Operation Round Up Cancelled, I'm mad about it.

[alf]

Just as an interest thing on Mulberrys. For those who have Google Earth, it is still visible

http://local.google.com/maps?ll=49.3474 ... &t=k&hl=en

if that link doesnt open go to http://www.answers.com/topic/mulberry-harbour

near the bottom of the page is the link again. Google Local satellite view

regards alf

[Martin_Schenkel]

Which is why I am still mad about Round-up being cancelled.

With only 10 US divisions in the European Theater in the summer of 1943, where do you assume the follow-on forces will come from? The British and Canadians were in no position to provide the bulk of the invasion forces. The Allies simply weren't prepared for a full-scale invasion in mid-1943.

And you can use all the subsequent forces that fought in Italy as the follow-up/build-up forces for round -up.

The bulk of the follow-up forces in Italy didn't start arriving until the spring of 1944, 6 months after the invasion. Most of these were divisions that would therefore not have been available in the summer of 1943 for Round-Up. Without the Italian campaign, a good number of first-rate German divisions would have been available for operations elsewhere, namely Round-Up.

True there was less shipping assets available , but as has been stated the run from England to France was alot shorter than the average run to Sicily/Italy, especially if a round-up was done at Pas de Calais instead of Normandy.

You're suggesting Round-up happen in the Pas-de-Calais, precisely where the Germans expected an invasion, and where their defenses were the strongest?

Normandy/Overlord was a walk-over,

Normandy a walk-over? Ask some Normandy vets if was all just a fun party. Overlord wasn't launched on a whim. It took months and years of careful preparation, deception, reduction of German transport capabilities, etc. The German rail net had suffered months and months of bombing attacks. A German tank could barely move in daylight due to crushing air superiority. In mid-1943, the Allies did not have air superiority over occupied Europe, and the bombing campaign was just starting to pick up steam.

and as the examples of Normandy and Anzio prove, once our troops get lodged on a beach-head , the Nazis could not dislodge it , in the presence of massive Naval gunfire support and air -superiority.

The force at Anzio was nearly thrown back into the sea, as was the landing at Salerno. In both cases, evacuation plans had been drawn up, in case the situation warranted an evacuation. While naval gunfire was very important in both cases, the Germans in a position to destroy both the Salerno and Anzio bridgeheads. Perhaps a bit more co-ordination and planning on the part of the Germans, and both landings could have been disasters for the Allies.

Well Dieppe was a dam poorly planned 1 divison abortion to begin with and had no support to speak of.

The same reason why Round-Up would have failed. Poorly planned and too little support. Why launch a risky invasion in 1943, rather than wait one more year and greatly imporve your probability of success?

[ChristopherPerrien]

lost a post, lost an hour, try again tomorrow, when I stop cussing

[Jon G.]

...I am still mad about Round-up being cancelled. I fail to see the real benefit of Operation Husky, sure it caused the actual fall of Mussolini , but what else did it accomplish?

The successful conquest of Sicily opened up the short route to the Far East, which saved the Allies a lot of shipping. Exactly how much shipping is open to debate; Churchill's claim of 'a million tons of shipping' must be exaggererated, and Brooke's 'two hundred ships' are also strangely airy. Still, there was a surplus of shipping gained, even if it is hard to quantify how much it was.

Mussolini's downfall was caused by Husky (no small prize, all things considered), but Italy's actual dropping out of the war and leaving the Axis only coincided with Avalanche/Baytown...

To me Torch and the conquest of North africa , disposed of any theat of Axis expansion in the Med. I see the Husky force as easily being used as the Round -up landing...

...which is why I think you should still see Husky and Baytown/Avalanche as wholly seperate operations with very different aims. The invasion of Sicily was a natural, opportunistic follow-up to the Tunisian campaign, but the invasion of mainland Italy was an attempt at capitalizing on Italy's overtures to the Allies. I don't think the Allies anticipated having to fight their way all the way up through Italy, but as it turned out translating the demand for unconditional surrender from Casablanca into practical policy proved a difficult and time-demanding exercise.

...Normandy/Overlord was a walk-over, and as the examples of Normandy and Anzio prove, once our troops get lodged on a beach-head , the Nazis could not dislodge it , in the presence of massive Naval gunfire support and air -superiority. I am positive the American/British Navies and air forces could have paralyzed counter-attacking German forces in France in 1943 as easily as they did in 1944.

