Battle of Sovkhoz «Red Star» (Sovkhoz 79)

[Yuri]

It is a little information on 1st batallion of 7th air-field division from a testimony of a PoW - private 4th company of this battalion.

The division was formed in the city of MILAU from September, 26th till November, 26th. Has arrived on station MOROZOVSKAYA on December, 6th by cars. From a motion has been engaged to action 7.12 in region the height 161.0.
This division is generated under the scheme of other infantry divisions, is exclusive from pilots-parachutists but who had not training preparation as an infantry. In the city of MILAU except 7th division were still formed similar type - 8th, 9th, 10th air-field divisions. These divisions have gone, possibly, on other sites of front.

7th air-field division consists of six separate battalions. By 7.12 has arrived only three battalion, the others were on the approach. Are thrown out in this region as a reinforcement. The battalion consists of 4 companies, number of 150-200 men everyone. Arms of 1st huntsman company: 4-5 heavy machine guns, 4-5 easy machine guns, 5-6 automatic machines, 150 carbines. 2nd and 3rd companies are similar to the first. 4th company - a heavy company. Is armed: 5 machine guns, 5 mortars, 2 anti-tank guns of calibre of 20 mm.

Division mission: together with other units to reject Russian on a starting position and to hold defence. With this mission of a unit have not manage because of weak arms and bad preparation. Have been disseminated and are almost entirely destroyed. All companies had heavy losses. In 4th company there was no more than 35 persons, such situation in other companies.
The company commander -captain OTTENGERR,
the battalion commander - captain MILLERHEBÜR.
Field mail L 50338-E

[Yuri]

Here situational maps for the first and second half of day for December,8th, 1942 and for December, 9th, 1942
The short description to these maps by Colonel David T. Zabecki, US Army Reserves here

By December 1942, the German Sixth Army was encircled in Stalingrad. Field Marshal Eric von Manstein, the commander of Army Group Don, planned to relieve the Sixth Army with Colonel General Hermann Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army, supported by the XLVIII Panzer Korps. On 7 December, before the XLVIII Panzer Korps could link up with the Fourth Panzer Army, elements of General P.L. Romanenko's Soviet Fifth Tank Army launched heavy attacks at various points along the Chir River, a tributary of the Don. By the end of the day, the Soviet I Tank Corps had crossed the Chir and penetrated 10 miles to the south, reaching Sovchos (State Collective Farm) 79.

When the attack came, two divisions of the XLVIII Panzer Korps were deployed along the river's west bank. The 7th Luftwaffe Field Division was on the left, and the 336th Infantry Division was on the right. To their rear, Balck's partially deployed 11th Panzer Division formed the corps reserve. Until that November the 11th Panzer Division had been operating near Roslavl in Byelorussia, more than 400 miles northwest of the confluence of the Chir and the Don. On 25 November, the division started to move by rail to join Army Group Don. By 6 December, the 11th Panzer Division was assigned to the LXVIII Panzer Korps, although only the division's 15th Panzer Regiment was in position. Balck's 110th and 111th Panzergrenadier Regiments were still in transit and did not close until late on 7 December.

With most of his combat units still en route from the railhead, Balck and his commanders were making a ground reconnaissance for the followon move toward Stalingrad when the Soviets attacked. The LXVIII Panzer Korps sent the 11th Panzer Division a warning order to have the 15th Panzer Regiment prepare for a possible counterattack. In the absence of their commander, the division staff passed along the warning order, and the 15th Panzer Regiment began moving forward.

When Balck got the word, he immediately moved to the 336th Infantry Division's command post at Verchne Solonvski. Contrary to all prevailing German doctrine, he decided to collocate his command post with that of the 336th. Balck then began analyzing the orders flowing in from corps ordering the 11th Panzer Division to throw the Soviets back across the Chir. Balck reasoned that if the threat was great enough to delay the relief drive toward Stalingrad, then simply forcing the enemy back across the Chir would be inadequate. He immediately began working to have the mission changed to one of destroying the enemy. His efforts were successful: the LXVIII Panzer Korps' orders were changed as Balck wished.
Because of the desperate situation, Balck was forced to commit his division piecemeal. Despite reinforcement by the 15th Panzer Regiment, the 336th Infantry Division was unable to prevent the enemy from reaching Sovchos 79. As the Soviets hunkered down in that position for the night, Balck brought up the remainder of his units and planned his attack for the following day.

