Glowaczow 1944

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Life Standarda
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Re: Glowaczow 1944

#16

Post by Life Standarda » 13 Mar 2018, 08:35

Art wrote:Tank losses of the 16 Tank corps are given in detail:
107 Tank Brigade lost ......So finally in 24 hours between the evening of 21 and 22 August 22-24 Soviet tanks and SP guns became irreparable losses. The German claim (42) is a usual exaggeration probably influenced by counting vehicles that were lost on the same battlefield in the previous days or counting damaged but repairable tanks/SP guns.
Hello,Art,regarding about the losses of 11GTB during 21-22 August,I find some records of 244 Gds Regiment.

https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view ... peregovori

This is a hand-write record so it's extremely difficult for me to understand, but please note Page 6 which seemly metions "3 tanks from 11GTB,of which one NC, were set on fire". And it seems this losses was suffered before the evening attack on 21.08.

According to reports from БТ и МБ division of 8GA,between (18:00) 21.08-(18:00) 23.08, the quantity of "burned out" tanks of 11 GTB increased from 10 to 12, perhaps fire on those 2 tanks had been successful extinguished, or it's a simply delayed record.

Regards.

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Re: Glowaczow 1944

#17

Post by Art » 13 Mar 2018, 17:57

Life Standarda wrote: Hello,Art,regarding about the losses of 11GTB during 21-22 August,I find some records of 244 Gds Regiment.

https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view ... peregovori


This is a hand-write record so it's extremely difficult for me to understand, but please note Page 6 which seemly metions "3 tanks from 11GTB,of which one NC, were set on fire". And it seems this losses was suffered before the evening attack on 21.08.
Or probably in the night 20/21.8
According to reports from БТ и МБ division of 8GA,between (18:00) 21.08-(18:00) 23.08, the quantity of "burned out" tanks of 11 GTB increased from 10 to 12, perhaps fire on those 2 tanks had been successful extinguished
Yes, I've seen it. Those records give cumulative totals, but it 's problematic to determine when and where they happened exactly. Unfortunately, not war diary or other docs of the 11 GTBr are available. Note that 244 Regiments complaint that brigade's tank retreated without much fighting.


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Re: Glowaczow 1944

#18

Post by Art » 14 Mar 2018, 09:27

Life Standarda wrote: This is a hand-write record so it's extremely difficult for me to understand, but please note Page 6 which seemly metions "3 tanks from 11GTB,of which one NC, were set on fire".
Translation of the relevant part:
[20 August]
After replenishing ammunition and bringing themselves in order regiment’s troops following a 15-minute artillery preparation started a resolute attack and by 16.00 reached the following lines: 1 Battalion – north-east edge of Moniochy, 2 Battalion – 200 m south of Emilow, 3 Battalion – 600 m south-east of Emilow. The enemy suffered large losses and in personnel and materiel and started to retreat in panic. Pursuing the enemy 1 and 2 Battalion by 22.00 reached Glowaczow from the south (?) and 3 Battalion reached north-east edge of Lezenice, At 21.45 after a 20-minute artillery strike 244 Guards Regiment started an attack supported by tanks with the objective to dislodge the enemy from Glowazcow and Lezenice. By 24.00 1 and 2 Battalions had fully captured Glowaczow and following an order of the regimental commander took defense on the north-west and south edges of Glowaczow. By that moment 3 Battalion fully took Lezenice and by 24.00 its right wing esteblished connection with Glowazcow.
See scheme No.4

