Can anyone help me with information about this raid? It began on the 8th or 9th of February 1943 as part of Operation Gallop. The German XXX Army Corps was struck. The railyard at Debalzevo was destroyed and warehouses burned. I need details. My father was with the XXX AK at Debalzevo until the 10th. The cavalry apprently reached the rail center on the 11th. He returned on the 12th. What was the situation? Where did they cross the Donets? What was the direction of their attack (they barely missed capturing General Fretter-Pico, the commander, and his command staff). Was the city also taken? What equipment did the three cavalry divisions (21, 35, 112) have - light tanks, armored cars? How many horses did they have and how many men? Did any Russian units try to rescue them when they were surrounded? Which ones?
Gerst
Raid of Soviet 8th Cavalry Corps at Debalzevo Feb. 1943
The below is the article translated by the US Army's FMSO.
It is most likely the best English-language info that you will be able to find published on the matter, from the Red Army perspective.
All the best
Andreas
Foreign Military Studies Office
101 Meade Ave
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1351
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
WARNING!
The views expressed in FMSO publications and reports are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Unknown Pages of a Heroic Raid
by A.A. Maslov
Translated and edited by COL David M. Glantz
Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS.
The heroic and, at the same time, completely tragic two-week raid in February 1943 by the Southwestern Front's cavalry, which began the liberation of the Ukraine, remains essentially obscure to this very day. Soviet historiography of the 1941-1945 war says little about the organization and course of the raid, and it has not paid fitting attention to the losses suffered by the cavalrymen. I have touched upon this and related issues through the prism of studying about general officer losses in the war, in general, and during the raid, in particular.1
The raid was carried out by forces of the 8th Cavalry Corps, which consisted of the 21st, 35th, and 112th Cavalry Divisions.2 The corps commander, Major General M. D. Borisov, was an experienced military leader who had participated in the Great Patriotic War from its very beginning and was instrumented in the Soviet victory at Stallingrad.3 Thereafter, the cavalry corps operated under Southwestern Front control as Soviet forces drove the Germans westward from the Stalingrad region and the great bend on the Don River. Then, in February 1943, the corps was designated to lead the Soviet assault south of Voroshilovgrad into the Donets Basin region. In accordance with the Soviet command's offensive concept, the employment of the cavalry as a deep raiding force was to have facilitated and accelorated the advance of the Southwestern Front's main forces into the Donbas region.
Having discovered a weak link in the enemy's defenses southeast of Voroshilovgrad [Lugansk], on the night of 8 February, the cavalry penetrated the front lines, entered the operational depths, and began a deep raid against the enemy rear area in the region of the large rail center at Debaltsevo. Debaltsevo was an important communications center for the entire enemy Donbas grouping. At first, the cavalry force was successful. It reached the Debaltsevo region and inflicted great losses in personnel and equipment on the enemy. According to archival documents preserved by the corps, the raid into the rear area of the German Voroshilovgrad grouping cost the enemy a total of more than 12,000 soldiers and officers lost and 28 tanks, 70 motorcycles, 50 guns, 35 mortars, 54 machine guns, 2 armored trains, 1 fuel train, 20 locomotives, 1 train with tanks, 3 trains with vehicles, and 1 train with aircraft destroyed. In addition, 6 communications centers were destroyed, 3 railroad bridges were blown up, up to 30 warehouses with ammunition and foodstuffs were burned, and the main rail lines leading to Debaltsevo were blown up in 56 places.4 Furthermore, during the raid, on 14 February the raid, the corps was transformed into the 7th Guards Cavalry Corps, and its 21st, 35th, and 112th Cavalry Divisons became the 14th, 15th, and 16th Guards Cavalry Divisions, respectively.5 The order doing so was transmitted to the corps headquarters by radio.
Having fullfilled their assigned missions, the cavalry began to return from the raid. It was at this stage of the operation that the corps was fated to experience several utterly tragic days. Documents and materials, in particular notes written by participants and eyewitnesses of these events, are now available to document the course of this raid. These have been collected in a thoroughly professional manner over tens of years by the workers in the Museum of Combat Glory in Krasnyi Luch (Lugansk oblast'). They represent a rich and exceptionally valuable collection of materials about the Debaltsevo raid.
According to notes among the recollections of General M. D. Borisov, the corps received the mission from the Southwestern Front, which was commanded by General N. F. Vatutin, to advance through the villages of Ivanovka and Iulino No. 2 and reach the Shirokii Farm region, located several kilometers from the front lines. Then the corps was to attack eastward, penetrate enemy positions, and reach the safety of front main forces' dispositions. To facilitate the fullfilment of the corps' mission, the plan required front formations to deliver a meeting blow in the Shirokii Farm region to link up with the withdrawing cavalry force. However, this attack by front forces failed to materialize, and, therefore, the cavalrymen had to penetrate the enemy positions independently. While doing so, they suffered extremely heavy losses in intense fighting.
The situation was further complicated by the fact that the cavalrymen were already out of ammunition and were burdened by many wounded. During the course of a terrible battle which continued for more than 24 hours in the steppe region in and around the villages of Iulino No. 1, Iulino No. 2, Fromandirovka, and Shirokii, the cavalrymen were subjected to attack by all types of enemy weaponry. Only a small number of the Soviet soldiers survived the fighting and succeeded in linking up with Red Army main forces. About one thousand soldiers and commanders and several hundred horses remained lying on the bloody field of battle. Soon after, local inhabitants buried all of the soldiers who perished in combat in common graves in the steppes. During this battle, Major General M. D. Borisov, the corps commander, was captured; Major General S. I. Dudko, the deputy corps commander, Colonel I. D. Saburov, the corps chief of staff, Colonel A. A. Karpushchenko, the corps commissar, and Colonel A. N. Sarbai, the corps chief of communications, were killed; and Major General M. M. Shaimuratov, the commander of the 16th Guards Cavalry Division, also fell into enemy hands.
Valuable information can also be found in the Lugansk museum about the circumstance surrounding S. I. Dudko's and M. M. Shaimuratov's deaths. For example, Fedor Golovatyi, an inhabitant of the village of Shterovka, which is located several kilometers from the site of the cavalrymens' battle, left a particular lucid account of the action.
