If it's not too much trouble Victor.
What is the link to your site by the way?
19 November 1942
This letter was sent by marshal Antonescu on 9 December 1942 to marshal Erich von Manstein, but obviously it was addressed more to Hitler.
Here are the fragments from the letter:
Romania offered almost all its available armed forces, with the best officers, the youngest and best trained troops and the most modern equipment it had, so that together with the Wehrmacht it can contribute to the destruction of the enemy, fulfilling thus an European role, far from its national and political ideals. This generous sacrifice must not be regarded as an obligation without restrictions. No one can ask us to give something else than we choose to, because between Germany and Romania there is no political or military convention.
[...]
The troops of the 3rd Army marched 500-600 km to get to the front, while the German troops were brought in directly by train.
[...]
As the Romanian divisions replaced a German or an Italian division on the front they left without even warning us. Out troops did not find any organization, AT defensive positions, barbed wire or even barracks. They had to defend an area without forests, with few villages or natural defenses. This region had already been dried out of food and hay by the previous occupiers. Even the existing warehouses were taken away, so the supply was done by horses, over a 120 km distance.
[...]
The remarks of the Romanian General Staff and even mine personally were not taken into consideration by the German command. [probably referring to the suggestions for the elimination of the bridgehead over the Don] The un-human behavior of the German troops towards their Romanian comrades has upset me profoundly. I am informed that, when the German soldiers retreated by trucks and Romanian soldiers tried to get into those trucks, they were hit and thrown into the road.
[...]
I am informed that my soldiers, who fought bravely are now shot by your men in the encirclement at Stalingrad. I am also informed that some of your soldiers, that have been behind the front for a long time, simply confiscate the hand weapons of our officers and NCOs.
[...]
The massacre of the units of the Romanian 1st Corps will have a disastrous effect on the Romanian-German comradeship and will bring nothing good in the future.
[...]
I am also informed that German units take, without any excuse and with a huge daring, the horses of our service troops and leave them on foot.
[...]
I am also informed, Herr Marschal, that general Hollidt is showing an unbearable brutality against the Romanian commanders.
[...]
There were of course cases of defections, but reported to the number of troops they were isolated. There were defections also in the German formations during the Soviet attacks on 19 and 20 November. The proof is the large number of confused German soldiers which gathered at Morozovskaya. But the Romanians were branded as cowards!
[...]
The success of the Soviet offensive is not due to the inefficiency of the 3rd and 4th Army, but to the lack of foresight of the command of Army Group B, the skillful choice of the attack point and the massive concentration of forces in secrecy.
[...]
The Romanian soldier can be judged only by the Romanian officer or command. I feel it is my duty to warn you that if this attitude does not stop I will have to reevaluate the situation of our forces in your front.
Here are the fragments from the letter:
Romania offered almost all its available armed forces, with the best officers, the youngest and best trained troops and the most modern equipment it had, so that together with the Wehrmacht it can contribute to the destruction of the enemy, fulfilling thus an European role, far from its national and political ideals. This generous sacrifice must not be regarded as an obligation without restrictions. No one can ask us to give something else than we choose to, because between Germany and Romania there is no political or military convention.
[...]
The troops of the 3rd Army marched 500-600 km to get to the front, while the German troops were brought in directly by train.
[...]
As the Romanian divisions replaced a German or an Italian division on the front they left without even warning us. Out troops did not find any organization, AT defensive positions, barbed wire or even barracks. They had to defend an area without forests, with few villages or natural defenses. This region had already been dried out of food and hay by the previous occupiers. Even the existing warehouses were taken away, so the supply was done by horses, over a 120 km distance.
[...]
The remarks of the Romanian General Staff and even mine personally were not taken into consideration by the German command. [probably referring to the suggestions for the elimination of the bridgehead over the Don] The un-human behavior of the German troops towards their Romanian comrades has upset me profoundly. I am informed that, when the German soldiers retreated by trucks and Romanian soldiers tried to get into those trucks, they were hit and thrown into the road.
[...]
I am informed that my soldiers, who fought bravely are now shot by your men in the encirclement at Stalingrad. I am also informed that some of your soldiers, that have been behind the front for a long time, simply confiscate the hand weapons of our officers and NCOs.
[...]
The massacre of the units of the Romanian 1st Corps will have a disastrous effect on the Romanian-German comradeship and will bring nothing good in the future.
[...]
I am also informed that German units take, without any excuse and with a huge daring, the horses of our service troops and leave them on foot.
[...]
I am also informed, Herr Marschal, that general Hollidt is showing an unbearable brutality against the Romanian commanders.
[...]
There were of course cases of defections, but reported to the number of troops they were isolated. There were defections also in the German formations during the Soviet attacks on 19 and 20 November. The proof is the large number of confused German soldiers which gathered at Morozovskaya. But the Romanians were branded as cowards!
[...]
The success of the Soviet offensive is not due to the inefficiency of the 3rd and 4th Army, but to the lack of foresight of the command of Army Group B, the skillful choice of the attack point and the massive concentration of forces in secrecy.