Sure the odds were strongly in the Allies' favour by 1944. In 1943 they were more even, not only with regard to the US build-up in Britain, but also in the air war. The Luftwaffe was nowhere as worn down in '43 as it was in '44 as has been mentioned elsewhere, and especially the US 8th Air Force was very much smaller in 1943 than it was the year after.

That means that to enact the Transport Plan for cutting off German communications with the invasion area you'd either need to relocate large parts of the Allied Mediterranean air forces to Britain (which in turn might have meant that the Tunisian campaign would have lasted longer), or Allied planners would have had to accept that the Germans would have been able to reinforce their forces in NW France faster than the Allies could reinforce their bridgehead - especially since the Germans would not have two whole armies committed in Italy, and the Balkans would still largely be garrisoned by Italian occupation troops.

True in 1943 the Mulberry Harbors were not finished but as Rich points out and I believe too, they really did not matter and you can say there was only one Mulberry, as the American mulberry was fairly destroyed before it was even finished...

As I understand it the Mulberries were somewhat redundant because navy calculations on how many supplies could be unloaded directly on the beaches were too pessimistic. But there was no way of knowing that in 1943, and at any rate delivering the needs of the Allied armies in NW France directly on the beaches took up even more landing craft.

...People cite Dieppe as proof that it is hard to seize a port. Well Dieppe was a dam poorly planned 1 divison abortion to begin with and had no support to speak of. Sure ports can be hard to sieze , St Malo, or easy, Cherbough/ Antwerpe. But again one of the real problems with Normandy was it was a great place to land but got real hard to exploit, again Round-up could have happened eslewhere which may have avoided this problem, and perhaps disposed of the real problem of having Hitler's Empire last a year longer...

I believe Normandy was chosen because it was easier to cut off that part of France from the rest of occupied Europe than it was to isolate the Pas de Calais area. Even in 1944, with the odds more in their favour, the Allies decided to play it safe by not going directly for an enemy controlled port, but rather isolate the invasion area through an intense interdiction campaign.

[Michael Emrys]

Mussolini's downfall was caused by Husky (no small prize, all things considered), but Italy's actual dropping out of the war and leaving the Axis only coincided with Avalanche/Baytown...

They coincided in time. The Italians were already seeking a formula for surrender before Avalanche though. Whether a large scale invasion of the Mainland (i.e., above and beyond Baytown and the additional landings in the extreme south) was a necessary quid pro quo for the surrender is something I am unsure of.

...the US 8th Air Force was very much smaller in 1943 than it was the year after.

And the 9th. Air Force as well as the 2nd. Tactical Air Force had not even come into existence yet, at least as actual fighting forces as opposed to names on an organizational chart.

As I understand it the Mulberries were somewhat redundant because navy calculations on how many supplies could be unloaded directly on the beaches were too pessimistic.

Does anyone have any figures of the amount of matériel landed over the beaches as compared to the amount unloaded via the surviving Mulberry? Seems to me that I have read somewhere that the Mulberry was rather more important than you are making out, but I don't have any numbers and that could be a false impression.

Michael

[Jon G.]

Mussolini's downfall was caused by Husky (no small prize, all things considered), but Italy's actual dropping out of the war and leaving the Axis only coincided with Avalanche/Baytown...

They coincided in time. The Italians were already seeking a formula for surrender before Avalanche though. Whether a large scale invasion of the Mainland (i.e., above and beyond Baytown and the additional landings in the extreme south) was a necessary quid pro quo for the surrender is something I am unsure of.

The armistice was negotiated in place before Avalanche and Baytown, but the 'formula' for Italian surrender was, simply, unconditional surrender as far as the Allies were concerned. While both Badoglio's government and the Allies were dicking around for just how to translate that into practical policy the Germans wasted little time in occupying Italy.

Part of the Italian demands for the armistice was a substantial landing in mainland Italy - initially set at 25 divisions, later dilluted somewhat. There was also that plan to land the US 82nd Airborne in Rome, but it was cancelled at the last moment. Still, Eisenhower had to exaggerate the size of the forces earmarked for the landings in southern Italy.

Anyway, it's too much to claim that the Italian armistice all went wrong and the Allies had anticipated Italy as the short route to Germany, but I am sure that the Allies had not anticipated that they would have to fight for Italy from Naples and upwards, cf. the Montgomery quote I posted earlier about the absence of a master plan.

...

