This KC-Holder of HG fought his last Battle commanding a Rgt. of ErsuAusbBrigade "HG" near Briesen in Eastern Prussian on 22th January of 1945 . Defending a treck of refugees in a 3 hours battle he and one half of his Rgt. fell .
Who could provide more info on Graf's last stand ?
Jan-Hendrik
Major Rudolf Graf's last Battle
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Jan-Hendrik
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Major Rudolf Graf's last Battle
Last edited by Jan-Hendrik on 03 Jun 2006, 14:32, edited 1 time in total.
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BATTLESHIP
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Jan-Hendrik
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Jan-Hendrik
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Ron Klages
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Jan-Hendrik
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No , dear Ron , I don't have Kurowskis book at all ( and , to be honest , I am not a fan of his works ) . Sorrowly I still failed to get a copy of Wolgang Bach's "Die Geschichte der Fallschirm-Panzer-Ersatz-und-Ausbildungs-Brigade Hermann Göring Rippin-Graudenz" , published in 1987 . But I still have not lost my hope to get it once ...
Best regards ,
Jan-Hendrik
Best regards ,
Jan-Hendrik
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Ron Klages
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Rudolf Graf
Jan-Hendrik,
As promised here is what Kurowski says about Ruidolf Graf. As you see it differs from your original question in that there appears to be no reference to assisting refugees. Please excuse the length.
Hope this helps,
Best regards,
Ron Klages
On 13 January the men of the brigade learned from the Wehrmacht communique that the Red Army had launched its long awaited winter offensive on the Vistula front. The communique of 14 January provided more detailed information. On 15 January 1945 the brigade was assigned a three-day field exercise. While preparations were being made for this an order arrived from Second Army which placed the brigade on alert readiness for action at the front and simultaneously placed it under the command on XXIII Army Corps as corps reserve. Although well-founded, the objections of the brigade commander achieved nothing. Oberst Meyer was forced to change the practice alert to a real one, however he informed only his two regimental commanders, Major Graf and Hauptmann Findeis of the change.
The first unit sent to the front was the Parachute-Panzer-Pioneer Replacement and Training Battalion, which was ordered by XXIII Army Corps into a readiness position east of Rippin during the night of 15 January 1945. The departure of the 1st Regiment under Hauptmann Findeis was postponed several times. Both Camps A and B were at alert readiness.
The units assigned to take part in the “brigade exercise” left their quarters in Rippin at midnight on 15 January and dawn on the 16th. They headed out over snow and ice-covered roads toward he area of operations. Shrouded in a light ice fog, the long column moved southeast over the snow-covered, and in places icy, Reichstraße 78. Prevailing temperatures ranged between 15 and 20 degrees below zero. En route the regimental command ordered the march to continue as far as Sichelberg.
At noon on the 16th brigade headquarters-which was still on the move- was ordered to occupy the prepared field positions along the Skrwa River, west and north of Sichelberg, and to come to defensive readiness. These positions were referred to as a blocking position by Oberst Meyer and as a line of security by the division command of the 83rd Infantry Division. Their purpose was to delay the enemy’s advance. The brigade’s general order was: THE SECOND ARMY’S FRONT MUST BE BROUGHT TO A STANDSTILL.”
Everyone in the position sensed that something tremendous was coming, but what it was no one knew. The prevailing opinion was that the Soviets would simply overrun them with their armored and motorized units. The only clue as to what was taking place was provided by the Wehrmacht communique of 15 January 1945, which stated that:
“After several-hour-long bombardment by the Red Army has broken out of its Vistula bridgeheads near Pulawy and Warka-Magnuszew, out of the Vistula-Bug triangle north of Warsaw, and out of the Narew bridgeheads on both sides of Ostenburg. Bitter fighting has broken out along the entire front.”
The Brigade’s 1st (Findeis) and 2nd (Graf) Regiments formed an approximately 35-kilometer-long defensive line in the Skrwa sector; it more closely resembled a line of outposts than an actual defensive line. The defense line extended from a point south of Zochowo up the Skrwa River across Reichstraßen 123 and 78, east of Schüttauer Lake and then east of Reselerwalde to Rippin in the north. The focal points lay on the three major roads, RS 123 from Warsaw through Sichelberg to Thorn, RS 78 from Sichelberg through Rippin to Strasburg, and the IA-II-B Road from Zuromin through Rippin to Dobrzyn Gollub.