Balck struck just before dawn on 8 December. The 110th Panzer-grenadier Regiment conducted a holding attack against the Soviet front, with the 15th Panzer Regiment supported by the 111th Panzer-grenadier Regiment, delivering the main blow against the Soviet rear. Later in the day the Soviets brought up previously uncommitted armor in an attempt to roll up the 336th Infantry Division's left flank. Balck left two Panzer-grenadier regiments to mop up at Sovchos 79 and sent the 15th Panzer Regiment to deal with the new threat. By the day's end, the Soviet I Tank Corps had lost 53 tanks and effectively ceased to exist.

For the next three days, the 11th Panzer Division fought a series of running battles, successively eliminating Soviet bridgeheads across the Chir. The division continually marched at night, fighting during the day, using speed, surprise and shock actions. Balck issued only verbal orders to his regimental commanders, either by radio or face to face, and continually positioned himself at critical points of any action.

Presence of similar works of art in KTB proves once again, that the German generals wrote the memoirs even during war.
Maps do not display real events. These are fantastic actions. But about it later.
Well, at German commanders was two plans of action for December, 8th, 1942
The foreground has offered by commander 336 Infantry Divisions lieutenant general Lucht (under other version this has offered a headquarters of 48th Tank Corps).
The second plan was offered by commander of 11th Tank Division major general Balck

[Yuri]

It is better to see an essence and distinction of these plans on colour maps.
(The punched lines - not carried out parts of plans)
At first sight the Balck's plan looks more preferable than the Lucht's plan.
However Russian proverb as well as possible suitable to this plan - "gladko bylo na bumagi, da zabyli pro ovragi, a po nim khodit' " - was smooth on a paper, but have forgotten about ravines, and on them to go
To see why the plan of Balck has not worked, we will impose on these plans of a position of units of 5th tank army as they were in the morning on December, 8th, 1942

[Yuri]

Now the same plans of the German commanders with imposing of positions of units of 5th tank army as they were in the morning on December, 8th, 1942

The Lucht's plan used the main weakness in a position of units of 5th Tank Army - absence of an infantry on a southern wing of bridgehead. Forces of two cavalry divisions (5th and 6th) on the Wehrmacht classification is two durchschits batallions.
Besides the part of one of batallions, namely 5th GKD, operated to the south Lisinsky in sector of group Adam.
32nd cavalry division had a mission to grasp the bridge through the river Chir near Blizhnemel'nechny, that is operated on a site of group Adam. This division had only 138 man or on the Wehrmacht's classification one schwache battalion.
At realisation of the plan of Lucht the infantry of 333rd Rifle Division could not come to the aid of tank brigades of 1TC. In this case in sector height 161- Lisinsky superiority of forces of 11th PzD, 336th ID, Kg. Shtumpfeld over forces of 1st TC, 6th b 5th GKDs would be suppressing. In a direct head-on collision Germans had every chance to break here forces of Russian and to get in flood plain of the river Chir. On Germans the surprise factor worked also, Russian did not know about presence of 11th PzD.

On the other hand at realisation of the Balck's plan tank brigades of 1st Tank Corps have quickly come to the aid of an infantry of 333rd Rifle Division. Besides, 216th Tank Brigade the active actions has tie up great strengths 11PzD.
And still the important detail which has worked against the Balck's plan.
On 7th of December 8th Motorcycle Regiment could not get into in the enemy's back and in the evening has come back to own forces, having lain between height 155.0 and state farm 79. Thus in the morning on 8th of December the regiment of lieutenant colonel Belik has appeared directly on a way of movement of German tanks. Pass by the regiment of Belik further on the north the Balck's tanks could not - ravine Kalinovskaya be in the way.

