Compare the defeat of Napoleon and the Nazis by the Russian?

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Demosthenes
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#31

Post by Demosthenes » 31 Oct 2002, 14:56

Bad Tolz wrote:
PS.Winter also played crucial parts,funny enough,both German army and Napoleon army faced very very strong Russian winter,ones that were due for a very long time.Weird....
As for the russian winter, I would like to compare it to the "kamikaze", the divine wind, that saved the japanese when the mongols tried to invade them.

For those (probably not very many of you) that don't know the kamikaye, here's a quick description (there will be better ones that are more thoroughly researched available somewhere on the internet, I don't have time to research.): <--That's not a smiley, by the way.

The mongols sent a great fleet out to invade japan, but was interrupted by a storm greater than any storm that had been before. Their ships sunk, and the invasion failed. The priest of Japan were quick to use this incident to get more funds, and called this the "Kamikaze", which means something like "divine wind"

The next time, ten years or so later, the mongols had assembled an even greater fleet, and once more sent it against the Japanese. And now, the Kamikaze came back, and sunk this fleet too.

same with extremely fierce russian winter, which grows hard when invaders come, right?

I think you can all see my point.

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Schwalbe
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#32

Post by Schwalbe » 31 Oct 2002, 18:56

double post....
Last edited by Schwalbe on 31 Oct 2002, 21:17, edited 1 time in total.


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witness
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#33

Post by witness » 31 Oct 2002, 21:05

Exellent post Bad Tolz .
Nietzsche called it 'Russian fatalism'
when the soldiers are ready to fight almost under any conditions .And this is combined with their utter disregard for own lives

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Schwalbe
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#34

Post by Schwalbe » 31 Oct 2002, 21:16

Schwalbe -

you are absolutely and completely wrong. Von Manstein did not command the advance on Moscow and never held a command on the central sector. In late autumn 1941 he was not even an army commander yet.

cheers
Yes I admit that I was wrong. But von Manstein really said he wanted to continue the assault on Moscow, whereever his command was. I saw this on Discovery, but perhaps you think that channel isn´t very reliable?

/Per

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bruce
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#35

Post by bruce » 01 Nov 2002, 00:23

any tactic/strategy experts out there?
may be u can help me out?
do u see any similarities in strategies or tactics uses by napoleon or hirler?
one would think hitler used same strategy as did napoleon more than a hundred years ago...and why not? the country's landscape didnt change so he could have applied the same strategy used by the french...except he could have lerned from thier mistakes and could have prepeared better for the winter time...history repeasts it self...
by they way didnt napoleon divide his army into 3
hitler did for sure,
army group north under von leeb
army group center under von bok
army group south under von rundsted

thank u 8)

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Qvist
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#36

Post by Qvist » 01 Nov 2002, 10:44

Hello schwalbe
I saw this on Discovery, but perhaps you think that channel isn´t very reliable?
Not that it matters much in this case, but yes, I do think that as a matter of fact. :)

cheers

alsaco
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#37

Post by alsaco » 02 Nov 2002, 01:16

bruce wrote:
do u see any similarities in strategies or tactics uses by napoleon or hirler?
one would think hitler used same strategy as did napoleon more than a hundred years ago...and why not?
I don't think you can consider that Napoleon's campaign could as a whole compare with operation Barbarossa.

