British Historian: "A pre-emptive German strike on the

[Roberto]

Roberto wrote:

Aggression it was.

But not against Germany, in regard to whom it was in accordance with the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact.

My dear Pendragon, I think you are confusing two historical events here.

The first of these was the Soviet Union's heavying of the Baltic States and Finland in October 1939 to sign non-aggression traties and allow it to establish military bases on their territory. That action was in accordance with the secret protocol to the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 23 August 1939, and the subsequent Borders and Friendship Treaty of 28 September. For that reason, the Soviet action was not opposed by Germany.

The three Baltic States submitted to Soviet pressure and allowed the stationing of small Soviet garrisons on their territory. Finland however refused to allow a Soviet base at Hangoe, which led to the Winter War.

The second event was the Soviet invasion in force of the Baltic states in June 1940, the incorporation of those states into the Soviet Union through fraudulent elections, and the unleashing of a reign of terror against opposition.

That move was a reaction to German victory in the West. It was not agreed with Germany, and greatly exceeded what Germany had agreed to in 1939. The Soviet occupation of the Baltic states was an aggressive move designed to improve its military position vis-a-vis Germany, by stationing massive forces directly on the German border; it was therefore a hostile move from the German point of view.

By committing an act of aggression against states friendly to Germany, the Soviet Union was in effect committing aggression against Germany itself.

Nun ja, dann ziehen wir wieder einmal den Herrn Overy zu Rate.

[…]Having absorbed half of Poland, and temporarily averted the German threat, Stalin was eager to press on with fulfillment of the terms set out in the secret German-Soviet protocols. The Baltic states were asked to sign treaties of mutual assistance in the two weeks following the Polish defeat. The treaties gave the Soviet Union the right to station troops in Baltic bases. A few weeks later, on October 5, similar demands were made of Finland: a naval and air base at the mouth of the Baltic at Hanko and cession of the Karelian isthmus north of Leningrad to provide a better defense of that vital city. In return Finland was offered a large area of Soviet territory in Karelia. The Finns refused and on November 13 negotiations were broken off. Stalin almost certainly would have preferred a political solution, but when the Finns refused to be intimidated he tore up the Soviet-Finnish non-aggression treaty and prepared for a military campaign to bring Finland entirely into the Soviet orbit.[…]

[…]The sharp change in the strategic situation prompted Soviet leaders to take the remaining spoils assigned to the Soviet sphere under the terms of the secret protocols of the pact with Germany[emphasis mine]. On June 27, on the pretext that ‘acts of provocation’ from the Baltic states had to be met with force, half a million Soviet soldiers were sent into the three republics, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, which were subject to the same regime of lawless terror that had been imposed in eastern Poland. […]At the end of June it was the turn of Romania. Under strong diplomatic pressure the Government in Bucharest handed back the former Tsarist territory of Bessarabia, as well as part of the Bukovina region that had not been included in the pact.[emphasis mine] The occupation of these areas was begun on June 28 under Zhukov’s supervision, and was completed two days later. The Red Army now lay only 120 miles from the Ploesti oil fields, which provided almost all of Germany’s wartime supply of crude oil.
The sudden expansion of Soviet territory westward, although conceded in principle in 1939, produced fresh anxieties in Berlin.[…]

So it seems that the occupation of the Baltic states and Bessarabia was in accordance with the protocols of the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact and only the occupation of Bukovina went beyond it, though Overy apparently considers it to have been “conceded in principle in 1939” as well.

At the same time as the invasion of the Baltic states, the Soviet Union made threatening moves against Finland.

Such as?

It was only the stationing of German troops in that country that averted a resumption of the Soviet-Finnish war at that time.

Evidence?

Indeed, one of Molotov's demands at the Berlin meeting in November 1940 was the removal of German troops from Finland.

That’s correct, for a change.

Evidence that this was meant to make possible another attack on Finland rather than to eliminate a perceived German threat?

Roberto also wrote:

Maybe so, but how would that make Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union look like anything better than naked, unprovoked aggression ?

What have you got against nudism, Draco? Why is naked aggression worse than aggression wearing trousers?

Mind you, I do grant that the sight of thousands of naked German soldiers advancing toward one would be rather daunting, particularly if they were all dosed up on Viagra!

"Nicht schiessen, Kamerad! The rifle I mean".

Poor Mills doesn’t have a sense of humor, and any attempt of his to provide some “comic relief” only reveals what a pitiable, sick fellow he is.

It also calls to mind that old German saying

“Wo das Herz von voll ist, quillt der Mund über” (What your heart is full of your mouth spurts out).

