Books of Viktor Suvorov contains a lot of myths

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LWD
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Re: Books of Viktor Suvorov contains a lot of myths

#76

Post by LWD » 26 Aug 2009, 21:19

Kunikov wrote:
LWD wrote:
Kunikov wrote: ... You'd have to agree that overall, fixed defenses, as with the case in pre-modern Europe, were/are only a passing fad which were turned obsolete within a few generations (back then) of their emergence (after which they could only begin playing catch-up).
Not really. Purely static defences were never particularly effective except for defending points. However when combined with mobile forces that allowed for counter attack or to channel attacks they were and are quite useful.
See above, we're talking about static defense solely, not combined with any type of 'mobile' forces.
On what level? What significant breaches were made in the Maginot line by frontal attacks? The French defences on the Italian front also worked quite well from what I recall. So did the Finnish defensive lines. The defences at Lenningrad also held did they not? Certainly the US coastal defences were never seriously challenged. Too my mind you are underplaying the effectiveness of defencive works just as at least one poster was overplaying them.

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Oleg Grigoryev
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Re: Books of Viktor Suvorov contains a lot of myths

#77

Post by Oleg Grigoryev » 26 Aug 2009, 21:35

On what level? What significant breaches were made in the Maginot line by frontal attacks?
The ones I posted quote about were not serious?
The French defences on the Italian front also worked quite well from what I recall.
How much effort to breach them was there actually?
So did the Finnish defensive lines.
They were breached that is why Finald sued for peace.
The defences at Lenningrad also held did they not?
The held because of Soviet armored counterattacks (Tikhvin counterstroke in 1941) and systemic attempts to deblockade the city that even if unsuccessful drained German forces to the point where they considered assault on the city unfeasible.
Certainly the US coastal defences were never seriously challenged.
Seriously is the key word – besides costal batteries are not in the same category.
Too my mind you are underplaying the effectiveness of defencive works just as at least one poster was overplaying them.
You entitled to your opinion of course but statistics is against you here.


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Kunikov
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Re: Books of Viktor Suvorov contains a lot of myths

#78

Post by Kunikov » 26 Aug 2009, 21:43

LWD wrote:
Kunikov wrote:
LWD wrote:
Kunikov wrote: ... You'd have to agree that overall, fixed defenses, as with the case in pre-modern Europe, were/are only a passing fad which were turned obsolete within a few generations (back then) of their emergence (after which they could only begin playing catch-up).
Not really. Purely static defences were never particularly effective except for defending points. However when combined with mobile forces that allowed for counter attack or to channel attacks they were and are quite useful.
See above, we're talking about static defense solely, not combined with any type of 'mobile' forces.
On what level? What significant breaches were made in the Maginot line by frontal attacks? The French defences on the Italian front also worked quite well from what I recall. So did the Finnish defensive lines. The defences at Lenningrad also held did they not? Certainly the US coastal defences were never seriously challenged. Too my mind you are underplaying the effectiveness of defencive works just as at least one poster was overplaying them.
And you are omitting context, as Oleg has just shown.
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LWD
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Re: Books of Viktor Suvorov contains a lot of myths

#79

Post by LWD » 26 Aug 2009, 21:50

Oleg Grigoryev wrote:
On what level? What significant breaches were made in the Maginot line by frontal attacks?
The ones I posted quote about were not serious?
I didn't see that you actually posted any. When and where and in what force?
The French defences on the Italian front also worked quite well from what I recall.
How much effort to breach them was there actually?
Irrelevant if your postion is that they were all breached or that they were useless. On the otherhand I seem to recall the Italians tried pretty hard.
So did the Finnish defensive lines.
They were breached that is why Finald sued for peace.
Indeed but at considerable cost. Certainly the Finns were much better off with them than they would have been without them.
The defences at Lenningrad also held did they not?
The held because of Soviet armored counterattacks (Tikhvin counterstroke in 1941) and systemic attempts to deblockade the city that even if unsuccessful drained German forces to the point where they considered assault on the city unfeasible.
But in their absence could Leningrad have held?
Certainly the US coastal defences were never seriously challenged.
Seriously is the key word – besides costal batteries are not in the same category.
US coastal defences were more than just a few coastal batteries.
Too my mind you are underplaying the effectiveness of defencive works just as at least one poster was overplaying them.
You entitled to your opinion of course but statistics is against you here.
Then present the statistics.

