Question About Western Contribution to the War

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MarkN
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Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

#196

Post by MarkN » 18 Jan 2018, 16:17

ljadw wrote:It's easy to make Hitler responsible for the success of Bagration (one should almost think that he drafted the Soviet plans, if one may believe some persons ) .

The unpleasant truths are

1 ) that the Soviets had an overwhelmong superiority (source : Germany and WWII Tome VIII, German edition )


For the first phase of Begration

1,254,000 men

24383 pieces of artillery

2715 tanks

1355 assault guns

5327 aircraft (strategic aircraft not included)

Germans :

Ist-Stärke 849000

Tagesstärke :486000

Artillery : 3236

62 !! tanks ,reinforced (haha) by the 56 tanks of 20 Pz

Assault guns : 452

Aircraft : 602

2 ) The proposal (by AGC and post war by the apologists of the Wehrmacht ) to withdraw AGC (til the German border ? )was senseless , as

a) before June there was no need for a withdrawal, as there were no indications for Bagration

b) after June 1 it was too late for a withdrawal

c) if the aim of the withdrawal was to shorten the front, a withdrawal would also shorten the front for the Soviets and would not change the Soviet superiority :withdrawal would not result in more German and less Soviet tanks and divisions : there were 34 German divisions, if AGC retreated, there would be still 34 German divisions .

3) At least Hitler had a possible solution to delay a Soviet advance : Die Festen Plätze = fortified towns and cities , these, was hoping Hitler, would suck in Soviet reserves, as they did in the winter of 1941/1942 .We know that they didn't suck in, and that they were a failure . But the proposals of the generals were not better .

AGC was no longer mobile and had no reserves to stop a Soviet advance .

There was no solution,unless hoping for a miracle and accepting that there would be a disaster.
That's a very Anglo-Saxon answer ljadw.... :lol:

jesk
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Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

#197

Post by jesk » 18 Jan 2018, 20:12

ljadw wrote:The Source for the Soviet artillery is :Geschichte des Grossen Vaterländischen Krieges Band 4, P 226 (mentioned by Frieser). :wink:
This number includes Soviet anti-tank guns and mortars. The total ratio is less.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Bagration
3,236 field guns and howitzers

32,718 guns, rocket launchers and mortars
On P 531 of the German edition of Germany and WWII , Frieser writes :"the biggest problem for AGC was the shortage on tanks ".118 German tanks against 2715 Sovjet tanks . This is NOT a normal ratio !
The Germans had anti-tank, assault guns. The ratio of the tanks is not terrible and was not decisive.
And on P 535 , Frieser writes : "Die immobil gewordene Heeresgruppe Mitte war im Sommer 1944 nicht mehr operationsfähig " .In English : AGC was in the summer of 1944 no longer mobile and could no longer operate .
my translation

The Army Group Center, which had become immobile, was no longer operational in the summer of 1944

this phrase is taken out of context, need to look at least a few pages
And a retreat was a non sequitur :

at the beginning of May, FHO expected an attack against AGNU with as direction East Prussia or Hungary .

a week before Bagration the prognose was : a secundary attack against AGC and the principal attack against aGNU with direction East Prussia .

Besides, given the immobility of AGC it was too late in June for a withdrawal .
That you explain to the German generals. At the meeting on June 14, they insisted on getting out, based on the situation. Your objection in the context: the German generals thought wrong. Hitler was right.
People do not like alternative history. Simpler war of the Germans against the Russians. And no mistakes. Errors tire and strain the brain.
And, if you are shortening the front for the Germans, you are shortening him also for the Soviets .
Wrong. The overall ratio of divisions in the operations of 1943/1944 is 1.5 - 2.5 in favor of the Russians. In places of enemy attacks 3-6 times. The reduction of the front is advantageous to the leading positional defense side.


ljadw
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Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

#198

Post by ljadw » 18 Jan 2018, 22:17

The Germans had also anti tank guns and mortars:number of German field artillery was only a small part of total artillery .

