On what level? What significant breaches were made in the Maginot line by frontal attacks? The French defences on the Italian front also worked quite well from what I recall. So did the Finnish defensive lines. The defences at Lenningrad also held did they not? Certainly the US coastal defences were never seriously challenged. Too my mind you are underplaying the effectiveness of defencive works just as at least one poster was overplaying them.Kunikov wrote:See above, we're talking about static defense solely, not combined with any type of 'mobile' forces.LWD wrote:Not really. Purely static defences were never particularly effective except for defending points. However when combined with mobile forces that allowed for counter attack or to channel attacks they were and are quite useful.Kunikov wrote: ... You'd have to agree that overall, fixed defenses, as with the case in pre-modern Europe, were/are only a passing fad which were turned obsolete within a few generations (back then) of their emergence (after which they could only begin playing catch-up).
Books of Viktor Suvorov contains a lot of myths
Re: Books of Viktor Suvorov contains a lot of myths
- Oleg Grigoryev
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Re: Books of Viktor Suvorov contains a lot of myths
The ones I posted quote about were not serious?On what level? What significant breaches were made in the Maginot line by frontal attacks?
How much effort to breach them was there actually?The French defences on the Italian front also worked quite well from what I recall.
They were breached that is why Finald sued for peace.So did the Finnish defensive lines.
The held because of Soviet armored counterattacks (Tikhvin counterstroke in 1941) and systemic attempts to deblockade the city that even if unsuccessful drained German forces to the point where they considered assault on the city unfeasible.The defences at Lenningrad also held did they not?
Seriously is the key word – besides costal batteries are not in the same category.Certainly the US coastal defences were never seriously challenged.
You entitled to your opinion of course but statistics is against you here.Too my mind you are underplaying the effectiveness of defencive works just as at least one poster was overplaying them.
Re: Books of Viktor Suvorov contains a lot of myths
And you are omitting context, as Oleg has just shown.LWD wrote:On what level? What significant breaches were made in the Maginot line by frontal attacks? The French defences on the Italian front also worked quite well from what I recall. So did the Finnish defensive lines. The defences at Lenningrad also held did they not? Certainly the US coastal defences were never seriously challenged. Too my mind you are underplaying the effectiveness of defencive works just as at least one poster was overplaying them.Kunikov wrote:See above, we're talking about static defense solely, not combined with any type of 'mobile' forces.LWD wrote:Not really. Purely static defences were never particularly effective except for defending points. However when combined with mobile forces that allowed for counter attack or to channel attacks they were and are quite useful.Kunikov wrote: ... You'd have to agree that overall, fixed defenses, as with the case in pre-modern Europe, were/are only a passing fad which were turned obsolete within a few generations (back then) of their emergence (after which they could only begin playing catch-up).
"Opinions founded on prejudice are always sustained with the greatest violence." Jewish proverb
"This isn't Paris, you will not get through here with a Marching Parade!" Defenders of Stalingrad
"This isn't Paris, you will not get through here with a Marching Parade!" Defenders of Stalingrad
Re: Books of Viktor Suvorov contains a lot of myths
I didn't see that you actually posted any. When and where and in what force?Oleg Grigoryev wrote:The ones I posted quote about were not serious?On what level? What significant breaches were made in the Maginot line by frontal attacks?
Irrelevant if your postion is that they were all breached or that they were useless. On the otherhand I seem to recall the Italians tried pretty hard.How much effort to breach them was there actually?The French defences on the Italian front also worked quite well from what I recall.
Indeed but at considerable cost. Certainly the Finns were much better off with them than they would have been without them.They were breached that is why Finald sued for peace.So did the Finnish defensive lines.
But in their absence could Leningrad have held?The held because of Soviet armored counterattacks (Tikhvin counterstroke in 1941) and systemic attempts to deblockade the city that even if unsuccessful drained German forces to the point where they considered assault on the city unfeasible.The defences at Lenningrad also held did they not?
US coastal defences were more than just a few coastal batteries.Seriously is the key word – besides costal batteries are not in the same category.Certainly the US coastal defences were never seriously challenged.
Then present the statistics.You entitled to your opinion of course but statistics is against you here.Too my mind you are underplaying the effectiveness of defencive works just as at least one poster was overplaying them.
