Operation Round Up Cancelled, I'm mad about it.

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ChristopherPerrien
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#31

Post by ChristopherPerrien » 20 May 2006, 18:42

As to the Muberries and the various success and failure of landing tanks , I will note for some of our readers , that the tides and waves in the British sectors were smaller and the effect of the later storm less than was happened the Amercian sectors. The Amercian beaches were less sheltered and closer to the Altantic ocean, than the British beaches.

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Martin_Schenkel
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#32

Post by Martin_Schenkel » 20 May 2006, 20:16

ChristopherPerrien wrote: Because in war, timing is everything. Waiting a year to do anything is dangerous. And British obstinacy and obstructiveness to Round-up combined with their Mediterranean preference could have lost the war.
You have yet to suggest with what forces Round-Up is to be carried out with. The follow-up forces in Italy didn't arrive in strength until spring 1944, so that isn't an option. The British and Canadians didn't have the manpower to carry out Round-Up themselves, and with only 10 US Divisions in Europe in the summer of 1943, postponing Round-Up was the smart choice. The Allies simply hadn't yet built up enough forces to maintain a landing in France. There were not yet enough better quality tanks in the Allied arsenal. For instance, all Canadian armoured units were still equiped with the 6pdr armed Ram Mk II, a tank that was already recognized as obsolete in 1943.
Still that does not change the fact that much of our effort in the Mediterranean was a waste because it ended up as a resoure eating stalemate in Italy.
The Italian Campaign ate up alot of German resources as well. A disproportinately large number of first-rate German Divisions were sent to fight in Italy. Italy wasn't a stalemate either. It was a hard fought campaign, but a campaign that was decisively won by the Allies. The German forces in Italy were the first to surrender, before any other German fronts.
And that year wait that you make such light of in how succeful Overlord was in comparsion to what might have been more risky a year earlier could well have cost the Britsh empire the war.
Heavy casualties in a pre-mature invasion of France in 1943, could well have meant that British and Canadian ground forces would be in a re-building state for months or years, and cost the British Commonwealth the war. Why would you NOT allow your strategic bombers to build up their strength and systematically destroy the German transportation network?


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#33

Post by ChristopherPerrien » 20 May 2006, 21:17

Martin_Schenkel wrote:
ChristopherPerrien wrote: Because in war, timing is everything. Waiting a year to do anything is dangerous. And British obstinacy and obstructiveness to Round-up combined with their Mediterranean preference could have lost the war.
You have yet to suggest with what forces Round-Up is to be carried out with. The follow-up forces in Italy didn't arrive in strength until spring 1944, so that isn't an option. The British and Canadians didn't have the manpower to carry out Round-Up themselves, and with only 10 US Divisions in Europe in the summer of 1943, postponing Round-Up was the smart choice. The Allies simply hadn't yet built up enough forces to maintain a landing in France. There were not yet enough better quality tanks in the Allied arsenal. For instance, all Canadian armoured units were still equiped with the 6pdr armed Ram Mk II, a tank that was already recognized as obsolete in 1943.

the German transportation network?
I hope you don't mine a fight ,because I am going to start one. Basically I look what happened in Overlord is that it took The British and the Canadians 3 months to advance 7 miles from CAAN to Falaise, with all those new tanks. And I don't want to hear about valiantly sucking in every German Panzer because air support and naval gunfire had more to to with with Monty standing with one foot in the ocean , instead of both, than all those Britsh units. It took the Amercans punching through the other side, liberating a good bit of France for all of us to get off the dam beach.

I don't know if 10 US divisons( I think it was 12) and all the airpower we had in England in1943 could have mounted an operation Cobra in 43 , then again Cobra did not involve 10 divisions. And all the divisions that America sent to Italy in1943 and early 1944 could well have been enough combined with the divisons we sent to england to wait for that whole year while the English fiddlle around worrying about "Colonial spheres of interest" in the Mediteranean, to win the whole war a year earlier.

Hell the German had less in Equipment in 43 than they did in 44 , so when you go arguing we had to wait that year , remember it also gave the Germans another year of Build-up too. How many Panther tanks were in France in 1943?