According to Golovatyi, at first light on 23 February 1943, capitalizing on the fact that bullets were not whistling through the village and shells were no longer exploding (since the front lines now passed 2-3 kilometers east of the village), he left his house with a pail to fetch water from a watering trough. While walking along the streets, Golovatyi glimpsed six horsemen clad in white sheepskin coats. Riding up to Golovatyi, one of them asked whether their were any Germans in the village? At that very moment, a burst of enemy automatic weapons fire resounded, one of the riders immediately fell from his horse, and the remaining horsemen turned back while firing from their automatic weapons. A "dappled blue-gray horse" remained near the fallen soldier. The Germans tried to catch it but failed. Then they exhausted the horse in a mine gallery [a horizontal mine exit], and they shot it. The rider, who had fallen from his horse, lay dead in the middle of the street. Golovatyi saw the Germans approach him and remove his fine sheepskin coat. A star was clearly visible on the collar of the dead man's military jacket, which meant a general officer's rank. According to Golovatyi, the dead man was a very handsome 40-45 year old man.
On the following morning, Golovatyi once again went to the watering trough for water. To his complete astonishment, he saw that the general's body was completely naked, and someone had fully removed his clothing and felt boots. Immediately, his attention was drawn to an old scar on his neck and on one of his legs, and there was also a large old scar below his knee. With the Germans' permission, that day the local inhabitants buried the man in a single grave in Shterovka, in a balka [ravine] near Romanov rock. There he remained until many years after the war, without any indication of family name or patronymic, although all in the vilage were sure that it was the grave of a great Soviet commander.
During the early 1960s an official commission made up of two professors and two colonels from Ufa, the capital of the Bashkir Republic, arrived in Shterovka to establish the place of death and the burial site of their fellow-countryman, M. M. Shaimuratov, who was a Bashkir by nationality. While visiting the grave of the unknown general, but without having examined the necessary materials, the commission reached the mistaken conclusion that M. M. Shaimuratov was buried in the grave. They even inscribed an inscription on Romanov rock, which read, "Here lies the remains of General M. M. Shaimuratov."
Several years later a new commission arrived from Bashkiria to re-bury the general in Ufa. His remains were taken from the grave and placed in a galvanized coffin, which, temporarily, pending receipt of official permission for reburial from responsible authorities in Moscow, was located in one of the factory warehouses in the town of Petrovskoe, located several kilometers from Shterovka. However, the answer arrived from Moscow, "Reburial of the remains of the unknown general in Bashkiria is forbidden." Consequently, the general's remains were transferred to a common grave containing cavalrymen who had died during the withdrawal in the Debaltsevo raid. The remains of hundreds of Soviet soldiers, which had brought together here during the postwar period from many common graves and individual graves, were buried in this common grave in the town of Petrovskoe.
Subsequent investigative work, however, permitted the following conclusions to be reached. Fedor Golovatyi was shown enlarged photographs of Generals S. I. Dudko. M. M. Shaimuratov, and also Major General I. T. Chalenko, the commander of the 7th Guards Cavalry Corps' 15th Guards Cavalry Division. Golovatyi identified the photograph of General Dudko as the officer he had observed being buried at this site. Soon the investigators succeeded in getting in touch with Dudko's wife, Evdokiia Ivanovna. From her it was determined that her husband actually had wounds on his neck and legs. The first of these he had received from a Makhnovite sabre (during the Civil War in Ukraine) and the second from a broken leg which he had received during a fall from a horse in the 1930s. Thus, the exact site, time, and circumstances of S. I. Dudko's death were finally successfully established. The USSR Ministry of Defense's Main Cadres Directorate received all of this new information in 1967.6 Then the exact site of General S. I. Dudko's burial was officially established, based upon information which the Main Cadres Directorate had not before possessed.7
In addition, we can now also finally and fully document the details of General Shaimuratov's death. While returning from the daring raid, the 16th Guards Cavalry Division had joined in terrible battle in the vicinity of the village of Iurino No. 1. The division commander, Shaimuratov, was severely wounded in the bloody encounter and was taken prisoner by the Germans and the Don Cossacks who were serving the Fascists. Having expelled its owner, the enemy brought Shaimuratov to one of the peasant houses in Iurino No. 1. The monsters then subjected the general to horrible torture; they put out his eyes with bayonets, they carved a star on his back and on his shoulders - as shoulder straps, and they cut off his sexual organs. The captured cavalrymen, among whom was Shaimuratov's adjutant, buried him, in the presence of the owner of the peasant hut where they tormented the general, within the walls of a stable in the village, since while the battle was going on, bullets were whistling about, and it was difficult to find a more appropriate place for his burial.
Many years after the war, the owner of the peasant hut (who is today deceased) and Shaimuratov's adjutant provided the details about those tragic events. Today, the general's remains repose in a common grave in the town of Petrovskoe in Krasnyi Luch raion of Lugansk oblast'. By order of the USSR Ministry of Defense's Main Cadres Directorate, M. M. Shaimuratov was removed from the Armed Forces officers' cadre list, in light of his short-term tenure as prisoner of war, as having perished on 23 February 1943, that is without indication of the exact circumstances of his death.8 It would have been more correct to have removed him as having been tortured to death in Fascist captivity.
Undoubtedly, considerable work is still required to clarify all the reasons for the destruction of the 7th Guards Cavalry Corps during the course of the initially successful Debaltsevo raid.
ENDNOTES
1. Editor's note. For additional details on the course of the Debaltsevo raid, see M. S. Dokuchaev, V boi shli eskadrony[The squadrons went into battle], (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1984), 35-59 and Kent A. Larson, The Debaltsevo Raid: A Case Study in the Role of Initiative in Soviet Operational Art, unpublished manuscript prepared for the School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS. Undated. The former is the history of the 7th Guards Cavalry Corps, and the latter is a superbly detailed study of the operation, which exploits both the 7th Guards Cavalry Corps history and a wide variety of German archival sources. Ultimately, the Germans employed the 17th and 6th Panzer Divisions and the 62d Infantry Division, all under XXXXVIII Panzer Corps control, to defeat the Soviet cavalry corps. Although the 7th Guards Cavalry Corps was virtually destroyed in the operation, the daring cavalry raid was instrumental in forcing the Germans to abandon the key city of VoroshilovgradBACK
2. In addition to the cavalry divisions, the corps included the 148th Mortar Regiment, the 263d Separate Cavalry Artillery Battalion, and the 8th Separate Antitank Artillery Battalion.BACK
3. General Borisov had been assigned command of the cavalry corps in fall 1942 and led it in during the Stalingrad counteroffensive, when it cooperated with 5th Tank Army in the encirclement of German Sixth Army at Stalingrad.BACK
4. Tsentral'nyi arkhiv ministerstva oborony TsAMO [Central archives of the Ministry of Defense], F. 3475, Op. 1, D. 1,. L. 2, 3.BACK
5. Ibid., L. 3.BACK
6. Materials in the files of GUPRK, formerly the GUK [Main Cadre Directorate] of the USSR's Ministry of Defense.BACK
7. From the personnel file of Major General S. I. Dudko (GUPRK) and information from the GUPRK published in Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal [Military-historical journal], No. 11 (November 1992), 20, which mistakenly states that the 7th Guards Cavalry Corps was assigned to the Voronezh Front.BACK
8. From the personnel file of Major General M. M. Shaimuratov (GUPRK).BACK
It is most likely the best English-language info that you will be able to find published on the matter, from the Red Army perspective.
