The Mius River Front

[Qvist]

Thanks AMVAS, much appreciated!

cheers

[AMVAS]

Summary operations of the shock group of the Southern Front in July.

Sorry for the quality, other schemes from the same sours are not much better.
With yime I can order better copies if my finances permitts

[tigre]

Hello to all, following the war diarist story....

Sixth Army Defends the Mius River Line
by Major Dr. Martin Francke
War Diarist, Sixth Army

Russian Penetration of the Mius River Position, 17-25 July.

In the early morning hours of 17 July the Russians unleashed a sudden, heavy artillery preparation, this signaled the opening of their major attack against Sixth Army's Mius River front in the Russkoye-Kuibyshevo- Dmitrievka area with the infantry and tank forces previously concentrated forward of the Lyssogorka-Dyakovo-Nish-Nagolchik line. The initial brunt of the attack fell on the Krynka sector between Uspenskaya and Artemovka.

Only from the land bridge at Izyum did the Red Army initiate a fairly strong infantry and tank attack against the front of First Panzer Army's XL Panzer Corps. This attack, with respect to both time and place, was strategically unified with the offensive against Sixth Army's eastern front.
If we are to believe what Russian officers told soldiers who later became our prisoners, the final objective of this offensive was the Dnepr River.

Containing Attacks.

By far the strongest of these issued from Malo-Nikolaevka along a narrow front at the boundary of XVII and IV Corps between Ivanovka and Shterovka.

The LIV Rifle Corps of the Third Guards Army committed the 50th Guards Rifle Division; the 67th, 302nd, and 346th Rifle Divisions; one tank brigade; and one or two mortar regiments along a four-kilometer wide front. The direction of this attack threatened the industrial district of Krasny Luch-Debaltsevo. The Soviets overran our outer trench line in their initial onrush, seizing Hills 278.5 (northeast of Promandirovka), 223.2, and 207.0 on the eastern edge of the Yelizavetovka Reservoir. They followed up with an attack by mounted infantry and thirty to forty tanks along the Malya Nikolsevka-Ivanovka road and the ravine cutting through Rodkina. The Russians continued a seemingly inexorable step-by- step advance against our front-line regiments: Grenadier Regiment 571 of the 302nd Infantry Division and Grenadier Regiment 575 of the 306th Infantry Division. The Russian penetration was contained along a line passed through the small forest near Hill 243.8 (Swch. Petrovsli), Hill 274.0 (the eastern edge of Shterovka), and Hills 247.2 and 205.2. Our defenses stymied all further Soviet attempts to break through in this sector on 18 July with the loss of additional tanks. Control of Grenadier Regiment 571 on the far left flank of XVII Corps was handed over to IV Corps and II Battalion/Grenadier Regiment 571—having been reinforced with additional troops and heavy weapons and designated Kampfgruppe Wandtke—led a spirited and successful counterattack against the enemy.
For two days German grenadiers struggled in the oppressive heat for control of hills, coal mines, ravines, and underbrush. Kampfgruppe Gruber, consisting of two infantry battalions and the Assault Gun Battalion 20, had to fight the entire day of 19 July before it succeeded in clearing the Redkino ravine of the Red Army soldiers stubbornly clinging to its walls. In a night attack II Battalion/Grenadier Regiment 575 threw the enemy off Hill 207.0, and by the end of 20 July the entire main battle line had been recovered. The Russians lost about twenty tanks and more than 200 prisoners.

The Soviets attempted other containing attacks on the Donets River north of Nizhnaya and in the extreme left sector of Sixth Army southeast of Belaya Gora. The objective of these attacks appeared to be to gain control of the southern railroad net behind our front. Within forty-eight hours, however, the Russian intentions had also been frustrated in both areas, thanks to two determined counterattacks by the 335th Infantry Division. Near Belaya Gora, Major General Carl Casper's grenadiers crushed the entire Soviet 1001st Rifle Regiment, taking more than 300 prisoners and much equipment, while around Nizhnoye wecaptured fifty prisoners and inflicted heavy losses on the Russians who tried to retreat across the Donets in rafts or by swimming.

Source: Excerpts taken from "KURSK: THE GERMAN VIEW". Eyewitness Reports of Operation Citadel by the German Commanders. Chap 11.

Cheers. Tigre.

[caraqchi71]

hi
There are two reference boks about that subject
“Decision in Ukraine” by Nipe
Rucckzugkampe in ukraine summer 43 – 44 by Rolf Hinze (unfourtunately only for who speak german, but i know Helion & Company is interested to translate it in englist for sale; why dont you (and the others interested) send it an e mail for pressing to do so? Their e mail is [email protected]
Regards
carlo

[tigre]

Hello folks something more.

