Technical Report BDM/W-81-077-TR, McLean, VA, December 19, 1980
– 35 –
…
5. Tactics and Techniques in General
Throughout the four-day conference, discussions ranged over a wide number of tactical questions in some detail. These have been assembled under this heading regardless of the actual sequence in which they occurred.
Very early in the conference General Balck explained a concept for the defense, or perhaps more accurately for the delay, which included, some important technical points.
Gen. Balck: «During my time as a division commander, I thought that our different tactics of concentrating on fixed lines to be held, during the First World War, was wrong. I developed a different defense method successfully:
a. I built up a line according to the old method, but only for deception. The armoured infantry regiments and the engineers were deployed in order to demonstrate some activity.
b. About 50 km away from this line, the armoured regiment, [antitank elements], and [remaining armoured infantry] would attack the advancing Russian troops and destroy[them]. -1/ p.114 L.
– 36 –
c. [We would then] withdraw to the last line, [presumably a rearward line]. Here, usually, the enemy did not have sufficient forces any longer to act energetically». 1/ p.75.
Here, again, the impact of space on tactics is readily apparent. On the largely uninhabited steppes of Russia, 50 kilometers was a trivial distance. However, just two or three such steps backward in Western Europe would signal the end of the war.
During the defense of the Chir River line in Russia, during and just after the failure to relieve Stalingrad, the XLVIlI Panzer Corps employed one weak infantry division and a Luftwaffe field division on the front, with General Balck's 11th Panzer Division in reserve for counterattack. Over a period of many weeks, this one Panzer Division mounted dozens of crucial counterattacks. Each time, the line of the Chir was restored. In the course of these operations the Russian 5th Tank Army was destroyed, and the German Position west and south of Stalingrad was saved from catastrophic defeat.
The discussion turned to the details of this campaign:
Gen. DePuy: «.... what weapons did [the armoured infantry regiment] have to stop the Russian armoured attack»?
Gen. Balck: «I put all available antitank weapons at the disposal of the regiment».
Gen. v. Mellenthin: "Antitank weapons did not belong to the regiment, they were at the disposal of the division». 2/ pp81-82
Gen. DePuy: «What Orders did General Balck issue to the commander of the 15th Panzer regiment in this particular case where the infantry stopped the attack? What were the orders»?
Gen. v. Mellenthin: « 'Forward.' .... One column was attacked and destroyed from the rear, then our tanks turned and attacked the other Russian column while it came over the rise and every tank showed its belly .... With 24 of our own tanks, we destroyed 72 Russian tanks without losing even one single man».
Mr. Dunnigan: «Was that because when you attacked the Russians, they were not facing you, and they were then incapable of resisting the surprise that you gained»?
Gen. Balck: «Naturally». 1/ pp.86-87
– 37 –
A recurring theme had to do with the combined arms team, and more specifically with the tactical employment of armoured infantry. Generally, it appears that the German Army, in World War II and even today, sees the infantry as a more static or deliberate-defending force: holding a line shaping the battlefield - maintaining coherence - providing a framework within which the mobile tank formations, usually held in reserve, carry out the counterattacks as the principal agent for the destruction of the attacking enemy. This leads to a situation in which the coordination of tanks with infantry is effected at the level of the brigade or division.
The American concept is not unlike that of the Germans, with one important exception. The American Army habitually cross-attaches its tank and mechanized battalions so that in almost all cases the mechanized battalions will have at least one tank company and the tank battalions will have one mechanized infantry company. This practice (not unheard of in the German Army as well) stems from the fact that battalions on the NATO line have wide frontages, and often conduct their battles independently in separate terrain compartments.
This means that in the American Army the coordination of tanks with infantry is at the battalion level.
The German Army today prefers to coordinate tanks with infantry at the Brigade level.
In General Balck's 11th Panzer Division the coordination was apparently often at division level:
Gen. DePuy: «…. on the Chir you blocked [the Russian breakthrough] with a Panzer Grenadier Regiment and attacked into the [flank of] the Russian armor with Panzers.
Was the other Panzer Grenadier Regiment then used against the enemy infantry [accompanying the Russian tanks] - did it look anything like that»?