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Oleg Grigoryev
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Re: Books of Viktor Suvorov contains a lot of myths

#80

Post by Oleg Grigoryev » 26 Aug 2009, 22:04

LWD – nobody is arguing here that fixed lines were useless – they can be very useful as a defensive backbone –they can slow enemy enough for the defender to identify points of the main effort , but you will need mobile reserves that can on the moment notice be brought up and beef up the defense or contain the penetration if it occurred. Mobile reserves in WW II meant tanks. That is the argument - in WW II you needed tanks regardless of what posture you assumed defensive or offensive. If the side that was not on defensive did not managed to move reserves in place fast enough it lines were breached with various degree of effort required – but breached non the less. West wall was breached, Siegfried Line was breached, Order-Watra line was breached, Stalin line was overrun – I really not sure what other data is needed there. On the final note the idea that USSR could have been protected by one continuous line of fortification is quite frankly not even a fantasy - it is a delusion.

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Re: Books of Viktor Suvorov contains a lot of myths

#81

Post by LWD » 27 Aug 2009, 19:05

Oleg Grigoryev wrote:LWD – nobody is arguing here that fixed lines were useless –
That seemed to be the case from what I read.
they can be very useful as a defensive backbone –they can slow enemy enough for the defender to identify points of the main effort , but you will need mobile reserves that can on the moment notice be brought up and beef up the defense or contain the penetration if it occurred.
Or they can stop the offense dead in it's tracks which they did on a number of occasions.
Mobile reserves in WW II meant tanks. That is the argument - in WW II you needed tanks regardless of what posture you assumed defensive or offensive. ....
Then you are wrong. One need only look at the Pacific or for that matter the Winter war to see where the mobile reserves were often not tanks at all. Certainly mobile reserves make a defensive line much stronger but that's a military maxim that goes back millenium.

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Re: Books of Viktor Suvorov contains a lot of myths

#82

Post by Kunikov » 27 Aug 2009, 19:08

LWD wrote: Then you are wrong. One need only look at the Pacific or for that matter the Winter war to see where the mobile reserves were often not tanks at all. Certainly mobile reserves make a defensive line much stronger but that's a military maxim that goes back millenium.
Now you're taking things out of context. The Winter War did not take place in a terrain conducive to tank/armored warfare.
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Re: Books of Viktor Suvorov contains a lot of myths

#83

Post by LWD » 27 Aug 2009, 19:15

Kunikov wrote:
LWD wrote: Then you are wrong. One need only look at the Pacific or for that matter the Winter war to see where the mobile reserves were often not tanks at all. Certainly mobile reserves make a defensive line much stronger but that's a military maxim that goes back millenium.
Now you're taking things out of context. The Winter War did not take place in a terrain conducive to tank/armored warfare.
The context quoted was WWII. Indeed for some of your posts claim an even wider context.

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Oleg Grigoryev
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Re: Books of Viktor Suvorov contains a lot of myths

#84

Post by Oleg Grigoryev » 27 Aug 2009, 19:16

LWD wrote:
Oleg Grigoryev wrote:LWD – nobody is arguing here that fixed lines were useless –
That seemed to be the case from what I read.
they can be very useful as a defensive backbone –they can slow enemy enough for the defender to identify points of the main effort , but you will need mobile reserves that can on the moment notice be brought up and beef up the defense or contain the penetration if it occurred.
Or they can stop the offense dead in it's tracks which they did on a number of occasions.
Mobile reserves in WW II meant tanks. That is the argument - in WW II you needed tanks regardless of what posture you assumed defensive or offensive. ....
Then you are wrong. One need only look at the Pacific or for that matter the Winter war to see where the mobile reserves were often not tanks at all. Certainly mobile reserves make a defensive line much stronger but that's a military maxim that goes back millenium.
That seemed to be the case from what I read.
well do you actually see anyone using the word "useless"?
Or they can stop the offense dead in it's tracks which they did on a number of occasions.
they can - if the effort is half-backed
Then you are wrong. One need only look at the Pacific or for that matter the Winter war to see where the mobile reserves were often not tanks at all. Certainly mobile reserves make a defensive line much stronger but that's a military maxim that goes back millenium.
You are cherry picking you TOs - obviously nobody is going to use masses of tanks in the theater that cannot accommodate masses of tanks. btw Finns after winter war formed an Armor division that they tried to use as mobile reserve exactly in the manner I described - not with whole lot of success though. In general - fighting in the Arctic was mainly an infantry affair - chiefly due to the reason that it is no tank country.