Soviet Penetration South of Kuibyshevo.

The Russians launched their main assault in two locations from assembly areas, including Dyakovo, Dmitrievka, Kuibyshevo, and Russki. The southern sector of this attack targeted the area between Yassinovski and Kuibyshevo while the northern wing struck a sector extending north of Kuibyshevo as far as Dmitrievka. The southern strip—where the Twenty-Eighth Army attacked—was the narrower of the two sectors, and the axis of the attack hit the boundary between XXIX and XVII Corps. Seven rifle divisions (151st, 347th, 320th, 271st, 118th, 127th, and 387th) and one tank brigade were committed along a front ten kilometers wide.

Forty Russian batteries laid a heavy barrage on the foxholes, trenches, and shelters of the six front-line battalions of Grenadier Regiment 686(336th Infantry Division) and Grenadier Regiment 515 (294th Infantry Division) as the attack began. Rolling salvos from the enemy's Katyusha multiple rocket launchers shook the air, and a thick cloud of dust and smoke obscured the flats along the Mius.

For achieving the initial penetration, tanks accompanied the Russian rifle regiments, the Russian air force supported its infantry with incessant bombing and strafing attacks. Thus the attack near Russki developed in this manner: continuous attacks by low-flying aircraft, rolling artillery barrages, and showers of phosphorus, high-explosives, and smoke.

South of Russki and near Skelyanski, however, our minefields delayed the Soviet tanks accompanying the lead assault regiments, probably disabling several. Local reserves staged immediate counterattacks against initial enemy penetrations, knocking out six tanks that tried to reach the high ground east of Gustavfeld and Novo Bakhmutski. Such a counterattack recaptured the village of Petropole, in which the II Battalion/Grenadier Regiment 686 had been encircled for several hours.

After an advance of only two kilometers, our front-line regiments stopped the Russians along the chain of hills east of Gustavfeld and Novo Bakhmutski, far short of XXIX Corps's support positions. The insignificant depth of this penetration and the greater success enjoyed by the enemy in the attack on Dmitrievka prevented the commitment of the bulk of the tank brigade that had been concentrated southeast of Kuibyshevo for a breakthrough near Russki. The Russians tried again on 18 July to make good the failure of the preceding day. This attack proved even less successful, for the Soviet rifle regiments attacked with so much hesitation that our defensive fire decimated them. General Hollidt immediately shifted the boundary of General Brandenberger's XXIX Corps toward the north to the line passing through Kainovo, Novo Olkhovski, and the center of Kuibyshevo. He also attached all units of the 294th Infantry Division(assigned to XVII Corps) committed in that area to XXIX Corps. In the meantime, General Brandenberger had been able to reinforce his front-Line infantry and artillery, primarily by bringing up elements of the 111th Infantry Division. Allowing only a brief period of time for assembling the troops, Gruppe Recknagel (Lieutenant General Hermann Recknagel, commander, 111th Infantry) counterattacked the Russian penetrations with elements of the 111th and 294th Infantry Divisions. This attack jumped off from the area of Marienheim Kol on the morning of 19 July. In the first impetus of the attack, Gruppe Recknagel recaptured the ravines at Kholodnaya and Skelyanski. Russian infantry, accompanied by tanks, suddenly launched such a fierce counterthrust. This attack, which issued from a mine west of Golubyachi, could only be stopped at the western exit of the Kholodnaya ravine. From 20 July onward the Red Army made hardly any offensive moves in this sector.

Source: Excerpts taken from "KURSK: THE GERMAN VIEW". Eyewitness Reports of Operation Citadel by the German Commanders. Chap 11.

Cheers. Tigre.

[tigre]

Hello folks, a little more.

Soviet Penetration Around Dmitrievka.

Along an attack sector thirteen kilometers wide the Red Army sent in a first wave consisting of eight rifle divisions and the II Guards Mechanized Corps (with an authorized strength of 120 T-34s and eighty T-70s), as well as the 32nd Independent Tank Brigade (with a strength of fortysix T-70s). Approaching from the depths of the Soviet position another 150-200 tanks of the IV Guards Mechanized Corps moved forward. The Fifth Shock and Twentyeighth Armies spearheaded the assault, both probably under the operational control of the Second Guards Army.