The defenders there had to fight for time, had to halt the enemy advance; at the very least it had to be delayed. It seemed that the Russian steamroller couldn’t be stopped, at least that’s what the sparse reports from the front suggested. The brigade’s battle order in the defense line between 16 and 20 January 1945 was as follows:
Right:
1st Regiment (Findeis) with reinforced II Battalion
1st Regiment (Hptm. Bach) elements of I Battalion
1st Regiment (Hptm Vollmer)
Left:
2nd Regiment (Graf) with heavy Panzer-Grenadier Battalion(Artillery) (Maj. Francois) with 4 batteries
Training and Conversion Battalion (Friebe)
The sector boundaries were moved several times by 20 January. These changes were the result of orders from the 83rd Infantry Division, to which the brigade was attached from 19 January 1945. The 83rd Infantry Division had taken over the entire Sichelberg sector on orders from XXIII Army Corps. The units of this division were still on their way to the front. They detrained in Sichelberg and marched immediately into the positions. The division commander, Genlt. Heun, had received the Knight’s Cross on 9 December 1944.
Late in the evening of 19 January the 83rd Infantry Division received orders to disengage fro the enemy in the Sichelberh sector, withdraw to Strasburg and establish a blocking position there. Oberst Meyer realized to what extent his two regiments would be inferior to the attacking Russian units. His decision to have the units carry out a fighting withdrawal was the only correct one in the situation. Oberst Meyer attempted in vain to obtain permission from the “Staff Office Reichsmarschall” for transfer to Berlin-Velten of all recruits who had arrived after 1 January 1945 and lacked any sort of training whatsoever.
On 20 January 1945 the first Russian armored spearhead-T34/85 tanks with mounted or closely following infantry- broke through in the brigade’s sector, taking advantage of the hard-frozen meadows and swamps. The brigade had no anti-tank weapons with which to face this mass of armor. The individual combat elements were forced to withdraw to avoid being outflanked and encircled. During the night of 20 January the Russians pushed forward into the sector held by II Battalion under Hauptmann Bach, advancing down both sides of RS 123. Beginning at dawn on 20 January, armored battle groups of the Red Army broke into Bach’s Battalion’s forward positions after a brief preparatory bombardment. The combat outposts pulled back as they had been instructed. The 1st Cannon-howitzer-Battery, which gave the grenadiers covering fire as they withdrew, was spotted by the enemy and itself came under heavy fire.
The Russian spearhead halted 800 meters northeast of the bridge over the Skrwa, suspecting strong German anti-tank defenses there. During the developing firefight it was the brigade’s snipers, most of whom were former foresters equipped with rifles with telescopic sights, who enjoyed the greatest success. In spite of their limited stocks of ammunition, the brigade’s mortars succeeded in smashing several enemy assembly areas. Nevertheless on 20 January the enemy broke into the German line in several places, and that afternoon, following heavy fighting, broke through the brigade’s defensive line in the Skrwa sector. The Soviets outflanked sections of the line and reached the brigade’s rear, where they took a large number of prisoners. The Skrwa bridge lay under continuous rocket and machine-gun fire. When the Soviet armored spearhead then advanced with reinforced infantry forces (riding in trucks and on foot) on both sides of RS 123, Hptm. Bach was forced to order the brigade to fight its way back to the second line of resistance. The 5th Company under Oblt. Schneider, as well as the 6th Company (Ellwanger). 7th (Alf) and 8th (Stürchen) Companies. Together with the attached soldiers of the Police Battalion, withdrew step by step.
Hauptmann Bach found the regimental headquarters and the 7th Company in Schaltensee. A short time later a second company arrived and the units there were ordered to march in the direction of Thorn. The 60 kilometer march from Schaltensee estate to Thorn began early on the morning of 22 January. When the retreating companies reached the second defense line they found that it existed in name only. The battalion had to act independently without losing any time. Hptm. Bach ordered his units to abandon this “line or resistance”, assemble in Schaltensee and await further orders there. The initial reaction of brigade headquarters was:
“Bach has opened a giant hole. XXIII Army Corps will not hesitate to have him court-martialled.”
