How did the destruction of Army Group Center happen?

[kon]

In june 1944 in Belarus was only one panzer division from 16 on eastern front.In august 1944 before Warshawa were 4 panzer divisions.And soviet have incurred big losses.Only 2nd panzer army lost 500 tanks.In january 1945 before 1st Belorussian front were 2 Pzd.Soviet moved forward because Hitler removed panzer divisions from a direction of the main impact.

http://www.truthforever.com/

[butgen]

It was destroyed because its line was too long and therefore thinly held and there were very few reserves.In addition freedom of movement was,as usual refused or given too late.
Unfortunately the proposals for retreating on a shorter line had been refused.
Even with the main attack being expected against HGr Nortukraine, an attack was also expected against AGC with such forces that the front of AGC would certainly collapse in view of its length and the lack of reserves. The proposal to fall back on a shorter line should have been accepted and had it been,AGC would have been pushed back but not destroyed.

[Piet Duits]

Actually I quoted the figures because I was hoping for someone to comment on the discrepancy.

As a snapshot, this is fine. I will however point to Niepold again, and the transfer of LVI.PzK on 30th May against the objection of Busch. The reason for this was that the previously mentioned attack planned by Model.

AIUI, this was just a transfer of command, i.e. LVI. PzK. was not physically moved but remained at its place, and that both Model and Busch expected the main attack of the Soviet summer offensive to start in the Kovel area.

Based on this (erroneous) expectations, transfer of LVI. Pz.K. was not unreasonable (to achieve unity of command). The "Schild and Schwert" attack was unrealistic, even the German operations department compared it to the Zitadelle attack. And of course the corps would have been better used in the Vitebsk or Bobruisk areas.

Best regards,
Michate

The LVI Panzerkorps with its 4. and 5. Panzer-Division would have been a complete waste in the Vitebsk area. The terrain was not suited for tanks during the summertime. In their preparations for the attack, the Soviet 39th army made clear that the terrain was too soft, too wet for tanks to go cross country, and would therefor only be restricted to the roads which were defended. If the T-34's and SU-76's of the attackers would not be able to perform, than the Panzers and Nashorns of the defenders wouldn't either.

[Michate]

The LVI Panzerkorps with its 4. and 5. Panzer-Division would have been a complete waste in the Vitebsk area. The terrain was not suited for tanks during the summertime. In their preparations for the attack, the Soviet 39th army made clear that the terrain was too soft, too wet for tanks to go cross country, and would therefor only be restricted to the roads which were defended. If the T-34's and SU-76's of the attackers would not be able to perform, than the Panzers and Nashorns of the defenders wouldn't either.

Sounds plausible enough for the Vitebsk area.
Anyway, my point, as far as I can still remember it, was a more general one, that the corps was positioned at the wrong sector. It might e.g. have been useful against 5th Guards Tank Army in the Orsha area.

[Piet Duits]

Yes, I believe so too. If they had the Infanterie-Divisionen take position at the Bären-Stellung, with the 4. and 5. Panzer behind it, they could perhaps
have made a small change of outcome.

[Vasilyev]

A significant part of the intelligence failure re: Bagration is that the Soviet regrouping in Belarus occurred relatively late, in the last days of May and early June.

In comparison, from February to mid-May the Volodymyr-Kovel area received 5 armies (N to S 70th, 47th, 69th, and 3rd Guards with 1st Polish in reserve), ~30 rifle/infantry divisions, 2 Tank Corps (8th Guards and 11th), and 2 Cavalry Corps (2nd Guards and 7th Guards), along with an artillery division and other reinforcements.

On 5/10 FHO reported that 34 formations had been deployed to the Kovel area from 2/15 to 5/10. So, they at least had an fairly accurate appraisal of what forces had been sent to the area.

The majority of reinforcements to the fronts in Belarus (1st Baltic, 3rd Belorussian, 2nd Belorussian, and 1st Belorussian) were only sent after the big planning conference in Moscow from 5/22-26. On 5/27 5th Guards Tank, 11th Guards, and 28th Armies along with 1st Mechanized, 3rd Guards Mechanized, 3rd Cavalry, 4th Guards Cavalry, 9th Tank, 19th Rifle, 23rd Rifle, and 81st Rifle Corps were sent. Most artillery reinforcements were also sent starting on 5/27. Air reinforcements were sent on 5/28-29.

So the main part of the transfers occurred from the last days of May to early-mid June. Most artillery and rifle formations didn't move into line until a few days before the offensive began.

6th Guards Army also regrouped from the right to the left wing of 1st Baltic Front during this period, but according to Gackenholz it wasn't detected. I'll need to double-check if that is correct.