[...]
The Romanian soldier can be judged only by the Romanian officer or command. I feel it is my duty to warn you that if this attitude does not stop I will have to reevaluate the situation of our forces in your front.
Jeschonnek or Goring
I, personally, would not be placing much emphasis on the alleged Jeschonnek/Hitler meeting, the lack of supporting written documentation means verbal testimony from second hand sources are the only evidence as to the veracity of the meeting. Not much needs to be said as to the dangers of using second hand sources or indeed verbal testimony, especially that which is recounted a few years after the event.
Apart from doubts over whether Jeschonnek advised Hitler as per the air lift success, Goring as supreme commander of the Luftewaffe must take sole responsibility, his postion of authority was such, that his advice in relation to Luftwaffe matters would have constituted the 'final word'. It is ludicrous for Goring to suggest that since Hitler had Jeschonnek's advice, Goring's only choice was to confirm it, indeed, this may be the case if Goring was Jeschonnek's subordinate, but with seniority comes the responsibility of providing any guidance or corrections that may be called for, not simply rubber stamping any existing advice.
Cheers
Julian
Apart from doubts over whether Jeschonnek advised Hitler as per the air lift success, Goring as supreme commander of the Luftewaffe must take sole responsibility, his postion of authority was such, that his advice in relation to Luftwaffe matters would have constituted the 'final word'. It is ludicrous for Goring to suggest that since Hitler had Jeschonnek's advice, Goring's only choice was to confirm it, indeed, this may be the case if Goring was Jeschonnek's subordinate, but with seniority comes the responsibility of providing any guidance or corrections that may be called for, not simply rubber stamping any existing advice.
Cheers
Julian
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Scott Smith
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Jeschonnek was the Chief of Staff; it was his job to know. That is what General Staff officers are for. But like most German GS officers, Jeschonnek was an expert in operations, not logistics (or intelligence). And it is ridiculous to blame the Luftwaffe for the Army's failures. The salient was surrounded; they were unable to restore land communications with the Kessel; they lost the airstrip and let the Red Army push the forward airfields farther and farther away. And even if the Sixth Army was ordered to breakout initially it might not have been possible--a panic and rout is more likely. Again, what was the Luftwaffe going to do, say "we won't do that, go to hell"? Göring said the Luftwaffe would do its part and then he scooted off to go shopping and let the chips fall on other shoulders. The Army could have demanded a feasibility study from the start but Hitler no longer trusted their judgment in emergency situations so he wouldn't have listened anyway. The blame is shared, but Göring is the least to blame.
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Scott Smith
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Actually, IIRC, it was in August of 1943 (long after the Stalingrad disaster, which Jeschonnek had his part in). The suicide followed the firestorm of Hamburg in July, and the attack on the Peenmünde secret weapons testing station on August 17, 1943. Hitler almost replaced Göring but the Reichsmarschall dodged that bullet. Jeschonnek was replaced with Günther Korter who was horribly killed by the July Bomb Plot the following year. Korten was a Bomber Baron at a time when almost all production should have gone to fighters. Göring should have been replaced by Milch and Jeschonnek probably by von Richthofen.GFM2000 wrote:Didn't poor Jeschonnek shoot himself after the Stalingrad debacle? Poor chap....
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David C. Clarke
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Hi Guys, I hate to be cynical about this, but Stalingrad was lost almost from the moment Hitler decided that he had to have it! Forget the Luftwaffe, the Rumanians, the Italians, Manstein and the entire layer cake of who lost Stalingrad. The simple answer is that the Russians out-generaled the Axis, concentrated superior forces on the Axis flanks (without anyone noticing!) and engulfed them. It wouldn't have mattered who was there on the Don at the time, the German Army and its Allies were simply caught unprepared, having lulled themselves into the false belief that the Russians were spent!
As for the airlift, you can't ignore the fact that Operation Uranus, the envelopment of Stalingrad, was but the first of a series of Red Amry offensives that collapsed various sections of the Axis front line through March of 1943. If you want a turning point in the already ineffective airlift, you'll have to look at Vatutin's Operation Little Saturn on December 15th, 1942 and the subsequent capture of the forward German Supply Airfield at Tatsinskaya by the heroic 2nd Guards Tank Corps on December 24th 1942.
The point of all of this is that after November 15th 1942, the Red Army was constantly on the offensive with superior manpower and equipment strength and a better "plan" than anything the German High Command had envisioned at the time. Russian Strategic thinking simply outmatched that of their opponents, period.
Best Regards, David
As for the airlift, you can't ignore the fact that Operation Uranus, the envelopment of Stalingrad, was but the first of a series of Red Amry offensives that collapsed various sections of the Axis front line through March of 1943. If you want a turning point in the already ineffective airlift, you'll have to look at Vatutin's Operation Little Saturn on December 15th, 1942 and the subsequent capture of the forward German Supply Airfield at Tatsinskaya by the heroic 2nd Guards Tank Corps on December 24th 1942.