Image
Positions of the 244 Guards Rifle Regiment as of 7.00 21.8.44

At 2.00 21.8.44 battalion commanders together with the regimental commander checked defensive positions of battalions and gave orders to lat mines in front of regiment’s positions at the western and southern edges of Glowaczow. By that time 246 Guards Regiment was on the level of Moniochy, so the right flank was fully exposed. The regimental commander decided to move his reserve (submachine-gun and anti-tank rifle companies) to the flank, but due to their weakness they were not able to firmly cover the gap to the 246 Regiment. Only at 12.00 21.8.44 76 Guards Regiment/27 Guards Division came to the left flank of the regiment, coordinated actions at the juncture with 3 Battalion were not organized before the enemy actions started.
By 6.00 21.8 all regimental and attached artillery was placed on firing positions at Glowaczow and was ready to repulse enemy attacks from Shmaelnik, Podmiesce. Between 8.00 and 15.00 the enemy launched 6 attacks from Shmaelnik and Ml.Wes to Glowazcow with forces more than an infantry battalion and 30 armored vehicles. In heavy combat the 244 Regiment inflicted large losses in personnel and weapons. The enemy left up to 300 dead and 5 knocked-out tanks and retreated to starting positions. In the course of the battle the regiment lost 2 45-mm guns, 93 men killed and wounded. In the area of the [Glowazcow’s] church 3 tanks of the 11 Tank Brigade were burnt, including 1 IS tank.

Between 15.00 and 19.00 concentration of enemy infantry and tanks in the areas of Lipa and Bronislawow and the hill 131.2 (south-west of Glowaczow) was spotted which was reported to the divisional commander and fire of rocket launchers on the enemy concentration was requested. At 19.30 21.8.44 up to an infantry regiment with 16 tanks from the area of Bronislawow, up to a battalion with 8 tanks from Shmaelnik and up to a battalion with unspecified number of tanks from Ml.Wes simultaneously launched a counterattack from the front and flank. Taking use of superiority in numbers the enemy at the price of heavy casualties managed to reach the Glowaczow church from the rear by 21.00. Regimental guns, a battery of 86 Anti-Tank Battalion and 5. anf 6. Batteries/185 Guards Artillery Regiment that were standing on open positions near a dirt road north of Glowaczow were partly knocked out by fire from enemy tanks and SP guns, and the rest of them couldn’t offer serious resistance. Tanks of the 11 Tank Brigade that were at assembly position in Lezenice … by three salvos of multiple rocket launchers and what remained of them without an order together with 76 Guards and 140 Guards Rifle Regiment started a disordered retreat from the line Glowaczow cemetery-Lenience-Rogozek toward Emilow. When enemy tanks came to the road Glowaczow-Lezenice the pocket around 244 Guards Regiment was fully closed. The commander of the 2 Battalion senior lieutenant Sarychev after reporting situation to the regimental commander at 4.00 started to prepare a breakout attack to the north and withdrawal to Emilow. By 7.00 the battalions after leaving Glowaczow took defense along the line north-east edge of Moniochy – point 126.9 which they defended until the evening of 9.9.44.
I would take their usual complaints about neighbors with a grain of salt

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Re: Glowaczow 1944

#19

Post by Life Standarda » 15 Mar 2018, 09:11

[20 August]
After replenishing ammunition and... withdrawal to Emilow. By 7.00 the battalions after leaving Glowaczow took defense along the line north-east edge of Moniochy – point 126.9 which they defended until the evening of 9.9.44.
Hello,art,really appreciate for your valuable trans work, it shows lots of details about the fight around Glowaczow,especially those occured before 22 Aug.

I have asked my friend who has some copy files(seems like KTB,not sure) of 9 Army on hand which offers information about 19pzd during 21-22 August.

According to this report,19 pzd had 8 PzIV and 20 PzV combat ready on 21 Aug(no excatly hour),along with 12 heavy ATG; a heer Flak.Abt was also assigned with 9 heavy Flak. A following report on 23 Aug indicates that there were 7 PzIV combat ready, but to status of PzV it only has a symbol "—'',I am not sure it means "no available data" or "no PzV combat ready."

Further more, a PzV from XXXXVI PzK was recorded as "total-loss" on August.

I'll try to upload the image of this record.
Regards

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Re: Glowaczow 1944

#20

Post by Life Standarda » 15 Mar 2018, 09:40

Two reports regard the status of 19PzD
Attachments
23-19.jpg
Reprot of 23 Aug, unclear status of PzV
21-19.jpg
Report of 21 Aug

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Re: Glowaczow 1944

#21

Post by Art » 15 Mar 2018, 15:20

Thanks, from this page I/Pz.Regt 27 had 33 operational Panthers on 19.8.44 and 20 on 22.8. On 1 September there were 53 Panthers total (41 operational).