On June 10th 2nd Tank and 8th Guards Armies were assigned to 1st Belorussian Front's left wing and began moving that way. 8th Guards finished its transfer on 6/21, 2nd Tank on 6/26. Bagration started on 6/24 for 1st Belorussian Front. I don't believe 2nd Tank and 8th Guards were detected, but the large rail traffic was.

To sum that up, I think the German worries about the Kovel-Volodymyr region up to mid-May were based on a relatively realistic assessment of where Soviet formations were moving until that point. The Red Army carried out a very significant buildup in the region, which started up again in mid-June along with demonstrations from 1st Belorussian Front's left wing along with 1st and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts.

I would say that from late-May to mid-June, the German fixation on the Kovel region owes as much to their offensive plans ("Shield and Sword") as intelligence. On 6/6 (as the Allies began their landing in Normandy!), Hitler issued a new order to Army Group North Ukraine on the final preparations for Shield and Sword based on his meeting with Model on 5/30:

1) I intend on the north wing of Army Group North Ukraine to destroy the enemy forces in the area south of Kovel and to smash the enemy's attack preparations there by means of an offensive operation to be carried out surprisingly, quickly and smoothly.

The timing of the attack is not rigidly fixed. Depending on the completion of the preparations and the development of the enemy and weather situation, I will determine it at short notice.

2) Army Group North Ukraine prepares for the intended attack and pushes it forward by all means. The sooner the attack can take place, the better.

According to the orders I gave to Field Marshal Model [on 5/30], two solutions are to be prepared.

3) During implementation, the following points are crucial to me:

a) The attack must be carried out completely by surprise, otherwise it is pointless. The enemy must not recognize the preparations. He must be deliberately misled by numerous deceptive measures of all kinds, carefully considered and prepared down to the last detail, such as sham movements, artillery zeroing in, briefings, reconnaissance advances in other places and other things.

Your own attacking force itself may only be brought forward to the staging areas or starting positions at the last possible moment. All marching movements and the supply movements that go beyond the normal level must only take place at night.

b) The attack must be carried out with a sharp concentration of forces and a very clear, uncompromising formation of priorities. This formation of priorities applies not only to the attacking force, to the use of tanks, etc., but also particularly to the concentration, use and effect of artillery and all heavy weapons. It also applies to the deployment of the Air Force and to the tasks to be assigned to it. There must be no fragmentation here either.

Through this sharp concentration of forces, the enemy must be completely crushed at the points determined by us.

This can also be achieved with a clear, sharp, uncompromising focus.

If it is not achieved, the focus was not set sharply enough.

c) The success of the attack depends not only on surprise and focus, but also on ruthless, uninterrupted exploitation of the initial success. That must be prepared in every respect. This includes an appropriate composition of the attack spearheads, sufficient ammunition, large depth to shore up the attack spearheads and use against enemy flank attacks, so that the attack spearheads are not removed from their actual target. This ruthless exploitation of the initial success must therefore also be hammered into every leader's mind and completely dominate the whole troop.

The more ruthlessly this exploitation of the initial success is, the fewer losses we will have.

The enemy must not be allowed time to draw up strong rear reserves until we have achieved our objective.

d) As a result of this ruthless and uninterrupted exploitation of the success of the attack, it is also important to take control of the points decisive for carrying out the attack, crossings over streams, sections of rivers or lowlands early and in a coup de main and to prevent them from being blown up or blocked by the enemy. For this purpose, special assault brigades are to be put together and deployed at the moment when the enemy position is breached. Your tasks must be clearly defined. The best leaders and the best troops are to be provided for these tasks. Your decisive part in the success of the attack must be rewarded accordingly. This is to be announced to these detachments before the start of the attack.

For the secrecy of the preparations I order:

a) All preparations follow the motto: Enemy large-scale attack is imminent. When the enemy charges and breaks through, we plan to attack and hit them from behind. Only very few leaders and general staff officers are allowed to know the actual intention. These are to be specified by name and committed in writing to non-disclosure of the actual purpose. Your orders must conform to the motto above.

b) All telephone and radio traffic that allows conclusions to be drawn about the offensive operation is prohibited. In the event of violations, a ruthless court-martial shall be pursued.

signed Adolf Hitler

NARA T-313, R-392, Frames 8682546-48

So you've got real and deceptive intelligence signals at different times. Meanwhile, the increased fixation on an offensive solution, Shield and Sword, draws German attention to the Kovel-Volodymyr region even as intelligence signals from Belarus are picking up. Even after Shield and Sword is derailed by the transfer of 9th and 10th SS on 6/11, a reduced offensive is still planned by LVI Panzer Corps and 4th/5th Panzer. This last gasp is in turn derailed by the start of Bagration. 20th Panzer is returned to 9th Army from the area west of Kovel, but only at the last moment.

