Experiences 48 pz corps around Shitomir-Berditschev

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Aida1
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Experiences 48 pz corps around Shitomir-Berditschev

#1

Post by Aida1 » 23 Feb 2021, 20:50

'Commanding general XXXXVIII Pz corps command post 26.01.1944
Ia nr 96/44 Secret
Experiences from the offensive and defensive fighting in the area Shitomir-Berditschev from 15.01.1943 to 21.01.1944

The corps has always fought at the decisive spots in attack and defense. An alternating number of pz div of the army, the waffen ss and infantry divisions were subordinated to it.

1 )infantry divisions in their actual form are outdated. Allocating a Sturmgechutz Abteilung can fundamentally remedy this and can make our infantry divisions in one stroke fully battle worthy again.

The light machinegun with its acessories are too heavy.In the actual panzer war the infantry is so disrupted , that it soon has to throw away its machinegun equipment because of physical exhaustion.Tests with the MP 43 have to strive towards doing away with the light machinegun.
Towed AT guns are left behind for the same reason. The infantry needs to get self propelled AT guns.
Close range antitank means(Faustpatrone) belong in each group

The above results in the following organisation of infantry and mot infantry companies :
2 storm platoons of 3 groups each , group around 1/7
armament : 5 machinegun gunners, 1 man with pistol, Faustpatrone and hand grenades.
1 heavy platoon, 2 heavy machineguns, 2 heavy mortars, 3 Ofenrohre'

to be continued

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Re: Experiences 48 pz corps around Shitomir-Berditschev

#2

Post by Aida1 » 24 Feb 2021, 20:49

'2) Tank destroyer btl 473(mot)

In the view of the corps the expense in manpower and material (vehicles)is not proportionate to its performances. The integration of Faustpatrone and Ofenrohre has to be done directly in the troup.

3)Panzer div have proven themselves. Our tanks are materially absolutely superior to the russians.

Training
The largest part of the successes of the corps are due to using night and the ruthless continuation of the attack by moonlight.First the troop had to get used to this combat method.Especially newly constituted pz units and Army Pnzer Abyeilungen believe that tanks should not operate at night and brusquely reject operations at night. Training has to remedy this.The russian used his tanks during the night with full light(strong searchlights with blinding effect).
The training of all soldiers in mine warfare which i had asked for in the past, has to be executed.In the fighting around Wel.Derewitschki on 15.1 and 16.1.1944 the 7 pz and parts of the 19 pz had broken into the russian positions. The russian counterattacks conducted from all sides were effectively supported by an offensive use of mines.The troop was most sensibly restricted in its area of movement. At each counterattack mines were laid rapidly.On the only track to the rear mines were laid again and again , partially under cover of overgrowth and dusk, between the vehicles of marching colums. Of 6 tanks, 14 Sturmgeschütze and 28 APC ,1 tank , 4 Sturmgeschüze and 3 APC were damaged by mines.This offensive use of mines was an important cause for the having to give up the offensive success of the 7.pz div.
Unfortunately the decree of the Gen d. Pi of 20.12.1943 for a relevant training and use of mines contains too many restrictions. The low number of russian tanks destroyed through mines could have the same cause. The troop has to accept losses through own mines as through other own means of combat.
The russian throws massed AT regiments against our tank attacks. The breaking of these AT fronts proved itself as very difficult. At times the troop shied from this more than the tank fight.Taking advantage of terrain, night attack and above all collaboration of all arms, namely timely and skillfull use of artillery, leads to success. Also using the Luftwaffe(tank hunters)is pretty effective'

to be continued
Last edited by Aida1 on 24 Feb 2021, 20:51, edited 1 time in total.


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Aida1
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Re: Experiences 48 pz corps around Shitomir-Berditschev

#3

Post by Aida1 » 24 Feb 2021, 20:49

'2) Tank destroyer btl 473(mot)

In the view of the corps the expense in manpower and material (vehicles)is not proportionate to its performances. The integration of Faustpatrone and Ofenrohre has to be done directly in the troup.

3)Panzer div have proven themselves. Our tanks are materially absolutely superior to the russians.

Training
The largest part of the successes of the corps are due to using night and the ruthless continuation of the attack by moonlight.First the troop had to get used to this combat method.Especially newly constituted pz units and Army Pnzer Abyeilungen believe that tanks should not operate at night and brusquely reject operations at night. Training has to remedy this.The russian used his tanks during the night with full light(strong searchlights with blinding effect).
The training of all soldiers in mine warfare which i had asked for in the past, has to be executed.In the fighting around Wel.Derewitschki on 15.1 and 16.1.1944 the 7 pz and parts of the 19 pz had broken into the russian positions. The russian counterattacks conducted from all sides were effectively supported by an offensive use of mines.The troop was most sensibly restricted in its area of movement. At each counterattack mines were laid rapidly.On the only track to the rear mines were laid again and again , partially under cover of overgrowth and dusk, between the ehicles of marching colums. Of 6 tanks, 14 Sturmgeschütze and 28 APC ,1 tank , 4 Sturmgeschüze and 3 APC were damaged by mines.This offensive use of mines was an important cause for the having to give up the offensive success of the 7.pz div.
Unfortunately the decree of the Gen d. Pi of 20.12.1943 for a relevant training and use of mines contains too many restrictions. The low number of russian tanks destroyed through mines could have the same cause. The troop has to accept losses through own mines as through other own means of combat.
The russian throws massed AT regiments against our tank attacks. The breaking of these AT fronts proved itself as very difficult. At times the troop shied from this more than the tank fight.Taking advantage of terrain, night attack and above all collaboration of all arms, namely timely and skillfull use of artillery, leads to success. Also using the Luftwaffe(tank hunters)is pretty effective'

to be continued

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Re: Experiences 48 pz corps around Shitomir-Berditschev