All the best
Andreas
Foreign Military Studies Office
101 Meade Ave
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1351
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
WARNING!
The views expressed in FMSO publications and reports are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Unknown Pages of a Heroic Raid
by A.A. Maslov
Translated and edited by COL David M. Glantz
Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS.
The heroic and, at the same time, completely tragic two-week raid in February 1943 by the Southwestern Front's cavalry, which began the liberation of the Ukraine, remains essentially obscure to this very day. Soviet historiography of the 1941-1945 war says little about the organization and course of the raid, and it has not paid fitting attention to the losses suffered by the cavalrymen. I have touched upon this and related issues through the prism of studying about general officer losses in the war, in general, and during the raid, in particular.1
The raid was carried out by forces of the 8th Cavalry Corps, which consisted of the 21st, 35th, and 112th Cavalry Divisions.2 The corps commander, Major General M. D. Borisov, was an experienced military leader who had participated in the Great Patriotic War from its very beginning and was instrumented in the Soviet victory at Stallingrad.3 Thereafter, the cavalry corps operated under Southwestern Front control as Soviet forces drove the Germans westward from the Stalingrad region and the great bend on the Don River. Then, in February 1943, the corps was designated to lead the Soviet assault south of Voroshilovgrad into the Donets Basin region. In accordance with the Soviet command's offensive concept, the employment of the cavalry as a deep raiding force was to have facilitated and accelorated the advance of the Southwestern Front's main forces into the Donbas region.
Having discovered a weak link in the enemy's defenses southeast of Voroshilovgrad [Lugansk], on the night of 8 February, the cavalry penetrated the front lines, entered the operational depths, and began a deep raid against the enemy rear area in the region of the large rail center at Debaltsevo. Debaltsevo was an important communications center for the entire enemy Donbas grouping. At first, the cavalry force was successful. It reached the Debaltsevo region and inflicted great losses in personnel and equipment on the enemy. According to archival documents preserved by the corps, the raid into the rear area of the German Voroshilovgrad grouping cost the enemy a total of more than 12,000 soldiers and officers lost and 28 tanks, 70 motorcycles, 50 guns, 35 mortars, 54 machine guns, 2 armored trains, 1 fuel train, 20 locomotives, 1 train with tanks, 3 trains with vehicles, and 1 train with aircraft destroyed. In addition, 6 communications centers were destroyed, 3 railroad bridges were blown up, up to 30 warehouses with ammunition and foodstuffs were burned, and the main rail lines leading to Debaltsevo were blown up in 56 places.4 Furthermore, during the raid, on 14 February the raid, the corps was transformed into the 7th Guards Cavalry Corps, and its 21st, 35th, and 112th Cavalry Divisons became the 14th, 15th, and 16th Guards Cavalry Divisions, respectively.5 The order doing so was transmitted to the corps headquarters by radio.
Having fullfilled their assigned missions, the cavalry began to return from the raid. It was at this stage of the operation that the corps was fated to experience several utterly tragic days. Documents and materials, in particular notes written by participants and eyewitnesses of these events, are now available to document the course of this raid. These have been collected in a thoroughly professional manner over tens of years by the workers in the Museum of Combat Glory in Krasnyi Luch (Lugansk oblast'). They represent a rich and exceptionally valuable collection of materials about the Debaltsevo raid.
According to notes among the recollections of General M. D. Borisov, the corps received the mission from the Southwestern Front, which was commanded by General N. F. Vatutin, to advance through the villages of Ivanovka and Iulino No. 2 and reach the Shirokii Farm region, located several kilometers from the front lines. Then the corps was to attack eastward, penetrate enemy positions, and reach the safety of front main forces' dispositions. To facilitate the fullfilment of the corps' mission, the plan required front formations to deliver a meeting blow in the Shirokii Farm region to link up with the withdrawing cavalry force. However, this attack by front forces failed to materialize, and, therefore, the cavalrymen had to penetrate the enemy positions independently. While doing so, they suffered extremely heavy losses in intense fighting.
The situation was further complicated by the fact that the cavalrymen were already out of ammunition and were burdened by many wounded. During the course of a terrible battle which continued for more than 24 hours in the steppe region in and around the villages of Iulino No. 1, Iulino No. 2, Fromandirovka, and Shirokii, the cavalrymen were subjected to attack by all types of enemy weaponry. Only a small number of the Soviet soldiers survived the fighting and succeeded in linking up with Red Army main forces. About one thousand soldiers and commanders and several hundred horses remained lying on the bloody field of battle. Soon after, local inhabitants buried all of the soldiers who perished in combat in common graves in the steppes. During this battle, Major General M. D. Borisov, the corps commander, was captured; Major General S. I. Dudko, the deputy corps commander, Colonel I. D. Saburov, the corps chief of staff, Colonel A. A. Karpushchenko, the corps commissar, and Colonel A. N. Sarbai, the corps chief of communications, were killed; and Major General M. M. Shaimuratov, the commander of the 16th Guards Cavalry Division, also fell into enemy hands.
Valuable information can also be found in the Lugansk museum about the circumstance surrounding S. I. Dudko's and M. M. Shaimuratov's deaths. For example, Fedor Golovatyi, an inhabitant of the village of Shterovka, which is located several kilometers from the site of the cavalrymens' battle, left a particular lucid account of the action.
According to Golovatyi, at first light on 23 February 1943, capitalizing on the fact that bullets were not whistling through the village and shells were no longer exploding (since the front lines now passed 2-3 kilometers east of the village), he left his house with a pail to fetch water from a watering trough. While walking along the streets, Golovatyi glimpsed six horsemen clad in white sheepskin coats. Riding up to Golovatyi, one of them asked whether their were any Germans in the village? At that very moment, a burst of enemy automatic weapons fire resounded, one of the riders immediately fell from his horse, and the remaining horsemen turned back while firing from their automatic weapons. A "dappled blue-gray horse" remained near the fallen soldier. The Germans tried to catch it but failed. Then they exhausted the horse in a mine gallery [a horizontal mine exit], and they shot it. The rider, who had fallen from his horse, lay dead in the middle of the street. Golovatyi saw the Germans approach him and remove his fine sheepskin coat. A star was clearly visible on the collar of the dead man's military jacket, which meant a general officer's rank. According to Golovatyi, the dead man was a very handsome 40-45 year old man.