As I understand it the Mulberries were somewhat redundant because navy calculations on how many supplies could be unloaded directly on the beaches were too pessimistic.

Does anyone have any figures of the amount of matériel landed over the beaches as compared to the amount unloaded via the surviving Mulberry? Seems to me that I have read somewhere that the Mulberry was rather more important than you are making out, but I don't have any numbers and that could be a false impression.

I'm sure plenty of material was landed via the British Mulberry, my point was more that the portable ports weren't in any way crucial to the success of D-Day. After all, the American Mulberry barely had started opertating before it was destroyed, and the Allies could meet the 600 tons per division per day mark also without it.

[alf]

I'm sure plenty of material was landed via the British Mulberry, my point was more that the portable ports weren't in any way crucial to the success of D-Day. After all, the American Mulberry barely had started opertating before it was destroyed, and the Allies could meet the 600 tons per division per day mark also without it.

A couple of points . The American Mulberry was destroyed as the Americans failed to anchor it to the sea bed, a big oops and hence the downplaying of the importance of Mulberries in some histories.

The storm that destroyed that Mulberry also sank/destroyed over 800 vessels predominately small ships ie LC's. So the logic being argued here is an Invasion force would be landed and supplies to it would be entirely at the mercy of the weather? An exercise in group think that leads to massacres in the military world.

Each Mulberry was the size of Dover Harbour and the British one did make a worthwhile contribution, especially in turning around ships for resupply and the landing of heavy equipment. Some ships were able to be grounded at Utah and Gold beaches and stores offloaded directly onto vehicles, that was a unplanned for bonus but it also meant a ship had a slow turn around as it was beached till the next high tide.

The logic on "funnies" is also strange to. To me it seems that the arguement is they couldn't have been able to be landed at Omaha because of the enemy opposition was so strong? They did land at 3 beaches, Sword, Juno and Gold and the opposition was strong at those beaches to. I understand those beaches are of little interest to Americans but they should be studied in detail. That study would show the "funnies" crushed the defences quickly, that is what they were especially designed for to shatter the Altantic Wall. Had they landed at Omaha in the first wave, much of the opposition would have been reduced and probably a massacre avoided.

Two beaches, Dieppe in 1942 and Omaha in 1944 showed clearly that infantry landing without armoured support is slaughtered, (Cape Helles in April 1915 was also a lesson ie River Clyde). So to land in 1943 without adequate armour with contested airspace and with supplies dependent on the weather is a sane thing? Because no port would be captured quickly and when eventually captured would not be in working order.

Again there is no reason why Hitler would not have put on hold action on the Eastern Front if the prize of shattering the Western Allies was available. To knock them out of the war for a few years would have been priceless gift ti him leaving him free to bolster his Eastern Front. The morale factor on the civilian population needs to be factored in, a loss would have been difficult to bear, especially for the British. 1942 was a long list of disasters except for El Alamein. Torch would mean nothing if Europe was in still in Nazi hands.

So in 1943, to land in the Calais area, the strongest part of the German defences. Using mainly infantry to storm the defences? Totally dependent on good weather to get resupply? The same good weather meaning the Luftwaffe can pop over for a visit at any time? No ports available and then realistically expecting to fight the Wehrmacht and Waffen SS on those unequal terms? Were Fireflys available in 1943? I don't think the Western Allies had much experience ( for them) of the German new generation of tanks, ie Panthers and Tigers so 75mm Shermans and Churchills/Cromwells would have been pitted against them. Any 17 pounder anti tank guns? This little things that were available in 1944 were not there in 1943.

One edit I said LST destroyed I meant LC (smaller) sorry everyone

[Jon G.]

I'm sure plenty of material was landed via the British Mulberry, my point was more that the portable ports weren't in any way crucial to the success of D-Day. After all, the American Mulberry barely had started opertating before it was destroyed, and the Allies could meet the 600 tons per division per day mark also without it.

A couple of points . The American Mulberry was destroyed as the Americans failed to anchor it to the sea bed, a big oops and hence the downplaying of the importance of Mulberries in some histories.

The storm that destroyed that Mulberry also sank/destroyed over 800 vessels predominately small ships ie LST's. So the logic being argued here is an Invasion force would be landed and supplies to it would be entirely at the mercy of the weather? An exercise in group think that leads to massacres in the military world.

From a 1944 or 1943 perspective the Mulberries were considered rather more important than they turned out to be. I have certainly not advocated an invasion without them as a wise idea. Rather, I have pointed out that the invasion proceeded well enough from a reinforcement/supply viewpoint also without the benefit of fully operational artificial ports.