[Vasilyev]

The situation on the front of Army Group North Ukraine also contributed to the greater focus it received compared to Army Group Center in April-May 1944. In mid-April the AG still did not occupy a coherent line in many places - especially the area from Brody to the Turiya river - and many parts of the frontline were held by adhoc groups composed mainly of LS and security forces. 16th Guards Cavalry Division almost seized Volodymyr off the march on April 12th before being repulsed by the last-minute arrival of the 214th Infantry Division. Until the end of April the KTB of 4th Panzer Army continued to emphasize how weakly held the frontline between the border with AG Center and Brody was. By early May the area started to have limited reserves (Aufkl. Abt. 9th SS), and 88th Infantry Division began to arrive to reduce the frontage covered by XXXXII and XIII Corps. But it remained the most vulnerable part of the frontline.

Just rebuilding the frontline was a significant task, even with the stabilization of the front it still took several months to build up the impressed civilian labor force to construct new positions. According to the HeWiFueh AG North Ukraine, the labor force committed to Stellungsbau went from 15-20k at the end of April/beginning of May to 70k by July, with a shortage of 30k. Model harangued 4th Panzer Army in early May about how few mines it was laying. 4th Panzer Army defended the slow pace as the result of labor shortages.

All that to say, AG North Ukraine's strength in early June shouldn't obscure its real vulnerabilities in April and May. A comparison between the "unbreakable" defenses of AG Center and the brittle front of AG North Ukraine makes the German misperception clearer.

Not an exhaustive discussion of the situation, the German counterattacks in the Kovel-Volodymyr and Stanislav regions up to late April/early May also helped draw attention to the region. AG North Ukraine only became a "quiet" sector in early May, by which point Zeitzler was already shopping around plans for a counteroffensive (what would become "Sword and Shield") to AG North Ukraine and AG Center (right wing).

[Art]

Hitler issued a new order to Army Group North Ukraine on the final preparations for Shield and Sword based on his meeting with Model on 5/30:

And what were the objectives and participating forces exactly?

[Vasilyev]

Hitler issued a new order to Army Group North Ukraine on the final preparations for Shield and Sword based on his meeting with Model on 5/30:

And what were the objectives and participating forces exactly?

There were three variations, the first two prepared in late-May and the third in mid-June after II SS PzK was sent to Normandy:

Case A: What Hitler was referring to in his order. 4 infantry divisions (28th Jaeger, 214th, 72nd, and 88th) under XXXXII AK would break through NW of Torchyn, the right flank of 3rd Guards Army and 1st Ukrainian Front. The breakthrough would immediately be exploited by II SS PzK (9th SS, 10th SS, and 8th Panzer), which would drive to the NE to cut the Kovel-Lutsk road between the Styr and Stokhid. 9th and 10th SS would then swing to the NW across the Stokhid to Holoby and on to Kovel.

There they would link up with German forces executing Operation Bluecher, an expansion of the Kovel perimeter with 342nd ID and 5th Panzer.

III PzK (4th and 20th Panzer) would be the 2nd echelon and be available to exploit/reinforce success or defend against counterattacks so II SS could keep advancing to Kovel. 5th SS Panzer and 1 unnamed infantry division would be the army's reserve.

The ultimate objective would be the destruction of 69th Army and the left wing of 47th Army in the Turiya bend, with further exploitation to Lutsk afterward. LVI PzK would then conduct operations N of Kovel after the end of Bluecher and Shield and Sword to force the 70th Army and right wing of 47th Army back behind the Turiya.

The pocket would be destroyed by 291st ID and 1st Hungarian Cavalry (XXXXII AK) along with the Ski Jaeger Brigade, 253rd ID, and 131st ID (LVI PzK).

This was in many ways a more ambitious descendent of 4th Panzer Army's plan from February to use its left wing XIII AK (2 IDs, 7th and 8th Panzer plus an unknown 3rd armored division) to counterattack around Lutsk (right wing of 13th Army), swing along the road to Dubno, then cut N to Rivne. After clearing the Dubno-Lutsk-Rivne triangle, the forces would attack the Soviet forces around Shepetivka (60 Army) from the rear. This offensive was interrupted by the start of 1st Ukrainian Front's Proskurov operation.

Case B: 3 infantry divisions (28th Jaeger, 214th, and 72nd) under XXXXII AK would break through from the German Turiya bridgehead, with Svynaryn as the main effort. This was where 72nd ID tried unsuccessfully to break through in late-April.