The point of all of this is that after November 15th 1942, the Red Army was constantly on the offensive with superior manpower and equipment strength and a better "plan" than anything the German High Command had envisioned at the time. Russian Strategic thinking simply outmatched that of their opponents, period.
Best Regards, David
It would be interesting Victor ...
And regarding the prepareness of Russian Offensive . The Information Service of the Romanian army informed the Romanian High Command within 1 month before the Russian offesive about huge masses of Russian troops. Romanian High Command informed the German High Command but the Germans dismissed the information , as Victor said, and called it as "defetist propaganda" and non-senses ...
I am curious if any German sources (Intelligence sources) have indicated the fact that Russians prepared the offensive ... Maybe German posters would help ...
BI
And regarding the prepareness of Russian Offensive . The Information Service of the Romanian army informed the Romanian High Command within 1 month before the Russian offesive about huge masses of Russian troops. Romanian High Command informed the German High Command but the Germans dismissed the information , as Victor said, and called it as "defetist propaganda" and non-senses ...
I am curious if any German sources (Intelligence sources) have indicated the fact that Russians prepared the offensive ... Maybe German posters would help ...
BI
Pretty detailed letter to Manstein there Victor, thanks for sharing again.
Goes to show the attitude of Germans upon other nations soldiers and that to me was despicable!! Extremely bad behaviour.
Hate to say it there David, but you kinda killed this thread a bit by what you wrote (next time dont be so truthfull OK?
)
Goes to show the attitude of Germans upon other nations soldiers and that to me was despicable!! Extremely bad behaviour.
Hate to say it there David, but you kinda killed this thread a bit by what you wrote (next time dont be so truthfull OK?
)David wrote :
And I think that a month was pretty long time ... for preparing the defensive positions or even a "strategic" retrait ....
BI
David , Romanian High Command relied on its Information Service and it informed the German High command as I have already said ...The simple answer is that the Russians out-generaled the Axis, concentrated superior forces on the Axis flanks (without anyone noticing!) and engulfed them
And I think that a month was pretty long time ... for preparing the defensive positions or even a "strategic" retrait ....
BI
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David C. Clarke
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- Posts: 11368
- Joined: 10 Mar 2002, 18:17
- Location: U.S. of A.
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David C. Clarke
- In memoriam
- Posts: 11368
- Joined: 10 Mar 2002, 18:17
- Location: U.S. of A.
Hi Napoli! Sorry about that! I like the thread:)
Hi Johnny, I agree that a month is a long time, but it occurs to me that once Hitler had set his "Inflexible Will" on taking Stalingrad, the highest leadership in the German Army focused only on that task. It didn't take a strategic genius to figure out that 6th Army's flanks were dangerously weak. Not due to the quality of the Italian or Rumanian forces, but due to rather indefensible terrain and a sheer scarcity of manpower.
Personally, I don't think that German Infantry Divisions would have fared much better despite their theoretically better equipment.
Combine Hitler's singlemindedness with the belief circulating at the highest levels of the Reich that the Russians were incapable of offensive action on 6th Army's flank and you have a situation where protess and intelligence from an Ally is likely to be ignored.
As for building defensive works, that assumes that supplies of wood, concrete, barbed wire and even sandbags could have been acomodated by the logisitical system feeding that portion of the front. I think that the majority of logistical service were tied up supplying 6th Army in Stalingrad and I don't think that would have been easy to change.
Best Regards, David
Hi Johnny, I agree that a month is a long time, but it occurs to me that once Hitler had set his "Inflexible Will" on taking Stalingrad, the highest leadership in the German Army focused only on that task. It didn't take a strategic genius to figure out that 6th Army's flanks were dangerously weak. Not due to the quality of the Italian or Rumanian forces, but due to rather indefensible terrain and a sheer scarcity of manpower.
Personally, I don't think that German Infantry Divisions would have fared much better despite their theoretically better equipment.
Combine Hitler's singlemindedness with the belief circulating at the highest levels of the Reich that the Russians were incapable of offensive action on 6th Army's flank and you have a situation where protess and intelligence from an Ally is likely to be ignored.
As for building defensive works, that assumes that supplies of wood, concrete, barbed wire and even sandbags could have been acomodated by the logisitical system feeding that portion of the front. I think that the majority of logistical service were tied up supplying 6th Army in Stalingrad and I don't think that would have been easy to change.
Best Regards, David
Victor wrote:
Victor also has written :
... and it was interesting ...
Unfortunatelly , my post was posted too late .... I do not know why ... :roll: It seemed that while posting my message there were a lot of people posting their messages ...
BI
This is the answer ...johnny bi wrote:
It would be interesting Victor ...
What would be interesting?
Victor also has written :
One should read the protest Antonescu sent to Manstein/Hitler. Maybe I will translate it if you are interested.
... and it was interesting ...
Unfortunatelly , my post was posted too late .... I do not know why ... :roll: It seemed that while posting my message there were a lot of people posting their messages ...
BI