On the following morning, Golovatyi once again went to the watering trough for water. To his complete astonishment, he saw that the general's body was completely naked, and someone had fully removed his clothing and felt boots. Immediately, his attention was drawn to an old scar on his neck and on one of his legs, and there was also a large old scar below his knee. With the Germans' permission, that day the local inhabitants buried the man in a single grave in Shterovka, in a balka [ravine] near Romanov rock. There he remained until many years after the war, without any indication of family name or patronymic, although all in the vilage were sure that it was the grave of a great Soviet commander.
During the early 1960s an official commission made up of two professors and two colonels from Ufa, the capital of the Bashkir Republic, arrived in Shterovka to establish the place of death and the burial site of their fellow-countryman, M. M. Shaimuratov, who was a Bashkir by nationality. While visiting the grave of the unknown general, but without having examined the necessary materials, the commission reached the mistaken conclusion that M. M. Shaimuratov was buried in the grave. They even inscribed an inscription on Romanov rock, which read, "Here lies the remains of General M. M. Shaimuratov."
Several years later a new commission arrived from Bashkiria to re-bury the general in Ufa. His remains were taken from the grave and placed in a galvanized coffin, which, temporarily, pending receipt of official permission for reburial from responsible authorities in Moscow, was located in one of the factory warehouses in the town of Petrovskoe, located several kilometers from Shterovka. However, the answer arrived from Moscow, "Reburial of the remains of the unknown general in Bashkiria is forbidden." Consequently, the general's remains were transferred to a common grave containing cavalrymen who had died during the withdrawal in the Debaltsevo raid. The remains of hundreds of Soviet soldiers, which had brought together here during the postwar period from many common graves and individual graves, were buried in this common grave in the town of Petrovskoe.
Subsequent investigative work, however, permitted the following conclusions to be reached. Fedor Golovatyi was shown enlarged photographs of Generals S. I. Dudko. M. M. Shaimuratov, and also Major General I. T. Chalenko, the commander of the 7th Guards Cavalry Corps' 15th Guards Cavalry Division. Golovatyi identified the photograph of General Dudko as the officer he had observed being buried at this site. Soon the investigators succeeded in getting in touch with Dudko's wife, Evdokiia Ivanovna. From her it was determined that her husband actually had wounds on his neck and legs. The first of these he had received from a Makhnovite sabre (during the Civil War in Ukraine) and the second from a broken leg which he had received during a fall from a horse in the 1930s. Thus, the exact site, time, and circumstances of S. I. Dudko's death were finally successfully established. The USSR Ministry of Defense's Main Cadres Directorate received all of this new information in 1967.6 Then the exact site of General S. I. Dudko's burial was officially established, based upon information which the Main Cadres Directorate had not before possessed.7
In addition, we can now also finally and fully document the details of General Shaimuratov's death. While returning from the daring raid, the 16th Guards Cavalry Division had joined in terrible battle in the vicinity of the village of Iurino No. 1. The division commander, Shaimuratov, was severely wounded in the bloody encounter and was taken prisoner by the Germans and the Don Cossacks who were serving the Fascists. Having expelled its owner, the enemy brought Shaimuratov to one of the peasant houses in Iurino No. 1. The monsters then subjected the general to horrible torture; they put out his eyes with bayonets, they carved a star on his back and on his shoulders - as shoulder straps, and they cut off his sexual organs. The captured cavalrymen, among whom was Shaimuratov's adjutant, buried him, in the presence of the owner of the peasant hut where they tormented the general, within the walls of a stable in the village, since while the battle was going on, bullets were whistling about, and it was difficult to find a more appropriate place for his burial.
Many years after the war, the owner of the peasant hut (who is today deceased) and Shaimuratov's adjutant provided the details about those tragic events. Today, the general's remains repose in a common grave in the town of Petrovskoe in Krasnyi Luch raion of Lugansk oblast'. By order of the USSR Ministry of Defense's Main Cadres Directorate, M. M. Shaimuratov was removed from the Armed Forces officers' cadre list, in light of his short-term tenure as prisoner of war, as having perished on 23 February 1943, that is without indication of the exact circumstances of his death.8 It would have been more correct to have removed him as having been tortured to death in Fascist captivity.
Undoubtedly, considerable work is still required to clarify all the reasons for the destruction of the 7th Guards Cavalry Corps during the course of the initially successful Debaltsevo raid.
ENDNOTES
1. Editor's note. For additional details on the course of the Debaltsevo raid, see M. S. Dokuchaev, V boi shli eskadrony[The squadrons went into battle], (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1984), 35-59 and Kent A. Larson, The Debaltsevo Raid: A Case Study in the Role of Initiative in Soviet Operational Art, unpublished manuscript prepared for the School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS. Undated. The former is the history of the 7th Guards Cavalry Corps, and the latter is a superbly detailed study of the operation, which exploits both the 7th Guards Cavalry Corps history and a wide variety of German archival sources. Ultimately, the Germans employed the 17th and 6th Panzer Divisions and the 62d Infantry Division, all under XXXXVIII Panzer Corps control, to defeat the Soviet cavalry corps. Although the 7th Guards Cavalry Corps was virtually destroyed in the operation, the daring cavalry raid was instrumental in forcing the Germans to abandon the key city of VoroshilovgradBACK
2. In addition to the cavalry divisions, the corps included the 148th Mortar Regiment, the 263d Separate Cavalry Artillery Battalion, and the 8th Separate Antitank Artillery Battalion.BACK
3. General Borisov had been assigned command of the cavalry corps in fall 1942 and led it in during the Stalingrad counteroffensive, when it cooperated with 5th Tank Army in the encirclement of German Sixth Army at Stalingrad.BACK
4. Tsentral'nyi arkhiv ministerstva oborony TsAMO [Central archives of the Ministry of Defense], F. 3475, Op. 1, D. 1,. L. 2, 3.BACK
5. Ibid., L. 3.BACK
6. Materials in the files of GUPRK, formerly the GUK [Main Cadre Directorate] of the USSR's Ministry of Defense.BACK
7. From the personnel file of Major General S. I. Dudko (GUPRK) and information from the GUPRK published in Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal [Military-historical journal], No. 11 (November 1992), 20, which mistakenly states that the 7th Guards Cavalry Corps was assigned to the Voronezh Front.BACK
8. From the personnel file of Major General M. M. Shaimuratov (GUPRK).BACK
Welcome back to the forum! I've been waiting for you so long time!I had found the article last week. It seems a bit exaggerated and even glorified, like it was written for propaganda purposes. Based on the article, the cavalry destroyed half the trains in the Ukraine! My father was actually at Debalzevo on the 10th and returned on the 12th. The Soviets did a lot of damage, but I don’t think the Germans took 12,000 casualties. I wonder if anyone has facts from the German side on this.