Nevertheless, when the companies came out of the abandoned Skrwa sector there was relief that the young soldiers had not been sacrificed trying to fulfill a senseless mission, even though they left behind most of their heavy equipment, including heavy machine-guns sleighs and complete mortars. Retired Maj. Bach said of this:
“Given a single platoon of tank destroyers, assault guns or a flak combat team and appropriate artillery support we would have been in a position to upset the Russian’s plans west of Sichelberg. Under the existing circumstances our battalion could also have been destroyed in these operations near Sichelberh. The enemy was strong enough to do so.”
On the evening of 20 January the brigade received orders to make a fighting withdrawal toward the Drewenz position to establish itself in a defensive posture in this prepared river position. The 2nd Regiment (Graf) succeeded in maintaining cohesion within and between the withdrawing combat elements. The opposite was the case with 1st Regiment, which became fragmented on the evening of 20 January 1945. The brigade’s withdrawal, which was oriented toward the west, was part of a general withdrawal by all German units in West Prussia. As a result of a lack of prepared reception positions it became an ever more rapid retreat, which continued far beyond the planned retreat sectors. 1st Regiment lost contact with its II Battalion and late in the evening on 20 January reported the battalion as lost.
This was not the case however, for, as previously reported, on 21 January 1945 II Battalion’s 3rd Grenadier Company marched toward the Schalensee Estate assembly point. The roads leading to the estate were blocked by snowdrifts, nevertheless, the battalion reached Schalensee Estate as darkness was falling on 21 January. There Hptm. Bach learned that his 7th Company (Alf) had continued onward after a brief rest without orders from the regiment. The 1st Regiment also left the village just before the arrival of the battalion headquarters, not even leaving behind a rearguard detachment. As a result, II Battalion, 1st Regiment found itself in the snow-covered Polish village without orders and in the dark as to the situation. During the night of 22 January the battalion operations officer succeeded in establishing contact with brigade headquarters in Rippin by public telephone. The brigade order, which arrived after several delays, read:
“II Battalion, 1st Regiment hold position, establish all-round defensive position, be ready to march at any time.”
Late on the morning of 22 January 1st Regiment’s medical officer, Oberarzt Dr. Thomas, arrived in Schalensee with medical personnel, equipment and ambulances. The brigade medical officer, Dr. Renken, had informed him of the situation, which was a good thing, because a number of soldiers urgently required medical attention. Hptm Bach was surprised to learn that his regiment had reported that the battalion had been “Smashed at the Skrwa and the survivors taken prisoner by the Russians.” Bach remarked. “As far as we’re concerned they’ve been on the other side for a long time.”
Following the medical officer, Hfw. Vothknecht had also made his way to Schallensee. He brought with him a truck loaded with food and provisions. As soon as the reappearance of the battalion had been reported the food was distributed.
On 20 January Oberst Meyer had received orders to pull back toward the prepared defensive position on the Drewenz and had withdrawn toward Rippen to occupy an intermediate position near the city. The Russians followed hesitantly. Their leading tanks were placed under fire in a defile on the Okalewo-Rippin road by the brigade’s artillery commander, Hptm Oberländer. As a result the enemy pressure abated and the withdrawal proceeded in an orderly fashion.
Several battered enemy tanks lay disabled in the defile, proof of the effectiveness of the artillery fire. Tank-killing squads awaited the enemy tanks in well-camouflaged positions on the outskirts of Rippin. They knocked out a series of attacking T 34s and destroyed more in close-quarters fighting. At this point misfortune struck the defenders; a number of Panzerfaust anti-tank weapons failed to function. The enemy tanks rolled over the foxholes and crushed the grenadiers. The 2nd Regiment (Graf) and its attached troops defended the main approaches to Rippin in the south and east and blocked them until the afternoon of 22 January. Following the loss of its infantry guns the brigade was instructed to seek artillery support from a foreign unit. However the backbone of the anti-tank defense was formed by three flak teams with 88mm and 20mm guns.