Each Mulberry was the size of Dover Harbour and the British one did make a worthwhile contribution, especially in turning around ships for resupply and the landing of heavy equipment. Some ships were able to be grounded at Utah and Gold beaches and stores offloaded directly onto vehicles, that was a unplanned for bonus but it also meant a ship had a slow turn around as it was beached till the next high tide...

...yes, the British port survived the gale that destroyed the American port, but apparently the British port lost some 40% of its capacity en route to Normandy, so it is worth asking when it compared to Dover Harbour in size.

Again, this is not to argue that an invasion in 1943 would have been a good idea, rather that Allied planning was well served by having enough surplus shipping on hand to deal with unforeseen events, such as the Mulberries not functioning as hoped, and German-held deep water ports being captured well behind schedule. The margin between success and failure wasn't decided by the remaining Mulberry port.

[Delta Tank]

alf,

alf wrote:The logic on "funnies" is also strange to. To me it seems that the arguement is they couldn't have been able to be landed at Omaha because of the enemy opposition was so strong? They did land at 3 beaches, Sword, Juno and Gold and the opposition was strong at those beaches to. I understand those beaches are of little interest to Americans but they should be studied in detail. That study would show the "funnies" crushed the defences quickly, that is what they were especially designed for to shatter the Altantic Wall. Had they landed at Omaha in the first wave, much of the opposition would have been reduced and probably a massacre avoided.

This is from a previous post on tanks at all the beaches on D-Day. If you read this post you will discover that there were lots of tanks at Omaha Beach. My suggestion is that everyone quit reading books written by non-Americans on what happened at Omaha Beach and instead read the Official History of the United States Army (Cross Channel Attack and Omaha Beachhead) and the pamplet that has been scanned and posted on this forum entitled: Armor in Operation Neptune.

Mako wrote:
Anyway. One reason why it got so bloody at Omaha was the lack of tank support. Can we at least agree on that?

RichTO90 wrote: Well, I don’t know? But the notion that armor support was somehow “different” between the Commonwealth and the American beaches at Normandy is somewhat inexplicable, in that the assault was planned to a common theme and drew from similar resources of landing craft, which was the ultimate arbiter. For example, if we consider the assaults in terms of regimental/brigade beach sectors, of which there were three American and five Commonwealth, we find that the allocations of assault landing craft were virtually the same. At OMAHA, Assault Group O-1 (16th RCT) consisted of:

1 Group HQ ship
2 APA – carrying 22 LCV (P) (each)
1 LSI (L) – carrying 18 LCA
6 LST
5 LCI (L)
14 LCT (5)
22 LCT (6) – carrying 3 M-4 tanks
8 LCT (6) – carrying 32 DD tanks
9 LCT (A & HE) – carrying 19 M-4 tanks and 8 M-4 tank dozers
53 LCT total

At GOLD, Assault Group G-1 (231st Brigade Group) consisted of:

1 Group HQ ship
4 LSI (L) – carrying 62 LCA (total)
1 LSI (H) – carrying 6 LCA
1 LSI (M) – carrying 8 LCA
1 LST
40 LCT (4) – carrying 29 M-4 tanks
8 LCT (3) – carrying 32 DD tanks
8 LCT (A) – carrying 16 Centaur and 4 M-4 tanks
6 LCT (HE) – carrying 12 AVRE, 8 Sherman Crabs and 8 D-9 bulldozers
2 LCT (3) – carrying 3 Crocodiles and 3 D-7 bulldozers
64 LCT total

Note that the number of “tanks” carried by Assault Group O-1 was 62, while those carried by G-1 were 104. But the number to be “assault landed” was actually about the same. Those were the tanks that it was intended to land between H-10 and H-Hour, the DD tanks and the tanks carried by the LCT (A) and (HE). There we find that O-1 carried 59 and G-1 just 72. Or possibly 74, another two may have been carried on the LCT (A) as “CB” tanks or “concrete busters, but so far the records I have seen are unclear. The real difference was the 12 AVRE and 8 Crabs (flail-type mine-clearing tanks) that were not available to the American forces at this time.

Also, note that O-1 had a total of 62 personnel landing craft (LCV (P)), while G-1 had 76 (LCA). But there the difference was that the British force included 47 RM Commando, carried on the LSI (H) and LSI (M).