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Re: Glowaczow 1944

#22

Post by Art » 20 Dec 2018, 09:11

Art wrote:
22 Oct 2017, 19:58
Below is an interesting tactical account published in the Volume II of T. Jentz's "Panzertruppen" and describing a battle fought by 19 Panzerdivision near a Polish village of Glowaczow on 21/22 August 1944.
I've found that Jentz omitted the part with conclusions from the original article which is quite instructive. The following is my translation from "Nachrichtenbalatt der Panzertruppen Oktober 1944"
Experience:
1. Tactically correct employment of tanks always lead to great results.
2. Firm concentration of tanks, fire support from artillery and clear objectives assigned to two battle groups of different strength were of decisive importance in night combat.
3. Offensive impetus of tanks dispersed strong enemy artillery and mortars fire which, thus making possible an advance of infantry.
4. Destruction of attacking enemy tanks is possible with even inferior forces, provided that:
a) Situation and especially terrain are correctly evaluated.
b) A reconnaissance for own counterattacks or starting positions is made.
c) Masked firing positions are skillfully selected and
d) A tank commander allows enemy tanks to advance to a close distance in cold blood.

Comments by the General Inspector of Panzertruppen:
The following conclusions from these two examples must be emphasized and made absolutely clear to troops:
Regarding A (attack)
1. Attack of tanks against a position with strong anti-tank defense is only possible when supported by artillery and heavy infantry weapons.
2. A tank battalion attacking with open flanks must be deployed in such a way that it would be possible to destroy an enemy attack against its flank by turning one of tank companies.
3. An attack against a settlement is made in principle from two different directions in order to split efforts of enemy defense.
4. Tanks employment in urban combat only achieves results when they are closely supported by accompanying infantry.
5. Night actions of tanks and infantry when they are executed with thorough preparation, clear assignment of objectives and perfect liaison between them often lead to great results with small own casualties.

Regarding B (defense)
1. Assembly positions of tanks in built-up areas must be avoided in case of enemy air superiority. One should refuse from them, since settlements attracts enemy air attacks, and tanks despite a prohibition are placed too close to buildings for a sake of camouflage, so when a building catches fire they cannot be rescued.
2. Correct assessment of terrain influence on enemy attacking capabilities as well as reconnoitering for own combat capabilities are decisive preconditions for success in defense. As a principle one should attack enemy forces from a flank.
3. Security of a town edge is provided by a few tanks driving into concealed positions, whereas the bulk of tanks stay ready for movement.
4. Clear and objective reports on enemy strength and direction and radio discipline are decisive conditions for correct employment of mobile tank reserve. Commanders, especially tank company commander should lead units in person.
5. Beaten and retreating enemy tanks should be ruthlessly pursuit and destroyed. A confusion of retreating enemy must be exploited for immediate own attack.

Summary:
Both battles provide instructive examples and prove than our troops stay far superior to enemy in attack and defense, provided that the following conditions are fulfilled:
a) Skillful and tactically correct employment and firm command
b) Cooperation of different arms, especially between tanks, infantry and artillery.
c) Unity and discipline as well as unfaltering battle brotherhood among troops.

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Re: Glowaczow 1944

#23

Post by Michate » 08 Mar 2019, 17:08

I have asked my friend who has some copy files(seems like KTB,not sure) of 9 Army on hand which offers information about 19pzd during 21-22 August.

According to this report,19 pzd had 8 PzIV and 20 PzV combat ready on 21 Aug(no excatly hour),along with 12 heavy ATG; a heer Flak.Abt was also assigned with 9 heavy Flak. A following report on 23 Aug indicates that there were 7 PzIV combat ready, but to status of PzV it only has a symbol "—'',I am not sure it means "no available data" or "no PzV combat ready."
The same records show for 19 Pz.-Div. 13 PzIV and 10 PzV combat ready on 24 August, climbing to 18 PzIV and 28 PzV combat ready on 25 August, and 22 PzIV and 30 PzV combat ready on 26 August.

With this context, it is likely the "-" means "no available data / not reported", and not "0".