The enemy forces before Rippin grew stronger by the hour. Soviet tanks bombarded the regiment’s positions at the city limits with everything they had. The order to withdraw came much too late. In an irony of fate, the supply goods in the two large dumps in Rippin had to be set on fire on account of a lack of transport space. On 23 January the brigade received orders from XXVII Army Corps, to which it had been subordinated the same day, to withdraw past the Drewenz positions, reach the line Briesen-Hohenkirch-Goßlershausen about 20 kilometers distant, and establish a defensive position there. The fall of Strasburg had a direct effect on 2nd Regiment, whose two battalion (Friebe and Francois) were en route to Hohenkirch via Hermannsruhe and Seekeim. This regimental unit was repeatedly attacked from Strasburg by Russian infantry and armored patrols. The resulting combats delayed the arrival of the units in the planned defensive sector at Hohenkirch.
In spite of these delays the brigade succeeded in directing both regiments into the Briesen-Hohenkirch-Goßlershausen line during the night of 24 January, establishing a main line resistance along the village and the rail line that ran past it. The brigade command post was located in Kieslingswalde’s school and dairy. It was learned that Major Graf, commander of the 2nd Regiment, and his adjutant, Lt. Boy, had been killed on the outskirts of Hohenkirch while scouting the new area of operations. Graf’s driver, who was badly wounded, was able to save himself and report what had happened. An infiltrated enemy anti-tank gun had fired on the command car, taking the occupants by surprise. Both bodies were recovered by troops participating in a counterattack which was launched immediately.
That is the end of the comments from Kurowski’s book The History of the Fallschirm Panzerkorps Hermann Göring.
I should also note that Maj. Rudolf Graf received the German Cross in Gold on 1 January 1945 and he had received the Knight’s Cross on 6 October 1941 as Chef of 1./Flak-Regiment (motorized) “General Göring”
As promised here is what Kurowski says about Ruidolf Graf. As you see it differs from your original question in that there appears to be no reference to assisting refugees. Please excuse the length.
Hope this helps,
Best regards,
Ron Klages
On 13 January the men of the brigade learned from the Wehrmacht communique that the Red Army had launched its long awaited winter offensive on the Vistula front. The communique of 14 January provided more detailed information. On 15 January 1945 the brigade was assigned a three-day field exercise. While preparations were being made for this an order arrived from Second Army which placed the brigade on alert readiness for action at the front and simultaneously placed it under the command on XXIII Army Corps as corps reserve. Although well-founded, the objections of the brigade commander achieved nothing. Oberst Meyer was forced to change the practice alert to a real one, however he informed only his two regimental commanders, Major Graf and Hauptmann Findeis of the change.
The first unit sent to the front was the Parachute-Panzer-Pioneer Replacement and Training Battalion, which was ordered by XXIII Army Corps into a readiness position east of Rippin during the night of 15 January 1945. The departure of the 1st Regiment under Hauptmann Findeis was postponed several times. Both Camps A and B were at alert readiness.
The units assigned to take part in the “brigade exercise” left their quarters in Rippin at midnight on 15 January and dawn on the 16th. They headed out over snow and ice-covered roads toward he area of operations. Shrouded in a light ice fog, the long column moved southeast over the snow-covered, and in places icy, Reichstraße 78. Prevailing temperatures ranged between 15 and 20 degrees below zero. En route the regimental command ordered the march to continue as far as Sichelberg.
At noon on the 16th brigade headquarters-which was still on the move- was ordered to occupy the prepared field positions along the Skrwa River, west and north of Sichelberg, and to come to defensive readiness. These positions were referred to as a blocking position by Oberst Meyer and as a line of security by the division command of the 83rd Infantry Division. Their purpose was to delay the enemy’s advance. The brigade’s general order was: THE SECOND ARMY’S FRONT MUST BE BROUGHT TO A STANDSTILL.”
Everyone in the position sensed that something tremendous was coming, but what it was no one knew. The prevailing opinion was that the Soviets would simply overrun them with their armored and motorized units. The only clue as to what was taking place was provided by the Wehrmacht communique of 15 January 1945, which stated that:
“After several-hour-long bombardment by the Red Army has broken out of its Vistula bridgeheads near Pulawy and Warka-Magnuszew, out of the Vistula-Bug triangle north of Warsaw, and out of the Narew bridgeheads on both sides of Ostenburg. Bitter fighting has broken out along the entire front.”