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Re: Books of Viktor Suvorov contains a lot of myths

#85

Post by Kunikov » 27 Aug 2009, 19:18

LWD wrote:
Kunikov wrote:
LWD wrote: Then you are wrong. One need only look at the Pacific or for that matter the Winter war to see where the mobile reserves were often not tanks at all. Certainly mobile reserves make a defensive line much stronger but that's a military maxim that goes back millenium.
Now you're taking things out of context. The Winter War did not take place in a terrain conducive to tank/armored warfare.
The context quoted was WWII. Indeed for some of your posts claim an even wider context.
The context quoted was that of the Stalin/Molotov line on the eve of the German invasion. The other examples used thus far have been to show that fixed defenses on their own are not enough to stop an offensive.
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Re: Books of Viktor Suvorov contains a lot of myths

#86

Post by Otto Fuchs » 27 Aug 2009, 20:48

Kunikov wrote:The context quoted was that of the Stalin/Molotov line on the eve of the German invasion. The other examples used thus far have been to show that fixed defenses on their own are not enough to stop an offensive.
As you mention it, do you have any explanation for the complete dismantling of the Stalin-line after September 1939? Why this very useful line was not kept intact?

Or is it, that Stalin didn't have enough tanks to form "mobile reserves" in the rear of that line, thus coming to the conclusion that this line was of no use at all--much the same way as you do?

And if this was so--how many tanks would have been sufficient to form "useful" mobile reserves? Would 30,000 tanks have been enough? Or would rather 40,000 tanks have been necessary? Or maybe 50,000?

Or maybe the lack was not in tanks, but in manpower? So, the five million Red-armists being mobilized from May 19, 1941 on did not suffice to man the line? And thus--the line being useless for any defense efforts whatsoever--all these five million Red-armists had to be concentrated in front of the Stalin-line instead of behind it?

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Re: Books of Viktor Suvorov contains a lot of myths

#87

Post by Kunikov » 27 Aug 2009, 20:53

Otto Fuchs wrote:
Kunikov wrote:The context quoted was that of the Stalin/Molotov line on the eve of the German invasion. The other examples used thus far have been to show that fixed defenses on their own are not enough to stop an offensive.
As you mention it, do you have any explanation for the complete dismantling of the Stalin-line after September 1939? Why this very useful line was not kept intact?

Or is it, that Stalin didn't have enough tanks to form "mobile reserves" in the rear of that line, thus coming to the conclusion that this line was of no use at all--much the same way as you do?

And if this was so--how many tanks would have been sufficient to form "useful" mobil reserves? Would 30,000 tanks have been enough? Or would rather 40,000 tanks have been necessary? Or maybe 50,000?

Or maybe the lack was not in tanks, but in manpower? So, the five million Red-armists being mobilized from May 19, 1941 on did not suffice to man the line? And thus--the line being useless for any defense efforts whatsoever--all these five million Red-armists had to be concentrated in front of the Stalin-line instead of behind it?

The Stalin line was replaced by the Molotov line. The Red Army did not count on 'mobile reserves', those exist for a country which did not rely so much on an offensive oriented strategy even in defense, as the Red Army did. Lastly, 5 million red Army men were not mobilized from May 1941. Your statements and 'questions' twist facts and ignore context.
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Oleg Grigoryev
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Re: Books of Viktor Suvorov contains a lot of myths

#88

Post by Oleg Grigoryev » 27 Aug 2009, 21:26

Otto Fuchs wrote:
Kunikov wrote:The context quoted was that of the Stalin/Molotov line on the eve of the German invasion. The other examples used thus far have been to show that fixed defenses on their own are not enough to stop an offensive.
As you mention it, do you have any explanation for the complete dismantling of the Stalin-line after September 1939? Why this very useful line was not kept intact?

Or is it, that Stalin didn't have enough tanks to form "mobile reserves" in the rear of that line, thus coming to the conclusion that this line was of no use at all--much the same way as you do?