Gen. v. Mellenthin: «General Balck and I consulted, and we concentrated both [Panzer Grenadier Regiments] to stop the tanks, and [our] tanks [alone] attacked into the flank».
Gen. DePuy: «Were there other occasions in which the Panzer Grenadier Regiment attacked in a coordinated way with the tanks»?
– 38 –
Gen. v. Mellenthin: «Usually General Balck preferred it if the units separated, the tanks from the infantry; but you are in a fortunate Position today because you have infantry which is mounted and has everything themselves ...».
Mr. Sprey: «General, is there maybe anything in your memory where Panzers and Panzer Grenadiers attacked combined simply because of the terrain»?
Gen. Balck: «There were occasions, but I tried to avoid it because if you combine two units, the result is so much disorder, and later an you have to separate them again and that will be difficult».
(Unidentified): «You did not run into situations where your Panzers needed infantry to protect them from enemy infantry»?
Gen. Balck: «No». 1/ p.86-87
This entire exchange was somewhat surprising except for General von Mellenthin's recognition that the Situation may be different if the infantry is also armoured and equally mobile in tracked vehicles especially tracked vehicles armed with automatic cannon and ATGMs.
It is generally accepted in all of the modern armies (including the Soviet) that the mechanized infantry will protect the tanks by preceding them into towns and forests in the attack or counterattack, and by clearing strong points or enemy dismounted positions which block or threaten the movement of the armoured force.
We can only take General Balck's strong position at face value. He did not want to mix tanks and infantry below his level. But we must remember that his division consisted of less than one full battalion of tanks. His Panzer Grenadier regiments were merely small battalions. Thus in effect we saw the tactical integration of tanks with infantry at the Brigade level - almost to battalion level - but with a very remarkable commander in charge.
Another aspect of defensive operations to which attention was drawn had to do with antitank weapons in their tactical relationship to infantry and tanks. This Subject is of current importance because of the advent of the antitank guided missile (ATGM).
– 39 –
Gen. DePuy: «In the desert you had the 88-mm and 76-mm antitank guns. What techniques did you use, in coordinating the employment of the antitank weapons with the maneuver of the tanks, that would be similar to what we are trying to do with the ATGM»?
Gen. von Mellenthin: «In Africa we deployed the antitank 88 in the front to block the approach of the enemy, and attacked the enemy with tanks separately from the flank and rear».
Gen. DePuy: «Did the tanks normally wait for the British armoured force to be disorganized by the effect of the antitank weapons before the counterattack»?
Gen. von Mellenthin: «We left them time to kill the attacking tanks in the front line of the 88s. Afterward came the surprise attack of tanks».
Gen. Gorman: «How far off would the 88s engage, assuming that they could see».
Gen. von Mellenthin: «You know, in the desert you have an enormous view, and therefore I would say he Gould successfully destroy tanks at a distance of 2000-3000 meters».
Gen. DePuy: «What, was the range at which you Gould destroy a T-34 tank with a [German] Mark IV»?
Gen von Mellenthin: «1500-2000 meters [but] very often we killed them at only 200-300 meters distances».
Gen. DePuy: «[In the counterattack], I wondered whether you stopped so you Gould fire [accurately] and destroy [the Russian tanks] before you closed [with them]»?
Gen. von Mellenthin: «Yes, quite definitely».1/ pp.B1-53
This last point is important. Many officers visualize a counter attack as a cavalry charge. However, in almost all seasoned armies the counterattacking forte gains a favourable position on the flank from which to destroy the enemy tanks from stationary firing positions. Only After all enemy tanks are destroyed or have taken cover does the force close. In some cases the counterattack never closes.
The desirability of massing antitank weapons was also a central feature of General Balck's defensive operations in Russia:
Gen. Balck: « . . contrary to the order of the Army Group, antitank units were not dispersed in the front lines and would be massively used at the ffocal point [by- 11th Panzer Division]».
Mr. Karber: «What kind of antitank units are we talking about»?
– 40 –
Gen. von Mellenthin: «76-mm guns. We took them from the Russians. They were excellent weapons. It is better to keep the antitank weapons in reserve, until you could see where the Schwerpunkt was».
Mr. Dunnigan: «Why did the Army Group commander want to disperse the force»?