Arnim
Arnim
I think you need some perspective. To transport a single Panzer division, ca. 60 trains were needed, and the number was apparently similar for an infantry division. The claim of six destroyed freight trains is one tenth of the transport required for one division. Debaltsevo was a rail centre, so it is quite likely that a number of trains would have been in the area. In any case, I seriously doubt that those six trains constituted half of the trains in Ukraine, because if that had been the case, the Germans would have lost the war in 1941 due to a lack of supplies.
The casualty claims cover the whole raid, which was not just on Debaltsevo. Nevertheless, as always there will be an element of overclaiming, and the numbers are best taken as the absolute upper boundary of possible losses, with real losses being lower.
All the best
Andreas
The casualty claims cover the whole raid, which was not just on Debaltsevo. Nevertheless, as always there will be an element of overclaiming, and the numbers are best taken as the absolute upper boundary of possible losses, with real losses being lower.
All the best
Andreas
Your absence was a big blow to the forum.Thanks again.
To further the point on trains - there is an analysis in the STAVKA study on L'vov (published by Glantz), where they state that after reparation and improvement work they got the carrying capacity of the lines up by a factor of 1.5-2. They became:
Single line: 12 pairs of trains per day (my guess is a pair means a train going and coming back)
Double line: 24 pairs/day
Shepetovka-Zdolbunov sector: 36 pairs/day
So six trains were half the daily capacity on a single line.
In terms of understanding the impact of the raid, it pays to look past the loss figures claimed (these were really neither here nor there on the eastern front), and into the footnotes:
All the best
Andreas
To further the point on trains - there is an analysis in the STAVKA study on L'vov (published by Glantz), where they state that after reparation and improvement work they got the carrying capacity of the lines up by a factor of 1.5-2. They became:
Single line: 12 pairs of trains per day (my guess is a pair means a train going and coming back)
Double line: 24 pairs/day
Shepetovka-Zdolbunov sector: 36 pairs/day
So six trains were half the daily capacity on a single line.
In terms of understanding the impact of the raid, it pays to look past the loss figures claimed (these were really neither here nor there on the eastern front), and into the footnotes:
So the Cavalry Corps (which in its strength was probably about the equal of a six-battalion German infantry division) occupied two Panzer and one infantry division for a while during a critical moment, and attained the operational gain of forcing the Germans out of Voroshilovgrad. Not bad. Of course, STAVKA then managed to p*ss it all away, but that's another story.Ultimately, the Germans employed the 17th and 6th Panzer Divisions and the 62d Infantry Division, all under XXXXVIII Panzer Corps control, to defeat the Soviet cavalry corps. Although the 7th Guards Cavalry Corps was virtually destroyed in the operation, the daring cavalry raid was instrumental in forcing the Germans to abandon the key city of Voroshilovgrad.
All the best
Andreas
Here's what I manage to put together. As this is fairly obscure operation, the only book giving the general overview of it is Schwarz: Die Stabilisierung der Ostfront nach Stalingrad, other sources (as listed bellow) are mainly unit histories from some of the divisions involved in the battle. The following text is by no means a complete account of the battle, so any additions or corrections are more then wellcome.
On 19.1. Gruppe Kreysing arrived from Millerowo and took up positions in the Donez bridgehead which was in the next days abandoned and a new front line established on the right bank of Donez at Woroshilovgrad - in the centre of Armee Abteilung Fretter-Pico's front. The group was reinforced with various scattered alarm units, elements of various rear area formations, repaired panzers from dislocated workshops etc. On AA F-P's right flank the Donez positions were defended by the Italian Division Ravenna and 304th Inf.Div. Especially in the area of the former, 3rd GA manage to establish several bridgeheads, which the German&Italian reinforcements reduced but didn't eliminate. According to Fretter-Pico, Ravenna was quickly disintegrating and was thus on 24.1. replaced on its positions by Gr.Kreysing and 304.Inf.Div. The left flank, as was thought, posed a more immediate threat as there was a big gap in the front line to 19.Pz.Div.'s positions and RA reinforcements were observed trying to exploit this. To tackle it AA F-P deployed its mobile Gruppe Schuldt with the task of securing AA's left flank. In the next days heavy fighting developed in this section. Once relieved from its positions by the newly arrived 335.Inf.Div. Schuldt was sent to reinforce the left flank defended by 304.Inf.Div., arriving there on 30.1.. Two days earlier 3rd GA established a solid bridgehead at Dawydo-Nikolskij. Counterattacks by local units failed to dislodge them, much worse taking advantage of the frozen Donez 3rd GA began quickly reinforcing the bridgehead with tanks and began advancing. According to Schwarz they had the following strength: 3 tank corps (2.TC, 2.GTC and 23.TC), 1 mechanized (1.GMC), 1 cavalry (8.CC) and 1 rifle corps(14.GRC). This would mean the bulk of 3rd GA with the entire army's tank force, estimated by Glantz to have 110 tanks. Obviously most of these units were probably worn out by the previous battles but then again the same is true for their German counterparts. By 1st Feb. the 3rd GA attack gained momentum, the German counterattack forces were swept aside and broken-through. On the N part of breakthrough Gr.Kreysing pulled back and occupied a blocking position at Nowa Svetlowka. Aproaching them was the 3rd GA's tank group (aparently 2nd GTC and 1st GMC(Klatt,p.152). On the S flank of Gr.Schuldt, now together with 304.Inf.Div. split from the AA F-P and subordinated to AA Hollidt, tried desperately to hold on to its position. In the next days Hollidt sent additional reinforcements (Krad.Btl.7 and Gr.v.Hünnersdorf) in order to close the penetration and though they relieved the pressure on Gr.Schuldt, they nevertheless failed in their objective and 3rd GA reached on 5th the SE outskirts of Woroshilovgrad. The city itself was also attacked from E and N directions, where 3rd GA established more bridgeheads, and also armed civilians began appearing on the streets. While the heavy battles for the city raged on 8.2. 