Was the Soviet Union preparing to attack Germany?

[sandeepmukherjee196]

hmmmmm

[antwony]

If the Russians had any interest whatsoever in staying away from Europe and moving against the British empire, they would have handled the Bose affair differently.

While he was a whole lot of other things, Stalin was always some kind of Marxist.

Even post war when he was boss of half(a third/ quarter???) the world Stalin didn't like Indian nationalists. He thought they were a bourgeois elite and part of some British conspiracy.

In addition, 1947 was a different time to 1940/41. Pretty sure the Soviet Union was still in its "there are no socialists outside the Soviet Union" phase.

They barely showed the courtesy of allowing transit through their territory onward to Berlin. Bose was ideologically much more comfortable with Russia..

If he was telling the Border Police and the NKVD he was a socialist he was lucky to not get shot. He was a no one and would have been presumed to be a British spy. At the absolute best, they may have been familiar with his politics, in which case he would have been considered a Trotskyist and, once again, lucky not to get shot.

Soviet Union's treatment of Bose isn't evidence of anything.

[sandeepmukherjee196]

It is always better to make informed comments on these things.viz.,

Bose's stature as an Indian leader in the 30s and 40s...as perceived by Global leaders.

Bose's perceived ideology.

How and through what mechanisms Bose escaped from India, was escorted to Afghanistan and transited through the USSR en route to Berlin. This is not the thread for me to explain these grossly off topic subjects here.

Hitler's advice to Molotov / Stalin to look towards the British Empire for nibbling at (rather than Europe) didn't by any stretch of sane imagination refer to socialist states alone..since there were none. Neither would it presume a pre-conditionality that Russia's allies would have to be per force Socialist.The suggestion is ridiculous.

[Globalization41]

6/17/1941, Germany, Russia, Iran, Afghanistan

This article came out just before the invasion of Russia. Stalin would have liked for Hitler to have seen the speculation about Afghanistan, India, and Iran. It would have implied that Stalin was considering Hitler's advice. ... Or if Goebbels leaked these rumors, then it could have possibly put Stalin off guard.

Excerpt:

GERMANY AND IRAN
"It is likely that the Germans will ask, or demand from Rus-
sia the right to operate from the Black Sea, and oil supply from
Baku. If this is granted to Germany something else is certain
to follow. This would probably be the right to transport troops
over the southern portion of Russia to the Caspian Sea. If Ger-
many had control of the Baku oilfield, she might then attempt
an attack on Teheran, and attempt an invasion of Iran.
There is another aspect. Germany may attempt to induce
Russia to take an active part in co-operation with Germany and
invade Iran or advance from south-east Russia to Afghanistan.
If Russia were to agree to such a proposal she might move in
the direction of Kabul, and then threaten the North-west fron-
tier of India. If Russia and Germany were to act in unison,
Germany might attack Iran and Russia Afghanistan.
Whoever attempts an attack on India will have no easy
task. The Afghans would not be likely to sit idly by and allow
strangers to move through their mountain fastnesses. If an
enemy force moved towards India they would have to cross the
Himilayas. The Kyber Pass is the main connecting road be-
tween Afghanistan and lndia. In these mountain fortresses a
few regiments could deal with several divisions. Both Hitler
and Stalin would think a very long time before attempting such
a hazardous campaign."

IRAN THE GREATER POSSIBILITY
"Joint action by Germany and Russia against Britain might
result in an attack on Iran. This would enable such a combina-
tion to make an attempt to get behind Turkey by moving from
Teheran via Hamadam to Bagdad. It is quite on the cards that
this move may be under consideration. If the Germans were
able to obtain the assistance of Russia, or be permitted the use
of Russian territory and the Caspian Sea, Germany might use
this route for an attack on Iran and the Mosul oilfields. If this
move was successful, the Germans would certainly move to-
wards Trans Jordon to attack the Suez Canal from the east,
while the Germans and Italians launched an attack in the west
through Libya. We shall know very soon what is to happen
between Russia and Germany. We can be quite certain that
whatever arrangement is arrived at it will not be favorable to
Britain."