Confronting this massed strength, General Schneckenburger's XVII Corps had four front-line and two reserve infantry battalions from Major General Johannes Block's 294th Infantry Division and Lieutenant General Karl-Erik Koehler's 306th Infantry Division. General Schneckenburger's combined divisional and corps artillery numbered (by the most optimistic estimates) about two-thirds of the strength of the Russian guns. The XVII Corps did have General von Schwerin's 16th Panzergrenadier Division placed in its area by General Hollidt as a mobile reserve. This division possessed a single panzer battalion with a strength, as reported on 10 July, of twenty-nine Pzkw Ills and seven long-barrel Pzkw IVs.

The Magic of the Landscape.

A certain magic about the landscape pervades military life, an intangible influence that the terrain of a battlefield exerts on the troops, so that for apparently inexplicable reasons they are attracted to one point and repelled by another. The village of Dmitrievka stretched like a worm, adorned by its many fruit trees, for seven kilometers along the Mius River valley. The town's western group of houses pointed like a finger toward the Gerasimova Balka, a deep ravine winding toward the northwest. Near Grushevy this ravine disappeared into the Snezhnoe hills. A few kilometers south and almost parallel to this ravine lay the Olkhovchik, a stream that in the course of the past thousand years had hollowed out a gorge in which lay hidden the villages of Malinovka and Stepanovka. Between these two ravines lay a ridge, the summit of which was Hill 213.9. Innumerable small lateral ravines and draws led up to the ridge, along whose summit ran the road connecting Snezhnoe to Kuibyshevo. Hill 213.9 dominated all elevated terrain in the area, which was bounded to the south by a lateral ravine of the Olkhovchik near Kalinovka. The only position that could potentially rival Hill 213.9 was Hill 277.9, farther to the west, which guarded the Savostyanovka Valley.

Russian spearheads advanced everywhere as far as the ends of the ravines near Kalinovka, Stepanovka, Grushevski, and Paradrievo. The mud-colored figures of Soviet rifle troops emerged from the ravines of Gerasimova and Olkhovchik, ascended the heights behind their tanks.

In the course of 17 July the Russians eventually succeeded in seizing the intermediate heights, including Hill 213.9. Everywhere else, however, German troops managed to stop the Russian attack at the outlets of the ravines. Our troops were not attracted by the valleys and the poor, battered villages hidden in them. Our grenadiers clearly realized that these villages represented nothing more than deathtraps. For them, the magic of the landscape lay in the heights, possession of which they saw as decisive.

Source: Excerpts taken from "KURSK: THE GERMAN VIEW". Eyewitness Reports of Operation Citadel by the German Commanders. Chap 11.

Cheers. Tigre.

[tigre]

Hello to all, greetings from Argentina in this Special Time. A little more.

Initial Soviet Attack, 17 July.

Radio intelligence had confirmed by 17 July that the Soviets planned to follow up a successful infantry penetration in the Dmitrievka-Stepanovka area with the II Guards Mechanized Corps. The Nagolnaya Valley east of Dmitrievka and the extensive village itself offered an attacker excellent possibilities for troop concentration, although our positions on the high western bank of the Mius allowed us to observe them clearly.

Unfortunately, the front-line battalions of the XVII Corps had not been able to entrench themselves very deeply because of the rocky nature of the soil.

At dawn, as the infantry of the XXXI Rifle Corps, accompanied by tanks, began to attack, they were received by the defensive fire of our own artillery and mortars. Machine-gunners of Grenadier Regiment 513 (294th Infantry Division) and Grenadier Regiment 581 (306th Infantry Division)inflicted heavy losses on them. The Soviets managed to penetrate into the Gerasimova and Vodyakava ravines, advancing in the direction of the Olkhovchik ravine.

The Russians had targeted this as the weak point of the German defenses. On their broad treads the T-34s drove out of Dmitrievka and into the ravines, which extended toward the west like a fan, from which they began ascending the heights. At 1630 hours, however, waves of the Luftwaffe's Ju 87 Stukas, heavy antitank guns, and local reserves combined to stop this attack with repeated counterthrusts.

By evening General Schneckenburger's troops had succeeded in blunting the Russian breakthrough attack, limiting the depth of the enemy penetration to about four kilometers.

The new line passed through Hill 168.5, Hill 194.3, Gerasimova, and Hill 173.4. A Soviet flanking attack with tanks had been launched from the Gerasimova ravine, but was stopped near Hill 213.9. The hill remained in German hands on the evening of 17 July. Hills 168.5,194.3,121.7, and 173.4 (the last two changing hands several times) became the core of XVII Corps's stiffening resistance.