8th CC advanced unopposed towards Debalzewo and threatened to encircle Gr.Kreysing and 335.Inf.Div. KG 22.Pz.Div. along with the redeployed 6.Pz.Div. checked further advance by 3rd GA advance towards W, from soutern direction but was unable to reestablish connection with Gr.Kreysing. As a result the Germans were forced on 14.2. to retreat to a shortened line earlier then expected in order to gain reserves, close the penetration and repulse further advance which would potentially threat the planned counteroffensive. The task of securing the gap between XXX.AK (renamed from AA F-P) and AA Hollidt, which was still in the exposed positions along Don, was entrusted to 6.Pz.Div. In the next days Germans manage to seal the gap, reestablish a front running in N - S direction. A decision was also made to destroy the now retitled 7th GCC in Debalzewo with a concentrated attack using 17.Pz.Div., local reserves and further units which would be freed after the accomplished retreat to the so-called Maulwurfstellung on the river Mius (6.Pz.Div. & 62.Inf.Div.). The operations were hampered by difficult terrain and heavy snowfalls. On 18th when both reinforcements arrived 7th GCC was already worn down by the heavy fighting and ejected from Debelzewo but continued to offer resistance SE of the city at Gorodischtsche. On 20.2. both Panzer Divisions were recalled back to participate in the counteroffensive on Kharkov, but at this time 7th GCC ceased to exist as a coherent combat formation and till the 24.2. when it was finally destroyed the fighting was more like cat and mouse plays, as scattered mobile cavalry groups tried to escape towards E, taking advantage of their superior mobility in deep snow and finding shelters in the numerous coal mine shafts in the area. Some groups also tried to mix in with the civilians. The Corps was effectively destroyed on 23.2. in the heavy battles at Julino I and II by elements of 62nd and 302nd Inf.Div. One last attempt to break through German positions was repulsed on 24.2 and the group annihilated by Fhr.Flak.Abt.100. At the same time very intense battles continued along the shortened front line as 3rd GA made further strong attempts, supported by tanks, to breakthrough along the Olchowka valley and help the beleaguered Corps. All were eventually repulsed after heavy fighting.
Schwarz, Eberhard: Die Stabilisierung der Ostfront nach Stalingrad.
Lehmann, Rudolf: The Leibstandarte. Bd.III.
Husemann, Friedrich: Die guten Glaubens waren. Bd II.
Ruef, Karl: Odyssee einer Gebirgsdivision. Die 3. Geb.Div. im Einsatz.
Fretter-Pico, Maximilian: “…verlassen von des Sieges Göttern”.
von Manteuffel, Hasso: Die 7.Panzer-Division. 1939-1945.
Nipe, George M. Jr.: Last Victory in Russia.
Schadewitz, Michael: Die Traditionstruppenteile des Panzerbataillons 194.
Klatt, Paul: Die 3.Gebirgs-Division 1939-1945.
Schäfer, Ralf Anton: Die 62.Infanteriedivision 1938-1944/Die 62.Volksgrenadierdivision 1944-1945. Die Mondschein-Division.
Glantz, David M.: From the Don to the Dneper.
Stoves, Rolf: Die 22. Panzer-Division, 25. Panzer-Division, 27. Panzer-Division und die 233.Reserve-Panzer-Division.
Osteuropa Map 1:130000 A49 Woroschilowgrad
On 19.1. Gruppe Kreysing arrived from Millerowo and took up positions in the Donez bridgehead which was in the next days abandoned and a new front line established on the right bank of Donez at Woroshilovgrad - in the centre of Armee Abteilung Fretter-Pico's front. The group was reinforced with various scattered alarm units, elements of various rear area formations, repaired panzers from dislocated workshops etc. On AA F-P's right flank the Donez positions were defended by the Italian Division Ravenna and 304th Inf.Div. Especially in the area of the former, 3rd GA manage to establish several bridgeheads, which the German&Italian reinforcements reduced but didn't eliminate. According to Fretter-Pico, Ravenna was quickly disintegrating and was thus on 24.1. replaced on its positions by Gr.Kreysing and 304.Inf.Div. The left flank, as was thought, posed a more immediate threat as there was a big gap in the front line to 19.Pz.Div.'s positions and RA reinforcements were observed trying to exploit this. To tackle it AA F-P deployed its mobile Gruppe Schuldt with the task of securing AA's left flank. In the next days heavy fighting developed in this section. Once relieved from its positions by the newly arrived 335.Inf.Div. Schuldt was sent to reinforce the left flank defended by 304.Inf.Div., arriving there on 30.1.. Two days earlier 3rd GA established a solid bridgehead at Dawydo-Nikolskij. Counterattacks by local units failed to dislodge them, much worse taking advantage of the frozen Donez 3rd GA began quickly reinforcing the bridgehead with tanks and began advancing. According to Schwarz they had the following strength: 3 tank corps (2.TC, 2.GTC and 23.TC), 1 mechanized (1.GMC), 1 cavalry (8.CC) and 1 rifle corps(14.GRC). This would mean the bulk of 3rd GA with the entire army's tank force, estimated by Glantz to have 110 tanks. Obviously most of these units were probably worn out by the previous battles but then again the same is true for their German counterparts. By 1st Feb. the 3rd GA attack gained momentum, the German counterattack forces were swept aside and broken-through. On the N part of breakthrough Gr.Kreysing pulled back and occupied a blocking position at Nowa Svetlowka. Aproaching them was the 3rd GA's tank group (aparently 2nd GTC and 1st GMC(Klatt,p.152). On the S flank of Gr.Schuldt, now together with 304.Inf.Div. split from the AA F-P and subordinated to AA Hollidt, tried desperately to hold on to its position. In the next days Hollidt sent additional reinforcements (Krad.Btl.7 and Gr.v.Hünnersdorf) in order to close the penetration and though they relieved the pressure on Gr.Schuldt, they nevertheless failed in their objective and 3rd GA reached on 5th the SE outskirts of Woroshilovgrad. The city itself was also attacked from E and N directions, where 3rd GA established more bridgeheads, and also armed civilians began appearing on the streets. While the heavy battles for the city raged on 8.2. 8th CC advanced unopposed towards Debalzewo and threatened to encircle Gr.Kreysing and 335.Inf.Div. KG 22.Pz.Div. along with the redeployed 6.Pz.Div. checked further advance by 3rd GA advance towards W, from soutern direction but was unable to reestablish connection with Gr.Kreysing. As a result the Germans were forced on 14.2. to retreat to a shortened line earlier then expected in order to gain reserves, close the penetration and repulse further advance which would potentially threat the planned counteroffensive. The task of securing the gap between XXX.AK (renamed from AA F-P) and AA Hollidt, which was still in the exposed positions along Don, was entrusted to 6.Pz.Div. In the next days Germans manage to seal the gap, reestablish a front running in N - S direction. A decision was also made to destroy the now retitled 7th GCC in Debalzewo with a concentrated attack using 17.Pz.Div., local reserves and further units which would be freed after the accomplished retreat to the so-called Maulwurfstellung on the river Mius (6.Pz.Div. & 62.Inf.Div.). The operations were hampered by difficult terrain and heavy snowfalls. On 18th when both reinforcements arrived 7th GCC was already worn down by the heavy fighting and ejected from Debelzewo but continued to offer resistance SE of the city at Gorodischtsche. On 20.2. both Panzer Divisions were recalled back to participate in the counteroffensive on Kharkov, but at this time 7th GCC ceased to exist as a coherent combat formation and till the 24.2. when it was finally destroyed the fighting was more like cat and mouse plays, as scattered mobile cavalry groups tried to escape towards E, taking advantage of their superior mobility in deep snow and finding shelters in the numerous coal mine shafts in the area. Some groups also tried to mix in with the civilians. The Corps was effectively destroyed on 23.2. in the heavy battles at Julino I and II by elements of 62nd and 302nd Inf.Div. One last attempt to break through German positions was repulsed on 24.2 and the group annihilated by Fhr.Flak.Abt.100. At the same time very intense battles continued along the shortened front line as 3rd GA made further strong attempts, supported by tanks, to breakthrough along the Olchowka valley and help the beleaguered Corps. All were eventually repulsed after heavy fighting.