Some more information from the same records:
Record of 22 August is not included (missing) in record set.
Record of 23 August reports (delayed) 1 PzV completely lost in XXXXVI Pz.-K on 22 August.
Oherwise, no complete losses reported during the covered time span.

From a tactical perspective, the use of the artillery from 19 Pz-Div to cover the advance of the Panther tanks is interesting, described (briefly) in the "Gefechtsbeispiele aus dem Zweiten Weltkrieg" and (in more detail) in Hinze's "Die Hannoversche Artillerie", Vol. 1 (PAR 19).

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Re: Glowaczow 1944

#24

Post by Life Standarda » 19 Dec 2019, 07:23

Art wrote:
14 Nov 2017, 21:06
You are welcome. Worth to add that total losses of the 82 Guards Rifle Division on 19-22 August (attack, defense and counterattack) were 530 men killed and 1370 wounded. Weapons losses included 1 122-mm howitzer, 19 76-mm divisional and 6 regimental guns, 10 45-mm AT guns, 1 120-mm and 10 82-mm mortars, 8 AT rifles, 35 medium and 52 light machine guns, 312 machine pistols and 436 rifles. Quoted in the final battle report of the 82 GRD:
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view/?id=134759956
Hello art, the loss mentioned in this division level report seems a little strange for me because no "missing" person are reported, although the loss of 82GRD amounts to 1900. I check some regiment level report and find missing person are reported in these document.

A report submitted by 244 Guards Regiment on 0800 23rd August , which belongs to 82GRD, states the total casualties between 19-23 amounts to 278 killed,349 wounded and 126 missed.
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view ... vki:drugie

Besides another regiment level report from 242 Guards Regiment(also belongs to 82GRD) metioned 17 missing person during same period.
https://pamyat-naroda.ru/documents/view ... 1%81%D0%BF

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Re: Glowaczow 1944

#25

Post by Art » 25 Jul 2020, 10:57


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Re: Glowaczow 1944

#26

Post by Art » 25 Jul 2020, 12:09

Combat strength of battalions of the XXXXVI PzK on 14.8.44:
https://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/ru/ ... ect/zoom/6

Artillery OOB of the XXXXVI PzK on 14.8.44:
https://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/pag ... 53/zooms/8

OOB of the 19 Pz. Division on 19.8.44:
https://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/ru/ ... ect/zoom/8

indicating in particular 31 Panthers, 36 Pz.IV and 20 assault guns with the division (I guess that means operational)

Detailed OOB of the XXXXVI Panzerkorps (16.8.44):
https://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/ru/ ... ect/zoom/6

OOB as of 25.8.44:
https://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/ru/ ... ect/zoom/6

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Re: Glowaczow 1944

#27

Post by Art » 02 Aug 2020, 14:24

Excerpt from a war diary of the German XXXXVI Panzerkorps
18 August 1944
Bartodzieje

The day was quiet save for numerous reconnaissance forays on the Magnuszew bridgehead in late evening and night hours.
Further offensive preparations of the enemy are confirmed by commitment of the I Guards Corps and artillery registration in many places. Enemy battle order is such that there are 6 divisions facing to the west and 3 divisions to the south.
Assessment of the enemy on the Janowiec bridgehead is unchanged.
Enemy activity on the Vistula Front is lively as usual. The Corps count on early start of the enemy large offensive from the Magnuszew bridgehead. The attack direction cannot be clearly determined thus far.
The Corps command holds on to its previous decision - withdrawal of mobile formations from the front for their mobile employment in case of the hostile large offensive.
At 11.00 the Army’s order assigns 19 Pz.D. for withdrawal to the army reserve and sets an assembly area for the HG division - area west of Glowaczow, without one regimental group at Zwolen, the division is to be later relocated to an area north of Radom. Task of the corps remains unchanged.
Attachment: telephone message of the 9 Army Ia Nr.155/44 g/Kdos.