The Brigade’s 1st (Findeis) and 2nd (Graf) Regiments formed an approximately 35-kilometer-long defensive line in the Skrwa sector; it more closely resembled a line of outposts than an actual defensive line. The defense line extended from a point south of Zochowo up the Skrwa River across Reichstraßen 123 and 78, east of Schüttauer Lake and then east of Reselerwalde to Rippin in the north. The focal points lay on the three major roads, RS 123 from Warsaw through Sichelberg to Thorn, RS 78 from Sichelberg through Rippin to Strasburg, and the IA-II-B Road from Zuromin through Rippin to Dobrzyn Gollub.
The defenders there had to fight for time, had to halt the enemy advance; at the very least it had to be delayed. It seemed that the Russian steamroller couldn’t be stopped, at least that’s what the sparse reports from the front suggested. The brigade’s battle order in the defense line between 16 and 20 January 1945 was as follows:
Right:
1st Regiment (Findeis) with reinforced II Battalion
1st Regiment (Hptm. Bach) elements of I Battalion
1st Regiment (Hptm Vollmer)
Left:
2nd Regiment (Graf) with heavy Panzer-Grenadier Battalion(Artillery) (Maj. Francois) with 4 batteries
Training and Conversion Battalion (Friebe)
The sector boundaries were moved several times by 20 January. These changes were the result of orders from the 83rd Infantry Division, to which the brigade was attached from 19 January 1945. The 83rd Infantry Division had taken over the entire Sichelberg sector on orders from XXIII Army Corps. The units of this division were still on their way to the front. They detrained in Sichelberg and marched immediately into the positions. The division commander, Genlt. Heun, had received the Knight’s Cross on 9 December 1944.
Late in the evening of 19 January the 83rd Infantry Division received orders to disengage fro the enemy in the Sichelberh sector, withdraw to Strasburg and establish a blocking position there. Oberst Meyer realized to what extent his two regiments would be inferior to the attacking Russian units. His decision to have the units carry out a fighting withdrawal was the only correct one in the situation. Oberst Meyer attempted in vain to obtain permission from the “Staff Office Reichsmarschall” for transfer to Berlin-Velten of all recruits who had arrived after 1 January 1945 and lacked any sort of training whatsoever.
On 20 January 1945 the first Russian armored spearhead-T34/85 tanks with mounted or closely following infantry- broke through in the brigade’s sector, taking advantage of the hard-frozen meadows and swamps. The brigade had no anti-tank weapons with which to face this mass of armor. The individual combat elements were forced to withdraw to avoid being outflanked and encircled. During the night of 20 January the Russians pushed forward into the sector held by II Battalion under Hauptmann Bach, advancing down both sides of RS 123. Beginning at dawn on 20 January, armored battle groups of the Red Army broke into Bach’s Battalion’s forward positions after a brief preparatory bombardment. The combat outposts pulled back as they had been instructed. The 1st Cannon-howitzer-Battery, which gave the grenadiers covering fire as they withdrew, was spotted by the enemy and itself came under heavy fire.
The Russian spearhead halted 800 meters northeast of the bridge over the Skrwa, suspecting strong German anti-tank defenses there. During the developing firefight it was the brigade’s snipers, most of whom were former foresters equipped with rifles with telescopic sights, who enjoyed the greatest success. In spite of their limited stocks of ammunition, the brigade’s mortars succeeded in smashing several enemy assembly areas. Nevertheless on 20 January the enemy broke into the German line in several places, and that afternoon, following heavy fighting, broke through the brigade’s defensive line in the Skrwa sector. The Soviets outflanked sections of the line and reached the brigade’s rear, where they took a large number of prisoners. The Skrwa bridge lay under continuous rocket and machine-gun fire. When the Soviet armored spearhead then advanced with reinforced infantry forces (riding in trucks and on foot) on both sides of RS 123, Hptm. Bach was forced to order the brigade to fight its way back to the second line of resistance. The 5th Company under Oblt. Schneider, as well as the 6th Company (Ellwanger). 7th (Alf) and 8th (Stürchen) Companies. Together with the attached soldiers of the Police Battalion, withdrew step by step.