II SS PzK (9th SS, 10th SS, and 8th Panzer) would then break through to east of Turiisk. There they would link up with an attack from LVI PzK across the Turiya composed of 131 ID, 5th Panzer, and part of 253rd ID. The goal would be to encircle and destroy 69th Army's forces in the Turiya bend (most of the army) and secure the Kovel-Volodymyr rail line. This was, more or less, the "big solution" pursued by 2nd Army in April-May.

III PzK (Sturm Regiment PzAOK 4, 1st Hungarian Cavalry and 20th Panzer in reserve) and part of LVI PzK (253rd ID and Ski Jaeger Brigade) would contain and destroy the 69th Army's encircled troops. 4th Panzer would be 4th Panzer Army's reserve, while 291st and 88th ID would defend the right flank of XXXXII AK.

Case C: A reduced operation after II SS PzK was transferred. XXXXII AK with 2 infantry divisions (28th Jaeger and 214th) and 4th Panzer would break through across the Turiya N of Volodymyr to the west of Turiisk, encircling 69th Army's forces in the tip of the salient and clearing most of the railway line. More or less, 2nd Army's "small solution" from April-May.

Operation Bluecher would also be executed from Kovel to expand the perimeter around the city, with 1 ID and 1 PzD (likely, 342nd ID and 5th Pz).

[Vasilyev]

This was in many ways a more ambitious descendent of 4th Panzer Army's plan from February to use its left wing XIII AK (2 IDs, 7th and 8th Panzer plus an unknown 3rd armored division) to counterattack around Lutsk (right wing of 13th Army), swing along the road to Dubno, then cut N to Rivne. After clearing the Dubno-Lutsk-Rivne triangle, the forces would attack the Soviet forces around Shepetivka (60 Army) from the rear. This offensive was interrupted by the start of 1st Ukrainian Front's Proskurov operation.

This should be XXXXVIII PzK, not XIII AK.

[Vasilyev]

To the original question, I think there are many reasons for destruction of AGC; Soviet successes as well as German failures. For the Red Army, some successful elements of the offensive were:

1. There was a well organized reconnaissance-in-force in the breakthrough areas. After a short artillery preparation (5-15 minute fire raid, depending on the location) the attackers were able to seize 1-2 trenches along with important strongpoints and hold them against counterattacks. Even for less successful attacks like the left wing of 11th Guards Army the recon still exposed many German positions which could then be targeted on the following day's main attack. A recon in force wasn't an unusual way to start the offensive, but the preparation and training in April-June really paid off.

2. Soviet armor was used to disrupt the integrity of the German defenses and turned organized withdrawals into routs. 2nd GTC cut the Orsha-Minsk highway by 6/26 (the offensive began on 6/23), completely disorganizing the 4th Army's rear and forcing it to withdraw along a single highway, Mogilev-Minsk. 9th TC cut off the withdrawal of all the German 9th Army's formations east of the Berezina by a daring thrust to the bridges around Bobruisk on 6/26 (the offensive began on 6/24), inflicting terrible losses and forcing those that broke out across the river to abandon most of their heavy weapons, horses, etc. By the 2nd-3rd day of the offensive, the coherence of AGC's defenses had been compromised and the escape of its formations imperiled. This continued into subsequent days, with the notable exception of 5th GTA's delayed advance around Borisov.

3. Relentless air attacks suppressed movement along the few major roads, forcing 4th Army in particular to conduct much of its retreat along inadequate routes as the single remaining highway became too dangerous and difficult to pass. The psychological effects of constant air attacks on already demoralized and confused German formations also shouldn't be overstated. Both 9th and 4th Army were so disordered that any organized breakout was a long shot - 9th Army's attempt quickly collapsed into chaos despite successfully punching through the Soviet perimeter N of Bobruisk.

[Vasilyev]

Fresh forces were obviously a core part of the operation's success.

3rd Belorussian Front received the largest group of reinforcements. 2nd GTC (SVGK reserve) and 3rd GMC were transferred on 5/24 in accordance with the General Staff's general plan for Operation Bagration from 5/20. 3rd GMC had previously operated under the Western Front in the winter campaign. 11th GA (from 1st Baltic Front), 3rd GCC (from 2nd Baltic Front), and 5th Guards TA (from 2nd Ukrainian Front) were transferred after the 3rd Belorussian Front's commander made his case in Moscow for more reinforcements from 5/25-5/26, which was accepted without dispute by the General Staff and Stalin.