Globalization41.

[michael mills]

From the source linked by Globalization41 (The Cessnock Eagle and South Maitland Advertiser? Not exactly a leading mouthpiece for the opinion of Allied governments).

President Roosevelt has caused a sensation by ordering the whole of the German Consulates in America to be
closed down. It was stated by Mr. Sumner Wells that these Consulates had been used for propaganda purposes
to the detriment of American interests. This was contrary to all consular procedure. The action of the President
is likely to bring about a rupture in diplomatic relations between Germany and America. It is difficult to see how
America can much longer remain out of active participation in the war.

The described action by Roosevelt gives the lie to the assertion that the United States was reluctantly forced into the war against Germany by Hitler's declaration of war on 9 December 1941. For all practical purposes the United States was already deeply involved in the war against Germany, and an undeclared naval war in the Atlantic had been underway since 9 September.

In relation to the topic of this thread, the speculation contained in the article shows that the Allied governments had found out about Ribbentrop's proposal to Molotov that the Soviet Union join Germany, Italy and Japan in an alliance against Britain, in which its region of expansion would be India.

In fact, Stalin had no intention of joining such an alliance, since that would most probably lead to the defeat of Britain and the cementing of German control over the European Continent, thereby denying him the possibility of extending Soviet control to the west, and indeed opening the possibility, that Hitler would turn against him, at a time when the Soviet Union would have no allies, and demand the cession of Ukraine and the Baltic States, and perhaps other territories.

Stalin's response to Ribbentrop's proposals, agreeing to join an alliance with Germany but only under conditions that he must have known Hitler would find totally unacceptable (ie further Soviet advances to the west in the Baltic and the Balkans), was in effect a way of saying no without saying no explicitly.

Stalin's most probable motivation for making such an equivocal response was to keep Hitler guessing, an attempt to draw him into extended negotiations over the Soviet Union's joining the Continental Bloc proposed by Ribbentrop, giving him a breathing space to continue strengthening the Red Army and the Soviet military-industrial complex to the point where it would be able to fight a successful war against Germany, whether reactively in resistance to a German attack, or actively, by launching a first strike.

[Globalization41]

There was plenty of fake news in 1941. Roosevelt tried every trick in the book to get the U.S. into the war with Germany. The accumulative effect paid off for F.D.R. only after Pearl Harbor was followed by Hitler's declaration of war. ... I tend to believe the article appearing one week before the invasion of Russia emphasizing the positive aspects for the Soviet Union in joining the Axis and teaming up with Germany in a drive on India to be possible disinformation and rumor designed to confuse Stalin by telling him something he wanted to believe. ... The Australians got the same news as appeared in Europe. ... Molotov didn't go along with Indian Ocean proposal in Berlin in 1940, but Hitler knew Stalin would negotiate hard, especially at the start of a new spheres-of-influence proposal. Molotov wanted everything and Hitler stopped negotiating after the meetings. Hitler set up the Soviets and played Stalin for a sucker. It bummed out Stalin at the start of the invasion for a few days after he figured out what Hitler had done. But, Stalin landed on his feet. ... The Soviet doctrine of counterattack, encirclement, and annihilation was immediately ordered shortly after Hitler's invasion and eventually completed in Berlin by the Red Army in May 1945. ... If Hitler had offered a spot on the Axis team a week before June 22, 1941, with the German Army in position to invade, as was known to the Soviets, Stalin would have jumped at the chance to sign up just as he did in the case of Poland and the original Nazi-Soviet Pact.

Globalization41.

[paulrward]

Hello All ;

To Mr. Yuri :

Since when was starting a second front against USSR a better move than just fighting the west in a one front war?

Since Stalin was only waiting for the right time to attack Germany, i.e, when he had re organized his army command and modernized his air and mechanized forces.

Barbarossa was a surprise to Stalin only inasmuch as Stalin never expected Hitler to be able to stab him in the back before he succeeded in stabblng Hitler in the back !

