Experiences 48 pz corps around Shitomir-Berditschev

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Aida1
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Experiences 48 pz corps around Shitomir-Berditschev

Post by Aida1 » 23 Feb 2021 19:50

'Commanding general XXXXVIII Pz corps command post 26.01.1944
Ia nr 96/44 Secret
Experiences from the offensive and defensive fighting in the area Shitomir-Berditschev from 15.01.1943 to 21.01.1944

The corps has always fought at the decisive spots in attack and defense. An alternating number of pz div of the army, the waffen ss and infantry divisions were subordinated to it.

1 )infantry divisions in their actual form are outdated. Allocating a Sturmgechutz Abteilung can fundamentally remedy this and can make our infantry divisions in one stroke fully battle worthy again.

The light machinegun with its acessories are too heavy.In the actual panzer war the infantry is so disrupted , that it soon has to throw away its machinegun equipment because of physical exhaustion.Tests with the MP 43 have to strive towards doing away with the light machinegun.
Towed AT guns are left behind for the same reason. The infantry needs to get self propelled AT guns.
Close range antitank means(Faustpatrone) belong in each group

The above results in the following organisation of infantry and mot infantry companies :
2 storm platoons of 3 groups each , group around 1/7
armament : 5 machinegun gunners, 1 man with pistol, Faustpatrone and hand grenades.
1 heavy platoon, 2 heavy machineguns, 2 heavy mortars, 3 Ofenrohre'

to be continued

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Aida1
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Re: Experiences 48 pz corps around Shitomir-Berditschev

Post by Aida1 » 24 Feb 2021 19:49

'2) Tank destroyer btl 473(mot)

In the view of the corps the expense in manpower and material (vehicles)is not proportionate to its performances. The integration of Faustpatrone and Ofenrohre has to be done directly in the troup.

3)Panzer div have proven themselves. Our tanks are materially absolutely superior to the russians.

Training
The largest part of the successes of the corps are due to using night and the ruthless continuation of the attack by moonlight.First the troop had to get used to this combat method.Especially newly constituted pz units and Army Pnzer Abyeilungen believe that tanks should not operate at night and brusquely reject operations at night. Training has to remedy this.The russian used his tanks during the night with full light(strong searchlights with blinding effect).
The training of all soldiers in mine warfare which i had asked for in the past, has to be executed.In the fighting around Wel.Derewitschki on 15.1 and 16.1.1944 the 7 pz and parts of the 19 pz had broken into the russian positions. The russian counterattacks conducted from all sides were effectively supported by an offensive use of mines.The troop was most sensibly restricted in its area of movement. At each counterattack mines were laid rapidly.On the only track to the rear mines were laid again and again , partially under cover of overgrowth and dusk, between the vehicles of marching colums. Of 6 tanks, 14 Sturmgeschütze and 28 APC ,1 tank , 4 Sturmgeschüze and 3 APC were damaged by mines.This offensive use of mines was an important cause for the having to give up the offensive success of the 7.pz div.
Unfortunately the decree of the Gen d. Pi of 20.12.1943 for a relevant training and use of mines contains too many restrictions. The low number of russian tanks destroyed through mines could have the same cause. The troop has to accept losses through own mines as through other own means of combat.
The russian throws massed AT regiments against our tank attacks. The breaking of these AT fronts proved itself as very difficult. At times the troop shied from this more than the tank fight.Taking advantage of terrain, night attack and above all collaboration of all arms, namely timely and skillfull use of artillery, leads to success. Also using the Luftwaffe(tank hunters)is pretty effective'

to be continued
Last edited by Aida1 on 24 Feb 2021 19:51, edited 1 time in total.

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Aida1
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Re: Experiences 48 pz corps around Shitomir-Berditschev

Post by Aida1 » 24 Feb 2021 19:49

'2) Tank destroyer btl 473(mot)

In the view of the corps the expense in manpower and material (vehicles)is not proportionate to its performances. The integration of Faustpatrone and Ofenrohre has to be done directly in the troup.

3)Panzer div have proven themselves. Our tanks are materially absolutely superior to the russians.

Training
The largest part of the successes of the corps are due to using night and the ruthless continuation of the attack by moonlight.First the troop had to get used to this combat method.Especially newly constituted pz units and Army Pnzer Abyeilungen believe that tanks should not operate at night and brusquely reject operations at night. Training has to remedy this.The russian used his tanks during the night with full light(strong searchlights with blinding effect).
The training of all soldiers in mine warfare which i had asked for in the past, has to be executed.In the fighting around Wel.Derewitschki on 15.1 and 16.1.1944 the 7 pz and parts of the 19 pz had broken into the russian positions. The russian counterattacks conducted from all sides were effectively supported by an offensive use of mines.The troop was most sensibly restricted in its area of movement. At each counterattack mines were laid rapidly.On the only track to the rear mines were laid again and again , partially under cover of overgrowth and dusk, between the ehicles of marching colums. Of 6 tanks, 14 Sturmgeschütze and 28 APC ,1 tank , 4 Sturmgeschüze and 3 APC were damaged by mines.This offensive use of mines was an important cause for the having to give up the offensive success of the 7.pz div.
Unfortunately the decree of the Gen d. Pi of 20.12.1943 for a relevant training and use of mines contains too many restrictions. The low number of russian tanks destroyed through mines could have the same cause. The troop has to accept losses through own mines as through other own means of combat.
The russian throws massed AT regiments against our tank attacks. The breaking of these AT fronts proved itself as very difficult. At times the troop shied from this more than the tank fight.Taking advantage of terrain, night attack and above all collaboration of all arms, namely timely and skillfull use of artillery, leads to success. Also using the Luftwaffe(tank hunters)is pretty effective'

to be continued

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Aida1
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Re: Experiences 48 pz corps around Shitomir-Berditschev

Post by Aida1 » 25 Feb 2021 20:14

' 4. Blocking units

Mostly only alarm units could be thrown against quickly penetrating russian tank units. Their battle worth was low.In accordance with the russian example(see above) AT gun regiments seem necessary. To prevent the german tendency for over organisation and the corresponding waste of personell and material, it is ecommended to apply the russian strengths.The units can only gain in mangeability and mobility.
The only gun that comes into consideration is the towed AT gun.Self propelled have no operational mobility and too strong losses in marching up.
The AT guns coud numerically be easily obtained the following way. The XXXXVIII has in the period concerned by this report ,captured and destryed 2027 AT guns . Of these 500 could easily have been recovered with a corresponding organisation.n The Feldzeugbtln that operated in the corps area only recovered 100 AT guns. The troop recovered 30AT guns. Because spare parts were lacking, they were quickly abandoned.
Proposal: Certain Feldzeugbtlns should be designated as AT guns recovery btlns, which exclusively recovery AT guns, their equipment and ammunition as also spare parts.Because the btlns have to closely follow the troop, the use of POW"s is not suitable.For the recovery of the captured weapons supply servics can also be used.

5.Airforce
The collaboration has proven itself, above all tank hunters.Frequently with success precisely coordinated attacks in time and space were started by tanks and aircraft against broken through tank units.In other cases the air force succeeded in pushing broken through tank units in woods and robbed them of any possibility to move during the day. Through this at least one full russian breakthrough was thwarted which could be opposed by nothing. A further expansion of the tank hunters seems urgent.
For our tanks there is the following conclusion: flak panzer and stronger rear armour.
Collaboration between tanks and air tank hunters has to be trained.Communication in combat through luminous signs and indicating fire.

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