[Yuri]

On December, 8th, 1942 to carry out the ingenious plan of Balck it has not turned out.
216th tank brigade (destroyed by Balck on a map) has completely kept the fighting capability and in the evening without the big problems has passed from state farm 79 through Derbentsev's ravine to Lisinsky.
On 8th of December losses 333rd rifle division were less, than its losses on 7th of December.
On 8th of December 1120 rifle regiment which was attacked by tanks of the colonel Selle's group had the greatest losses.
And the accepted main blow of the Balck's tanks 8th motorcycle regiment had following losses - 50 killed and 40 wounded men.
On 8th of December 44th motorised-rifle brigade not only has not lost the initial positions at height 161, but also has managed to promote on the south towards Derbentsev's ravine. For this reason the anti-tank battalion of 8th LwFD, to which have probably informed that Russian are rejected in flood plain of the river Chir, has been destroyed.
Having understood, that its ingenious plan has suffered full breakdown, Balck in the morning on December, 9th has started fulfilment of the plan of Lücht. But was late, the situation has changed, at night with 8 for December, 9th on profit bridgehead 47th Guards rifle division and 8th separate Guards tank brigade. Besides at 15 o'clock have approached flamethrower tanks of 510th and 511th Tank Battalions which have been subordinated by 8th Guards Tank Brigade.

[Yuri]

The only thing, that on situational maps of 336ID is displayed correctly, it is a site of group of colonel Selle.
The front line on morning 8.12.42 passed here as shown yellow colour.
The command point of 1120th rifle regiment was on a field camp.
The regiment had mission to grasp height 118,3 (on situational the map at this height is specified of the colonel Selle's command point).
Germans the first have gone over to the offensive, and group of German tanks (on a map of 333rd rifle division this group is designated as "Tiger") has broken to command point of 1120th regiment.

1. F. N. S. Vorobej Paul Prokopevich
2. Rank Red Army Men
3. Post the operator of a company of communication 1120th Rifle Regiment of 333nd Rifle Division

It is represented to a government award of the USSR
4. Year of a birth 1920
5. Nationality Byelorussian
6. Party membership non-party
7. Participation in civil war, the subsequent operations on protection of the USSR and Patriotic War (where when) did not participate. In a Patriotic War since June, 1941
8. Whether has wounds and a contusion in patriotic war has no
9. Since what time in Red Army since September, 1940
10. What RMC it is called the Ljubansky regional military commissariat of the Minsk area. .
11. Than it is earlier awarded (for what distinguish) awards has no
12. Constant home address represented to awads decoration and the address of his family of 361 field mail, a unit No_. The father - Vorobey Procopiy Astaf’evich of the Minsk area, Ljubansky region, village Zapol’noe

I. Brief, is concrete account of a personal battle feat or merits
In battle for a field camp at height 118,3 8.12.42 the Red Army man Vorobey P.P. was on the regiment’s CP as the duty operator. At the moment of attack of German tanks he has not thrown phone and until the last minute the life adjusted fire the one's own artillery and when tanks on he approached he has transferred the last by phone: «shoot on me, I perish under the enemy tanks». Then has been knocked down by the enemy tanks.
The Red Army Man Vorobey P.P. is worthy the posthumous award of an order «Red Banner». .

The commander ( the chief )

The commander (chief) 1120RR
The colonel /Takunov/

The chief of a headquarters
The major /Vinogradskij/
December, 1942

Other group of tanks (designated on a map as "Lion") could not punch front of defence 1116 rifle regiment that has given the chance to a regiment to counter a strike in flank to the tank group which has broken through front of 1120 rifle regiment.
As a result the front line has accepted approximately that position as it is displayed on a situational map of 336ID for the end of day.

[Yuri]

Now we will put position of a front line around height 161 where operated 44 MSBr.
On the end of day 7.12.42 its position was such

From the battle report of a headquarters of 1st Tank Corps at 20 o'clock 00 min 7/12/42:

44 MSBr within day held a former boundary (on southern slopes the height 161, 600 m to the south of a mark 161), reflected numerous attacks of the opponent, having put to it the big damage.

8.12.42 around heights 161-156.0 and ravine Derbentsev together with 44th MSBr operated 159th TBr.
7.12.42 this brigade (11 tanks T-34 and 10 tanks T-70) was on left (east) coast of the river Chir. By the order of the commander of 5th Tank Army this brigade in structure of 4 tanks T-34 and 10 tanks T-70 has been directed on bridgehead. One company of tanks T-34 remained on the left coast for reflexion of possible attack of the opponent from the side Rychkovskiy.

The result of actions of 44th MSBr and 159th TBr for 8.12.42 is that.