Gen. Balck: «The Army Group commander wanted a long continuous line of antitank units, but this would have been [penetrated] anyway, and then we would not have anything to oppose the major threat».
Gen. von Mellenthin: «He was an excellent soldier, but he was much more infantry-minded than we». 1/ pp.9-10
Here again we see the classic conflict between the desire to hold ground resolutely - to deny it to the enemy and to do so by holding a line - and the alternative tactic of opening up the battle and destroying his forces in the open field. To some extent, as General von Mellenthin points out, this is a difference between the viewpoint of «infantry-minded» officers on the one hand and «armor-minded» officers on the other. This difference should come as no surprise, as infantry is most effective in deliberately prepared defenses where they are protected from artillery and enemy armor by field fortifications and minefields. Tank commanders, on the other hand, are uncomfortable in fixed positions and wish to be able to move about. A judicious mixture of these complementary capabilities seems to shape the battlefield, maintain coherence, and create situations in which the enemy can be destroyed. Either capability acting alone has a value significantly less than 50 percent of their combined effectiveness.
6. Organization of the Fighting Elements
When 11th Panzer Division achieved its incredible series of successful counterattacks an the live of the Chir, it was by no means a full-strength fighting organization. In fact, the 15th Panzer regiment, more often than not, comprised no more than 26 tanks - the equivalent of one and a half U.S. tank companies. A U. S. armoured division today has over 300 tanks. Hown was it that such a small force could destroy, over a period of several months, a Russian Tank Army?
Gen. Balck: «In the three years that I was a company commander in World War I, we always had concentrated attacks with few people but much artillery. {In other words, you}
– 41 –
In other words, you should have a lot of technology but as few people as possible, that is the way to conduct a war».
Gen. von Mellenthin: «I can only stress what General Balck told us about smaller units: that you should avoid big units. It does not matter if it is a company or an Army Corps or a division it is easier to have small formations». 1/ p.61
Gen. DePuy: «How many officers did the General have in his company most of the time»?
Gen. Balck: «No more than one. He was a platoon leader. Normally you did not need more than two [officers in the company]. Sometimes there was no other officer besides me in the company. On the other hand, I led many special forces, commando forces, raids like Teheran, and in such instances we had up to 4 to 6 officers. …Company strength should be no more than 70 to 80 people».
«…300 men (in a battalion) are broken into 4 companies - 3 rifle companies and a machine gun company». 2/ ibid.
Gen. Balck: «The ideal [armoured] division would consist of three [Panzergrenadier] regiments with 2 battalions in watch, and one tank regiment».
....If I had a good tank, 10 tanks per company would be enough ..., there should be 3 platoons with 3 tanks bach, and one tank for the company commander. Too many tanks will lead to too many losses».
p «…3 [companies per battalion]». 1 p.62
Mr. Karber: «One of the arguments of the critics [of small units] was that after a battle, the losses you had taken made the unit too weak to still be a viable combatant unit».
Gen. Balck: «The argument against that is that smaller units have smaller losses. It is a tendency amongst the troops that they stick together [bunch up], that when you have one there are others around - you have 12 tanks [in one place], they are hit by fire, and half of them are gone."
“ ..... a small unit is easier to lead and is more flexible». 2/ pp.62-63
Mr. Dunnigan: «What was the resistance you got in the German Army to go to smaller units»?.
Gen. Balck: «The resistance was that everybody wanted as much as possible because they believe with more they can do more». 3/ p.64
Gen. DePuy: «When the 11th Panzer Division achieved its most impressive results, it was understrength. Therefore, what in fact happened was that perhaps the best division commander in the German Army was commanding a brigade [sized force], and the regimental commanders were commanding battalions, und the battalion commanders companies, and the company commanders were commanding two or three tanks at the most. Now, is that further proof that success depends on quality of leadership and the size of the units being led? Is that a fair proposition»?
– 42 –
Gen. von Mellenthin: «Right»!
Gen. Balck: «Yes, absolutely»! 4/ pp.68-69
Closely related to the size of units is the question of their composition. There are a number of strong supporters of the idea that battalions should be mixed (tanks and mechanized infantry) from the start, because that is the way they fight. Others favour «pure» companies and battalions to facilitate and simplify training, maintenance and leadership.
