Hello Paul
During the Third Period of the War, the Soviets had both the numbers and the skill to destroy the German forces, but the manpower crisis necessitated a continued emphasis on sophisticated maneuver attacks. Massive frontal assaults occurred but more infrequently, and they were usually examples of failure on the part of Red Army commanders.
So, in theory, 1944 should see the fruition of these efforts, but since the overall numbers are not considerably lower in terms of casualties for either 1944 or 1945, the question must be asked: What exactly was done to reduce casualties and how effective were those measures?
A very good question. The simple answer (to just make a start) would appear to be on the first point that the rhytm and nature of Soviet offensive operations changed, increasingly taking the form of large battles of annihilation of a more closely defined duration, coupled with an increasing sophistication in the large offensive formations. On the second point, the losses themselves are of course a direct answer, and on that basis the reply would seem to be "not very". However, they succeeded in being very considerably more destructive to their
opponent, without increasing the cost to the Red Army (and indeed while generally reducing it, at least to some degree).
It is perhaps worth recalling that the German experience earlier in the war also suggests that even very successful annihilation victories do not tend to go hand in hand with low own losses - indeed, the summer of 1941 was the most costly quarter the Ostheer experienced prior to the summer of 1943, and costlier also than any other quarter in 43/44 except for III-44. Likewise, their losses in III-42 were notably high.
However, to qualify the loss intensity point a bit, it can be a little misleading in some ways to look at just total figures for 43 and 44 respectively. Firstly, II-43 were marked by very low activity on both sides, and marks by far the least costly quarter of the war. This means that if you compare quarter by quarter, the contrast in the three other quarters are correspondingly greater. Also, I and in part IIQ 1944 are really the tail end of the late 43 offensives, probably more similar in outlook and character to their predecessors than their successors. It is perhaps best from the summer of 1944 that one can begin to judge the fruits of these late developments, after the replenishing operational pause in late spring and early summer. And, during the last two quarters of 1944, losses are very much lower than in the corresponding period of the previous year. * One thing to remember here however is that the German forces were considerably weaker than the year before. Of course, I-45 is at similar levels to earlier years and II-45 is quite gruesome given that it lasted only 39 days (transposed to a fult quarter, that intensity would equal 1,768,000). But this was after all the final bloody battles, which could hardly be fought in any other way than with great and bloody intensity, as long as German determination (or desperation) persisted.
For reference, Soviet quarterly losses (as usual, from Krivosheev, combat losses only):
III-41....2 642 122
IV-41.....1 516 643
1941......4 158 407
I-42.......1 652 007
II-42......1 369 041
III-42.....2 317 473
IV-42.....1 246 243
1942......6 584 764
I-43.....1 904 852
II-43.......429 627
III-43..2 619 109
IV-43...1 923 530
1943....6 877 118
I-44....1 851 031
II-44...1 008 789
III-44..1 756 388
IV-44..1 069 577
1944...5 685 785
I-45....1 880 567
II-45......757 600
1945...2 638 167
I think there is a good deal to be said for comparing a quarter to the same quarter in other years rather than to the preceding and succeeding quarters of the same year. As you see above, losses fluctuate more strongly by season than in any other way, and mostly according to a similar pattern in every year. For instance, IIIq, and to an extent Iq, always tends to be the costliest ones in every year. This is of course connected to the pace of operations as dictated by season and weather.
cheers