From the battle report of a headquarters of 1st Tank Corps at 20 o'clock 00 min 8/12/42:

159 TBr at 8 o'clock 00 minutes attacked the opponent in a direction southeast slopes the height 161, height 156.0, the DRRBENTsEV's ravine
In readiness for battle: tanks T-34 =2, T-70 =1. ATG of 76 mm =2, 45 mm =2.
For day of battle the brigade has lost: T-34 =2, from them one irrevocably, T-70 =9, from them 4 irrevocably /have burnt down/.
It is killed: commanding structure =1 persons, younger commanding and ordinary structure =4 persons.
Wounded: commanding structure =5 people, younger commanding and ordinary structure =6 people
were missing =7 people
Trophies: are destroyed 2 companies of officer regiment, AT Guns =9, large-calibre machine guns =7, machine guns manual and heavy to 50 pieces, motor vehicles =8, heavy tanks =1, average tanks =3

44 MSBr within day continues to keep height 161, to hold the one's own positions and has promoted in a southern direction on 400-500 m.
In readiness for battle: active bayonets = 80, submachine gunners = 80, in a company of submachine gunners = 42
Arms presence /cut/
Losses for 7.12.42 It is killed = 7 people, it is wounded = 47 people
For 8.12.42 It is killed =7, it is wounded = 17, them two average commanders.
One motor vehicle ZIS-5 with products and kitchen is broken.
Trophies: 30 rifles, 8 machine guns.
It is destroyed: to 200 soldiers and officers of the opponent. It is brought down two planes of the opponent "Messerschmidt-110".

[spiegel]

Hello,

Mega Discussion, lasting over years !

I'm going to dilute lengthy texts with graphic materials. These pics stem from the photo-convolute of the 11. Pz Div, taken in Winter 1942-43.
I think these Matilda -Panzers, shot down at 19-20 Dec.-42, belong to the 5. MechCorps .

The caption to the group of photos: "Wir greifen an und vernichten in 90 Minutem mit 12 eigenen Wagen 56 Russen Panzer. Ritterkreuzträgger Hpt. Lestmann"

PS. Source for images: ebay

[Yuri]

Hello,

I'm going to dilute lengthy texts with graphic materials. These pics stem from the photo-convolute of the 11. Pz Div, taken in Winter 1942-43.
I think these Matilda -Panzers, shot down at 19-20 Dec.-42, belong to the 5. MechCorps .

OPERATIVE REPORT № 017 CORPS HEADQUARTERS of 5th MECHANIZED, NOWO-DERBENOVSKY
04 o'clock 00 min
20.12.42

1. /cut/
2. /cut/

3. 50 MBR - 168 TR followed in avant-guard of a brigade, and on reaching height 137.0 at 9.00 has been attacked at the left, from a ravine to the east of height 137.0, approximately, by 20 tanks of the opponent. At turn of a regiment towards flank, strong artillery and mortar fire of the opponent from region of heights 148.8 and 137.0 has been opened.
Simultaneously the aircraft of the opponent made raids on the battle orders. In an outcome of a battle the tank regiment with an infantry has been cut off from the main forces of a brigade. Attempt will incorporate to avant-guard of success had no, as since a boundary of heights: 148.8, 137.0 continuous, strong artillery, mortar fire and bombing from air was conducted.
By an outcome of day the brigade left on a boundary выс.137.0 and has started the defence organisation.
Losses: Has burnt down and is shot down 24 tanks. The unit from them in 3-4 days will be restored. Efficient tanks in two regiments / 252th and 168th/-24 tanks.
Losses in people are specified.
At the opponent 15 tanks are shot down and burnt.

I have a detailed report about this battle. In due time I will give out it.
Irrevocable losses in it to battle - 17 tanks from which at height 14 tanks have been shot down. One tank platoon in number of three tanks has made the way on the south and has reached suburbs of state farm 79 where these three tanks have been shot down by antiaircraft guns.

And now at me a question.
According to data left an environment - here the commander of 252nd tank regiment lieutenant colonel Nadchetchikov has been taken prisoner.
Whether Is not present at you what or data on it?

[spiegel]

"here the commander of 252nd tank regiment lieutenant colonel Nadchetchikov "

his name is Motcheshnikow, according to the Memorial DB, i don't know about his capture by germans.

Yes, it's sad story, i personally do not believe the number of "46" shot down russian panzer in one day. Then it would indicate the annihilation of the whole panzer-regiment at once. What i have found from the Memorial that a couple of regiments suffered high losses at that day. "High" means: about 20 tankists/reg, these are the 156 Reg and the 168 Reg, both belong to the 5-th MechCors.