In terms of tanks actually landed though, the situation is somewhat different. At OMAHA, out of 62 Shermans in the 741st Tank Battalion lost at least 54, with 29 DD tanks swamped, 2 M-4 75mm and 1 M-4 tank dozer lost when their LCT was sunk. Of the 32 tanks that landed, 1 M-4 tank dozer damaged, 7 M-4 75mm knocked out by gunfire and mines, 5 M-4 75mm tracked or abandoned in the surf, while the cause of loss for 9 others is unknown, so a total of 22. Out of 62 Shermans in the 743rd Tank Battalion, at least 22 were reported lost, all on shore. So in the first case, 32 were “lost at sea” leaving 30 to fight on the beach, where another 22 were lost on land, exactly the same number lost on land by the other battalion. Furthermore, the 16th Infantry, supported by the 30 tanks of the 741st Tank Battalion, suffered about 971 casualties. The 116th Infantry, supported by the 62 tanks of the 743rd Tank Battalion, still suffered about 797 casualties. And yet at GOLD, 231 Brigade still suffered at least 398 casualties (and the attached 57 RM Commando about another 43, for a total of at least 441), despite having landed nearly 60 tanks successfully (7 of the 32 DD tanks sank and only 5 of the 20 Centaurs and Shermans of the 1st RM Armoured Support Regiment made it ashore).

So we have two cases of near identical tank support, but casualties in one nearly twice those in the other. And then we have one case of one-half the tank strength in the other two cases, but casualties about twice one case and only about 20 percent greater than the other. I'm not sure how that "proves" things either way?

RichTO90 wrote:
Quote:
Um, yes....in a sense. That is we can argue about what "within a few minutes of H-Hour" means, but we know the number intended to be landed (124), and we know the number sunk or swamped (32), so the number appears to have been 92 (although a number of LCT had problems with the current and navigation, so arrived somewhat later than a "few minutes fater"). In terms of the question of relative armor support, we may compare this to GOLD - 96 - and JUNO - 88 - and find that there was little concrete difference between OMAHA and the other beaches in this respect.

The above discussion can be found at:Casualties in Omaha

Mike

[Delta Tank]

Michael,

Michael wrote: Does anyone have any figures of the amount of materiel landed over the beaches as compared to the amount unloaded via the surviving Mulberry? Seems to me that I have read somewhere that the Mulberry was rather more important than you are making out, but I don't have any numbers and that could be a false impression.

I did read the numbers, but I cannot put my finger on it right now. I was at that (1993) very nice museum at Arromaches (?) where they have a working model of a Mulberry and at low tide you can still see the block ships. The museum director was talking to us about the harbor and how much tonnage it unloaded, when I made the comment that the American beaches off loaded more without a Mulberry. He agreed that was in fact true. However, I believe that the block ships (can't remember their name, Gooseberries?) that reduced the wave action were vital to the success of the logistics operation.


Mike

[Michael Emrys]

However, I believe that the block ships (can't remember their name, Gooseberries?) that reduced the wave action were vital to the success of the logistics operation.

That's what I've been thinking all through this part of the discussion. Even though the offloading piers were wrecked and unusable, the blockships and breakwaters were still partially intact and would have offered semi-sheltered waters for either beaching landing craft (if the beaches within the harbor area were appropriate; I have tried to find that out, but with no success as yet), or offloading into DUKWs (and possibly Buffaloes?) which would then drive inshore to dumps. All those operations would have benefitted from the calmer waters inside the artificial harbor.

Michael

[RichTO90]

Each Mulberry was the size of Dover Harbour and the British one did make a worthwhile contribution, especially in turning around ships for resupply and the landing of heavy equipment. Some ships were able to be grounded at Utah and Gold beaches and stores offloaded directly onto vehicles, that was a unplanned for bonus but it also meant a ship had a slow turn around as it was beached till the next high tide.