Respectfully ;

Paul R. Ward

[Paul Lakowski]

Soviet invasion of a Nazi control/dominated Europe would be a disaster of the first magnitude. With out actual combat experience to rebuild the Red ARMY ;their best units would be annihilated deep enough into Europe that Hitler could march on Moscow unopposed, with Stalin hunted down by his enemies.

Stalin knew this much which is why he believed he could only attack AFTER the AXIS & ALLIES had battered each other to pieces for years .From what I've read Wehrmacht generals were much more afraid of invading USSR, than just" biting the bullet" and invading Britain. The losses would be enormous but neutralizing the UK/American axis effectively wins them the war even if Stalin is dumb enough to attack.

[Stiltzkin]

Since Stalin was only waiting for the right time to attack German

If he had done that, he would have lost this war in a very short amount of time (comparable to WW1 or the war against Poland in 29).
There was no intention to attack, because morale would not be on his side, nor would there be ever an "anti-Hitler" coalition (UN).
This is just speculation. Did they have possible scenarios and plans prepared for their armed forces? Certainly, as do NATO and russian forces today. Soviet intelligence was one of the best in the world, they could assess the situations well.
On Stalins personal list, were the following enemies: France, Poland, Japan, Finland, democracies (except for Japan, due to historical quarrels) as dictatorships were seen as possible "allies", useful for their task of expanding.
Germany was a willingful ally to divide Europe into two pieces. Exchange of resources and technology, for military maneuvers/polygons (outside the boundaries of the Versailles treaties) in Kazan.
One could argue that the Winter War emerged, because the Germans enabled a Soviet expansion over the baltic states deep into Bukovina. The next logical step was to grasp for Finland and parts of Poland.

To sum up: Whoever attacked first, would have also lost first. One of the most important assets the RKKA could rely on was the large amount of territory it could utilize, with an offensive undertaken, the exchange rate would have been considerably higher than historical levels, knocking them quickly back into their own territory.

This "view" is usually perpetuated by Nazi apologists "we had to go to war, it was preemptive". It is useful to read about German diplomacy and the tone that is used in documents, a revelation.
If this was the case, Hitler could have relied on a possible Union of armoured forces, not just limited to the "Axis" countries.
With either French, Dutch, Swedish, Polish participation, the balance of forces would have been immensly disfavourable.
I think it is quiet safe to prognose that they could not have even made it past Poland, at that time. They seized the opportunity to divide it in 39.
Hitler destroyed Europe (and thus any hope of countries fighting alongside him, his alliances were fragile and useless) and enabled an Anglo-American Soviet-alliance, bringing totally anthitetic factions to the table.

[ljadw]

No serious historian believes Suvurow : If Stalin wanted to stab Hitler in the back , he could and would have done it between october 1939 and july 1940,when German defenses in the East were very weak .

Even Hitler did not think that Stalin would stab him in the back in 1941 .

[Art]

On Stalins personal list, were the following enemies: France, Poland, Japan, Finland, democracies (except for Japan, due to historical quarrels) as dictatorships were seen as possible "allies", useful for their task of expanding.

From mid-30s France was formally a Soviet ally. About the same time Germany moved to the forefront as a principal Soviet military opponent. Right after Hitler established a democratic regime there, he-he. In short Soviet "European" planning before the mid-1930s expected a war with limitrophe states (Poland, Romania, Baltic countries, Finland) with a material and possibly a military support from Frnace and Britain. After mid-30s - a war with German, Poland, Italy, possibly in alliance with other limitrophes.
Calling interwar Poland "democracy" is quite stretch, even more for Baltic states.

[Omeganian]

There was no intention to attack, because morale would not be on his side,

Source that he believed that.

nor would there be ever an "anti-Hitler" coalition (UN).

...
If this was the case, Hitler could have relied on a possible Union of armoured forces, not just limited to the "Axis" countries.
With either French, Dutch, Swedish, Polish participation, the balance of forces would have been immensly disfavourable.