Let's wait on your report, in fact you don't need to retype everything in English, you may just put here the russian text as an image.

[Yuri]

Yes, it's sad story, i personally do not believe the number of "46" shot down russian panzer in one day.

It seems on a photo 64 tanks are written. In Mellenthin's memoirs at height 148.8 - 65 tanks.

Then it would indicate the annihilation of the whole panzer-regiment at once. What i have found from the Memorial that a couple of regiments suffered high losses at that day. "High" means: about 20 tankists/reg, these are the 156 Reg and the 168 Reg, both belong to the 5-th MechCors.

Order of Battle of 5th Mechanised Corps and loss of tanks from December, 10th on December, 24th, 1942
According to assistant to commander of corps on tank troops of lieutenant colonel ShCherbakov

Units - Type of machines - Quantity on staff - Irrevocable losses
188TR - Mk-III - 37 - 4
168TR­­ -­ Mk-II - 39 - 16
156TR /45MBr/- Mk-III - 38 - 1
46TR/49MBr/ - Mk-III - 39 - -
252TR/50MBr/ - Mk-II - 38 -11
45SABtl - T-70 - 7 -
Management company - T-34 - 2 -

[spiegel]

Well, let's check your losses figure with independent information on KIA.

The 'Stabskompanie' of the 5-th MC. 4 KIA plus one officer is dead due to a technical incident. Looks like a good match to your number of 2 Tanks.


Next one -- 188 TR. Three tank-commanders plus two drives, would indicate smth. like 3-4 tanks, in your report 4 tanks are specified, OK !


168 TR, i have only the total number about 20-25 KIA between Dec.13 and 20-th, seems to be in a good accord with your numbers.

I don't have any reliable data on 252 TR,only the fact that its command staff was killed. Only one disagreement remains about 156 TR. According to the DataBase the Regiment lost about 20 tankists on Dec. 19 . This figure can't be equivalent to one tank lost. It seems like a one digit is missing in your report, or there is a misprint in the document.

So, this in my impression.

[Yuri]

The 'Stabskompanie' of the 5-th MC. 4 KIA plus one officer is dead due to a technical incident. Looks like a good match to your number of 2 Tanks.

They were lost 10.12 in Popov-II during aircraft raid. In Popv-II the command point of a headquarters 5th TA placed. On December, 10th there there has arrived a headquarters of 5th Mech.Korp. At this time has begun bombing. From a management company was lost four fighters.

168 TR, i have only the total number about 20-25 KIA between Dec.13 and 20-th, seems to be in a good accord with your numbers.

At whom death date is specified on December, 20th, were lost on December, 19th. Why so, I will explain later.

I don't have any reliable data on 252 TR,only the fact that its command staff was killed. Only one disagreement remains about 156 TR. According to the DataBase the Regiment lost about 20 tankists on Dec. 19 . This figure can't be equivalent to one tank lost. It seems like a one digit is missing in your report, or there is a misprint in the document.

So, this in my impression.

It is the simplified scheme of battle at heights 148.8 and 137.0 (to the right of road height 137.0, to the left of road height 148.8)
Continuous yellow line - position for the morning 19.12. A dashed line on the end of day 19.12.
More detailed scheme will be given on a course of a statement of events day after day.

I have checked up the ShCherbakov's data. The general irrevocable losses of Corps - 32 tanks. It corresponds to the sum of losses of all units of Corps.

ShCherbakov's data are made at 02.00 24/12/42. I can verify its data with data of a headquarters of 252nd regiment which are made at 19.00 23/12/42 According to data of a headquarters a regiment have lost irrevocably 7 tanks. Besides there were no 7 tanks. 1 tank was at loading station in a Efremov (a place formation of 5th Mech. K - the Tula area of 650 km from a battle place), and 6 tanks were on a Sebryakovo off-loading station (these are 85 km from a battle place). Why Scherbakov for 252nd tank regiment instead of 7 irrevocably lost tank has specified 11 tanks, it is not found out yet.

According to commission data (an investigating case of destruction of tanks at heights 137/0 and 148.8 ) the general number of losses in it to battle - 22 tanks, from which irrevocable losses - 17 tanks.

Summary conclusions by results of work of the commission investigating this case.