The Russians had lost fifteen tanks and taken heavy personnel losses as well. On the other hand, losses in the 294th and 306th Infantry Divisions were also heavy: fifty officers and 2,061 enlisted men.

The initial encounter with the Russian main effort attack would therefore take place on 18 July. Generals Hollidt and Schneckenburger had resolved to conduct an aggressive defense, which anticipated the Russian main attack against Marinovka and Hill 213.9 (which commenced at dawn), by having General von Schwerin's 16th Panzergrenadier Division execute a quick thrust into the enemy's southern flank.

Panzergrenadier Regiment 60 and Panzer Battalion 116 launched a dawn attack from their assembly areas south of Kalinovka. Supported by the division's forty-odd panzers, the panzergrenadiers crossed the Olkhovchik Valley near Yelizavetinski and attacked their initial objective, Hill 168.5.

Soon, however, this wing of the attack became embroiled in heavy fighting. Meanwhile, Panzergrenadier Regiment 156 also appeared to make good progress at first. Advancing southeast of Marinovka, the regiment retook Hill 203.4 and thrust northeast (at the time Marinovka remained in German hands) through the Olkhovchik Valley toward Hill 114.3. At Olkhovchik ravine the 156th Panzergrenadiers ran into bad luck. A strong Soviet tank attack issuing from the valley hit the regiment's right flank southwest of Hill 203.4 and forced the Germans onto the defensive.

the regiment had to summon Panzer Battalion 116 to its assistance. The panzer battalion left its position on the western bank of the Olkhovchik, and without tank support the attack of Panzergrenadier Regiment 60 quickly stalled. The II Guards Mechanized Corps now threw its entire weight—more than 100 tanks—against General von Schwerin's division, and although the 16th Panzergrenadier Division attempted another counterattack at 1530 hours that afternoon, it was clear that Sixth Army's original objectives could no longer be achieved. By the second day of battle, many of General Schneckenburger's frontline units had been scattered or dispersed, and XVII Corps had to conduct its defense largely with improvised Kampfgruppen. Consequently, following the failure of the 16th Panzergrenadier's attack, the corps quickly lost Hill 213.9 and the villages of Marinovka and Stepanovka. Near Hill 173.4 the Russians thrust as far as the southern edge of Grushevi and took Gerasimova, pushing tanks up the valley and through two ravines toward the west against the Snezhnoye-Marinovka road between Hills 222.0 and 214.0. Along this road existed an admirable system of defenses built for training purposes by the headquarters, Engineer Regiment 520; these extensive defenses included not only antitank ditches but also communications and support trenches. Now these training works suddenly acquired decisive importance, as our troops utilized them to make a firm stand. There, for ten days, they repelled the heaviest Russian tank and infantry attacks, thus securing for Sixth Army the critical assembly areas in which to muster forces for its subsequent counterattack.

The Soviet penetration into the depth of our main defensive zone cost the II Guards Mechanized Corps eighty-six tanks on 18 July alone when it met XVII Corps's medium antitank and assault guns.

The battered Red Army units regrouped during the night of 18-19 July near Marinovka, where they received reinforcements.

Across the lines, General Schneckenburger and his subordinates awaited an enemy attack from the Marinovka-Stepanovka area toward Artemovka. Sixth Army considered a night attack possible and an early- morning assault a certainty; General Hollidt resolved to anticipate a Soviet breakthrough with a German counterattack.

Source: Excerpts taken from "KURSK: THE GERMAN VIEW". Eyewitness Reports of Operation Citadel by the German Commanders. Chap 11.

Regards and Merry Christmas to all of you, wishing the best for the coming year. Tigre.

[tigre]

Hello folks, the story goes on.

Counterattack, 19 July.

General von Vormann's 23rd Panzer Division reached its assembly areas near Removka and Pervomaisk late in the evening of 18 July, immediately deploying Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion 23 on Hills 253.5 and 256.8, as well as southeast of the area, to protect the division against surprise attacks. XVII Corps had received Sturm [Assault] Battalion 6 from the Army Weapons School at Ordzhonikidze as an additional reinforcement. This heavily armed battalion General Schneckenburger assigned to defend the northern sector of the penetration. Once IV Flieger Corps had promised the necessary support of fighters, dive-bombers, and ground attack aircraft, General Hollidt issued orders that the Soviet penetration should be eliminated by another counterattack beginning at 0700 hours, 19 July, which would have the objective of rolling up both enemy flanks. The difficult task of recapturingHill 213.9 fell to the 23rd Panzer Division.