1st Belorussian Front received the second largest group. 1st GTC and 9th TC were transferred on 5/24, again according to the General Staff's 5/20 plan. Rokossovsky also argued for additional formations on 5/26 as well as a new operational plan, his famous "two main blows" dispute with Stalin. Exactly how acrimonious this discussion was is disputed, as all the sources are from memoirs and interview given well after the fact. But the changes to the 1st Belorussian Front's plans were accepted, and from 5/27 it received 28th A (previously in the SVGK reserve, 3rd Ukrainian Front before that), 1st GMC (SVGK reserve), and 4th GCC (3rd Ukrainian Front before that).

To these transfers we should also add 2nd TA and 8th GA, which were also sent to the left wing of 1st Belorussian Front after the conference - Rokossovsky's proposal for the offensive on his left wing was accepted without incident. This was conceived as an extension of the Belorussian Operation, and in Rokossovsky's original planning from April his left wing would deliver the Front's first strike, aiming for Brest. I discussed this in more detail here:
viewtopic.php?f=79&t=271714#p2480855

The presentations to the Stavka and Stalin on 5/26, along with the meetings from 5/22-25 in Moscow with members of the General Staff, played an important role in securing new forces for both Fronts than the General Staff originally decided. But this was likely expected, a back and forth about what reserves would be sent to which Fronts was the usual pattern. As Shtemenko noted, disputes over the distribution of forces and material were far more common than arguments over plans:

Differences usually arose not over the concept of the operation or the order in which it was carried out, but over the composition of the troops and their support. It is clear that each commander sought to get more reserves from the Stavka, to have enough tanks, artillery, and ammunition. We never told any of them what exactly the Stavka had at its disposal, but the commanders, bypassing us, found out about it in their own ways. At the General Staff they demanded, at the Stavka they petitioned.

[Art]

3rd GMC had previously operated under the Western Front in the winter campaign.

I suppose, you mean 2 Guards Tank Corps.
3 Guards Mechanized Corps was inactive since the Autumn 1943.

[Vasilyev]

3rd GMC had previously operated under the Western Front in the winter campaign.

I suppose, you mean 2 Guards Tank Corps.
3 Guards Mechanized Corps was inactive since the Autumn 1943.

Yes, 2nd GTC! Under the Western Front, then briefly withdrawn into reserve in spring 1944.

[Vasilyev]

1. There was a well organized reconnaissance-in-force in the breakthrough areas. After a short artillery preparation (5-15 minute fire raid, depending on the location) the attackers were able to seize 1-2 trenches along with important strongpoints and hold them against counterattacks. Even for less successful attacks like the left wing of 11th Guards Army the recon still exposed many German positions which could then be targeted on the following day's main attack. A recon in force wasn't an unusual way to start the offensive, but the preparation and training in April-June really paid off.

To add some nuance, the recon-in-force had different results and different effects on the defenders.

3rd Belorussian Front was very successful in the sectors of 39th and 5th Army. 1-2 trenches were occupied and the defenders were seriously disrupted. 11th Guards Army had success on its right wing but was stymied in many places on its left wing and didn't advance further than the first trench. 31st Army had similar results to the 11th Guards Army's left wing. The Germans expected a strong blow along the Minsk-Moscow highway and had well-prepared defenses.

1st Baltic Front's recon-in-force was very successful, seizing 1-2 trenches. Again, the German defense was disrupted and their tactical reserves burned up prior to the main attack on 6/23. 6th Guards Army was the most successful recon-in-force of the regrouped and newly-inserted armies in Bagration (6th Guards, 11th Guards, 48th, and 28th) . At some point I'll look into why.

2nd Belorussian Front was maybe 80% successful, seizing bridgeheads over the Pronya and the first trench in many places. However, some formations were stopped in front of the first trench after seizing a bridgehead. Overall, it achieved its most important goals and paved the way for a successful attack on 6/23.

1st Belorussian Front began its recon-in-force on 6/23 and main offensive on 6/24. On its right wing, the 3rd Army's commander, Gorbatov, wasn't interested in conducting a recon-in-force at all and wanted to maintain surprise. His attacks weren't strongly reinforced and failed to occupy the first trench or expose the entire German defensive system. 48th Army's attacks were also weak and pinned down in the Drut floodplain without much success.

65th Army's attacks were expected along the Parichi direction but its recon-in-force was strong. It broke into the first trench and forced the Germans to commit their tactical reserves, driving the recon forces out of the first trench after 2-3 counterattacks in most places. While 65th Army's losses were heavy, it did force the Germans to overcommit on 6/23. 28th Army had a similar story, but was generally less successful. It was only inserted into the line on 6/20, so its relatively worse outcome is understandable.