Hauptmann Bach found the regimental headquarters and the 7th Company in Schaltensee. A short time later a second company arrived and the units there were ordered to march in the direction of Thorn. The 60 kilometer march from Schaltensee estate to Thorn began early on the morning of 22 January. When the retreating companies reached the second defense line they found that it existed in name only. The battalion had to act independently without losing any time. Hptm. Bach ordered his units to abandon this “line or resistance”, assemble in Schaltensee and await further orders there. The initial reaction of brigade headquarters was:
“Bach has opened a giant hole. XXIII Army Corps will not hesitate to have him court-martialled.”
Nevertheless, when the companies came out of the abandoned Skrwa sector there was relief that the young soldiers had not been sacrificed trying to fulfill a senseless mission, even though they left behind most of their heavy equipment, including heavy machine-guns sleighs and complete mortars. Retired Maj. Bach said of this:
“Given a single platoon of tank destroyers, assault guns or a flak combat team and appropriate artillery support we would have been in a position to upset the Russian’s plans west of Sichelberg. Under the existing circumstances our battalion could also have been destroyed in these operations near Sichelberh. The enemy was strong enough to do so.”
On the evening of 20 January the brigade received orders to make a fighting withdrawal toward the Drewenz position to establish itself in a defensive posture in this prepared river position. The 2nd Regiment (Graf) succeeded in maintaining cohesion within and between the withdrawing combat elements. The opposite was the case with 1st Regiment, which became fragmented on the evening of 20 January 1945. The brigade’s withdrawal, which was oriented toward the west, was part of a general withdrawal by all German units in West Prussia. As a result of a lack of prepared reception positions it became an ever more rapid retreat, which continued far beyond the planned retreat sectors. 1st Regiment lost contact with its II Battalion and late in the evening on 20 January reported the battalion as lost.
This was not the case however, for, as previously reported, on 21 January 1945 II Battalion’s 3rd Grenadier Company marched toward the Schalensee Estate assembly point. The roads leading to the estate were blocked by snowdrifts, nevertheless, the battalion reached Schalensee Estate as darkness was falling on 21 January. There Hptm. Bach learned that his 7th Company (Alf) had continued onward after a brief rest without orders from the regiment. The 1st Regiment also left the village just before the arrival of the battalion headquarters, not even leaving behind a rearguard detachment. As a result, II Battalion, 1st Regiment found itself in the snow-covered Polish village without orders and in the dark as to the situation. During the night of 22 January the battalion operations officer succeeded in establishing contact with brigade headquarters in Rippin by public telephone. The brigade order, which arrived after several delays, read:
“II Battalion, 1st Regiment hold position, establish all-round defensive position, be ready to march at any time.”
Late on the morning of 22 January 1st Regiment’s medical officer, Oberarzt Dr. Thomas, arrived in Schalensee with medical personnel, equipment and ambulances. The brigade medical officer, Dr. Renken, had informed him of the situation, which was a good thing, because a number of soldiers urgently required medical attention. Hptm Bach was surprised to learn that his regiment had reported that the battalion had been “Smashed at the Skrwa and the survivors taken prisoner by the Russians.” Bach remarked. “As far as we’re concerned they’ve been on the other side for a long time.”
Following the medical officer, Hfw. Vothknecht had also made his way to Schallensee. He brought with him a truck loaded with food and provisions. As soon as the reappearance of the battalion had been reported the food was distributed.
On 20 January Oberst Meyer had received orders to pull back toward the prepared defensive position on the Drewenz and had withdrawn toward Rippen to occupy an intermediate position near the city. The Russians followed hesitantly. Their leading tanks were placed under fire in a defile on the Okalewo-Rippin road by the brigade’s artillery commander, Hptm Oberländer. As a result the enemy pressure abated and the withdrawal proceeded in an orderly fashion.
Several battered enemy tanks lay disabled in the defile, proof of the effectiveness of the artillery fire. Tank-killing squads awaited the enemy tanks in well-camouflaged positions on the outskirts of Rippin. They knocked out a series of attacking T 34s and destroyed more in close-quarters fighting. At this point misfortune struck the defenders; a number of Panzerfaust anti-tank weapons failed to function. The enemy tanks rolled over the foxholes and crushed the grenadiers. The 2nd Regiment (Graf) and its attached troops defended the main approaches to Rippin in the south and east and blocked them until the afternoon of 22 January. Following the loss of its infantry guns the brigade was instructed to seek artillery support from a foreign unit. However the backbone of the anti-tank defense was formed by three flak teams with 88mm and 20mm guns.