The code number

To the commander of Southwest Front

5th Mechanized Corps is poorly trained and knock together. Staff are picked up badly, command and a headquarters no coaching. As a whole on the preparation Corps cannot be used for the decision of missions in operative depth.
18.12 Corps, having a mission is go into the break, thanking not readiness and weak organisation this mission has not carried out, was involved in long battles in settlements.
19.12 Corps, not conducting investigation and not having sent battle outposts, has been attacked by a mechanised infantry and tanks of the opponent of smaller force, having had by loss 22 tanks and 400 fighters, - attacked on Nov. Derbenovsky.
Not to risk manpower and an equipment, I ask of the permission to use Corps for detour and coverage of flanks of the opponent directly in the field of battle in close interaction with rifle divisions while Corps in a sufficient measure is not knock together
Romanenko
Tumanyan
Kuleshev
20/12/42
16.00

As it has been established later, from these 17 tanks around heights 148.8 and 137.0 are shot down 14 tanks.
Three tanks have broken on the south and left to state farm 79. To the east of height 165.6 these tanks have been shot down. However crews of these tanks led by the platoon commander at a breaking out from the encirclement have attacked the anti-tank battery of Germans and have taken possession it. They held defence till December, 21st. Here they were found out by group of motorcyclists of 8th motorcycle regiment. The battery place (which tankmen have grasped) on a map was rendered personally by lieutenant colonel Belik at 18 o'clock 00 min 21.12.42..
The case with a tank platoon of 252nd tank regiment show, that irrevocable losses of tanks not necessarily by destruction of tankmen. Certainly, the return will be correct also - absence of irrevocable losses of tanks does not mean, that crews did not have victims.
I do not have data that tanks 156th tank regiment participated in battle at heights 148.8 and 137.0
At this time this regiment conducted operations at height 94.4, that is in a strip of group Stahel.
The border between group Stahel and 48PzK is conducted how it is shown on a map 48PzK.
I still yet did not study documents of units of Red Army on battle at height 94.4, as it is battle for Oblivskaya. Studying of operations on this direction the following stage of my researches.

At present from the German (trophy) documents on battle around height 94.4 I have the report of the commander 2./147.Ers.Flk.Abt. Besides there are indications of prisoners of war, among them soldiers 2./238.Flk.Abt. From 26 PoWs, grasped in this region and interrogated in an intelligence section of a headquarters of 5th TA, there is nobody from 336th ID or 11th PzD.
In the report the commander 2./147.Ers.Flk.Abt informs, that its battery, ostensibly, has shot down 11 tanks Mk-III. The type of tanks corresponds to type of tanks of 156th TR. The quantity, certainly, should be confirmed by documents of Red Army.
If you have data or documents, that tanks of 11th PzD participated in battle at height 94.4 it would be desirable them to have.
If in a photo with padded tanks it is possible to see tanks Mk-III it will mean, that 156th TR participated in battle at heights 137.0 and 148.8.
168th and 252nd TRs had tanks Mk-II.
To the right of road, that is at height 137.0, units of 11th PzD and 336th ID operated. It is confirmed indirectly with the medallions found there. These two guys at the moment of destruction sat in one entrenchment. Most likely, were lost from shell rupture. Apparently, one of them the sapper of 11th PzD.
Among other victims, undoubtedly, there are soldiers 10./I.R. 685.
To the left of road (that is at height 148.8) air defence units operated. That indirectly confirm these medallions

[ATH]

Journal 336 ID

sorry for long post of really bad translation

5.12.42

8,30
In the course of the morning one enemy reconnaissance of the Golaja Gorge, supported by four tanks is turned back by KG Selle.

2 T-34 are determined by the division under its "Pz.Kp. Abendroth" (8 tanks) shot. During the afternoon a strong patrol of the "III./GR685" took the dairy farm hard northwest Lissinskij without a fight and is connected to the right neighbor in Lissinskij ago. The message of the group Adam that Lissinskij must be vacated due to heavy enemy attacks confirmed not. Lissinskij remains in our hands.


19,10
The following instructions from the "rum.AOK.3" on the 6.12. be continued attack by the Division to clean up the bridge head can not be carried out according to the Division at the time ordered as a result non-scheduled arrival of the railway transport, travel difficulties, and lack of fuel does not arrive in time units required for battle.
Our escalated patrol activity showed that enemy has occupied the bridgehead with more powerful forces and tanks, and it reinforced by ongoing fortification work.