Mr. Dunnigan: «General, in 1940 you developed the Kampfgruppe, a unit that had tanks, infantry, pioneers that were needed for that particular mission. You still feel that that is the way to do it»?
Gen. von Mellenthin: «Sometimes yes, sometimes no - depends on the circumstances».
Mr. Dunnigan: «Do you mean, in some cases the paper organization of the division is the one you go into combat with, with separate battalions of infantry and tanks»?
Gen. Balck: «The organization must be maintained, because it is the basis for the training and the feeding and the command and control of the unit».
Mr. Dunnigan: «In 1945 the German Army did one final reorganization doing in the direction of composite battalions - of tanks and APCs and even antitank units. Do you feel that this was solution, or do you feel that units should be 'pure' at the battalion level»?
Gen. Balck: «I think the latter would be the thing to do. You have to keep one thing in mind, which is repair and maintenance of modern weapons systems, and that can only be done in 'pure units'. The maintenance of the materiel is of paramount importance, and it is not possible to maintain the materiel in one unit where you have a conglomeration of different types of materiel. That is the art of leadership, that you can control the various forces but you still maintain the pureness of the unit».
Mr. Dunnigan: «The German Army in World War II had an armoured reconnaissance battalion which was a mixed unit .... did that present a lot of maintenance problems, because of that mix»?
Gen. Balck: «Resupply problems». 1/ pp.30-31
The issue remains unresolved in the minds of many, some of whom continue to believe we should be organized the way we fight - that is, cross-attached.
– 43 –
The fact remains that all the principal armies of the world continue to maintain «pure» tank and infantry battalions, cross-attaching as necessary for tactical training and for combat.
7. Other Subjects on which the Generals had important and interesting comments
The Location of Command Posts in Retrograde Movement
Gen. Balck: «....during the withdrawal, many commanders hesitated to shift their staff to the rear and then they got into .... bad disasters. In my system, the staff would work quietly [in the rear] and the commander would be at the focal point (Schwerpunkt) and exert his moral power». 2/ p.7
General Balck explained further that the rearward command post should not be situated at some nodal point along the obvious line of advance of the attacking Russians - for example a town on the main road to the rear - but rather should be off to the side in an inconspicuous location. The Russian attack could then sweep by, if necessary, and command and control would not be lost.
The Impact of Tactical Air Forces
Col. Samuel: «How do you view the role of the Air Force - the Luftwaffe - in highly mobile operations»?
Gen, v. Mellenthin: «In my opinion it is a decisive question. The Air Force must assist us to destroy the enemy. For instance on Tuesday, when we made our counterattack [in the simulation]: we can not make the counterattack without assistance from the Air Force.
There must be a very close Liaison between the Air Force and division or brigade, [battalion, etc.]». 1/ p.117
Col. Samuel: «[In the circumstances of today], would it be more valuable for the Air Force to support you in close combat, that is, close air support operations, [or by] interdiction in the rear of the enemy against reserves and support units»?
Colonel Samuels was seeking the General's view on an issue of current interest. There are those who feel that air forces today are most effective in the role of battlefield air interdiction that is, the highest pay-off with the lowest attrition rate.
– 44 –
Gen. v. Mellenthin: «Now, we are fortunately allied with you, and you have a very big Air Farce, and we are hopeful that this Air Force will have the strength to assist our tactical attack, in addition to the other [interdiction] mission.
"In the East we were never really dangerously attacked by the [Russian Air Force], but at the Normandy campaign even in Army Group G [in Lorraine], movement stopped completely [in the day time] because of your Air Force. No movement, impossible».
Col. Samuel: «How effective was [the Russian Air Force] against ....your supply units»?
Gen. v. Mellenthin: «Not drastically. We had sometimes heavy losses [when] our troops used roads we had forbidden them to use. The Russian Air Force attacked them and destroyed them, but it was a mistake of our troops». 2/ pp.117-118
Russian Guerrilla Operations
General Balck rated highly the value of Russian guerrillas to the Soviet war effort. He preferred that headquarters and service units be located in positions where the security requirements would be reduced that is, in small villages and woods, or even in the open. positions in large towns or cities, and in or near large forests, were especially vulnerable.