With the AG, the ratio was : Germans 570; Soviets 4070 .

The Soviets could attack every sector of AGC even simultaneously ,while the Germans had not the forces to defend all sectors, even not to defend a few sectors .

Even if you were shortening the front of AGC, its 35 divisions could not defend it against a Soviet superiority . And there is no reason to assume that,if AGC was withdrawing to the Berezina, it could stop the Soviets there . Besides, a withdrawal of AGC implied a withdrawal of AGN .

In the winter of 41/42 the generals wanted to retreat to Poland,hoping it would be less cold there . After Citadelle, Manstein, who had a lot of mobile divisions, retreated to Romania, something his fanboys glorified after the war with the nonsens about his backhand . The excuse for a retreat of AGC was that this would shorten the front, but in France the generals wanted to give up Normandy and to retreat to the Seine which would extend the front . :P

What the generals of AGC said on June 14 was nonsense : if there was a small attack as was saying FHO, there was no need to retreat, if it was a big attack,it was too late to retreat and a frontline at the Berezina would not stop the Soviets .

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Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

#199

Post by ljadw » 18 Jan 2018, 22:30

Aretreat of AGC before Bagration has already been discussed on this forum in the following thread : Army Group Center withdraw before operation Barbarossa ?

I like to refer to the post by Paspartoo, who cited an excerpt of an article published in the Journal of Slavic military Studies with as titlr " A reappraisal of operation Bagration" 1944, the conclusion of which was :

"Given the Soviet intentions and overwhelming forces,the German weaknesses were simply too comprehensive for withdrawal to prevent the ultimate success of Soviet plans ."

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Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

#200

Post by jesk » 18 Jan 2018, 22:44

ljadw wrote:The Germans had also anti tank guns and mortars:number of German field artillery was only a small part of total artillery .

With the AG, the ratio was : Germans 570; Soviets 4070 .

The Soviets could attack every sector of AGC even simultaneously ,while the Germans had not the forces to defend all sectors, even not to defend a few sectors .

Even if you were shortening the front of AGC, its 35 divisions could not defend it against a Soviet superiority . And there is no reason to assume that,if AGC was withdrawing to the Berezina, it could stop the Soviets there . Besides, a withdrawal of AGC implied a withdrawal of AGN .

In the winter of 41/42 the generals wanted to retreat to Poland,hoping it would be less cold there . After Citadelle, Manstein, who had a lot of mobile divisions, retreated to Romania, something his fanboys glorified after the war with the nonsens about his backhand . The excuse for a retreat of AGC was that this would shorten the front, but in France the generals wanted to give up Normandy and to retreat to the Seine which would extend the front . :P

What the generals of AGC said on June 14 was nonsense : if there was a small attack as was saying FHO, there was no need to retreat, if it was a big attack,it was too late to retreat and a frontline at the Berezina would not stop the Soviets .
You write baloney. Posts of other authors more adhere to the threads of discussion. Your level is the lowest. :) For every nonsense or phrase from the context, I need a comment. To which follows a new portion of "reflection" on the war.

For example, comment on the words about Manstein and his departure to Romania. In the first half of 1944, an army group was formed in Normandy. Large forces were spent in Italy and the Balkans. Accordingly, the strength of the eastern front has greatly subsided. In addition it is. In such circumstances, Manstein well kept.

https://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic ... 2#p2102392
And, remember, that the RA could attack along the ENTIRE front. In November, Manstein demanded a) shorten the front (abandoning Crimea, the Dnieper curve (=Nikopol bridgehead and Zaporoshje) b) give us more mobile divisions (from Army Group Centre) c) place them in the northern wing (4. Pz.Armee)

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Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

#201

Post by ljadw » 19 Jan 2018, 09:14

Manstein was already fired BEFORE D Day :P

The truth is that Manstein failed, although he had most of the mobile divisions in the East . The result of his backhand was that the Soviets were at the border of Romania .