[Roberto]

Roberto challenged:

What we would now need is evidence that and when Hitler gave up this "toying".

Could Smith please provide such evidence?

Note: "I think that ..." or "I don't think that ..." will not be accepted as evidence.

Geoffrey Roberts writes on page 173:

A further, less tangible factor must be taken into account when assessing the effects of what Volkogonov calls Stalin's and Molotov's whitewash of Nazi Germany: its impact on Hitler's perception of the USSR. For a period in 1939-1940 Hitler and Ribbentrop held the view that the Bolshevik regime was being subsumed by a modern, state form of Russian nationalism. On this basis Hitler was able seriously to contemplate the possibility of a long-term alliance with Soviet Russia (providing Moscow accepted German hegemony). It was only when the clash between German and Soviet interests in the Balkans developed in 1940-41 that Hitler reverted to his previous determination to mount an anti-Bolshevik crusade for 'living space' in the east.

In a footnote to the above, Roberts writes:

On Hitler and Ribbentrop's changing view toward Soviet Russia see W. Carr, Poland to Pearl Harbour (London: Edward Arnold, 1985), pp. 112-16.

Roberts considers that Adolf temporarily abandoned his dreams of “Lebensraum” in favor of “the possibility of a long-term alliance with Soviet Russia”.

Overy, Shirer, and Graml, on the other hand, are of the opinion that Hitler merely put his ideological goals on the back-burner as long as the geopolitical situation did not allow for the pursuit thereof, and revived them when that became possible.

Whose assessment is more accurate depends on what either has got to offer by way of evidence. What my sources base their assessment on I have shown. What Mills’ sources back their assessment up with is for Mills to show.

I trust, Pendragon, that the above quote will be sufficient to soothe your inflamed haemorrhoids.

Keep the insults coming, Mills. Not only do they show how furious and desperate you are, they also make for a splendid self-portrait of Michael Mills.

I suspect, though, that you will dream up yet another ingenious excuse for rejecting it as proof of what Scott Smith wrote in relation to Hitler's changing priorities.

Piece of cake. See above.

Might I suggest that you do something really radical: read a book. Start with Geoffrey Roberts' book, which I have been quoting, and then move on to the Carr book mentioned above. I have not read the latter, but I have put it on my reading list, and I dare say I will have consulted it well before you have moved beyond recycling the same old load of tired, worn-out quotations.

I’d rather wait for Mills to come up with whatever new readings of his to shove back into his throat either the sources themselves or the absurd contentions he bases on one of his usual self-serving distortions thereof.

And as I said before, Mills should be careful with bragging about how much he has read and I have not, lest he wants readers to wonder why, then, the dissident researcher and expert from Australia has his contentions slapped around his ears all the time.

Maybe he should remember his beloved Führer’s words and ponder to what extent they apply to himself:

I know people who read interminably, book after book, from page to page, and yet I should not call them ‘well-read people’. Of course they ‘know’ an immense amount; but their brain seems incapable of assorting and classifying the material which they have gathered from books.

Source of quote:

http://www.stormfront.org/books/mein_ka ... 1ch02.html

[webtoy100]

I don't see why Hitler's words are worthless. He was the one in charge. His explanation makes perfect sense to me and you didn't even try to refute it. Is it perhaps because you can't?

It is clear, concise, and reasonable, and explains the encirclement of Germany. It doesn't fit the familiar enemy propaganda image at all. Thanks for posting it.

It is propaganda from the master of propaganda you mean? Maybe I miss understood you.

It is what the German people wanted to hear, Hitler and Gobbles would continue to feed fiction to the German people through out the war. Most works I have read about German soldiers state the same thing about the propaganda regarding the war. They started to see the truth later on when things did not add up.

What is propaganda or fiction about it?

I agree - the speech is terribly boring and full of lies - one of the biggest of which is that there were no German troops on its eastern border until a few weeks previously. They had been building up there over a period of many months.

All the evidence is that Hitler had decided to attack Russia a long time previously - possibly as early as July 1940 after the fall of France, and indeed issued operational orders. Over and above that, he made his plans for eastern colonisation clear in Mein Kampf as well, years earlier.

Everything else is an excuse for propagandistic purposes - he knew full well the German people did not like this escalation of the war - they had possibly read their history books more assiduously than Hitler ever had (cf the fate of people who invade Russia) - and their misgivings were proved correct.

Whilst I admit its interesting and indeed the purpose of this forum to discuss these issues, ultimately it is only possible to understand and appreciate his motives for this insane and fatal act if you are, in fact, as paranoically nuts as he was.

And, yes, as someone else has noted, we seem to have been here before...!