terrain and finger-pointing Monty making it impossible to win? The only thing the British 'fell victim to' were the Germans themselves.
'Lack of artillery', you said! I didn't see von Luck complaining about the total abscense of German artillery. Will the whining ever end?
What utter nonsense, what's your source for this contention?
Exactly as von Luck says, the German defences were about 15 km in depth, they were build to sustain any attack. The British, using aerial scouting, had only mapped the German defences up until 7 km. This ment they tought they were up against German defences only half as elaborate as they were in reality.
Secondly, this dialogue between von Luck and Dietrich disproves your silly unfounded statement:
[...] In the late afternoon of 14 July, I was summoned to the HQ of SS-Obergruppenführer Sepp [Josef] Dietrich, our recently appointed corps commander. Sepp Dietrich knew me from the time I had asked him about advice about my problem of marriage to Dagmar.
It is a good time to pause here for a while and note two things.
i.) The date is 14 July 1944. Keep in mind Goodwood was launched 18 July.
ii.) So much for von Luck 'disliking the SS', also notice he names Dietrich by his nickname.
[Dietrich then informs von Luck he has been put forth for the Ritterkreuz]
[...] I know also that tomorrow is your birthday and that your financeé works in Paris. To give you a few days rest, I have decided to send you instead of one of my staff officers on a special mission to Paris. You will leave tonight and return in the early of the eighteenth. I wish you happy days. 'Obergruppenführer', I cried, ' I can't accept this, tempting though as it is. I can't leave my men on their own in this critical situation. I reckon the British will try their next breakout, or even breakthrough, in my sector. Thank you for your offer, but let me stay here please.
'Luck' said Sepp Dietrich, 'according to your information there's little likelihood for a fresh attack the next ten to fourteen days. After their costly Epsom offensive, the Britsh will first have to regroup and build up apropriate supplies, so it's alright to go'. [...]
This came from von Luck's 'Panzer Commander', p. 190. Should wipe these naive misunderstandings of you away.
'The idea was to use a corps of armored divisions, not because they were suited to the operation as it was conceived, but because it was what Montgomery had available.'
Nonsense. The British had the tendancy to assault with masses tanks. Epsom is another example of that. As von Luck remarks, that tactique was quite unfortunate, as the smallest nest of German PaK resistance slowed down the advance, and proved hard to be eradicated, certainly if the position was camouflaged as well.
There was a Canadian Infantry division on the right flank, and a British infantry division on the left flank, and the British armoured divisions had some organic infantry in Bren carriers and White halftracks.
[deleted hollow poetical talk]
Look here chum, its no use trying to polish up British defeats by putting the blame at the planners or at the oh so unfavourable terrain, as I said, Goodwood was canned by some excellent defensive battles.
Von Luck's book contains an authorative account by Major Bill Close, who was a commander of a tank Kp. in the 11th British Armoured division.
Here's his account, p. 197:
'We had warned the Guards Armoured division coming after us about Cagny. In spite of that they pushed on and within seconds lost about 20 tanks at Cagny. We could see how the front regiment tried to avoid the fire from Cagny. In doing so several tanks were again knocked out, this time from the woodland in the east. The attack came to a standstill. We were glad we had been able to turn off west and so escape the fire from your damned eighty-eights. We saw burning fires here and there in Caen, lying on our right, and in front of us, about 5 kilometres to the south, the Bourgebus hills, our first objective, which we should have reached early that morning.'
Does this seem like an unfortunate coinciding of events as you so elegantly decided to polish the situation, or does this look like a sound round of canning?
Here's another, from the same Major, same page, same passage;
[...] I got into my tank again and rolled cautiously into the village [Cagny]. By the church I stopped the tank and ran to the four guns, where an almost indescribable sight set my eyes:
- The 8.8cm cannons were firing one salvo after the other. One could see the shots flying through the corn like torpedoes. The men on the guns were proud of their first engagement as an antitank unit. All four guns were intact and had not been attacked.
- In the extensive cornfields to the north of the village stood at least 40 British tanks, on fire or shot up. I saw how the tanks that had already crossed the main road were slowly rolling back.
So so, does this still look like rugged terrain and finger-pointing Monty making it impossible to win? The only thing the British 'fell victim to' were the Germans themselves.
'Lack of artillery', you said! I didn't see von Luck complaining about the total abscense of German artillery. Will the whining ever end?
Jees, you really like to pick a quarrel even where there's not really much to quarrel about, don't you?
1. "Firstly, this was a rare instance where the Germans had prior knowledge of the operation, and could prepare accordingly.'
What utter nonsense, what's your source for this contention?"