The threat of a flank attack was to be eliminated by a parallel attack by elements of General Koehler's 306th Infantry Division and Sturm Battalion 6 against hill 173.4. General von Schwerin's 16th Panzergrenadier Division would relieve pressure along the 23rd Panzer's right flank by conducting its own simultaneous attack against Stepanovka.

Unfortunately, the attack quickly misfired. One regiment of the 23rd Panzer Division failed to advance in the direction of the main thrust due to improper commitment. Nonetheless, when Panzergrenadier Regiments 126 and 128 advanced toward their objectives at 0700 hours, they made good progress at first. Panzergrenadier Regiment 126 attacked past the northwestern edge of Stepanovka; Panzergrenadier Regiment 128 struck southeast after crossing the Olkhovchik Valley.

At 0830 hours the 201st Panzer Regiment pushed forward for a concentric attack against Hill 213.9, advancing to the left of Panzergrenadier Regiment 128 along the critical ridge. Our panzers soon received flanking fire from the high ground beyond the Gerasimova ravine, where the attack of the 306th Infantry Division had not successfully dislodged the enemy.

Panzer Regiment 201 established communications with Panzergrenadier Regiment 128, which in spite of initial heavy losses was now driving the Soviet reserves up the slopes of Hill 213.9 after forcing them to abandon the Olkhovchik Valley. The 126th Panzergrenadiers, like Panzerjaeger Battalion 126 attached to it, had not been able to advance toward the southeast because of the flanking fire from Hill 203.9 and the northern edge of Stepanovka. A Russian counterthrust from Stepanovka led to fierce fighting and succeeded in throwing Panzergrenadier Regiment 126 onto the defensive. Around Hill 213.9, the Russians had erected a real defensive wall of antitank guns, dug-in T-34s, and concealed antitank rifles. Panzer Regiment 201 ran headlong into this wall at close range. Meanwhile, as the leading platoons of Panzergrenadier Regiment 128 climbed the slopes of Hill 213.9, they received a devastating fire from infantry and antitank guns, supported by mortars. Hill 213.9 remained in Soviet hands, and at noon Panzer Regiment 201 had to withdraw.

The 16th Panzergrenadier Division's supporting attack toward Stepanovka was spearheaded by the weak Panzer Battalion 116, which entered the battle "with only twenty operable tanks. This attack also ran into such a strong antitank defense that, following the engagement, the battalion was reduced to only five tanks ready for immediate employment. A fan-shaped Russian attack (supported by strong tank forces) out of Stepanovka hit the center of General von Schwerin's division, pushing it rapidly back to the west. Soviet tanks broke into the position of the German engineer battalion stationed along the two hills southwest of Stepanovka. The day that had begun with the hope of crushing the Russian penetration now threatened to end in disaster.

Fortunately, our defenses on Hills 202 and 230.9 held, repulsing the Soviets with heavy losses—most importantly knocking out a significant number of enemy tanks. The situation perceptibly eased. With fifty tanks having been put out of action on 19 July, this brought the total of Red Army tanks lost from 17 to 19 July up to 159 vehicles. Soviet personnel losses had also been heavy. At 1530 hours, following a strong artillery preparation and dive-bomber attacks, the 23rd Panzer Division attempted to give the day a favorable ending by recapturing Stepanovka.
With the 16th Panzergrenadier Division tied up dealing with the Russian penetration to Garany, this unsupported attack also proved unsuccessful.

General Hollidt therefore determined to change tactics. Instead, he ordered our soldiers to cling tenaciously to all important points and to let the Russians dash themselves against our antitank defenses.

To relieve General Schneckenburger of extraneous details and to ensure uniformity in the combat operations still ongoing around Kuibyshevo, the sector of Grenadier Regiment 515 (294th Infantry Division) reverted to the control of General Brandenberger's XXIX Corps.

General Hollidt also requested that Army Group South send him General of Panzer Troops Walter Nehring's XXIV Panzer Corps headquarters.
General Nehring arrived the following day and took over command of the right sector of XVII Corps (23rd Panzer Division, 16th Panzergrenadier Division, and the bulk of the 294th Infantry Division). The XXIV Panzer Corps had the mission of preventing—at all costs—a widening of the enemy penetration in any direction from Stepanovka and to hold the high ground on both sides of Hill 277.9. The formal change of command in this sector took place on the night of 21-22 July.

Source: Kursk, the german view. Chap 11.