Chris

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Martin_Schenkel
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#34

Post by Martin_Schenkel » 20 May 2006, 23:10

ChristopherPerrien wrote:Basically I look what happened in Overlord is that it took The British and the Canadians 3 months to advance 7 miles from CAAN to Falaise,
The distance between Caen and Falaise is approximately 35 kms, and the advance from Caen to Falaise was made in approximately 1 month.
And I don't want to hear about valiantly sucking in every German Panzer because air support and naval gunfire had more to to with with Monty standing with one foot in the ocean , instead of both, than all those Britsh units.
It seems as though your arguments are based more on your frustration with British society, than any objective analysis of facts, figures, and historical events.
It took the Amercans punching through the other side, liberating a good bit of France for all of us to get off the dam beach.
Since the British and Canadians are quite obviously inept, why would you want to launch an invasion in 1943, when the bulk of your forces are going to be so horribly inadequate?
I don't know if 10 US divisons( I think it was 12)
No, it was ten. I took the time to do the reasearch: 1st and 2nd Armored, 1st, 3rd, 9th, 29th, 34th, 36th, and 45th Infantry, and 82nd Airborne Divisions. These Divisions were in the European Theater by the end of June 1943.
And all the divisions that America sent to Italy in1943 and early 1944
Which divisions were those?

The following US Divisions were serving in Italy by the spring of 1944:
1st Armored
3rd Infantry
34th Infantry
36th Infantry
45th Infantry
85th Infantry
88th Infantry

As you can see, 5 out of these 7 US Divisions are from the original 10 Divisions that were already in Europe in mid-1943. The two additional Divisions (85th and 88th) didn't leave the USA until Dec 43. So there aren't any extra Divisions that the US had to divert to Italy prior to the spring of 1944, since those divisions sent to Italy were already in Europe in mid-1943.

combined with the divisons we sent to england to wait for that whole year while the English fiddlle around worrying about "Colonial spheres of interest" in the Mediteranean, to win the whole war a year earlier.
Only an additional 8 US Divisions arrived in Europe before the end of 1943 (and 5 of those very late in the year).

5th Inf - Aug 43
3rd Armd - Sep 43
101st Abn - Sep 43
2nd Inf - Oct 43
28th Inf - Oct 43
8th Inf - Dec 43
85th Inf - Dec 43
88th Inf - Dec 43

So, it's still only those 10 initial US Divisions from mid-1943 that were waiting for a whole year. 8 more US Divisions arrived before the end of 1943, with an additional 11 US Divisions arriving between Jan and May 44, prior to Overlord.

Are you asking that US strategic planners be able to dictate how British and Canadian forces are deployed? Since the British and Canadians still made up the bulk of the ground forces in western Europe in mid-1943, they would be suffering the brunt of the casualties during Round-Up. Easy for you to ask someone else to take the casualties for your risky invasion plan.

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#35

Post by ChristopherPerrien » 20 May 2006, 23:54

Excuse me on my razzing of the English and I guess You missed the question and the point I was trying to make.
Hell the Germans had less in Equipment in 43 than they did in 44 , so when you go arguing we had to wait that year , remember it also gave the Germans another year of Build-up too. How many Panther tanks were in France in 1943?

Chris


How many Panthers in France in 1943?

instead of 44?

Military build ups, work for both sides involved. I think what we had and what we could have put on the beach in 1943 would have worked. Remember Germany did not reach full war production until 1944. And are you saying the "West Wall" was weaker in 1944 than 1943? In tons of concrete? In obstacles? Mines? tanks?

Overlord was a hammer on a eggshell. It was the subsequent breakout that proved tough. And much of that was that the Germans employed better tanks in that year that proved to be a real big problem, especially to the British around Caan.

How many Tiger tanks in France in 1943?

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#36

Post by alf » 21 May 2006, 02:31

hope you don't mine a fight ,because I am going to start one. Basically I look what happened in Overlord is that it took The British and the Canadians 3 months to advance 7 miles from CAAN to Falaise, with all those new tanks. And I don't want to hear about valiantly sucking in every German Panzer because air support and naval gunfire had more to to with with Monty standing with one foot in the ocean , instead of both, than all those Britsh units. It took the Amercans punching through the other side, liberating a good bit of France for all of us to get off the dam beach.
So many things to cover. Like where were all the Waffen SS Panzer Units in Normandy and their location against the various Allied Forces? The entire First and Second SS Panzer Korps with all their divisons were against the British/Canadians. To defend against Operations Epsom and Goodwood, there were the Panzer Lehr, 12th SS, 9th SS, 1st SS Divisons and then the Army Divisons on top of those.