Assembly and deployment of the Corps Group E are expedited by arrival of the last regimental groups using motor transport of the HG division and is completed by evening.
6 Grenadier Division according to an army’s message starts arriving at night 18/19.8.44 by tempo 12 [trains per day] and is unloaded in the area north of Radom. The corps asks to change the unloading area to Krusziny in order to shorten march duration.
It is expected that a first regiment will be able to deploy during the night 19/20.8.44 on the northern wing of the HG division by relieving the Krampnitz battalion. Until 6 Gred.Div. takes over a sector arriving elements will be subordinated to the HG division.
2 fortress anti-tank companies (each 3 8.8-cm Pak 43 and 12 7.62-cm infantry guns) and 5 anti-tank battle groups each of 3 8.8-cm Pak 43 are sent to the Corps Group E. They are immobile and according to the Army’s instruction are employed for defense of the Pilica River front from Warka to Bialobrzegi. Arrival of the first company can be counted on already on this day.
Attachment: Corps Order Nr. 56 Ia Nr. 1946/44 geh.

The Corps order and special instructions to commanding generals regarding occupation of defense in the first line in expectation of the defensive battle.
Individual arrangements:
A) Chief of staff in the course of conversation with the Army’s COS once again points to poor material situation of the artillery regiment of the Corps Group E and requests early issue of replacement materiel.
B) COS says that until deployment of new formations (304 Infantry Division) release of miscellaneous units attached to the 17 Infantry Division is not possible.
C) At 13.00 the Army’s operational officer orders bringing the 19 Armored Reconnaissance Battalion (without 2nd company) to one-hour march readiness by 19.8.44. Release only by authorization of the Army.
This order wasn’t carried out since the 19 Armored Reconnaissance Battalion arrived to the divisional zone already by 13.30.
D) 19 Pz.D. receives an order on survey and construction of rear position.
Attachment: telephone message Ia Nr.1948/44 geh.

The Corps Group E (save for 447 Grenadier Regimental Group attached to the Corps Harteneck) fully arrives by 17.00.
At 17.45 COS informs the commander of HG division of the general situation. In respect to expected large hostile offensive the commander believes that the hostile attack should be stopped in depth at 2 kilometers from the present positions.
COS says that for the Corps Group E and 45 Inf.Div. withdrawal from the present main line of defense is not possible and therefore the HG division should also fight on the present line.
At 18.00 the commander in chief of the 9 Army in a telephone conversation with the COS once again stresses importance of prepared defense measures for expected large hostile offensive.
COS reports that all needed for defense is already set forth in a written form in today’s order and formations are preparing for defense.
Attachment: see details in “Corps order Nr.56 on strengthening of defense measures on the Vistula Front”

Air situation: large activity of hostile aircraft
Weather: before noon – clear and sunny, after noon – sultry and stormy.
From:
https://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/ru/ ... ect/zoom/6

For simplicity "Fallschirm-Panzer-Division Hermann Göring" is abbreviated as HG.

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Re: Glowaczow 1944

#28

Post by Art » 03 Aug 2020, 22:30

Battle order of the XXXXVI PzK from 18 August (mentioned in the war diary above):
Command of the XXXXVI Panzer Corps
Corps HQ, 18.8.44
Abt. Ia Nr.1946/44 geh.

Corps Order Nr.56
On strengthening of defense measures on the Vistula position.

1.) The enemy carries out preparatory activity for a large offensive from the bridgeheads. With the start of the large offensive simultaneous attempts of crossing are also possible.
It should be expected that before the attack the enemy will try to precisely reconnoiter course of the main line of resistance, positions of artillery and heavy weapons, locations of staffs etc and then by massed air strikes and drum fire on these targets will neutralize our defense power.

2) XXXXVI Panzer Corps strengthens its defense measures for defense of the present positions while continuing to release mobile reserves.