- Oleg Grigoryev
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Re: Books of Viktor Suvorov contains a lot of myths
LWD – nobody is arguing here that fixed lines were useless – they can be very useful as a defensive backbone –they can slow enemy enough for the defender to identify points of the main effort , but you will need mobile reserves that can on the moment notice be brought up and beef up the defense or contain the penetration if it occurred. Mobile reserves in WW II meant tanks. That is the argument - in WW II you needed tanks regardless of what posture you assumed defensive or offensive. If the side that was not on defensive did not managed to move reserves in place fast enough it lines were breached with various degree of effort required – but breached non the less. West wall was breached, Siegfried Line was breached, Order-Watra line was breached, Stalin line was overrun – I really not sure what other data is needed there. On the final note the idea that USSR could have been protected by one continuous line of fortification is quite frankly not even a fantasy - it is a delusion.
Re: Books of Viktor Suvorov contains a lot of myths
That seemed to be the case from what I read.Oleg Grigoryev wrote:LWD – nobody is arguing here that fixed lines were useless –
Or they can stop the offense dead in it's tracks which they did on a number of occasions.they can be very useful as a defensive backbone –they can slow enemy enough for the defender to identify points of the main effort , but you will need mobile reserves that can on the moment notice be brought up and beef up the defense or contain the penetration if it occurred.
Then you are wrong. One need only look at the Pacific or for that matter the Winter war to see where the mobile reserves were often not tanks at all. Certainly mobile reserves make a defensive line much stronger but that's a military maxim that goes back millenium.Mobile reserves in WW II meant tanks. That is the argument - in WW II you needed tanks regardless of what posture you assumed defensive or offensive. ....
Re: Books of Viktor Suvorov contains a lot of myths
Now you're taking things out of context. The Winter War did not take place in a terrain conducive to tank/armored warfare.LWD wrote: Then you are wrong. One need only look at the Pacific or for that matter the Winter war to see where the mobile reserves were often not tanks at all. Certainly mobile reserves make a defensive line much stronger but that's a military maxim that goes back millenium.
"Opinions founded on prejudice are always sustained with the greatest violence." Jewish proverb
"This isn't Paris, you will not get through here with a Marching Parade!" Defenders of Stalingrad
"This isn't Paris, you will not get through here with a Marching Parade!" Defenders of Stalingrad
Re: Books of Viktor Suvorov contains a lot of myths
The context quoted was WWII. Indeed for some of your posts claim an even wider context.Kunikov wrote:Now you're taking things out of context. The Winter War did not take place in a terrain conducive to tank/armored warfare.LWD wrote: Then you are wrong. One need only look at the Pacific or for that matter the Winter war to see where the mobile reserves were often not tanks at all. Certainly mobile reserves make a defensive line much stronger but that's a military maxim that goes back millenium.
- Oleg Grigoryev
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Re: Books of Viktor Suvorov contains a lot of myths
LWD wrote:That seemed to be the case from what I read.Oleg Grigoryev wrote:LWD – nobody is arguing here that fixed lines were useless –Or they can stop the offense dead in it's tracks which they did on a number of occasions.they can be very useful as a defensive backbone –they can slow enemy enough for the defender to identify points of the main effort , but you will need mobile reserves that can on the moment notice be brought up and beef up the defense or contain the penetration if it occurred.Then you are wrong. One need only look at the Pacific or for that matter the Winter war to see where the mobile reserves were often not tanks at all. Certainly mobile reserves make a defensive line much stronger but that's a military maxim that goes back millenium.Mobile reserves in WW II meant tanks. That is the argument - in WW II you needed tanks regardless of what posture you assumed defensive or offensive. ....
well do you actually see anyone using the word "useless"?That seemed to be the case from what I read.
they can - if the effort is half-backedOr they can stop the offense dead in it's tracks which they did on a number of occasions.
You are cherry picking you TOs - obviously nobody is going to use masses of tanks in the theater that cannot accommodate masses of tanks. btw Finns after winter war formed an Armor division that they tried to use as mobile reserve exactly in the manner I described - not with whole lot of success though. In general - fighting in the Arctic was mainly an infantry affair - chiefly due to the reason that it is no tank country.Then you are wrong. One need only look at the Pacific or for that matter the Winter war to see where the mobile reserves were often not tanks at all. Certainly mobile reserves make a defensive line much stronger but that's a military maxim that goes back millenium.
Re: Books of Viktor Suvorov contains a lot of myths
The context quoted was that of the Stalin/Molotov line on the eve of the German invasion. The other examples used thus far have been to show that fixed defenses on their own are not enough to stop an offensive.LWD wrote:The context quoted was WWII. Indeed for some of your posts claim an even wider context.Kunikov wrote:Now you're taking things out of context. The Winter War did not take place in a terrain conducive to tank/armored warfare.LWD wrote: Then you are wrong. One need only look at the Pacific or for that matter the Winter war to see where the mobile reserves were often not tanks at all. Certainly mobile reserves make a defensive line much stronger but that's a military maxim that goes back millenium.