6.12.42

Allgemeiner Feindeindruck:
Vor jedem Regiment etwa 1 "Feind-Rgt", wobei vor rechtem Flügel ein stark angeschlagenes "Reiter -Rgt." mit rund 200 bis 250 Kopfen anzunehmen ist.

Unter Schwierigkeiten (es schneit erneut) und durch Ausfall von Zugmaschinen gelingt es dann noch unter Einsatz aller verfügbaren Mittel, die Masse der "schweren Art.Abt." der Division in Stellung zu bringen.

The improvised "Selle battle group" has been caught in recent days. On its own initiative put in "patrol company" took quite ordinary, useful results.

The division is to overcome all these difficulties most good things.
After the Russian air activity completely due to heavy fog in the last few days resting, she went on the afternoon of 6.12. stimulated by the torchlight of the Air Force column (!), first with long-range reconnaissance back in action (the trenches were finished in foresight).

In the evening, the preparations of the Division for the attack
completed.

The "Bttle." have reached their starting position, the fire plan is set and the
"Bttrn." zeroed in.

Despite the lack of column space and poor road conditions, we succeeded in bringing the necessary quantities of ammunition and fuel.

As of the instructions of the "Rum.AOK.3" The Division with the attached "Luftw.Rgt.7", "Gruppe Selle" and "Pz.Kp.301" with an emphasis on the right wing attack to reach the Chir and then to establish defense.


7.12.42

5,00
The division with its subordinated units have launched the attack:
In the section of the Luftw.Rgt., the attack goes despite heavy enemy resistance, particularly from the northeast, at first ahead(?). Between Ostrov and Golaja Gorge are hostile infantry parts, further to the east recognized individual tanks.

5,55
Report of Group Selle:
In the area of the crossroad between the two ravines, 14 volley guns and two Tanks.
Artillery is set immediately on the target.


6,17
Reports "Commander Gren.Rgt.686" that attack the "regiment." initially gained ground quickly now, but due to heavy flank fire of "height 94" and by a previously unknown but highly developed "height north" point 161 "'is fixed. Then Order of the "Gren.Rgt.685" immediately take left "wing height 94".

6,30
Shifting of more enemy tanks from Savinskiy to Ostrovskoye.

7,00
The "Gren.Rgt.686" identifies a group of 21 tanks and multiple stalin organs in area around "Height 96.4". The tanks are engaged by our "s.FH". Ammunition situation is extremely tense.

7,15
The concentration of armor at point 96,4 has increased to 50 tanks. The enemy introduces other units in a deeply staggered formation along the road in the direction of Height 129,0. Truck mounted infantry follows.

7,17
Does the "Luftw.Rgt.7" during the attack of the gorge "600 yards east of 155.0" is reached. Intensified enemy infantry in the section of the "regiment." and make determined resistance, enemy above message is confirmed.
The Division urges the "VIII.Flg.Korps" urgent air support for the continuation of the attack and the battering of the enemy armor concentration.

7,30
In the area of Gren.Rgt.685, on the right flank of the Division, the attack is for now proceeding as planned against tough enemy resistance.

The regiments stands firm on the line just west of Height 106,6 – the finger on the western edge – the north-south ravine against heavy resistance. In particular, the strong flanking fire from the previously unknown Height north of Point 161 is very sensitive.

7,35
Oberstlt. Hellwig informs the division of the situation in the “Rgt-Abschnitt.”

The right wing of the "Luftw.Rgts." not succeed at first, defended by the enemy to take tough "hill north of 161". In the "area Ostrowskoje and 96.4" enemy has drawn together in a previously unsuspected strength armored forces, which are located in the attack to the west.

7,37
The direction of the enemy tank attack is clear. Enemy has broken through on the boundary between "Luftw. Regiment" and "battle group Selle," the local weak front, one turns to the south and southeast, and roll the left wing of the "Luftw.Rgts." on and is now facing the "8th and 11th Bttr" Since the last reserves of the "Luftw.Rgts." are used, can be the first "Bttrn." no infantry protection to be granted.

The section used on numerous "2 cm Flak" against the heavy Russian tanks have no effect and will be rolled over.

Order of the division, the left wing of the "regiment" turn south to cover the flank of the division.

7,40
If the right wing of the "Group Selle" bent back towards the west. "Height 129.0" is lost first.