Mind rephrasing that in a manner that does not sound like you are stupid enough to think Stalin attacking first would have changed something in term of alliances?

This is just speculation. Did they have possible scenarios and plans prepared for their armed forces? Certainly, as do NATO and russian forces today.

Plans always exist, but they aren't always carried out. The 1941 plans were being executed to the letter.

Hitler destroyed Europe (and thus any hope of countries fighting alongside him, his alliances were fragile and useless) and enabled an Anglo-American Soviet-alliance, bringing totally anthitetic factions to the table.

If Hitler destroyed the hope of countries fighting alongside him, then what is this talk of a possible union?

[Stiltzkin]

Calling interwar Poland "democracy" is quite stretch, even more for Baltic states.

You might have a different defintion of "democracy" than other members on this forum (not to mention that such a formulation can be already classified as a mean spirited offense), however everything is better than the qualities of a Nazi or Soviet dictatorship. The annexation of the baltic states with the attack on Finland and Poland were a consequence of Nazi and Soviet (imperialistic) ambitions. France was on the list since the 20s, because of their support in the Polish-Soviet war:

"The first French aid to Poland came in the form of Haller’s army, a large force of Polish soldiers who had fought in France during World War I.82
The French armed and trained them, and up until late 1918, they had been commanded by a French commander."

JOSMS, The Fire of Revolution: A Counterfactual Analysis of the Polish-Bolshevik War, 1919 to 1920

If Hitler destroyed the hope of countries fighting alongside him, then what is this talk of a possible union?

Because this refutes peoples point about the casus belli, stating that the ultimate goal was "to counteract against a Bolsheveik expansion" and not conducting a war for living space, in the East.

Mind rephrasing that in a manner that does not sound like you are stupid enough to think Stalin attacking first would have changed something in term of alliances?

And finally, the Allies, wary of Communist power, might have proved more willing to revise Germany’s treaty obligations in an effort to
create a bulwark against communism. The result would have been an earlier revival of Germany’s military capabilities accompanied by a political desire to use them

p.182

1. Be careful with personal attacks - and with this we are already at point two, revealing your outstanding political understanding and intellect: 2. Because then he would be brandmarked as the official invader, Nazi crimes were still rather an unknown variable at that particular time, there was still room for negotiation, this was not the case once the world knew the full extent of Nazi crimes. Soviet crimes were always well hidden, this would change with a Soviet military expansion into the Western countries. In fact the USSRs policies did not differ substantially from Russias today. It is the same wine, just in a new bottle. "Poco a poco", grabbing for foreign soil, calling it either "military aid" or the support of a "separatist uprising".

Negotiating while fighting, used extensively in the Russian Civil War, would become a staple of communist diplomacy the world over. Given the lack of respect for diplomatic norms and the view that capitalist regimes were fundamentally illegitimate, communist regimes often dangled the prospect of peace while their militaries continued aggressive operations in an effort to weaken enemy resolve. This strategy would be used again by Stalin against Japan, by Mao in the Chinese Civil War, by Kim Il-Sung in North Korea, and most famously, by the North Vietnamese government during the Vietnam War.

[Art]

You might have a different defintion of "democracy" than other members on this forum (not to mention that such a formulation can be already classified as a mean spirited offense), however everything is better than the qualities of a Nazi or Soviet dictatorship

I don't see how it rebuts my words. Post-1926 Poland had a mixed political regime with strong authoritarian element. Three Baltic states had 100% authoritarian regimes. Neither was a pure democracy. The main point is that there was no observable correlation between "democratism" and assessment in Soviet military planning.

[Stiltzkin]

I don't see how it rebuts my words. Post-1926 Poland had a mixed political regime with strong authoritarian element. Three Baltic states had 100% authoritarian regimes. Neither was a pure democracy. The main point is that there was no observable correlation between "democratism" and assessment in Soviet military planning.

So you are saying that the Soviet occupation of the Baltic states was an act of self defense?