"Opinions founded on prejudice are always sustained with the greatest violence." Jewish proverb
"This isn't Paris, you will not get through here with a Marching Parade!" Defenders of Stalingrad
"This isn't Paris, you will not get through here with a Marching Parade!" Defenders of Stalingrad
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Re: Books of Viktor Suvorov contains a lot of myths
As you mention it, do you have any explanation for the complete dismantling of the Stalin-line after September 1939? Why this very useful line was not kept intact?Kunikov wrote:The context quoted was that of the Stalin/Molotov line on the eve of the German invasion. The other examples used thus far have been to show that fixed defenses on their own are not enough to stop an offensive.
Or is it, that Stalin didn't have enough tanks to form "mobile reserves" in the rear of that line, thus coming to the conclusion that this line was of no use at all--much the same way as you do?
And if this was so--how many tanks would have been sufficient to form "useful" mobile reserves? Would 30,000 tanks have been enough? Or would rather 40,000 tanks have been necessary? Or maybe 50,000?
Or maybe the lack was not in tanks, but in manpower? So, the five million Red-armists being mobilized from May 19, 1941 on did not suffice to man the line? And thus--the line being useless for any defense efforts whatsoever--all these five million Red-armists had to be concentrated in front of the Stalin-line instead of behind it?
Re: Books of Viktor Suvorov contains a lot of myths
Otto Fuchs wrote:As you mention it, do you have any explanation for the complete dismantling of the Stalin-line after September 1939? Why this very useful line was not kept intact?Kunikov wrote:The context quoted was that of the Stalin/Molotov line on the eve of the German invasion. The other examples used thus far have been to show that fixed defenses on their own are not enough to stop an offensive.
Or is it, that Stalin didn't have enough tanks to form "mobile reserves" in the rear of that line, thus coming to the conclusion that this line was of no use at all--much the same way as you do?
And if this was so--how many tanks would have been sufficient to form "useful" mobil reserves? Would 30,000 tanks have been enough? Or would rather 40,000 tanks have been necessary? Or maybe 50,000?
Or maybe the lack was not in tanks, but in manpower? So, the five million Red-armists being mobilized from May 19, 1941 on did not suffice to man the line? And thus--the line being useless for any defense efforts whatsoever--all these five million Red-armists had to be concentrated in front of the Stalin-line instead of behind it?
The Stalin line was replaced by the Molotov line. The Red Army did not count on 'mobile reserves', those exist for a country which did not rely so much on an offensive oriented strategy even in defense, as the Red Army did. Lastly, 5 million red Army men were not mobilized from May 1941. Your statements and 'questions' twist facts and ignore context.
"Opinions founded on prejudice are always sustained with the greatest violence." Jewish proverb
"This isn't Paris, you will not get through here with a Marching Parade!" Defenders of Stalingrad
"This isn't Paris, you will not get through here with a Marching Parade!" Defenders of Stalingrad
- Oleg Grigoryev
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Re: Books of Viktor Suvorov contains a lot of myths
Otto Fuchs wrote:As you mention it, do you have any explanation for the complete dismantling of the Stalin-line after September 1939? Why this very useful line was not kept intact?Kunikov wrote:The context quoted was that of the Stalin/Molotov line on the eve of the German invasion. The other examples used thus far have been to show that fixed defenses on their own are not enough to stop an offensive.
Or is it, that Stalin didn't have enough tanks to form "mobile reserves" in the rear of that line, thus coming to the conclusion that this line was of no use at all--much the same way as you do?
And if this was so--how many tanks would have been sufficient to form "useful" mobile reserves? Would 30,000 tanks have been enough? Or would rather 40,000 tanks have been necessary? Or maybe 50,000?
Or maybe the lack was not in tanks, but in manpower? So, the five million Red-armists being mobilized from May 19, 1941 on did not suffice to man the line? And thus--the line being useless for any defense efforts whatsoever--all these five million Red-armists had to be concentrated in front of the Stalin-line instead of behind it?
The line was never dismentaled.As you mention it, do you have any explanation for the complete dismantling of the Stalin-line after September 1939? Why this very useful line was not kept intact?
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Re: Books of Viktor Suvorov contains a lot of myths
The Naval Institute Press, (U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland) has published new book by Viktor Suvorov
The Chief Culprit: Stalin's Grand Design to Start World War II, 2008.
“A remarkable book. A delayed bombshell that includes very pertinent new research and discovers Suvorov has made since 1990. He makes savvy readers of contemporary and World War II history of a mind to reexamine the Soviet past in terms of what historians call ‘present interest’. None of the ‘new Russian’ historians can match his masterful sweep of research and analysis.”