It is mentioned in practically every account of the Normandy campaign that I've read. I don't have my books here and now, but you'd might want to check out Carlo D'Este's "Decision in Normandy", Max Hastings' "Overlord", John Keegan's "Six armies and Normandy" and Alexander McKee's "Caen:Anvil of victory" for starters. I'll get back with references if you like.
2. "ii.) So much for von Luck 'disliking the SS', also notice he names Dietrich by his nickname. "
Have I claimed that he did?
3. "'The idea was to use a corps of armored divisions, not because they were suited to the operation as it was conceived, but because it was what Montgomery had available.'
Nonsense. The British had the tendancy to assault with masses tanks. Epsom is another example of that "
Oh really? Perhaps you'd care to name one other operation in Normandy where the British employed three armoured divisions as they did in Goodwood? Otherwise, I refer you to D'Este and Hastings on this issue. This approach was indeed unfortunate, as I also pointed out at length in my original post.
4. "There was a Canadian Infantry division on the right flank and a British infantry division on the left flank"
Indeed. And they both failed miserably in keeping pace with the armor, getting bogged down in the industrial suburbs and in the Bourgebus area respectively.
5. "and the British armoured divisions had some organic infantry in Bren carriers and White halftracks."
Which, as so often, proved completely insufficient to provide adequate infantry support.
6. "Look here chum, its no use trying to polish up British defeats by putting the blame at the planners or at the oh so unfavourable terrain, as I said, Goodwood was canned by some excellent defensive battles. "
What the heck are you on about? I am not trying to polish up any British defeats. The Goodwood plan was flawed, and became even more so in its execution. Do you think that this reflects badly on the fighting performance of the defenders? Perhaps you'd care to consult something more than only Luck's memoir before performing hasty and ill-informed jufgements. Luck's book is an excellent account, but it does not, for obvious reasons, offer many insights into either allied planning or allied operations, except as they were experienced from the German side.
7. "'We had warned the Guards Armoured division coming after us about Cagny. In spite of that they pushed on and within seconds lost about 20 tanks at Cagny. We could see how the front regiment tried to avoid the fire from Cagny. In doing so several tanks were again knocked out, this time from the woodland in the east. The attack came to a standstill. We were glad we had been able to turn off west and so escape the fire from your damned eighty-eights. We saw burning fires here and there in Caen, lying on our right, and in front of us, about 5 kilometres to the south, the Bourgebus hills, our first objective, which we should have reached early that morning.'
Does this seem like an unfortunate coinciding of events as you so elegantly decided to polish the situation, or does this look like a sound round of canning? "
It sounds exactly like the sort of sound round of canning that resulted from the train of events as described in my first post, which, incidentally, contains nothing that can reasonably be construed as pointing to "unfortunate coinciding of events". It describes what happened when unsupported British armor attempted to advance on intact German PAK defenses. The reasons why they were unsupported I have already outlined. Was this good British tactics? No, it obviously was not. Did the defenders fight well? Yes, they obviously did.
8. "So so, does this still look like rugged terrain and finger-pointing Monty making it impossible to win? The only thing the British 'fell victim to' were the Germans themselves. "
Who said it was impossible to win? The British attacked with a great preponderance in numbers and massive air support. But they had some factors working against them, and they decreased their chances by formulating and implementing a flawed concept. Against an enemy who fought with great skill and perseverance as so often, this was not good enough.
9. "'Lack of artillery' , you said! I didn't see von Luck complaining about the total abscense of German artillery. Will the whining ever end?"
Firstly, there was not total absence of German artillery. Secondly, what the hell do you mean "whining"? The artillery problem I pointed out was real enough, and I shouldn't think it would be neccessary to have to point out why it is a drawback to conduct offensive operations without adequate artillery support.
You don't seem to care for any understanding of the battle beyond what enables you to say who outfought who, or to even consider any other factor, as if war was some sort of football match. My view on that particular aspect of it, in Normandy generally, was that the Germans consistently outfought their adversaries, and that goes for Goodwood too. But I don't think that's where all explanation begins and ends.
1. "Firstly, this was a rare instance where the Germans had prior knowledge of the operation, and could prepare accordingly.'
What utter nonsense, what's your source for this contention?"
It is mentioned in practically every account of the Normandy campaign that I've read. I don't have my books here and now, but you'd might want to check out Carlo D'Este's "Decision in Normandy", Max Hastings' "Overlord", John Keegan's "Six armies and Normandy" and Alexander McKee's "Caen:Anvil of victory" for starters. I'll get back with references if you like.
2. "ii.) So much for von Luck 'disliking the SS', also notice he names Dietrich by his nickname. "
Have I claimed that he did?