And if this was so--how many tanks would have been sufficient to form "useful" mobile reserves? Would 30,000 tanks have been enough? Or would rather 40,000 tanks have been necessary? Or maybe 50,000?

Or maybe the lack was not in tanks, but in manpower? So, the five million Red-armists being mobilized from May 19, 1941 on did not suffice to man the line? And thus--the line being useless for any defense efforts whatsoever--all these five million Red-armists had to be concentrated in front of the Stalin-line instead of behind it?
As you mention it, do you have any explanation for the complete dismantling of the Stalin-line after September 1939? Why this very useful line was not kept intact?
The line was never dismentaled.

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Re: Books of Viktor Suvorov contains a lot of myths

#89

Post by Cheshire Cat » 27 Aug 2009, 21:36

The Naval Institute Press, (U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland) has published new book by Viktor Suvorov

The Chief Culprit: Stalin's Grand Design to Start World War II, 2008.

“A remarkable book. A delayed bombshell that includes very pertinent new research and discovers Suvorov has made since 1990. He makes savvy readers of contemporary and World War II history of a mind to reexamine the Soviet past in terms of what historians call ‘present interest’. None of the ‘new Russian’ historians can match his masterful sweep of research and analysis.”

ALBERT WEEKS, Professor Emeritus of International Relations, New York University, and author of Stalin’s Other War: Soviet Grand Strategy, 1939-1941

“One of the last great secrets of World War II is why Nazi Germany succeeded in surprising Soviet Russia in June 1941. Did Stalin ‘trust’ Hitler or was he just afraid?
Was the Red Army simply outmoded and doomed failure? Instead, Victor Suvorov ably argues, Stalin, ‘The Chief Culprit’ of World War II, was caught just days before launching his own assault into Central Europe. Thus the Red Army’s offensive posture rendered it uniquely vulnerable to attack. Suvorov cogently explains the rationale behind the whole huge, crude machine that was the USSR: to forge the weapon to conquer all of Europe. All of Stalin’s policies, including the Nazi-Soviet pact, were intended to bring about that Soviet victory. None of this absolves Hitler, but Suvorov removes the last vestige of Red righteousness regarding World War II.”

JOHN B. LUNDSTROM, author of Black Shoe Carrier Admiral: Frank Jack Fletcher at Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal



More support from Daniel W. Michaels

http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v17/v17n4p30_Michaels.html


http://wwii-issues.blogspot.com/2007_06_27_archive.html

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Oleg Grigoryev
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Re: Books of Viktor Suvorov contains a lot of myths

#90

Post by Oleg Grigoryev » 27 Aug 2009, 21:42

Cheshire Cat wrote:The Naval Institute Press, (U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland) has published new book by Viktor Suvorov

The Chief Culprit: Stalin's Grand Design to Start World War II, 2008.

“A remarkable book. A delayed bombshell that includes very pertinent new research and discovers Suvorov has made since 1990. He makes savvy readers of contemporary and World War II history of a mind to reexamine the Soviet past in terms of what historians call ‘present interest’. None of the ‘new Russian’ historians can match his masterful sweep of research and analysis.”

ALBERT WEEKS, Professor Emeritus of International Relations, New York University, and author of Stalin’s Other War: Soviet Grand Strategy, 1939-1941

“One of the last great secrets of World War II is why Nazi Germany succeeded in surprising Soviet Russia in June 1941. Did Stalin ‘trust’ Hitler or was he just afraid?
Was the Red Army simply outmoded and doomed failure? Instead, Victor Suvorov ably argues, Stalin, ‘The Chief Culprit’ of World War II, was caught just days before launching his own assault into Central Europe. Thus the Red Army’s offensive posture rendered it uniquely vulnerable to attack. Suvorov cogently explains the rationale behind the whole huge, crude machine that was the USSR: to forge the weapon to conquer all of Europe. All of Stalin’s policies, including the Nazi-Soviet pact, were intended to bring about that Soviet victory. None of this absolves Hitler, but Suvorov removes the last vestige of Red righteousness regarding World War II.”

JOHN B. LUNDSTROM, author of Black Shoe Carrier Admiral: Frank Jack Fletcher at Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal



More support from Daniel W. Michaels

http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v17/v17n4p30_Michaels.html


http://wwii-issues.blogspot.com/2007_06_27_archive.html
good Lord this crap was discredit through and through an yet they keep reprinting it.

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