The Grande Armée started from Vilnius, in one long train. It moved on foot to Moscow directly. In fact, it moved without opposition to Smolensk, and found russian troops only for the Moskowa battle. The fight was difficult and costly, but the troups entered Moscow without difficulty, and took their quarters there.
They were supposed to stay there until spring.
But Russian proved uncooperative, and the Tsar did not accept any negociations. Remember the reason of this campaign against an ally since the meeting on Tilsitt bridge was to force Russia to practise the Big Blockade against England. Alexander refused, and the war had to go on.
Napoleon had seized Moscow, and left some small garrrisons in main towns along the Vilna-Moscow road. But as said by Victor Hugo, he was very embarassed by his conquest.
I don't know where the tsar was at that time, probably in Saint Petersburg, but Koutousov and his army, covered by Kossaks was watching.
Napoleon did hope food and hay in Moscow would permit to stay there, particularly when he was told that convoy from Vilna where raided by the Kossaks. But the governor of Moscow managed, or benefited from, a strong fire which destroyed nearly all old town, and put this way an end to Napoleon's plans.
The Grande Armée was build up with regiments from all countries in Europe, French, Italians, German kingdoms, Spaniards, Croats. These disbanded, took all values they could from the burning houses, and took the way back home. French troops, more orderly, but not much, received the retreat order and took as a rear-gard the way to Vilna.
But they returned by the same road, already pillaged on the way up, and no means to eat or save horses could be provided. The Grande Armée rapidly split of in little groups, pray to Kossaks raid and very cold weather.
The only encounter with russian troops was at the crossing of the Beresina, where the rapid building of a bridge permitted the escape of the rests of the french troops before the arrival of regular russian divisions.
Then sick, wounded and remaining soldiers marched to Vilnius, where recently graves containing more than 20000 deaths from exhausion have been recently found.
Napoleon himself had fled directly from Smolensk to Paris
Similarity with Hitler is the delay for entry in Russia. Napoleon had to wait the regiments comming from allied kingdoms. Hitler had to conclude his Balkan and Greek expedition.
Dissimilarity are numerous. One trek for Napoleon, Three directions for Hitler. No deviation for Napoleon, a branch from Smolensk toward Kiev for Hitler. An expedition to put pression on the tsar for Napoleon, a war to Russia for Hitler. No real confrontation with the russians for Napoleon, Kessel after Kessel for Hitler.
Even the relation to winter was different. Unpreparation and defensive for Hitler. Improvisation for Napoleon, and the burned earth consequences resulting from the itineray used, instead of the south road planned.

From 1812 to 1941, in terms of military practice, the differences are tremendous. Napoleonic wars were similar to 1700 wars, with more troops on the battle field, no winter campaign, organised battles and honourable truces and peaces. Operation Barbarossa was entirely different, a street strugle by two mad dogs.

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bruce
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#38

Post by bruce » 02 Nov 2002, 05:17

first, i would like to thank u alsaco...great info :mrgreen:
really cleared some things up for me

however, dont u think that hitler could have at least taken a look at the napoleonic campaign...or may be he did? history repeats it self...the winter, the scorch earth policy...wasnt he aware of that?

how about over all strategy used by russians and hitler/napoleon?
can u point out any similarities, or differences?

i know that in both cases russians just kept falling back waiting for winter, that was thier main strategy...pls correct me if im wrong


thank u again
good nite

alsaco
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#39

Post by alsaco » 02 Nov 2002, 11:30

Kutusov tactic was certainly to refuse any battle. Napoleon had such a reputation of winner yhat he considered that russians neesed to be much more numerous than french to risk a face to face battle;
Therefore his orders were to play a mosquito politic, trying to disperse and reduce the french divisions.

I do not think russian troops in 1941 played the same game. On the contrary they kept strongholds, which turned into cauldrons, Bialystock, Minsk, Viasma. On the South front, and after Kiev, the tactic changed, and russians did begin to try to escape by retreating, instead of keeping ground at all costs.

We must also consider the fact that in 1812 speed was around 5 km/h for both armies, and therefore tactics could be to place troops on positions. napoleon was very strong in these movements,occupy strong position before the ennemy. In 1941, motorized units could reach 20 to 30 km/h, four to six time the on foot units. Encirclement was then the solution.

Historically, both central russian campaign can be compared, but war conditions were so different, in my opinion, that they did not allow comparison or lessons between both situations so far tactics is considered.

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bruce
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#40

Post by bruce » 02 Nov 2002, 23:12

thank u again

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