3. "'The idea was to use a corps of armored divisions, not because they were suited to the operation as it was conceived, but because it was what Montgomery had available.'
Nonsense. The British had the tendancy to assault with masses tanks. Epsom is another example of that "
Oh really? Perhaps you'd care to name one other operation in Normandy where the British employed three armoured divisions as they did in Goodwood? Otherwise, I refer you to D'Este and Hastings on this issue. This approach was indeed unfortunate, as I also pointed out at length in my original post.
4. "There was a Canadian Infantry division on the right flank and a British infantry division on the left flank"
Indeed. And they both failed miserably in keeping pace with the armor, getting bogged down in the industrial suburbs and in the Bourgebus area respectively.
5. "and the British armoured divisions had some organic infantry in Bren carriers and White halftracks."
Which, as so often, proved completely insufficient to provide adequate infantry support.
6. "Look here chum, its no use trying to polish up British defeats by putting the blame at the planners or at the oh so unfavourable terrain, as I said, Goodwood was canned by some excellent defensive battles. "
What the heck are you on about? I am not trying to polish up any British defeats. The Goodwood plan was flawed, and became even more so in its execution. Do you think that this reflects badly on the fighting performance of the defenders? Perhaps you'd care to consult something more than only Luck's memoir before performing hasty and ill-informed jufgements. Luck's book is an excellent account, but it does not, for obvious reasons, offer many insights into either allied planning or allied operations, except as they were experienced from the German side.
7. "'We had warned the Guards Armoured division coming after us about Cagny. In spite of that they pushed on and within seconds lost about 20 tanks at Cagny. We could see how the front regiment tried to avoid the fire from Cagny. In doing so several tanks were again knocked out, this time from the woodland in the east. The attack came to a standstill. We were glad we had been able to turn off west and so escape the fire from your damned eighty-eights. We saw burning fires here and there in Caen, lying on our right, and in front of us, about 5 kilometres to the south, the Bourgebus hills, our first objective, which we should have reached early that morning.'
Does this seem like an unfortunate coinciding of events as you so elegantly decided to polish the situation, or does this look like a sound round of canning? "
It sounds exactly like the sort of sound round of canning that resulted from the train of events as described in my first post, which, incidentally, contains nothing that can reasonably be construed as pointing to "unfortunate coinciding of events". It describes what happened when unsupported British armor attempted to advance on intact German PAK defenses. The reasons why they were unsupported I have already outlined. Was this good British tactics? No, it obviously was not. Did the defenders fight well? Yes, they obviously did.
8. "So so, does this still look like rugged terrain and finger-pointing Monty making it impossible to win? The only thing the British 'fell victim to' were the Germans themselves. "
Who said it was impossible to win? The British attacked with a great preponderance in numbers and massive air support. But they had some factors working against them, and they decreased their chances by formulating and implementing a flawed concept. Against an enemy who fought with great skill and perseverance as so often, this was not good enough.
9. "'Lack of artillery' , you said! I didn't see von Luck complaining about the total abscense of German artillery. Will the whining ever end?"
Firstly, there was not total absence of German artillery. Secondly, what the hell do you mean "whining"? The artillery problem I pointed out was real enough, and I shouldn't think it would be neccessary to have to point out why it is a drawback to conduct offensive operations without adequate artillery support.
You don't seem to care for any understanding of the battle beyond what enables you to say who outfought who, or to even consider any other factor, as if war was some sort of football match. My view on that particular aspect of it, in Normandy generally, was that the Germans consistently outfought their adversaries, and that goes for Goodwood too. But I don't think that's where all explanation begins and ends.
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StandartenfuehrerSS
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'Jees, you really like to pick a quarrel even where there's not really much to quarrel about, don't you?'
It is called accuracy, hardly quarrelling.
'It is mentioned in practically every account of the Normandy campaign that I've read.'
I have never come across any reference stating that the German side knew what was coming, I have already given you Dietrich's tête-a-tête with von Luck, so if you can disprove Dietrich, be my guest. I don't see how the Germans could be informed of Goodwood in the first place. An anticipation on another breakout attempt yes, - but plans for Goodwood, I don't think so.
'Perhaps you'd care to name one other operation in Normandy where the British employed three armoured divisions as they did in Goodwood?'
Let's not put words in my mouth here, I did not say that they used a corps per say, armoured divisions were always the thrusting ram with which the British operated, that is what I stated.
'Which, as so often, proved completely insufficient to provide adequate infantry support.'