Cheers and Happy New Year for all . Tigre

[Alex Yeliseenko]

Culmination of the Defensive Battle

On 20 July, without awaiting the arrival of the entire IV Guards Mechanized
Corps, the Soviets attempted to force a breakthrough with the
forces at hand. These included the remaining tank elements of the II
Guards Mechanized Corps and 32nd Independent Tank Brigade and an
infantry force increased from six to nine rifle divisions (including the
118th and 387th Rifle Divisions recently shifted from the Russki sector).
The Russians made the maximum possible use of artillery, rocket launchers,
and air support for the attack. Despite these measures the attack did
not score any great success, due to stiffening German resistance and the
heavy casualties already suffered by the Red Army units participating.
The Russians did succeed in capturing Saur Mogilski and in forcing
Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion 116 to give up Hill 230.9 in the face of a
heavy tank attack. Northwest of Saur Mogilski, however, Engineer Battalion
675 began the process of breaking up the attack by checking the
enemy at Hill 277.9. This battalion's tenacious defense bought time for
the 23rd Panzer Division to launch a quick and dexterous counterthrust
Sixth Army Defends the Mius River Line 325
into the Soviet infantry regaining Hill 214.3 initially, and following up
this success by recapturing Saur Mogilski itself that evening.
German resistance had stiffened along the entire defensive line. More
and more Soviet tanks fell victim to close-combat weapons, and it
seemed that our troops had lost their initial fear of Russian armor. Thus
elements of the 306th Infantry Division repulsed a tank attack from
Garany, two attacks against Hill 196.0, and another against the commanding
heights south of Paradrievo. Meanwhile the aircraft of IV
Flieger Corps returned to the air in support of our troops, who knocked
out seventy-one Russian tanks on 20 July. By itself, Assault Gun Battalion
210 had accounted for fifty-one Soviet tanks since the beginning of
the battle. We estimated total Russian tank losses in the sector to have
risen to at least 240—three-quarters of their starting strength. The remaining
vehicles were not sufficient, on their own, to force a breakthrough.
Unfortunately, such a situation could not last. On 21 July the IV Guards
Mechanized Corps (consisting of the 12th, 13th, and 15th Guards Mechanized
Brigades) entered the fight with another 200-250 tanks. This raised
Red Army tank strength, on the fifth day of battle, back to more than 300
vehicles. Conversely, Sixth Army possessed only nineteen Pzkw Ills and
seventeen long-barrel Pzkw IVs ready for action. Aside from nine identified
rifle divisions already in the sector, intelligence believed four others
to be present and had firm knowledge that the 45th and 87th Guards
Rifle Divisions, as well as the 320th Rifle Division, had been brought up
as reinforcements. Thus the balance of forces in the sector on 21 July appeared
as follows:
Soviet
IV Guards Mechanized Corps
II Guards Mechanized Corps
32nd Independent Tank Brigade
sixteen rifle divisions
German
23rd Panzer Division
16th Panzergrenadier Division
336th Infantry Division
306th Infantry Division
On the Russian side, the II Guards Mechanized Corps and 32nd Tank
Brigade were both far below strength, but the IV Guards Mechanized
Corps and at least half of the rifle divisions were fresh. Sixth Army's
units not only were numerically inferior by a wide margin but also were
overtired from four days and nights of incessant fighting. The oppressive
heat had worn down their stamina while the unceasing fire from artillery
and rocket launchers, as well as air raids, had thinned their ranks.
Dozens of experienced officers and hundreds of NCOs—all of whom it
was impossible to replace—had fallen.