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Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

#202

Post by Boby » 19 Jan 2018, 13:11

jesk wrote:That you explain to the German generals. At the meeting on June 14, they insisted on getting out, based on the situation.
Jesk, I asked you before to provide a source for this claim. It is not mentioned at all in Ziemke and, as far I can see, Frieser.

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Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

#203

Post by jesk » 19 Jan 2018, 17:19

ljadw wrote:Manstein was already fired BEFORE D Day :P

The truth is that Manstein failed, although he had most of the mobile divisions in the East . The result of his backhand was that the Soviets were at the border of Romania .
It's hard to argue with you. You have a worldview that you adhere to. About Operation Bagration is:
There was no solution, unless hoping for a miracle and accepting that there would be a disaster.
All other arguments are ignored, in response, write nonsense. I was not the first to notice that your posts are defiantly goofy.

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Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

#204

Post by jesk » 19 Jan 2018, 17:26

Boby wrote:
jesk wrote:That you explain to the German generals. At the meeting on June 14, they insisted on getting out, based on the situation.
Jesk, I asked you before to provide a source for this claim. It is not mentioned at all in Ziemke and, as far I can see, Frieser.
Tippelskirch K., Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges. — Bonn, 1954.

In another source, I read that, following the results of the meeting, it was decided to send the 5th Panzer Division from Kovel to Belarus. The division received the order on June 15, but because of diversions of guerrillas on the railroad could begin the movement only on June 22.

http://militera.lib.ru/h/tippelskirch/10.html

At the front of Army Group Center, the enemy's intentions began to be clarified approximately by June 10. It was here, where the German command least expected an offensive, began to appear, evidently, signs of large Russian preparations. Intelligence reported new armies; aviation noted the strengthening of rail transport and intensive traffic on highways. As always, the well-performing AIR divisions established that a large number of forces of Russian artillery that had been sent here began to fire at a number of sectors of the front of the German army group. The prisoners reported on the appearance of "shock units" in the rear of the enemy. On the so-called "defensive sections", which were hitherto held by less efficient units, the change of the latter was noted by strong connections. A few more days passed, and for the command of the army group "Center" it became quite obvious that the enemy was deploying large forces on this front. In addition, the directions of the forthcoming attacks on Bobruisk, Mogilev, Orsha and Vitebsk began to become clearly visible. Obtained as a result of a comparison of the most diverse observations, the picture of the enemy's preparations was so clear and definite that there was absolutely no room for speculation about the possibility of imitating and misleading. On June 14, the Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces held a meeting with the participation of all the Chiefs of Staff of the groups of armies and armies. While the chiefs of staff of Army Group North and the two southern groups unanimously reported that there was no sign of preparations for their anticipated Russian offensive on their front, the chiefs of staff of the armies of the Center group equally unanimously pointed to the almost complete The deployment of large Russian forces in front of the front of their armies.

The evacuation of the remaining bridgehead on the Dnieper would make a significant part of the army's front almost impregnable and would simultaneously lead to considerable economy of forces. Even more effective would be a well-prepared, immediately before the start of the Russian offensive, the withdrawal of troops to the border of Bobruisk and Polotsk, thanks to which a straight, considerably shortened front would be created, and the deployment of enemy forces would immediately be devoid of any effect.
The commander of Army Group Center, Field Marshal Bush, was unable to defend his point of view before Hitler. The attempt made by him at the end of May to point out the discrepancy between the length of the front line and the number of troops and to achieve a change in the task of the army [597] group, which obliged to keep and defend the line occupied, met with sharp opposition. Hitler cynically asked Bush whether he belongs to the number of generals who constantly look back. After this, Bush submitted to the will of Hitler and proceeded to fulfill the order of the latter to throw all his forces at the equipment of the front lines. Not wishing, apparently, to run into new troubles, Bush did not renew more attempts to achieve another solution, until by mid-June the scope of enemy preparations on the front of this group of armies became quite certain. Probably still, the command did not assume that the enemy would undertake an offensive here with great forces and with such broad aims as it turned out a few days later, and therefore their own chances for defense were clearly overestimated. The last uncertainty regarding the timing of the offensive began on June 20, when major sabotage on the railways of Pinsk-Luninets, Borisov-Orsha and Molodechno-Polotsk, that is, exactly on the communications of Army Group Center, were taken by guerrillas.