3) Missions:
17 Inf.Div. positions itself for defense of the present sector with main effort on the Janowiec bridgehead. Dispatch of additional forces to the divisional sector beginning from 23.8 should be counted on.
45 Gren.Div. reinforces with unchanged missions defense measures in its present sector with the main effort on the left.
6 Gren.Div. relieves with unloaded units the HG division in its present sector step by step beginning from the northern wing and deploys itself for defense of this sector.
Corps Group E defends the sector assigned to it.
1/1132 Gren.Brig. is to be relieved by 6.00 19.8 and sent to Magierova Wola under control of the VIII Army Corps. The commander is to establish telephone communications with the brigade HQ at Chynow.
For security of the Pilica sector from Bialobrzegi to Warka (these towns included) two fortress anti-tank companies )each with 3 8.8-cm Pak 43 and 12 7.62-cm infantry guns) are sent by the VIII Army Corps. Further on dispatch of five anti-tank battle groups (each with 3 8.8-cm Pak 43) by rail transport should be counted on.
Division HG according to an order which will follow soon is relieved in its sector by 6 Gren.Div. and assembles its relieved elements at the disposal of the corps in the are Glowazcow-Helenow-Grabowy Las. Artillery and anti-aircraft still remain on their positions. [Their] early withdrawal should be secured.
Reinforces 2nd Parachute Panzergrenadier Regiment stays in the area of Zwolen. Actions in the sector of the 17 Inf.Div. should be reconnoitered.
Further on relocation of the division to the area Wincentow-Jedlinsk is foreseen.
19 Pz.Div. assembles itself in the region assigned to it as a reserve of the Army. Transfer of orderes via the XXXXVI Pz. Corps.
The division reconnoiters possible actions in the following order of priority:
a) Grabow Pilica
b) sector Mariampol-Cecylowka
c) Vistula sector Ostroleka - Gora Kalwaria
The following divisional elements are initially left for actions with the Corps Group E:
a) Panzer Artillery Regiment 19 (with 2 battalions south of Pilica)
b) two armored strike groups of composition to be soon ordered to the division
c) 1 panzerjäger company
Artillery command 101 in addition to its previous tasks secures cooperation between artillery of the Corps Group E and VIII Army Corps in the sector Ostroleka-Konary.
Corps Pioneer Commander and Corps Signal Battalion 446 – missions are unchanged.

4) Measures for increasing defense power
Troops should made systematic preparations for a coming defense battle with powerful artillery fire and strikes ground-attack airplanes. Preservation of own artillery and signal lines is of decisive importance.
Therefore it is pointed out among other things:
a) The enemy should be deceived regarding the course of the main line of resistance by ever-changing positions of combat outposts, good camouflage and building of dummy positions.
b) Massed fire effect of hostile artillery and air force should be dispersed by deployment in depth. That also applies to positions of heavy weapons in depth. Every company, every battalion, and every regiment should have strike reserves even small.
c) Every battery should be provided with one alternative position and one dummy position. Report execution by 22.8.
d) Protection of artillery by anti-aircraft guns is a vital question, liaison with local antiaircraft commanders.
e) Provision of artillery support by assignment of barrage and destruction fire zones, signals and uniform fire plan for artillery and heavy weapons for a case of signal failures
f) Maintenance of signal communications by signal centers in bomb-proof installations, laying signal lines in areas protected from fire and not along roads, distancing of radio stations from headquarters, camouflage and decentralization of radio stations.
g) Camouflage of headquarters. Preparation of alternative positions for headquarters.
h) Construction of splinter-proof holes along the main communication roads.

5.) I expect that every troop commander will adjust to a large battle not merely materially but first of all by his spiritual qualities.

Signed Freiherr von Lütwitz [sic!]
General Lieutenant
https://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/ru/ ... ect/zoom/6