Nobody said that Mulberry did not make a worthwhile contribution, and it is clear that it was a "neccessary" contribution. But it is not clear that it was any more "neccessary" than any other part. Unloading data for the beaches from D-Day to August 31 (D+86) are fairly complete and are:

US (tonnage excludes POL and vehicles) -
OMAHA - 886,730 long tons
UTAH - 489,245 long tons
Cherbourg - 298,302 long tons
Minor Ports - 175,143 long tons
Total - 1,849,420 long tons

UK (tonnage includes 181,000 long tons of POL but excludes vehicles) -
Beaches - 622,813 long tons
Mulberry - 435,969 long tons
Minor Ports - 186,843 long tons
Total - 1,245,625 long tons

Grand Totals -
All Beaches - 1,998,788 (64.58%)
Mulberry - 435,969 (14.09%)
Minor Ports - 361,986 (11.70%)
Cherbourg - 298,302 (9.64%)
Total - 3,095,045 (100.01% - due to rounding)

The logic on "funnies" is also strange to. To me it seems that the arguement is they couldn't have been able to be landed at Omaha because of the enemy opposition was so strong? They did land at 3 beaches, Sword, Juno and Gold and the opposition was strong at those beaches to. I understand those beaches are of little interest to Americans but they should be studied in detail. That study would show the "funnies" crushed the defences quickly, that is what they were especially designed for to shatter the Altantic Wall. Had they landed at Omaha in the first wave, much of the opposition would have been reduced and probably a massacre avoided.

Sorry, but no, you misread. There is little evidence to show that the Funnies made a decisive differance in and of themselves on any of the British beaches, all popular history to the contrary. Rather, the evidence is that successfully landing armor of any kind was important, but was also dependant upon the intensity and capability of the German resistance and the nature of the terrain itself. And a good example is the one nicely reposted by DT (thanks for saving me the time and effort ) between OMAHA and GOLD. But if you require I can post the loss and effectiveness of the AVRE and Crabs on D-Day as rendered by 1st Assault Brigade RE.

[paulmacg]

Again there is no reason why Hitler would not have put on hold action on the Eastern Front if the prize of shattering the Western Allies was available. To knock them out of the war for a few years would have been priceless gift ti him leaving him free to bolster his Eastern Front. The morale factor on the civilian population needs to be factored in, a loss would have been difficult to bear, especially for the British. 1942 was a long list of disasters except for El Alamein. Torch would mean nothing if Europe was in still in Nazi hands.

Hitler could have done whatever he wanted in 1943, attack or not, and the Eastern Front would still have become a nightmare. At best he might have delayed the Russians another year by knocking the Western Allies out of the war and switching to a purely defensive stance in the east, but even that is doubtful. By the time of Kursk, Stalin already knew he could win with or without assistance.

The truth is that the Allies had little to gain and a lot to lose in 1943. The Wehrmacht was still dangerous and confident, if mistakenly, in its abilities and would probably have been able to throw a slow invasion force back into the sea despite huge losses in the east. Judging by the events of 1944, I do not see it as unreasonable that a substantially smaller and more poorly supported invasion force, facing a stronger and better supported enemy, would have found itself very quickly facing a powerful German counterattack that it would have only survived by a miracle.

Worse, judging by the amount of armour lost in 1944, it would have been a while before the Allies, clinging to a small bridgehead at great cost in 1943, would have managed to amass enough force to launch a decisive counterattack of their own. Evidence of German ability to counter overwhelming Allied superiority in armour, air and artillery is more than abundant. Imagine the Allies fighting at Caen in 1943 with half of what they had in 1944.

Cheers

Paul

[Delta Tank]

To all,

It is my understanding that we just drove the ships up onto the beach at low tide, off loaded them and refloated them at high tide. I don't know if you can do this with every ship, but you can with LSTs. I was under the impression that the beaching of the ships enabled us to off load them faster, not slower. If the cargo was loaded onto LSTs in trucks and driven off and empty trucks put back on the now empty LST it would really increase the amout of supplies off loaded. I believe I read somewhere that this technique was done at Anzio.


Mike

[ChristopherPerrien]

Why launch a risky invasion in 1943, rather than wait one more year and greatly imporve your probability of success?

Because in war, timing is everything. Waiting a year to do anything is dangerous. And British obstinacy and obstructiveness to Round-up combined with their Mediterranean preference could have lost the war. I suppose you could ask the civilians killed in England by V-1 and V2 attacks what diffence a YEAR earlier invasion might have made. And what if Hitler had decided to load them up with nerve gas, which they had. Or atom bombs, which they were working on. Could you say in 1943, what the German could develope by 1944?
With hindsight it is easy to say that Overlord was a great success in 1944. Still that does not change the fact that much of our effort in the Mediterranean was a waste because it ended up as a resoure eating stalemate in Italy. And that year wait that you make such light of in how succeful Overlord was in comparsion to what might have been more risky a year earlier could well have cost the Britsh empire the war.

Regards Chris