Eventually part of one Waffen SS Divison moved south to fight the US Forces for Operation Cobra, so perhaps one of the reasons the US troops effectively carried out their role overall in Montys strategic plan was that the British and Canadians tied down much of the German armour as was orginally intended. The US forces were always intended to break out from the southern flank, the US did not "save" the day, they carried out the role always intended of them.

It is disrespectful to the British and Canadian troops and their dead to infer otherwise.

Mulberries have touched a nerve and I don't know why. I still see lots of people who still want to supply an army grounding their ships as a means to support it. Any modern army needs a modern harbour to support itself and to try and side step that fundamental point is astounding. Dieppe in 1942 showed a port could not be captured intact. Indeed it took the US troops a very long time to capture Cherbourg and even longer to get it operational again. And a lot of ports were bypassed till the end of the war as their garrisons held out.

As to the funnies, why did the British and Canadians get of the beaches so fast and move the furtherest inland on the first day? It isnt a modern myth on the contary, the modern myth is to downplay their effectiveness. The funnies cleared the Altantic Wall fortifications, thats what they were designed for and thats what they did. The Candians advanced 7 kms (the furtherest of any troops) . Swimming tanks sank at Omaha, 27 out of 29 due to the waves, the swimming tanks for the Brits mostly arrived on the beaches safely in heavier surf ( not lighter another modern myth) but the crucial difference was the angles of the waves, they had the easier run.

Once ashore one of the major failings uncovered was the inadequacy of US Army Tank doctrine and its reliance on the role of the medium tank ( Sherman). The doctrine was for medium tanks to break through and disrupt communications etc, tank destroyers were supposed to engage and destroy enemy armour. Great on paper , on the battlefield in the Bocage, it failed. In tank to tank battle and confronting anti tank guns, the Sherman was inadequate. (The British tanks were no better ie Cromwells). It wasn't its intended role but it had to fight that way. Ronsons or Tommy cookers I believe they were called. Only the Firefly variant had any real chance to deal with German armour because of its 17 pounder cannon not its armour protection.

Lots of things came unstuck in 1944, things good on paper and on exercies did not work in practice but that is common in every war. In 1943 to try the same thing would have only prolonged the war and caused a lot of men to die pointlessly

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#37

Post by Kingfish » 21 May 2006, 02:31

A couple of things to consider:

The U-boat campaign was in full swing during '43, and only started to turn in the allies favor during the summer. Even then it took many months before the necessary amount of tonnage got through to supply the successful invasion and follow-up campaigns.

Same story with the air war. The isolation of the Normandy battefield, via the destruction of bridges and rail lines, was a decisive factor for both the initial invasion and expansion of the bridgehead.

Then there is the effect the Russians had on the overall German strategy. In mid '43 the Germans were still a potent force on the battlefield, and although the Russians were slowly gaining the upper hand they still had a ways to go. It was only after the Kursk campaign and subsequent drive to the Dnieper that the Germans really began to feel the pressure. By mid '44 they were reeling, and the worse was yet to come. This had a monumental effect on the German strategy as a whole, forcing them to divert precious front line formations eastward, and replacing them with second-grade formations to man the Atlantic wall.

It wasn't until '44 that these factors started to take effect.

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#38

Post by Martin_Schenkel » 21 May 2006, 03:06

Here's an entire book available online regarding planning and strategies for a cross-channel attack:

http://www.army.mil/CMH-PG/books/wwii/7 ... ntents.htm

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Michael Emrys
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#39

Post by Michael Emrys » 21 May 2006, 04:10

ChristopherPerrien wrote:The Amercian beaches were less sheltered and closer to the Altantic ocean, than the British beaches.
The American beaches may have been closer to the Atlantic, but they were on the lee side of the Cotentin Penninsula, which was one hell of a breakwater for Atlantic storms. It was actually the British beaches that were less sheltered.