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Re: Glowaczow 1944

#29

Post by Art » 12 Aug 2020, 21:18

War diary of the XXXXVI Panzer Coprs, 19 August 1944:
19 August 1944
Bartodziele

At night harassing fire from both sides along the entire corps sector. Hostile attacks of company strength on the entire front, especially against Chodkow and the forest north of Grabow Zalesny. A regiment-strength attack at Grabow Zalesny (Corps Group E) is repulsed by fire of all weapons.
Relief proceeds as planned save for I./Gren.Brig. 1132, which couldn’t be relieved due to hostile attack at dawn.
At 8.00 divisions on both bridgeheads reported hostile drum fire followed in the areas of the 45 Gren.Div. and HG division by battalion- and regiment-strength attacks which led to penetrations.
The hostile penetration reported at Grabnowola was eliminated, whereas Mariampol and Cecylowka were lost. HG 1 regiment was committed against the penetration at Mariampol.
By 10.00 the fire ebbed.
By 10.30 the strongest drum fire renewed. The hostile offensive in southern direction manifested itself.
On the ground of the situation the Corps ordered 19 Pz.Div. to get ready for a march at 10.45. The exact area of actions (tentatively Glowaczow) still couldn’t be foreseen.
During the night the left neighbor corps reported that the enemy crossed the Pilica and penetrated the village of Pilica. Evidently a battalion (Poles). VIII Army Corps request to send the I./1132 Gren.Brig. as soon as possible, since the Corps has no reserves.
At 11.20 a telephone order is transferred to the I./1132 Gren.Brig. (which was relieved in the meantime) to set on march toward Pilica was a group of assault guns.
By 13.00 the following picture of the situation emerged:
The counterattack of the HG 1 regiment advanced to the southern edge of Kol. Moniochy.
In the area of the 45 Gren.Div. the enemy by employment of numerous ground attack planes and with support of massed artillery fire achieved a deep penetration which evidently advanced to Emilow. The situation along the entire front west of the Radomka remains unclear.

The Corps now decides to restore the situation by commitment of all available reserves. Calculations of time reveals that HG 2 regiment released by the Army in Zwolen and elements of the 19 Pz.Div (74 Pz.Gren.Rgt. and the armored group), which were also readied for a march, in the best possible case can be assembled in the penetration area by 19.00. Timely arrival of Pz.Gren.Rgt. 73 cannot be expected due to poor roads.
The counterstrike is to be made in the following way:
45 Gren.Div. with arriving and attached to it HG 2 regiment: departure from the area of Rogozak via Machalow to the north to occupy the main line of resistance east of Grabnowola.
19 Pz.Div.: departure with organic units via Lipa, point 146.7, forest north of Emilow to occupy the main line of resistance north of Grabnowola.
HG Division: (attached to the 19 Pz.Div. for the attack): departure using the strike of the 19 Pz.Div. to the north to occupy the main line of resistance in the sector Mariampol-Cecylowka.
Arko 101 has a mission to coordinate concentrated employment of both divisions’ artillery for support of the counterstrike.

13.15 order to the HG 2 regiment to start march toward Brzoza as soon as possible.
13.45 the chief of staff request aviation support from the 9 Army’s chief of staff (however without result)
15.00 message from the VIII AK, the situation at Pilica with arrival of the I./1132 Gren.Brig. was soon restored. The hostile penetration was widened by renewed attacks with strong support of artillery and air force in the afternoon.

Situation at 18.00:
Forward line: along the Radomka (Chodkow is occupied by the enemy) – to “B” south of Chodkow – then to the west via point 127 to Michalow – eastern edge of Michalow -point 133 – north edge of Emilow – south of Kol.Moniochy – Hernrykow – Heelnowek - P.135 (in the forest) – then to the north-east to the old main line of resistance.
The 45 Gren.Div. should be viewed as not fully stable (see the daily situation report).
The counterstrike planned to be launched at 19.00 was postponed considerably, since both strike groups could reach assembly areas only at nighttime due to aviation activity and difficult terrain.
At 23.00 there is no still clear picture of the counterstrike. It is questionable if the strike groups would be able to depart and gain ground in darkness.

Assessment of the enemy: XXXXVI Pz.Corps holds the view that the attack to the south was made by three divisions, while a Polish division provided a screen to the west at Warka. The Corps command decides based on that that the enemy has other 6 divisions in his disposal for continuation of the offensive and attack direction to the south and south-west should be expected.
Signs of expected hostile attack on the southern bridgehead (Janowiec) were not obtained yet, but the Corps command is aware of the critical situation there (due to departure of reserves from the area of Zwolen).

Intentions:
a) Defense on the present line;
b) Assembly of all reserves in the area of Dobieczyn, which could be employed either north of Glowaczow or north of Dobieczyn.
The main part of the 19 Pz.Div. is also concentrated in the area of Dobieczyn and joined by the rocket battalion previously situated at Warka and moved by imporvised motor transport, whereas a part of the division (19 Reconnaissance Battalion and 19 Anti-Tank Battalion) are left in the area of Bialobrzegi and can be sent toward Zwolen if required.
Corresponding orders are given to divisional chiefs of staffs by telephone between 16.30 and 17.25.
Attachment: Excerpts from the “Crops Order Nr. 57 for continuation of the battle on the Magnuszew bridgehead” – Ia Nr.1954/44 geh.