The IV Guards Mechanized Corps directed its first attacks on 21 July
southwest toward Uspenskaya; a concentrated attack against Panzergrenadier
Regiment 156 (16th Panzergrenadier Division) northeast of
Kalinovka resulted in a deep penetration. XVII Corps hurriedly scraped
together elements of the 16th Panzergrenadier and 294th Infantry Divisions
for a counterattack that destroyed the Russian spearheads and restored
the original battle line. Meanwhile the Soviets had captured Grigoryevka
and the high ground to the northeast, from which they launched
a tank attack east of Kalinovka. Yelizavetinski was one moment in Russian
hands and another moment possessed by the Germans. Soviet attacks
from Saur Mogilski against Hill 196.0, attacks north of Stepanovka, and
attacks against Nikiferov and Paradrievo failed with the loss of thirty to
forty enemy tanks. Russian attacks reached their culmination on 22 July
with the commitment of the entire IV Guards Mechanized Corps for a
breakthrough in the direction of Artemovka-Kolpakovica.
By this time General Nehring's XXIV Panzer Corps had taken control
of this highly critical sector and before noon on 22 July had regrouped its
armor-piercing weapons and handful of panzers to block the expected
Russian advance. General Hollidt had committed such reinforcements as
were available. The XXIX Corps brought a regimental Kampfgruppe built
around the headquarters of Grenadier Regiment 70 (lllth Infantry Division)
to Alexeyevka to join the 294th Infantry Division. Assault Gun Battalion
236, just arrived, was attached to the 16th Panzergrenadier Division.
General Mieth's IV Corps turned over to the XVII Corps the
mechanized battalion, which had been held available for the army's use.
The Russians opened their attack against the front of XXIV Panzer
Corps, as expected, between Grigoryevka and Saur Mogilski at 1530
hours. The axis of attack pointed southwest, with the spearhead consisting
of approximately 150 tanks, supported by enormous amounts of artillery
and aircraft. The magnitude of this attack—after four days of battle—
clearly indicated the intention of the Soviets to force a decision.
According to prisoner statements taken later, IV Guards Mechanized
Corps had been assigned the mission of achieving a breakthrough as
deep as the Krynka sector near Uspenskaya and Sukhaya Krynka—a
penetration of seventeen kilometers.
As the fury of the fighting increased, it became obvious that the Russian
tankers had learned many lessons from the previous days. In the initial
attacks on 17 July the Soviets had already known to used concealed
and irregular terrain for tank attacks, rather than following straight
roads. Now, on the uncovered heights, they did not let their tank waves
attack our defenses openly. Instead, they made good use of the dust towering
above the withered ground, which had been stirred up by marchSixth
Army Defends the Mius River Line 327
ing soldiers, tank treads, wheels, and the wind. The yellow dust clouds
mixed with the smoke from the burning steppe, kindled by aerial spraying
of phosphorus and mingling with the debris thrown into the air by
thousands of shell and bomb impacts. At any point where this cover
seemed insufficient, the Russians fired smoke shells or dropped smoke
bombs. Behind this nearly impenetrable curtain of smoke and dust, the
Soviet tanks approached our defenses. The superior range of our antitank
weapons had been neutralized; gunners at the antitank guns, assault
guns, and flak batteries could not discern the approaching T-34s
until the very last minute. Nerves strained to the breaking point, our
gunners and grenadiers could hardly breathe, their eyes burned, and
their faces became encrusted with a thick layer of dirt and soot. Temperatures
inside our tanks and assault guns rose to the level of a blast furnace,
and the wounded, in particular, suffered horribly from the terrible
heat and dust.
The dust and smoke also blinded artillery observation posts, made it
difficult for our fighter pilots to find Soviet planes in the sky, and severely
decreased the accuracy of our dive-bombers. The showers of phosphorus
arcing through the smoke and dust created the picture of an infernal battle
of attrition on the plains of Hell, as the first pestilential stench of putrefaction
filled the torrid air. With the assistance of such formidable
weapons as these, the Russian tanks succeeded for the first time in simply
rolling past the German defenders and achieving a deep penetration
in the direction of Krinichka.
This success, however, cost the IV Guards Mechanized Corps dearly, as
our troops had also learned some important tactical lessons over the past
week. We realized that the fighting qualities of the Soviet infantry had
deteriorated to such a point that a battle was already half-won if it became
possible to separate the rifle troops from their tank supports. On 22
July this factor decided the day's battle. Once Russian tanks rolled across
our lines, they were isolated from their supports and lured into the prepared
antitank defenses established by XXIV Panzer Corps. Tank after
tank was annihilated on the western hill slopes in the rear of our thin line
of grenadiers—after an hour no more than a handful of the enemy tanks
that had penetrated our positions still survived. The Soviet tanks thrusting
against Kalinovka suffered the same fate, with the 294th Infantry and
16th Panzergrenadier Divisions reporting that they had knocked out
ninety-three enemy vehicles in a short time.
Thus the major attack of the IV Guards Mechanized Corps, though it
succeeded in capturing Kalinovka, cost the Red Army another 130 tanks.
This brought total Soviet tanks losses since 17 July to 400 and meant that
the Russian attempt to break through on the Mius had more and more
degenerated into a battle of attrition. Now that the Soviets had lost the
greater part of their tanks and the danger of further concentrated tank attacks
had been so greatly diminished, another factor assumed greater importance.
While the IV Guards Mechanized Corps had been grinding its
way toward Kalinovka, XVII Corps succeeded in completely repulsing
all Russian attacks from the northern edge of the penetration zone near
Hill 214.0 and Nikiferov. For General Hollidt, therefore, 22 July stood out
as a decisive defensive success, which had to be ascribed primarily to the
bravery of General von Schwerin's 16th Panzergrenadier Division.