Michael

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#40

Post by RichTO90 » 21 May 2006, 05:55

ChristopherPerrien wrote:Excuse me on my razzing of the English and I guess You missed the question and the point I was trying to make.
Sorry, but you keep missing the point as well. Although the Germans were weaker in France in 1943 than they were in 1944, the Allies were also proportianately much weaker, especially in terms of airpower, amphibious capability, and simple experience. For instance, there could be no transportation interdiction campaign prior to an invasion in spring 1943, because there were insufficent Allied air forces available to prosecute such a campaign and there was also neither time nor experience in planning and executing such a campaign. As a result, there would be little hindrance to German movements to counter an invasion. Nor did it require Panthers or Tigers to defend the bocage against American forces in June and July of 1944, there were no Tigers and few Panthers there. Instead the terrain and a capable German infantry defense sufficed to hang on for six weeks.

There is also the not so minor problem that if you wish to generate sufficient force to execute a landing in France in spring of 1943, you simply will be forced to cancel TORCH in November 1942. Unfortunately there is simply no way that you can get the forces to Tunisia to defeat 5. Panzerarmee and 1. Italenische-deutsche Panzerarmee by 12 May 1943 and then back to England in time for a spring landing, it just won't work. Which leaves the defeat of Rommel unresolved and incidentaly a quiet nicely refurbished 10. Panzerdivision sitting in France in spring 1943.

There was a minor "window" of opportunity basically from about March-July 1943 in which German forces in France were relatively weak, espeically in terms of tanks. But that weakness was actually caused by TORCH and the drawdown of forces sent from France to Tunisia in the attempt to hold onto a toehold in Africa. But if TORCH doesn't occur then Tunisia doesn't become a sinkhole for 300+ Panzers that could have remained in France. Oh, and of course it's probable that British forces would likely have been at least temporarily stalemated by Romeel and without the threat to Tunisia could have been evacuated or even reinforced for another go at the Benghazi Handicap. :D

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#41

Post by ChristopherPerrien » 21 May 2006, 16:15

It is disrespectful to the British and Canadian troops and their dead to infer otherwise
Good lord lets not talk about mistakes, and failed attacks because soldiers died? Hey it was a war and objectively looking at failure is something that needs to be done, no matter who or who's dad, etc. was involved.




Eventually part of one Waffen SS Divison moved south to fight the US Forces for Operation Cobra, so perhaps one of the reasons the US troops effectively carried out their role overall in Montys strategic plan was that the British and Canadians tied down much of the German armour as was orginally intended
Excuse me but 6 panzer divisons(400 tanks) were involved in the Mortain counter-attack. As to Monty's strategic plan , Numerous attacks were made by the Britsh and Canadians to punch through the German lines in Normandy. Epsom , Goodwood, etc. They failed. As to tying down German Armor , I think air-power made that a given. And what I suppose I see is that Monty with his numerical superiorty , massive artillery, Naval Gunfire support, air support, could have done better than just a valiant defensive action as that was "his plan" as you say. Actually if you go back and look Monty several times talked of a BRITISH breakthrough, since that did not happen I suppose he deserves high praise for following the plan.

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#42

Post by ChristopherPerrien » 21 May 2006, 16:40

Kingfish wrote:A couple of things to consider:

The U-boat campaign was in full swing during '43, and only started to turn in the allies favor during the summer. Even then it took many months before the necessary amount of tonnage got through to supply the successful invasion and follow-up campaigns.

Same story with the air war. The isolation of the Normandy battefield, via the destruction of bridges and rail lines, was a decisive factor for both the initial invasion and expansion of the bridgehead.

Then there is the effect the Russians had on the overall German strategy. In mid '43 the Germans were still a potent force on the battlefield, and although the Russians were slowly gaining the upper hand they still had a ways to go. It was only after the Kursk campaign and subsequent drive to the Dnieper that the Germans really began to feel the pressure. By mid '44 they were reeling, and the worse was yet to come. This had a monumental effect on the German strategy as a whole, forcing them to divert precious front line formations eastward, and replacing them with second-grade formations to man the Atlantic wall.

It wasn't until '44 that these factors started to take effect.
Hi Kingfish,
You make one point that does really affect the potential success of Round-up and that is the U-boat war. But in 1943 the U-boat war was a see-saw affair depending when Egnima could be read.