#4

Post by Aida1 » 25 Feb 2021, 21:14

' 4. Blocking units

Mostly only alarm units could be thrown against quickly penetrating russian tank units. Their battle worth was low.In accordance with the russian example(see above) AT gun regiments seem necessary. To prevent the german tendency for over organisation and the corresponding waste of personell and material, it is ecommended to apply the russian strengths.The units can only gain in mangeability and mobility.
The only gun that comes into consideration is the towed AT gun.Self propelled have no operational mobility and too strong losses in marching up.
The AT guns coud numerically be easily obtained the following way. The XXXXVIII has in the period concerned by this report ,captured and destryed 2027 AT guns . Of these 500 could easily have been recovered with a corresponding organisation.n The Feldzeugbtln that operated in the corps area only recovered 100 AT guns. The troop recovered 30AT guns. Because spare parts were lacking, they were quickly abandoned.
Proposal: Certain Feldzeugbtlns should be designated as AT guns recovery btlns, which exclusively recovery AT guns, their equipment and ammunition as also spare parts.Because the btlns have to closely follow the troop, the use of POW"s is not suitable.For the recovery of the captured weapons supply servics can also be used.

5.Airforce
The collaboration has proven itself, above all tank hunters.Frequently with success precisely coordinated attacks in time and space were started by tanks and aircraft against broken through tank units.In other cases the air force succeeded in pushing broken through tank units in woods and robbed them of any possibility to move during the day. Through this at least one full russian breakthrough was thwarted which could be opposed by nothing. A further expansion of the tank hunters seems urgent.
For our tanks there is the following conclusion: flak panzer and stronger rear armour.
Collaboration between tanks and air tank hunters has to be trained.Communication in combat through luminous signs and indicating fire.

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Re: Experiences 48 pz corps around Shitomir-Berditschev

#5

Post by Aida1 » 26 Feb 2021, 21:34

'6) Command experiences
The cavalry type use of the pz div , that is to say the use of its high mobility to envelop the enemy has proven itself again and again and is above all much cheaper as frontally battering through.
So the corps succeeded in a night march from 05/06.12.1943 from the area of Shitomir in an average performance of 70 km per pz div a fully surprise attack in the open flank of the russian 60 Army, which during the day could be pushed 30-40 km deeper in the rear of the enemy. With low own losses it was succeeded to disrupt the enemy fully and inflict heavy losses.
the russian seals off his breakthroughs and bridgheads to the flank so strong immediately that a attack conducted against this runs into a dead end, the same against the front of the attack.By contrast, an attack obliquely from the side mostly brings a resounding success(bridghead Radomyschl).
The experiences 'Zitadelle' repeated themselves on a small scale daily. The night and the twilight are to be exploited more than ever for attack and pursuit. One should not be afraid of marching with open lights.The resistance of the troop against night marches is to be broken. Tanks can also attack by moon shine-and star light .The troop must learn to use the compass again.
When feasible,the breakthough through enemy positions is to be conducted in a cohesive corps attack , namely that first the whole artillery helps through the tanks and Sturmgeschütze of a division , then the whole artillery makes the second division sector ripe for attack and the tanks of the second division which at first have joined the attack of the first division ,willl break open the sector of the second division from flank or rear.
This procedure is necessary in the combat operations with decreasing numbers of tanks.
In the defense the armored groups of the divisions are to be kept in reserve and centrally commanded by the corps.The collaboration also with the airforce is to be secured.
In the retreats the 7 pz div suffered a high loss of vehicles.The corps to which the division was not subordinated at this time, cannot check the details. However, i believe the following circonstance was partly to blame.
In Shitomir there were ,when the corps took over, 436 units. LSSAH and 1 pz div had still to march through.The 18 artillery div marched in and the supply troops of XIII corps and partly the XXXXIII Corps streamed back in it. Only with brute force and use of a division staff, the corps succeeded in disreveling this tangle in some way. There was no time and space for the necessary moving away of the supply trains. That it did not come to one of the more disastrous catastrophes of this war is only attributable to the fact that the russian was lead badly and too cautiously.
For the future it is proposed:
a)banning the occupying of certain cities and road junctions by rear units. Continuous controls of the occupation. All these services can work good in villages too.
b)timely providing for detour roads and bridges
c) timely moving away of the supply trains
d) order to burn all towed vehicles when difficult retreats are envisaged'

to be continued

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Re: Experiences 48 pz corps around Shitomir-Berditschev

#6

Post by Aida1 » 27 Feb 2021, 19:54

The artillery is too difficult to move in its actual structure, above all the apparatus of supply facilities and staff built around a few tubes is too extensive and complicated.An Abteilung staff which today only commands y 9 tubes, can just as well handle triple that number. To achieve massed effect and a destructive effect on the decisive spot,an increase of Nebelwerfer is necessary to the disadvantage of the artillery.
Therefore proposal for the structure of the artillery in a Panzer corps:
a)in the pz div , structure as before but per battery 6 instead of 4 barrels
b)building a center of gravity group under the ARKO of the pz corps from 1 Nebelwerfer and 1 mortar regt as wel a Mörser Abteilung

The major importance of the correct choice of the location of the corps command post has again been proven in the eventfull fighting of the last weeks.
In retreats the command post should not be kept too close. As practice has shown, corps staff are then too easily pulled into local fighting, start to wander and cannot command. If instead the command post is at a sensible distance from the front, the stability of command is a given, above all there is the possibility to let the troop and the div staffs move to it during the retreat movements and command tightly particularly during these critical hours. The crorps staff should only move again when the front stands.
For the same reason, road junctions and locations near big roads are to be avoided, there enemy tanks will apear first.
Small locations that are secluded are favourable.'

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