Source - KURSK: THE GERMAN VIEW

[tigre]

Thanks for helping me Alex . Regards. Tigre.

[tigre]

Hello something more.

Declining Strength of the Russian Attack.

Because Luftwaffe reconnaissance flights had reported the arrival of additional Soviet reinforcements into the zone of operations, General Hollidt expected another major attack on 23 July. He ordered every possible measure taken to reform a continuous defensive line where our infantry had been forced back. The resulting line ran southwest of the Olkhovchik ravine and as far as Hill 188.4, southwest of Kalinovka. General Nehring, at XXIV Panzer Corps headquarters, received orders to take one panzergrenadier regiment (reinforced with tanks) from the 23rd Panzer Division to form a mobile reserve. Because General Nehring had experienced difficulties maintaining communications and contact with General Brandenberger's XXIX Corps, General Hollidt attached the entire 294th Infantry Division back to the XXIX Corps. This required the boundary between the two corps to be shifted to run along a line passing through Kolpakovka, Grigoryevka, and the southern tip of Dmitrievka.

The Russians launched the first in a series of disjointed thrusts as early as 0300 hours out of the Yelizavetinski-Kalinovka sector. By sunrise ten enemy tanks had penetrated into Semenovski, but the 16th Panzergrenadier Division destroyed eight and sent the other two packing. Simultaneously, the 294th Infantry Division turned back another attack in heavy fighting south of Kalinovka at Hills 5.0 and 175.5 and the road junction north of them.

After both of these attacks failed, the Soviets threw new, stronger— though equally unsuccessful—attacks against the XXIV Panzer Corps front near Semonovksi and Hill 277.9 northwest of Saur Mogilski. Along the axis of the IV Guards Mechanized Corps's main attack of 22 July, the Soviets attempted nothing but did try additional partial attacks (once again without success) from Stepanovka against Hills 214.3 and 214.0. Despite all of these efforts, the Russians gained no ground on 23 July.

The OKW [German Armed Forces High Command] bulletin for 25 July read:
In the engagement along the Mius River, the 16th Panzergrenadier Division, from Rhineland-Westphalia, has greatly distinguished itself.
The bravery of Panzerjaeger Battalion 661 also deserves special mention, for the guns and their crews of this battalion often remained in their positions on 22-23 July during Russian tank attacks even after their infantry supports had been overrun. With cool resolution, these gunners put out of action a high percentage of the enemy tanks destroyed.

Those units that had been forced to bear the brunt of the fighting for several days—especially the 16th Panzergrenadier and 294th Infantry Divisions—had become so exhausted that their strength had reached the breaking point. As a single example, by the end of 23 July the infantry strength of the 16th Panzergrenadier Division (including four panzergrenadier battalions, one engineer battalion, and one Feldersatz battalion) totaled only 550 men.

General Hollidt, as he had done on 19 July, spent the critical hours of 23 July in the forward areas of the XXIV Panzer and XVII Corps. He had taken an active role in the fighting by issuing orders, bringing up reinforcements, and procuring extra ammunition.

Moreover, in comparison to 21 July the tank situation of both the 16th Panzergrenadier and 23rd Panzer Divisions had improved as the result of reinforcements. The two divisions had, ready for employment on 24 July:
-------------------------------------On 21 July - On 23 July
16th Panzergrenadier Division -----------4 --------12
23rd Panzer Division ----------------27 (13) ---33 (18 )
Note: numbers in parenthesis refer to long-barrel Pzkw IVs.

Sixth Army's four assault gun battalions had, on hand and ready for employment on 24 July:
------------------------------------Available ---------------Operational
Assault Gun Battalion 209 ----------28 ------------------------10
Assault Gun Battalion 210 ----------18 ------------------------10
Assault Gun Battalion 236 ----------10 ------------------------10
Assault Gun Battalion 243 ----------31 ------------------------17
Total -----------------------------------87 -------------------------47

Source: Kursk, the german view. Chap 11.

Cheers. Tigre

[Alex Yeliseenko]

Hi, Tigre

This book is published and on Russian. But I have also an English variant.

In Russia in the past year research Alexey Isayev "Mius-Front" also is published. There is a lot of given of former Soviet archives.

Regards.

[tigre]

Hello Alex, glad to greet you again; just a little thing, do you have any good map about?. Cheers. Tigre.

[Alex Yeliseenko]

[tigre]

Thank you Alex. Cheers. Tigre.