As to the air war, which I am hearing so much about , we had enough asets in England in 1943 to interdict German forces. We were already conducting massive day and night strategic bombing of Europe that failed to accomplish its goal. So we could have used those assets for the tacitical support of an Invasion in 1943. And even in 1943 I believe between American and British fighter planes we could have generated air superiority over the channel and France.

As to the Germans in 1943 , Kursk ate up alot of German offensive power. And the Russian front was already sucking up most other German forces. And the West-wall was less built up and was already being manned by second rate forces. ALso as I said earlier the German did not reach full war production until 1944, so although many people here say we had to wait that year to build up, I think many people don't grasp the full ramifications of allowing the German to build-up another year. Also as I noted earlier, the German had no Panthers and few tigers in 1943 in France, and although the Sherman tank might even be considered obsolete in 1944, In 1943 it was on par with the Pz III's and PZ IV's, which would have meant alot.

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#43

Post by ChristopherPerrien » 21 May 2006, 17:13

Martin_Schenkel wrote:[

No, it was ten. I took the time to do the reasearch: 1st and 2nd Armored, 1st, 3rd, 9th, 29th, 34th, 36th, and 45th Infantry, and 82nd Airborne Divisions. These Divisions were in the European Theater by the end of June 1943.
And all the divisions that America sent to Italy in1943 and early 1944
Which divisions were those?

The following US Divisions were serving in Italy by the spring of 1944:
1st Armored
3rd Infantry
34th Infantry
36th Infantry
45th Infantry
85th Infantry
88th Infantry

As you can see, 5 out of these 7 US Divisions are from the original 10 Divisions that were already in Europe in mid-1943. The two additional Divisions (85th and 88th) didn't leave the USA until Dec 43. So there aren't any extra Divisions that the US had to divert to Italy prior to the spring of 1944, since those divisions sent to Italy were already in Europe in mid-1943.

combined with the divisons we sent to england to wait for that whole year while the English fiddlle around worrying about "Colonial spheres of interest" in the Mediteranean, to win the whole war a year earlier.
Only an additional 8 US Divisions arrived in Europe before the end of 1943 (and 5 of those very late in the year).

5th Inf - Aug 43
3rd Armd - Sep 43
101st Abn - Sep 43
2nd Inf - Oct 43
28th Inf - Oct 43
8th Inf - Dec 43
85th Inf - Dec 43
88th Inf - Dec 43

So, it's still only those 10 initial US Divisions from mid-1943 that were waiting for a whole year. 8 more US Divisions arrived before the end of 1943, with an additional 11 US Divisions arriving between Jan and May 44, prior to Overlord.

Are you asking that US strategic planners be able to dictate how British and Canadian forces are deployed? Since the British and Canadians still made up the bulk of the ground forces in western Europe in mid-1943, they would be suffering the brunt of the casualties during Round-Up. Easy for you to ask someone else to take the casualties for your risky invasion plan.
Hi Martin ,

Good info on the divisons.

Yes That is exactly what I am asking. As for "taking casualties", I worry if that is or was the first thing on someone's mind. I am much more concerned with "inflicting casualties" and "winning".

I see Round-up as taking palce in August 1943. This would correspond to the Russian counter-attack after Kursk and would be a moment when the Germans would have been off-balnce and heavily focus on the Russian front. Allied high command would have known of this through Ultra, just as Stalin knew of Kursk.

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#44

Post by ChristopherPerrien » 21 May 2006, 17:41

RichTO90 wrote:
ChristopherPerrien wrote:Excuse me on my razzing of the English and I guess You missed the question and the point I was trying to make.
Sorry, but you keep missing the point as well. Although the Germans were weaker in France in 1943 than they were in 1944, the Allies were also proportianately much weaker, especially in terms of airpower, amphibious capability, and simple experience. For instance, there could be no transportation interdiction campaign prior to an invasion in spring 1943, because there were insufficent Allied air forces available to prosecute such a campaign and there was also neither time nor experience in planning and executing such a campaign. As a result, there would be little hindrance to German movements to counter an invasion. Nor did it require Panthers or Tigers to defend the bocage against American forces in June and July of 1944, there were no Tigers and few Panthers there. Instead the terrain and a capable German infantry defense sufficed to hang on for six weeks.