Schwarz, Eberhard: Die Stabilisierung der Ostfront nach Stalingrad.
Lehmann, Rudolf: The Leibstandarte. Bd.III.
Husemann, Friedrich: Die guten Glaubens waren. Bd II.
Ruef, Karl: Odyssee einer Gebirgsdivision. Die 3. Geb.Div. im Einsatz.
Fretter-Pico, Maximilian: “…verlassen von des Sieges Göttern”.
von Manteuffel, Hasso: Die 7.Panzer-Division. 1939-1945.
Nipe, George M. Jr.: Last Victory in Russia.
Schadewitz, Michael: Die Traditionstruppenteile des Panzerbataillons 194.
Klatt, Paul: Die 3.Gebirgs-Division 1939-1945.
Schäfer, Ralf Anton: Die 62.Infanteriedivision 1938-1944/Die 62.Volksgrenadierdivision 1944-1945. Die Mondschein-Division.
Glantz, David M.: From the Don to the Dneper.
Stoves, Rolf: Die 22. Panzer-Division, 25. Panzer-Division, 27. Panzer-Division und die 233.Reserve-Panzer-Division.
Osteuropa Map 1:130000 A49 Woroschilowgrad
- Attachments
-
- Klatt, Paul: Die 3.Gebirgs-Division 1939-1945.
- scan0003.jpg (66.07 KiB) Viewed 6291 times
Thanks to everyone for the information and perspective. The information I am looking for id always a bit hard to find because it has to be relevant to my dad's experiences in the war. I sure wish he had told me more about them. I guess he just wanted to forget that stuff. Spending several months freezing one's butt in a foreign land while getting shot at can't be something you would want to remember!
As to the trains, an infantry division (with horses) took upwards of 50 trains. By the way, my dad acquired quite a taste for horsemeat. I wonder if they ate the mounts of the Soviet cavarymen which were shot up. I know that they ate their own horses. I never liked horsemeat, but then I was never on the Russian Front.
Gerst
As to the trains, an infantry division (with horses) took upwards of 50 trains. By the way, my dad acquired quite a taste for horsemeat. I wonder if they ate the mounts of the Soviet cavarymen which were shot up. I know that they ate their own horses. I never liked horsemeat, but then I was never on the Russian Front.
Gerst
Last edited by Gerst on 08 Aug 2006, 05:21, edited 1 time in total.
This is great stuff Mark. The corps was down to less than 10,000 effectives during their attack into Debalzevo which seems to have been largely unopposed.
My father's staff was there until the 10th. The corps "hit town" the very next day and tore the place apart. The weather was terrible. By the account written by General Fretter-Pico, he and his staff barely avoided capture while they were on the move to the west on the 8th of February.
I am a bit sleptical about the 12,000 casualties inflicted by the corps but they did a lot of damage and had a lot of guts, that's for sure. They held out for over two weeks behind the German lines and very few managed to escape. They did their duty, and died doing it - that's a soldier's job in every army.
The map is in the 3rd Mt. Division book by Paul Klatt? I must try to find it. How detailed is it about the Fretter-Pico period? Does is name names?
Arnim
My father's staff was there until the 10th. The corps "hit town" the very next day and tore the place apart. The weather was terrible. By the account written by General Fretter-Pico, he and his staff barely avoided capture while they were on the move to the west on the 8th of February.
I am a bit sleptical about the 12,000 casualties inflicted by the corps but they did a lot of damage and had a lot of guts, that's for sure. They held out for over two weeks behind the German lines and very few managed to escape. They did their duty, and died doing it - that's a soldier's job in every army.
The map is in the 3rd Mt. Division book by Paul Klatt? I must try to find it. How detailed is it about the Fretter-Pico period? Does is name names?
Arnim
-
Abel Ravasz
- Member
- Posts: 402
- Joined: 31 Mar 2002, 22:46
- Location: Hungary/Slovakia
Excellent work, Marko, as usual! Let's see if I can add anything new.
19/1/43
Ravenna's positions on the Donez are breached.
Gr. Kreysing arrives at Gerasimovka in heavy combat.
20/1/43
7. Pz Div crosses the Donez and occupies defense positions at Kamensk.
Two Russian corps bypass the positions of A-A Fretter-Pico at the Donez.
Ravenna and elements of the 304. Inf Div (GR 537) are pushed back as Soviet gain Donez bridgehead.
Gr. Kreysing takes over defense of the Donez line, supported by KG Mattheas (Lw Btl zbV 100)
22/1/43
German forces (KG Schuldt?) counterattack at Kruscilovka, reestablishing Ravenna's Donez positions.
24/1/43
Ravenna is withdrawn from the frontline to Rovenki for reorganizing under the command of II. Ita AK.
