reliability of german documents
reliability of german documents
the majority of German NARA documents, which describe the interrogation of Soviet prisoners in 1941, stress poor morale and fighting spirit of Soviet prisoners and Red army in general. At the same German KTB even in summer of 1941 wrote about severe resistance of even encircled soviet units. What is the reason of such contradictions?
Re: reliability of german documents
There are probably many explanations for this. One that you may wish to research further is to what extent Russian units were fighting with political commissars at their back with promises of a bullet in their back if they wavered.teg wrote:the majority of German NARA documents, which describe the interrogation of Soviet prisoners in 1941, stress poor morale and fighting spirit of Soviet prisoners and Red army in general. At the same German KTB even in summer of 1941 wrote about severe resistance of even encircled soviet units. What is the reason of such contradictions?
British intel reports of the same period in North Africa suggest the German POW soldier was so low in moral the entire Nazi edifice was about to crumble - whilst they rumbled from one tactical victory to another...
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Re: reliability of german documents
There is one possible and quite elegant explanation:
Prisoners tend to be self selecting, in that they have not fought to the death.
They are therefore much more readily available for interrogation than those who have!
A slightly tongue-in-cheek Sid
Prisoners tend to be self selecting, in that they have not fought to the death.
They are therefore much more readily available for interrogation than those who have!
A slightly tongue-in-cheek Sid
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Re: reliability of german documents
That is not really what the prisoner reports in sector of the 11th Army say. About the only Concrete thing they say is the food in the Soviet Army was really bad. When it comes to morale the situation is more complicated. There are examples of one prisoner saying morale in a unit was bad, while Another says it was fine. When it comes to morate in the Soviet Army, the documents say a couple of different thingsteg wrote:the majority of German NARA documents, which describe the interrogation of Soviet prisoners in 1941, stress poor morale and fighting spirit of Soviet prisoners and Red army in general. At the same German KTB even in summer of 1941 wrote about severe resistance of even encircled soviet units. What is the reason of such contradictions?
1.) Morale among the pre-war professional Soldiers seems to have been fine (better than history would have us Believe). Great Russian were the most motivated, troops from the Cacausus and Central Asia not so much.
2.) The Soviets forced conscripted large numbers of Ukrainian, Moldavians and Rumanians into the Soviet units stationed in the area just Before and during the war. A large number of these troops just wanted to deserted at the first possible moment and return to their farms.
3.) It was fear of the Soviet officers and commissars that held the Soviet units together. Disipline was very harsh. One prisoner stated that the Soviet 14th Rifle Corps had executed 700 of their own men for defeatisum by early July 1941.
4.) This characteristic of Soviet troops to sometimes fight to the last man doesn't seem to be connected to military morale. It seems to be more like some group response to the fight-or-flight mechanisim. There are examples of part of a unit fighting for the last man, while the rest of the unit routed and examples of a unit fighting to the last man one hour, while an hour later the remainder of the unit routed when the German started forming up for a new attack. The Germans were confused by the behavior.
These observations are for the period June - August 1941. The Soviet units in the area suffered quite heavily (some units had recieved Three Groups of replacements by the end of July) and it wouldn't be surprising if most of the pre-war Soldiers were gone after just a few month.
Re: reliability of german documents
Just a random document:
"One should be cautious when interrogating prisoners for Russians are more than other nations prone to conform to expected aspirations of interrogators".
http://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/pages/595118/zooms/4
"One should be cautious when interrogating prisoners for Russians are more than other nations prone to conform to expected aspirations of interrogators".
http://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/pages/595118/zooms/4
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Re: reliability of german documents
Especially fascinating are the interrogations/interview reports with uberlaufers, and the colorful info they provide, especially about themselves; many of whom were serving in strafbats when they "deserted".
Even by mid-43, there seem to be almost daily reports from each division of Red Army soldiers and especially officers showing up at German lines to surrender.
Even by mid-43, there seem to be almost daily reports from each division of Red Army soldiers and especially officers showing up at German lines to surrender.
Re: reliability of german documents
I do not think that there were many officer deserters in Red army in 1943.
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Re: reliability of german documents
Actually I was somewhat surprised too. But according to the selection of Ic reports I looked at, from mid-July 1943 on the south face of the Kursk Bulge in the weeks after 'Zitadelle' was defeated, but before 'Rumyantsev' (Aug 3) each German division along the front was apparently receiving at least 3-4 deserters each week from either Voronezh or Steppe Fronts, and from every type of unit; Rifle divisions, Guards, Tank, whatever. There were some 8-12 German divisions along the line. Compared to the usual TO+E of about 1 officer per 5-10 men, it seems there was about 1 officer per 3 enlisted men who crossed the line, so it seems more officers than men were prone to desert.
But I have not gone back and carefully studied the reports or compared them to other areas or periods of the war. It's simply a rough count.
But I have not gone back and carefully studied the reports or compared them to other areas or periods of the war. It's simply a rough count.