There is also the not so minor problem that if you wish to generate sufficient force to execute a landing in France in spring of 1943, you simply will be forced to cancel TORCH in November 1942. Unfortunately there is simply no way that you can get the forces to Tunisia to defeat 5. Panzerarmee and 1. Italenische-deutsche Panzerarmee by 12 May 1943 and then back to England in time for a spring landing, it just won't work. Which leaves the defeat of Rommel unresolved and incidentaly a quiet nicely refurbished 10. Panzerdivision sitting in France in spring 1943.

There was a minor "window" of opportunity basically from about March-July 1943 in which German forces in France were relatively weak, espeically in terms of tanks. But that weakness was actually caused by TORCH and the drawdown of forces sent from France to Tunisia in the attempt to hold onto a toehold in Africa. But if TORCH doesn't occur then Tunisia doesn't become a sinkhole for 300+ Panzers that could have remained in France. Oh, and of course it's probable that British forces would likely have been at least temporarily stalemated by Romeel and without the threat to Tunisia could have been evacuated or even reinforced for another go at the Benghazi Handicap. :D
Hi Rich , Well I am looking at Round-UP for Aug 1943, and I don't see having to Cancel Torch because of that. We might scale it back a little. And given Hitler's propensity for "standing fast" I don't see any German forces being withdrawn from Africa, we'll just let them sit there and die on the vine in Tunisia , which was already occuring, plus if they try to ship anything back we could have just sunk it.

As to your 300+ panzer comment are you talking PZ's III IV and VI's, or are you including all those Italian tin can's too.
There was a minor "window" of opportunity basically from about March-July 1943 in which German forces in France were relatively weak, espeically in terms of tanks. But that weakness was actually caused by TORCH and the drawdown of forces sent from France to Tunisia in the attempt to hold onto a toehold in Africa
Like I said Aug 1943 Round-up , but I think that German forces were weak at that time in France not because they were being sent-off in small numbers to the side-show in North Africa/MED. I believe the massive investment of German fighting strength for the Kursk offensive and the Nazi-eating Bear on the Russian front had much more to do with it. And as I said earlier we knew of the German July Kursk offensive through Ultra. And being informed of the subsequent failure of Citadel and the Russian counter-attack it looks like a good time to kick the Nazis in the ass while the Russian are beating his head in, so-to-speak.

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#45

Post by Kingfish » 21 May 2006, 18:22

You make one point that does really affect the potential success of Round-up and that is the U-boat war. But in 1943 the U-boat war was a see-saw affair depending when Egnima could be read.
See-saw in that it went up once and came down once, and from there stayed down. However, the allied high command had no way of predicting that the tide would definetly turn in their favor. In fact, for the first half of the year the evidence pointed to the U-boats winning the battle of the Atlantic.

Here is a list of ship losses starting for the first half of '43:

Jan - 30 British, Allied and neutral ships of 189,000 tons in the Atlantic from all causes
Feb - 50 British, Allied and neutral ships of 310,000 tons in the Atlantic from all causes, 1 corvette
Mar - 90 British, Allied and neutral ships of 538,000 tons in the Atlantic from all causes, 1 destroyer
Apr - 40 British, Allied and neutral ships of 242,000 tons in the Atlantic from all causes, 1 destroyer and 1 submarine
May - 40 British, Allied and neutral ships of 204,000 tons in the Atlantic from all causes

This is the data the allied high command was looking at in the first part of '43.

Now, once the summer rolled around the pendelum swung back, and losses dropped to a fraction of what it was in the spring:

June - 7 British, Allied and neutral ships of 30,000 tons in the Atlantic from all causes
July - 29 ships British, Allied and neutral ships of 188,000 tons in the Atlantic from all causes
Aug - 4 British, Allied and neutral ships of 25,000 tons, 1 escort
Sept - 11 ships of 54,000 tons and 4 escorts
Oct - 13 ships of 61,000 tons and 1 destroyer
Nov - 7 ships of 28,000 tons and 1 US destroyer off the Azores
Dec - 7 ships of 48,000 tons and 2 destroyers including one US in the North Atlantic

Armed with this knowledge the allied high command could now plan for an invasion in '44, comfortable in the fact that the convoys from America, the lifeline of any invasion plan, would be getting through in sufficent numbers to sustain such a campaign.

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