Stiltzkin wrote:I am familiar with the 10 days reports. You should learn how to read the casualty reporting system (Verlustwesen), before correcting other posters. There are KIA, WIA , MIA, DOW/HW, other causes (sick, later returns, frostbitten etc.). They cannot have sustained 150,000 KIA in the city. The ration strength of 6th army was 298,573 (26,000 on leave, 50,000 Hiwis), plus 152,000 allies (see M.Kehrig, Stalingrad, Anlage 14 , 1974, p. 671). 4th Panzer Army had 42,215 men plus Romanian Divisions with 104,700 men (80,700 Romanians in Div., 24,000 non specified/in non-divisional HQ units), for a total of 146,915 men. Actual strength is always lower than ration strength. Ist Stärke: 242,583
These 3 armies faced the Soviet offensive with 597,488 men opposed by 1,106,000 men.
If you take 1,100,006 for the Red Army, Axis forces it is necessary to consider all the forces of the Italian 8th army. The Soviet South-Western front, all the forces which are included in the 1,100,006, occupied the area along Don river, which the enemy held the 3rd Romanian and 8th Italian. In the reserve of the 8th Italian army was 294-nd and 62-nd German infantry divisions. Before 19 November the battle group of the 62nd infantry division was transferred to the area of Kletskaya, and the result -in ring.
There, in the ring, was all 294-nd pioneer battalion 294 infantry division. In addition to the ring came a group of Italians (about 1000 people). This group went by truck to Stalingrad for firewood (in the don steppes there are no trees, they wanted to take apart the wooden house on the outskirts of Stalingrad). Just November 19, the group crossed the river via the bridge of Don near Kalach and hit the ring. These examples (such examples can give a lot) show the difficulty in determining the actual size of the documents only the 6th army. Not enough documents of army group B, as the ring came as non-Heer units and even non-Wehrmacht units (e.g. battalions "agricultural" army Goering or RAD).