27/1/43
Gruppe Schmidt (19. Pz Div) of A-A Fretter-Pico reaches the Donez.
28/1/43
335. Inf Div is inserted into the frontline at Voroshilovgrad.
Soviet forces push back the 304. Inf Div through the frozen Donez at Kruscilovka.
29/1/43
Gr. Schmidt beats off an attack on Lisichansk.
30/1/43
KG Schuldt is transferred to aid the 304. Inf Div.
31/1/43
A gap is openned between the 19. Pz Div and the 320. Inf Div after the former division's retreat behind the Donez at Lisichansk.
1/2/43
A-A Hollidt takes over the sector of the 304. Inf Div.
19. Pz Div is assigned to the newly reestablished III. PzK.
2/2/43
Elements of 7. Pz Div are encircled at Slavjansk, city declared Fester Platz.
3/2/43
A-A Fretter-Pico is renamed XXX. AK and attached to the PzAOK 1, just arriving.
7. Pz in heavy, 3-day combat against the 10. TC at Kramatorsk.
Russian forces break through the 304. Inf Div lines 30 kms from Voroshilovgrad and establish a large bridgehead there.
4/2/43
6. Pz Div is sent to aid the 304. Inf Div.
5/2/43
6. Pz Div fails to reestablish the Donez line in the 304. Inf Div sector.
6/2/43
3. Pz and 7. Pz in tough combat at Kramatorsk.
7/2/43
Kramatorsk is "liberated".
Russian cavalry pierces German lines and heads for Debaltzevo.
8/2/43
Soviet 8. CC raids and captures Debaltzevo.
9/2/43
17. Pz Div is assigned to help the 19. Pz Div at PzAOK 1.
11/2/43
Postichevo falls to the Soviet, last rail connection to the PzAOK 1 is severed.
12/2/43
22. Pz Div, supported by elements of the XXX. AK, checks the cavalry at Debaltzevo.
XXXX. PzK start counterattack against the Popov group.
13/2/43
PZ 10A (train) controls the rail line at Debaltzevo.
14/2/43
Soviet forces capture Voroshilovgrad.
XXX. AK pulls back behind a temporary line near the Mius.
17/2/43
XXX. AK arrives at the Mius.
17. Pz Div in combat at Chernushino against the Soviet forces that broke through to Debaltzevo.
18/2/43
As A-A Hollidt arrives at the Mius, the 6. Pz Div closes gap so far separating the army from PzAOK 1.
19/2/43
17. Pz Div leaves Chernushino area and transfers to the west.
21/2/43
Elements of the encircled 7. GCC surrender near Debaltzevo.
24/2/43
KG Mattheas annihilates remnants of the Soviet cavalry group at Shterovka.
Info is from my own collection, using several (100+) books, posts and manuscripts. Detailed source list available if needed.
Any notes, or plus data, is more than welcome!
Hope this helps,
Abel
19/1/43
Ravenna's positions on the Donez are breached.
Gr. Kreysing arrives at Gerasimovka in heavy combat.
20/1/43
7. Pz Div crosses the Donez and occupies defense positions at Kamensk.
Two Russian corps bypass the positions of A-A Fretter-Pico at the Donez.
Ravenna and elements of the 304. Inf Div (GR 537) are pushed back as Soviet gain Donez bridgehead.
Gr. Kreysing takes over defense of the Donez line, supported by KG Mattheas (Lw Btl zbV 100)
22/1/43
German forces (KG Schuldt?) counterattack at Kruscilovka, reestablishing Ravenna's Donez positions.
24/1/43
Ravenna is withdrawn from the frontline to Rovenki for reorganizing under the command of II. Ita AK.
27/1/43
Gruppe Schmidt (19. Pz Div) of A-A Fretter-Pico reaches the Donez.
28/1/43
335. Inf Div is inserted into the frontline at Voroshilovgrad.
Soviet forces push back the 304. Inf Div through the frozen Donez at Kruscilovka.
29/1/43
Gr. Schmidt beats off an attack on Lisichansk.
30/1/43
KG Schuldt is transferred to aid the 304. Inf Div.
31/1/43
A gap is openned between the 19. Pz Div and the 320. Inf Div after the former division's retreat behind the Donez at Lisichansk.
1/2/43
A-A Hollidt takes over the sector of the 304. Inf Div.
19. Pz Div is assigned to the newly reestablished III. PzK.
2/2/43
Elements of 7. Pz Div are encircled at Slavjansk, city declared Fester Platz.
3/2/43
A-A Fretter-Pico is renamed XXX. AK and attached to the PzAOK 1, just arriving.
7. Pz in heavy, 3-day combat against the 10. TC at Kramatorsk.
Russian forces break through the 304. Inf Div lines 30 kms from Voroshilovgrad and establish a large bridgehead there.
4/2/43
6. Pz Div is sent to aid the 304. Inf Div.
5/2/43
6. Pz Div fails to reestablish the Donez line in the 304. Inf Div sector.
6/2/43
3. Pz and 7. Pz in tough combat at Kramatorsk.
7/2/43
Kramatorsk is "liberated".
Russian cavalry pierces German lines and heads for Debaltzevo.
8/2/43
Soviet 8. CC raids and captures Debaltzevo.
9/2/43
17. Pz Div is assigned to help the 19. Pz Div at PzAOK 1.
11/2/43
Postichevo falls to the Soviet, last rail connection to the PzAOK 1 is severed.
12/2/43
22. Pz Div, supported by elements of the XXX. AK, checks the cavalry at Debaltzevo.
XXXX. PzK start counterattack against the Popov group.
13/2/43
PZ 10A (train) controls the rail line at Debaltzevo.
14/2/43
Soviet forces capture Voroshilovgrad.
XXX. AK pulls back behind a temporary line near the Mius.
17/2/43
XXX. AK arrives at the Mius.
17. Pz Div in combat at Chernushino against the Soviet forces that broke through to Debaltzevo.
18/2/43
As A-A Hollidt arrives at the Mius, the 6. Pz Div closes gap so far separating the army from PzAOK 1.
19/2/43
17. Pz Div leaves Chernushino area and transfers to the west.
21/2/43
Elements of the encircled 7. GCC surrender near Debaltzevo.
24/2/43
KG Mattheas annihilates remnants of the Soviet cavalry group at Shterovka.
Info is from my own collection, using several (100+) books, posts and manuscripts. Detailed source list available if needed.
Any notes, or plus data, is more than welcome!
Hope this helps,
Abel