Inadequate support is one thing, let me remind you that the organic German personnel in Panzerdivisionen always did well, wouldn't this failure of the British infantry be caused be not that very decent training? In the account by Major close I have given you, we have the example of 4 lonely Fliegabwehrkanonen succeeding in not only canning over 40 British tanks, they recieved no fire whatsoever. It would only take a platoon, maybe even less, to have taken the battery out, where was that platoon?
'Perhaps you'd care to consult something more than only Luck's memoir before performing hasty and ill-informed jufgements. '
Hastly conclusions, and some swirling linguistic waxations thrown in along with them, are more your cup of tea than it is mine I'm afraid. Frankly, Goodwood was not called for either way; I think that Operation Cobra could not fail, so the American arm of the giant pincer movement was already secured, if the British would have launched even only sporadic offensives, but on a weekly basis, they would also succeed in keeping the German armor in their sector. Pushing three armoured divisions through a small gap between Caen and the eastern heights, thereby having to dash over Bourgébus, seems a bit of a stretch if you ask me. I wonder how on earth they planned to get past the Leibstandarte.
'Who said it was impossible to win? The British attacked with a great preponderance in numbers and massive air support.'
2.500 bombers, 1.000 pieces of artillery and naval support, it wiped out several German battalions, including one of von Luck's units. Looking back, it was almost impossible to resist, but yet the Britsh offensive stalled, at the cost of about 120 tanks each day. Altough, one must remember that they made terrain gains, so the offensive wasn't that much of a failure. It was a lose-lose situation for the Germans either case, in hindsight, their fate was already sealed because of Hitler's strict regime with which he oversaw the Normandy campaign.
Of course it was impossible to win for the British; SS-Panzerdivisionen 1 and 12 were quitely waiting at Falaise, waiting to be thrown in the line. Even if von Luck's Kampfgruppe was overrun, they would have to face these two divisions. Let me remind you that was happened at Soliers was a writing on the wall for the offensive, and that was a 'clean' fight of armour vs. armour.
It is called accuracy, hardly quarrelling.
'It is mentioned in practically every account of the Normandy campaign that I've read.'
I have never come across any reference stating that the German side knew what was coming, I have already given you Dietrich's tête-a-tête with von Luck, so if you can disprove Dietrich, be my guest. I don't see how the Germans could be informed of Goodwood in the first place. An anticipation on another breakout attempt yes, - but plans for Goodwood, I don't think so.
'Perhaps you'd care to name one other operation in Normandy where the British employed three armoured divisions as they did in Goodwood?'
Let's not put words in my mouth here, I did not say that they used a corps per say, armoured divisions were always the thrusting ram with which the British operated, that is what I stated.
'Which, as so often, proved completely insufficient to provide adequate infantry support.'
Inadequate support is one thing, let me remind you that the organic German personnel in Panzerdivisionen always did well, wouldn't this failure of the British infantry be caused be not that very decent training? In the account by Major close I have given you, we have the example of 4 lonely Fliegabwehrkanonen succeeding in not only canning over 40 British tanks, they recieved no fire whatsoever. It would only take a platoon, maybe even less, to have taken the battery out, where was that platoon?
'Perhaps you'd care to consult something more than only Luck's memoir before performing hasty and ill-informed jufgements. '
Hastly conclusions, and some swirling linguistic waxations thrown in along with them, are more your cup of tea than it is mine I'm afraid. Frankly, Goodwood was not called for either way; I think that Operation Cobra could not fail, so the American arm of the giant pincer movement was already secured, if the British would have launched even only sporadic offensives, but on a weekly basis, they would also succeed in keeping the German armor in their sector. Pushing three armoured divisions through a small gap between Caen and the eastern heights, thereby having to dash over Bourgébus, seems a bit of a stretch if you ask me. I wonder how on earth they planned to get past the Leibstandarte.
'Who said it was impossible to win? The British attacked with a great preponderance in numbers and massive air support.'
2.500 bombers, 1.000 pieces of artillery and naval support, it wiped out several German battalions, including one of von Luck's units. Looking back, it was almost impossible to resist, but yet the Britsh offensive stalled, at the cost of about 120 tanks each day. Altough, one must remember that they made terrain gains, so the offensive wasn't that much of a failure. It was a lose-lose situation for the Germans either case, in hindsight, their fate was already sealed because of Hitler's strict regime with which he oversaw the Normandy campaign.
Of course it was impossible to win for the British; SS-Panzerdivisionen 1 and 12 were quitely waiting at Falaise, waiting to be thrown in the line. Even if von Luck's Kampfgruppe was overrun, they would have to face these two divisions. Let me remind you that was happened at Soliers was a writing on the wall for the offensive, and that was a 'clean' fight of armour vs. armour.