ALBERT WEEKS, Professor Emeritus of International Relations, New York University, and author of Stalin’s Other War: Soviet Grand Strategy, 1939-1941
“One of the last great secrets of World War II is why Nazi Germany succeeded in surprising Soviet Russia in June 1941. Did Stalin ‘trust’ Hitler or was he just afraid?
Was the Red Army simply outmoded and doomed failure? Instead, Victor Suvorov ably argues, Stalin, ‘The Chief Culprit’ of World War II, was caught just days before launching his own assault into Central Europe. Thus the Red Army’s offensive posture rendered it uniquely vulnerable to attack. Suvorov cogently explains the rationale behind the whole huge, crude machine that was the USSR: to forge the weapon to conquer all of Europe. All of Stalin’s policies, including the Nazi-Soviet pact, were intended to bring about that Soviet victory. None of this absolves Hitler, but Suvorov removes the last vestige of Red righteousness regarding World War II.”
JOHN B. LUNDSTROM, author of Black Shoe Carrier Admiral: Frank Jack Fletcher at Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal
More support from Daniel W. Michaels
http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v17/v17n4p30_Michaels.html
http://wwii-issues.blogspot.com/2007_06_27_archive.html
The Chief Culprit: Stalin's Grand Design to Start World War II, 2008.
“A remarkable book. A delayed bombshell that includes very pertinent new research and discovers Suvorov has made since 1990. He makes savvy readers of contemporary and World War II history of a mind to reexamine the Soviet past in terms of what historians call ‘present interest’. None of the ‘new Russian’ historians can match his masterful sweep of research and analysis.”
ALBERT WEEKS, Professor Emeritus of International Relations, New York University, and author of Stalin’s Other War: Soviet Grand Strategy, 1939-1941
“One of the last great secrets of World War II is why Nazi Germany succeeded in surprising Soviet Russia in June 1941. Did Stalin ‘trust’ Hitler or was he just afraid?
Was the Red Army simply outmoded and doomed failure? Instead, Victor Suvorov ably argues, Stalin, ‘The Chief Culprit’ of World War II, was caught just days before launching his own assault into Central Europe. Thus the Red Army’s offensive posture rendered it uniquely vulnerable to attack. Suvorov cogently explains the rationale behind the whole huge, crude machine that was the USSR: to forge the weapon to conquer all of Europe. All of Stalin’s policies, including the Nazi-Soviet pact, were intended to bring about that Soviet victory. None of this absolves Hitler, but Suvorov removes the last vestige of Red righteousness regarding World War II.”
JOHN B. LUNDSTROM, author of Black Shoe Carrier Admiral: Frank Jack Fletcher at Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal
More support from Daniel W. Michaels
http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v17/v17n4p30_Michaels.html
http://wwii-issues.blogspot.com/2007_06_27_archive.html
- Oleg Grigoryev
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Re: Books of Viktor Suvorov contains a lot of myths
good Lord this crap was discredit through and through an yet they keep reprinting it.Cheshire Cat wrote:The Naval Institute Press, (U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland) has published new book by Viktor Suvorov
The Chief Culprit: Stalin's Grand Design to Start World War II, 2008.
“A remarkable book. A delayed bombshell that includes very pertinent new research and discovers Suvorov has made since 1990. He makes savvy readers of contemporary and World War II history of a mind to reexamine the Soviet past in terms of what historians call ‘present interest’. None of the ‘new Russian’ historians can match his masterful sweep of research and analysis.”
ALBERT WEEKS, Professor Emeritus of International Relations, New York University, and author of Stalin’s Other War: Soviet Grand Strategy, 1939-1941
“One of the last great secrets of World War II is why Nazi Germany succeeded in surprising Soviet Russia in June 1941. Did Stalin ‘trust’ Hitler or was he just afraid?
Was the Red Army simply outmoded and doomed failure? Instead, Victor Suvorov ably argues, Stalin, ‘The Chief Culprit’ of World War II, was caught just days before launching his own assault into Central Europe. Thus the Red Army’s offensive posture rendered it uniquely vulnerable to attack. Suvorov cogently explains the rationale behind the whole huge, crude machine that was the USSR: to forge the weapon to conquer all of Europe. All of Stalin’s policies, including the Nazi-Soviet pact, were intended to bring about that Soviet victory. None of this absolves Hitler, but Suvorov removes the last vestige of Red righteousness regarding World War II.”
JOHN B. LUNDSTROM, author of Black Shoe Carrier Admiral: Frank Jack Fletcher at Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal
More support from Daniel W. Michaels
http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v17/v17n4p30_Michaels.html
http://wwii-issues.blogspot.com/2007_06_27_archive.html