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Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

#205

Post by ljadw » 19 Jan 2018, 18:31

For obvious reasons, an English translation of a Russian translation of what Tippelskirch wrote in 1950/1951, is very questionable .

Almost everything that from German side was published in 1950 is good for the dust-bin .

It is also irrelevant as on 14 june the dies were cast .

The meeting between Busch and Hitler in may is also besides the point, as Busch did still not believe that there would be a big Soviet attack against AGC, thus there was no reason for this army group to retreat .

Tippelskirch is also writing nonsense : how could the Germans organise ,a week before Bagration, a well -prepared withdrawal of an immobile army group (the words are from Frieser) and do this a few hours before the Soviets attacked ?

The opinion of the Co S of the armies of AGC and of the southern AGs was also debunked by the previsions of FHO (Gehlen) which were, on 15 june, : a secundary attack against AGC while the main attack would happen against AG NU (Germany and WWII Tome 8 P 573).
The deployment of large Soviet forces against AGC did NOT mean that this would be the Soviet main attack .

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Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

#206

Post by jesk » 19 Jan 2018, 18:42

ljadw wrote:For obvious reasons, an English translation of a Russian translation of what Tippelskirch wrote in 1950/1951, is very questionable .

Almost everything that from German side was published in 1950 is good for the dust-bin .

It is also irrelevant as on 14 june the dies were cast .

The meeting between Busch and Hitler in may is also besides the point, as Busch did still not believe that there would be a big Soviet attack against AGC, thus there was no reason for this army group to retreat .

Tippelskirch is also writing nonsense : how could the Germans organise ,a week before Bagration, a well -prepared withdrawal of an immobile army group (the words are from Frieser) and do this a few hours before the Soviets attacked ?
For 2-3 days, it's just a retreat. Do not argue with Tippelskirch, just remember that soldiers have legs. In the army horses.

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The opinion of the Co S of the armies of AGC and of the southern AGs was also debunked by the previsions of FHO (Gehlen) which were, on 15 june, : a secundary attack against AGC while the main attack would happen against AG NU (Germany and WWII Tome 8 P 573).
The deployment of large Soviet forces against AGC did NOT mean that this would be the Soviet main attack .
What's the difference. The main attack or not the main one. There were reconnaissance data that the Russians simultaneously attacked the 2, 4, 9, 3 panzer armies. This should have alerted. Russians start something big. Taking the opportunity, the generals recalled the desire to reduce the front for the convenience of defense, at the same time to deprive the Russians of the opportunity to act according to plan. Impromptu only.

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Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

#207

Post by jesk » 19 Jan 2018, 19:00

For the Dnieper, at least withdraw. Defense on the waterfront by small forces. More divisions were released for Orsha's defense.

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Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

#208

Post by jesk » 19 Jan 2018, 19:07

Soviet attacks and German plan. Germans knew everything about plans of Russians. arrows coincide!

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Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

#209

Post by jesk » 19 Jan 2018, 21:33

In the winter 1944 Russians performed operations by limited forces. In the summer at the same time attacked on all front. The possibility of maneuver reserves from not attacked sites wasn't any more. Therefore the front needed to be reduced. Main reason of defeat of course fortresses. Already position defense became super position. Not lack of tanks, Hitler has immobilized the Center group.

