#20
Post
by StandartenfuehrerSS » 05 Apr 2002, 12:02
‘[...] Max Hastings, Carlo d'Este and Alexander McKee all mention it. ‘
I see. What nationality are you?
‘[...] Sperrle of Luftflotte 3, warning of a major British attack SE of Caen on 17-18th.’
Sperrle, issuer of the famous Sperrle orders, one of the best decisions ever made during the entire war in the occupied regions.
‘Nobody's very precise about exactly what the Germans knew or how they came to know it, the [...] The British on their side failed to detect the shifting of German units in response to this threat.’
Well, this does, in my eyes, not prove that the Germans knew per say of the size and magnitude of the attack. They anticipated the attack, yes, as we learn from von Luck, and even with Sperrle’s warning, I fail to see what more could be done. There were no minefields whatsoever, except for some isolated mines put there by the U.S. 6th AB division, and I did not see major troop movements or strengthening of the lines of any kind. One thing is sure, blaming the short-term failure of the offensive to German preparedness is futile. If they indeed had such a thing called ‘prior knowledge’, it was not the American kind of prior knowledge, where entire orders were deciphered into detail and the exact date, location an composition of the troops was known. Von Luck described the country as ‘excellent tank country’, but adds that with the many villages and bushes, it is even more excellent tank-killing country. Let’s also not fool ourselves on the presence of FlaK, there was the battery with four models in Cagny and 24 models from a Flakkampfgruppe, coming from the excellent III. Flakkorps. 16. Luftwaffe-felddivision was almost obliterated by the attack, and 21. Panzerdivision badly burned. So no, I do not believe German preparation had suddenly sprung up, time was too limited for that, and the means for that were not available, considering the immediate divisions in the vincity were bödenstandig. A warning was all that could be done I’m afraid. Movement by day was made impossible, as we know well.
Still, I did not know of Sperrle’s warning, which is was new to me.
Since you did not appear to be aware of the exact British casualties, I provide you with the numbers:
i.) British personnel losses were 4.011 out of a total 76.213. This is quite low, making it a total percentage of 5.26%, or 1.75% per day. This is for the period 18-20 July, the general length of the offensive, although in my eyes there was no such thing anymore as Goodwood after July the nineteenth. The expected casualty rate in this kind of corps-level assault was 1.2%, making Goodwood in terms of personnel losses not particularly high, just normal. As a comparison, the British casualty rate for this kind of attacks in WWI was 4-8.5%, considerably higher. (1)
ii.) British tank losses were very high, 493 lost units. I remember watching ‘propaganda’ movies showing the victory over the ‘Anglo-Americans’ at the time, which stated ‘über fünfhundert’ armour was destroyed. Looking back, it was not propaganda at all, just the truth in fact. Although, this number must be looked at from two sides. The number also contains lightly and heavily damaged units, not all were per say lost. The number that was still in rotation by 19 July was 191, out of a total tank force of over 1.000, (running or in repair) suggests that 302 (by that date) were wrecked, which is only logical, a hit from either a Pak 43 75mm or FlaK was often enough to render a unit unusable, but the total number of wrecked is unclear, as no data exists on that, and, to make matters worse, 20 July marks a ‘blind’ report by the quartermaster, stating he does not know how many tanks were in running order. (2) Now, the second way we need to look at this number is as a comparison. The battle for Prokharovka, far greater in scale, on 12 July 1943, one day alone, cost the Russians 313 tanks, while only succeeding in destroying 49 German Panzer, of which 19 came from the LSSAH. Considering the Waffen-SS held the field, all lost tanks could be repaired again. On the first day of the offensive, 18 July, the British lost 136 tanks. As I said before, it was a matter of the stronger force canning the larger but highly clumsy and sometimes inept Allied force.
I will finish with a nice quote by Kurt Meyer, from Grenadiere, p. 154:
"Where is the spirit of the Light Brigade at Balaclava in the Crimean War? The enemy tanks drag themselves across the ground like turtles, their poser is not concentrated."
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(1) MORU Report n° 23, Battle Study Operation "GOODWOOD"
(2) Ibid.
. Still, thanks for providing such detailed info for the benefit of everyone. As I suspected, I don't really think we disagree on many basic points here, we just came at it from different angles and stressed different aspects. BTW, I strongly recommend D'Este's "Decision in Normandy" - it is a superb, meticulous and balanced study of the allied higher command and its plans and decisions in this campaign. 