The enemy forces before Rippin grew stronger by the hour. Soviet tanks bombarded the regiment’s positions at the city limits with everything they had. The order to withdraw came much too late. In an irony of fate, the supply goods in the two large dumps in Rippin had to be set on fire on account of a lack of transport space. On 23 January the brigade received orders from XXVII Army Corps, to which it had been subordinated the same day, to withdraw past the Drewenz positions, reach the line Briesen-Hohenkirch-Goßlershausen about 20 kilometers distant, and establish a defensive position there. The fall of Strasburg had a direct effect on 2nd Regiment, whose two battalion (Friebe and Francois) were en route to Hohenkirch via Hermannsruhe and Seekeim. This regimental unit was repeatedly attacked from Strasburg by Russian infantry and armored patrols. The resulting combats delayed the arrival of the units in the planned defensive sector at Hohenkirch.
In spite of these delays the brigade succeeded in directing both regiments into the Briesen-Hohenkirch-Goßlershausen line during the night of 24 January, establishing a main line resistance along the village and the rail line that ran past it. The brigade command post was located in Kieslingswalde’s school and dairy. It was learned that Major Graf, commander of the 2nd Regiment, and his adjutant, Lt. Boy, had been killed on the outskirts of Hohenkirch while scouting the new area of operations. Graf’s driver, who was badly wounded, was able to save himself and report what had happened. An infiltrated enemy anti-tank gun had fired on the command car, taking the occupants by surprise. Both bodies were recovered by troops participating in a counterattack which was launched immediately.
That is the end of the comments from Kurowski’s book The History of the Fallschirm Panzerkorps Hermann Göring.
I should also note that Maj. Rudolf Graf received the German Cross in Gold on 1 January 1945 and he had received the Knight’s Cross on 6 October 1941 as Chef of 1./Flak-Regiment (motorized) “General Göring”
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Jan-Hendrik
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Ron Klages
- In memoriam
- Posts: 299
- Joined: 20 Oct 2002, 22:34
- Location: Lynnwood, Washington
Danke
Jan-Hendrik,
I forgot to mention that he was the author of the book you mentioned.
He was also to receive the German Cross in Gold on 26 February 1945.
You may want to acquire or at least look at Kurowski's book since it has 37 pages devoted to the FPzAusuErsBr. HG including an element by element OOB.
Glad I could assist.
Best regards,
Ron Klages
I forgot to mention that he was the author of the book you mentioned.
He was also to receive the German Cross in Gold on 26 February 1945.
You may want to acquire or at least look at Kurowski's book since it has 37 pages devoted to the FPzAusuErsBr. HG including an element by element OOB.
Glad I could assist.
Best regards,
Ron Klages
-
Jan-Hendrik
- Member
- Posts: 8710
- Joined: 11 Nov 2004, 13:53
- Location: Hohnhorst / Deutschland
Re: Major Rudolf Graf's last Battle
Hello ! I am very appreciated I could have written so many historic facts about my region in which I was born I mean : Rypin ( Poland where the Parachute Brigade has stationing. I would like to add that I am espoecially interested in finding out the history of the Luftwaffe airport which was near Rypin. I would like to fing some photos , plans of this airport. I am aware that there is abook of Mr Wolfgang Bach : Die Geschichte der Fallschirm-Panzer-Ersatz- und Ausbildungsbrigade "Hermann G?ring" September 1944 bis M?rz 1945 Rippin - Graudenz aus der Sicht des Kommandeurs des II. Battaillons - there is question if somebody has english version of this book ? If there is a possibility to buy this book in english version ? Were you reading this book - maybe there are more details which I could find regarding the Luftwaffe in my town Rypin ? I will be very appreciated for your help.
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Jan-Hendrik
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- Posts: 8710
- Joined: 11 Nov 2004, 13:53
- Location: Hohnhorst / Deutschland
Re: Major Rudolf Graf's last Battle
I don't think that there was ever an english edition of Mr.Bach's book...
Jan-Hendrik
Jan-Hendrik