Gen. Balck: «I have always forbidden taking up such positions, and pressed my view against strong protests by the units in question. There are no disadvantages from the Service point of view. On the contrary, the guerrillas lost their freedom of movement . ... A Corps which concentrated in a city lost 720 trucks when it suddenly had to be moved.
They were completely immobilized [by guerrillas], and one Corps was a total loss.
This teaches us also something else, that comprehensive good infantry training for all soldiers and Services is a necessity». 1/ p.5
Another example was given, wherein 50 guerrillas massacred over 400 service troops who were not trained or disposed to fight.
– 45 –
The Von Hutier Issue
Perhaps only military historians will be interested, but the discussions led to a somewhat surprising exchange on the nature of evolution of German tactics. British and American historians have long put forth the theory that General von Hutier's infiltration tactics using Stosstruppen (assault troops), first employed with great success against the Russians at Riga in World War I, were the lineal forbearers of the Blitz tactics of World War II. General Balck professed ignorant of this connection.
Mr. Dunnigan: «At the end of World War I, the German Army developed what we call infiltration tactics, Stosstruppen, many energetic officers were attracted to that type of service. Did you find there was any carry-over in that mentality among those officers and troops to your tactics in World War II»?
Mr. Sprey:(Translating in German) «In the U. S. we talk a lot about the infiltration technique of the First World War. By that they mean the breaking in with shock troops to open the enemy position, and then to follow with the other forces. The question is, does the mentality of the shock troop leader have any influence an the tank troops [Leader] or otherwise»?
Gen. Balck: «The last part of the First World War, I was in attack units (Stosstruppen)».
Mr. Sprey: «Was not the so-called Alpen Corps predominantly attackoriented»?
Gen. Balck: «[It was] one of the best attack units, and I never noticed anything of this method of infiltration, we did not use it. We suppressed the enemy fire by strong artillery and then we deployed».
Mr. Sprey: «What here in the States is called 'Von Hutier tactics' is not known in Germany»?
Gen. Balck: «I can only say that I went through practically everything, but that is something that I did not experience». 1/ p.59-60
In a separate conversation later, Col. von Uslar-Gleichen, the German Army Attaché in Washington, told this reporter that the «Von Hutier» theory seemed to be confined to the British and Americans. He knew of no such ideas in German military doctrine or publications.
Given the wide adherence to the theory outside Germany, this may be a fertile field for further research.
- 46 -
SUMMARY COMMENTS
In addition to the great value derived from all the details of the wide-ranging discussions over the period of four days with our distinguished guests, there was an added dimension of enormous importance.
We were reminded in the most vivid and convincing manner that small forces skilfully led can win battles against large forces if the small force is synchronized and the large force is disorganized. Generals Balck and von Mellenthin made it clear that this is the essence of successful operations. Their experience told them that it was not difficult to create such opportunities - that the Russians were peculiarly susceptible to disorganization when confronted with new and unexpected situations. Conversely, they expressed confidence that soldiers of the "West" were inherently superior in fast-breaking situations - more apt to take individual initiative - more apt to adjust quickly to opportunities and cope with surprises.
They Said many times, in many ways, that it was the goal of the German "system" to nurture these qualities in their Leaders and even in every soldier. They believed that the basic nature of the German citizen and the tradition of the German Army strongly supported this effort.
Not surprisingly, the wider audience on the last day was deeply impressed. Inevitably the question arose as to whether American generals and American soldiers measured up to the standards implicit in the Balck/ von Mellenthin prescription for success in combat wich Russians. General Blanchard, former Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Army Europe and Commander, NATO Central Army Group, was positive in his opinion on this score. He thought the concept of the Auftragstaktik deserved emphasis in U. S. training. He attributed flexibility and initiative to our officers and non-commissioned officers.
No army has found the key to the mass production of either a Balck or a von Mellenthin. This kind of talent is found - not made - although, of course, it is sharpened and directed through doctrine and training. In this respect we must give the German system high marks. In this same respect, the insights into that system and its philosophy that we were given by the German generals is worthy of our most careful thought and attention.