By 00.30 it is reported: 45 Grem.Div. took Chodkow by a counterattack. HG 2 Regiment took Michalow and presumably also the Hill at Michalowek. The Hill 139 and the grove west of it are in our hands.
At 24.00 the 45 Gren.Div. reports recapture of Chodkow.
00.30 situation briefing to the Army Commander-in-Chief. Course of the main line of resistance: Michalow-Emilow-Kol.Moniochy-Henrykow-Helenowek.
Combat on this line.

Miscellaneous:
a) Owing to withdrawal of anti-aircraft elements from ground command the Corps command sends a proposal to the Army by teletype.
Attachment: Telegramme Ia Nr. 1949/44. geh.
b) At 02.30 a telephone order of the Army on immediate survey and marking of the rear position (“Tiger” position). General course: Vistula to Kozieniec (incl.) – to Brzoza – Podlesie Stromiec -Stromiec – Ducka Wola – Palczew. The surveyed position will be then built be civilians under the Party control. The order on survey of the further rear position (“Leopard”) should be expected.

Air situation: during the day and evening hours increased activity of hostile ground attack airplanes on both bridgeheads.

Weather: hot and dry summer day.

Art
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Re: Glowaczow 1944

#30

Post by Art » 13 Aug 2020, 09:26

Daily situation report of 19.8.1944 to the 9 Army command.

1a) In the evening of 18.8. and morning of 19.8 attacks up to regimental strength of reconnaissance and pinning down character along the entire front of the Magnuszew bridgehead with strong artillery support. In the middle of the day of 19.8 an offensive in the southern sector evidently launched by three divisions and initiated by drum fire and strong activity of ground-attack airplanes and supported by circa 60 tanks. It should be expected that this offensive was made to gain favorable starting positions and the main mass of the 8 Guards Army will come into action tomorrow from previously conquered positions to the south of will make a surprise attack from the region south of Grabow Pilica to the south-west, after units of the 8 Guards Army situated south-east of Warka are relieved by Polish forces.

b) In detail:
17 Inf.Div: after repulsing of hostile attack of battalion strength from Nw. Janowiec prepared by strong artillery and mortar fire the day passed quietly.
45 Gren.Div.: after a drumfire-like artillery preparation a hostile attack of regimental-strength on the left wing of the 45 Gren.Div. led to deep penetration to a line north of Michalow-Emilow-Kol.Moniochy. After 15 tanks were knocked out a new defense line was built. From 15.00 a new hostile attack with support of tanks, artillery and rocket launchers against Michalow-Emilow is in progress.
HG Div.: a hostile attack in the southern sector of 6-8 battalion strength supported by tanks and strong artillery fire pushed the reconnaissance battalion from the line Monjochi-Henrikow-south of point 147.6. Own counterattack with HG 1 regiment and assault battalion brought the enemy to a standstill.
Corps Group E: In the morning 2 hostile attacks each of battalion strength north of Grabow Zalesny were repulsed. A local penetration was cleared up. 50 counted enemy dead, 1 prisoner captured.

3.) 37 Gren.Rgt. (6 Gren.Div.) is attached to the HG division and employed in the sector Budy-Augustowskije – Podosije (excl.).
Attachment of I./1132 Gren.Brig. is ended and it is sent to the VIII Army Corps.
Fortress Atni-Tank company from 09.00 is on positions in the area north of Pilica. Positional Rocket Regiment 102 with I. Battalion has arrived.

7.) [Intentions:] Restoration of the old main line of resistance by counterattacks with the main mass of the 45 Gren.Div., HG and 19 Pz. Div. After successful execution it is intended to withdraw the 19 Pz. Div. during the night and assemble in the area Studnie-Stromiec.

8.) In the 17 Inf.Div. one man went missing, probably a defector (grenadier Adolf Adam, Gren.Btl. 476)

9.) Warm, dry.
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