Surprise for Germans became defense consequences in fortresses. Alfred Jodl pointed to it, in particular. If the commander of group of armies Bush has moved up reserves closer to the front, only then fortress could consider the holding-down factor. He had to treat to troops on a ledge as to promptly lost. Not to consider that there divisions, to see only holes in defense. Then conclusions could be similar to Jodl's opinion.

https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Витебская ... я_операция

In October-December 1943, the Soviet fronts in the western direction attempted to carry out the orders of the Supreme Headquarters of the Supreme Command to defeat the German Army Group Center and take the Vilnius-Minsk line. In a number of directions, the local enemy was able to inflict local defeats (Gorodok operation, Nevel operation, Gomel-Rechitsa operation), on others the offensive ended in failure (the Orsha operation), but on the whole these operations did not develop into a strategic offensive, German defense in the central sector of the Soviet-German front withstood the onslaught of Soviet troops.

In the Vitebsk direction after the defeat of the grouping of German troops north of Gorodok, the troops of the First Baltic Front cut the railway of Polotsk-Vitebsk and occupied the covering position from the north in relation to the Vitebsk enemy grouping. At that time, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command also enlisted the Western Front and transferred the 39th Army from the First Baltic Front to its operation. In view of the failure of previous operations, several shortened tasks were set in the Directive of Supreme Headquarters of the Supreme Commander in Chief No. 220011 of January 18, 1944.

However, the troops did not have the proper preparation for the operation. Thus, the Western Front before the start of the operation twice went on the offensive, trying to break through the German defense: from December 23, 1943 to January 6, 1944 in the Vitebsk direction (the front advanced to 12 kilometers, forcing the enemy to leave the first defensive line, having lost the killed - 6,692 people, wounded - 28,904 people, total 35,596 people), and on Bogoshevskoe direction from January 8 to 24, advancing by 2-4 kilometers (losses amounted to 5,517 people killed, 19,672 wounded - 25,189 people). Thus, instead of accumulating forces for the operation, the troops squandered them.

http://zhistory.org.ua/alfrjodl.htm

Concerning the plan of operations of 1944 I can tell that it actually didn't exist. we carefully analyzed a question – where the German army can take active actions? In the west of army were in invasion expectation. From one theater of war it was impossible to take troops for the East more. There was an offer on carrying out active operation of local value in the area Fords, but also it hasn't taken place.

For the first time we have begun to experience the difficulties in ammunition connected with falling of production of the steel and coal industry.

The lack of manpower in a quantitative sense managed to be overcome. Divisions of East front by the beginning of summer operations of 1944 have been completed on 75–80 percent though the quality of staff was much worse, than earlier.

We assumed that the blow from Russians will follow on the southern site, namely in the direction of the Romanian oil therefore the main quantity of tank divisions has been concentrated by us around the southern groups of armies.

At this time Hitler has said at one of the operational meetings: "Better I will lose the Belarusian woods, than the Romanian oil".

Nevertheless the main blow of the Red Army has been struck against the central group of armies which considerably has been weakened by transfer of forces to the south. The private reason of defeat of TsGA (21) can be considered also small mobility and efficiency of troops of the general field marshal Bush (22) and misuse of reserves by him. He put reserves too far, and in the conditions of 1944 it was impossible to count neither on counterattack, nor on counterstroke but only on counterattacks.

Subsequently the Fuhrer looked for the reasons of defeat of TsGA in subversive activities of traitors – participants of a plot on July 20. I didn't agree with him. The reasons should be looked for not in traitors, and in a lack of forces.

I considered the main shortcoming that East front never had opportunities to create the real reserves. Divisions which were removed to the second line didn't manage to have a rest and again rushed to fight. Of course, I understood that here we are depending on the opponent's initiative.

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Re: Question About Western Contribution to the War

#210

Post by jesk » 19 Jan 2018, 21:45

Hitler's orders from the point of view of the military theory are ridiculous. In them there is no sense, it how to dig in a heap of shit, trying to find valuable there. His actions only in the context of sabotage are logical. Reduction of the front always on advantage to the party conducting position defense. Up to reduction to a midget point. From which the Universe has arisen then. :)

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