8,00
"Gren.Rgt.685" supported by our tank has taken "Height 106.6".

Height 94.0 not yet in our hands.

8,30
Since the division expects a further breakthrough of the enemy to the west and southwest, to Order "Colonel Wagner." with "II./Gren.Rgt.686" and 13./Gren.Rgt.685 to establish a blocking position at "Sowch. No. 79".

8,33
On the division's right wing, the attack of III./Gren.Rgt.685 is halted due to strong flanking fire from Tschir-Finger (just east of Lissinskij). The battalion sets up defence on both sides of Height 106,6, then, after a successful Stuka attack and with support from the artillery of Gruppe Adam, continues the attack.

The attack of the left battalion against Height 94,0 is hampered by unfavourable ravine terrain and by tenaciously fighting enemy. Since the enemy strong point north of height 161 couldn't be eliminated quickly, the attack of Gren.Rgt.686 is also halted (also falters).

8,40
Report communicated by division advanced units: “3 enemy tanks in Sovkhoz 79.”

From then on, no more wire connection to the front, which complicates the division's management of the defensive fighting significantly.

Over the next few hours, the enemy brings more armor to Sovkhoz 79 and with different elements, pushes south, in the direction of Nizhne Solonovskij, and west.

8,50
Order to Gren.Rgt.686 to put all armor piercing weapons on the deep left flank of the division and against Sovkhoz 79.

8,50
Informed the Ia of the commander of XXXXVIII.Pz.Korps about the situation. The division considers the use of the Panzer regiment of 11.Pz.Div. necessary because it cannot seal off and eliminate the deep enemy armoured breakthrough with its own forces.

After consulting with the commanding general, General of Panzer troops from Knobelsdorff, the use of Pz.Rgts.15 is promised that the division is placed under to do so. With the arrival of first parts in Verkhne Ssolonowskij is expected in one to two hours.

9,25
The divisional staff prepares change of position.
New command post will be explored in Peschtscherskij area and set the heavy Staffel there in March.

10,00
One s.Flak-Bttr. of the Gem.Flak.Abt.7.Luftw.Feld the Div. in Verkhne Solonovskij is instructed by the Division commander and gets to the area south of Height 132,1 against the aproaching tanks from Sovkhoz 79.

The use of these batteries immediately stops the attack of the enemy lead tanks.

11,00
Telex of 7.12. The Division is placed under the unified leadership of the attack XXXXVIII.Pz.Korps.

11,30
Luftw.Rgt. situation:
As a result of the enemy armoured attack against the left wing of the Luftw.Rgt, a large part of the machine and light AT weapons have been destroyed. According to orders, the Rgt. bends its left wing back to the south to secure the flank against the enemy breakthrough. Due to loss of almost all officers and under the impact of the following tanks, the flank line has not been formed in the intended way. Only in the area of Height 161 and west of it was it possible to keep the remnants of the regiment under the leadership of Oberstleutnant Hellwig. The high losses, as well as the partial failure of establishing a defensive line on the flank can be attributed to the demoralising effect of the first tank attack on the young troops and to the low armor-piercing qualities of their equipment. Due to this situation, the division is ordered to hold the present line.

Since the right wing of the Luftw.Rgt could not take the Height north of 161 due to stubborn enemy resistance, Gren.Rgt.686 is itself threatened on his left flank; It is impossible for now to fill the gaps.

13,30
Early darkness descends in the north and in the ravines 132.1 pts standing strong enemy armored forces prohibit the counterattack north of Nizhne Ssolonowskij assembled armored battalion. However, securing the tank battalion, as two 88 mm anti-aircraft guns of the heavy-Bttr Luftw.Feld Div.7 are down by fire and antitank reserve division is no longer available, initially on both sides of the road in area 132,1

The Corps Headquarters. ordered dissolution of the Department and with nightfall new use as part of 11.Pz.Div. that at 8.12. advancing from the south and west of the adjusted position for the counterattack Sowch.Nr.79 and the gap between Luftw.Rgt. and group and exclude the Selle Tschirerreicht. The division commissioned lieutenant colonel. Wagner to prevent the construction of a locking position of the enemy against Nizhne Ssolonowskij. To him be the II./Gren.Rgt.686. Flak-men and stragglers assumed. (To establish a blocking position at Sowch.Nr.79 there was no longer in the morning).

14.00
Issued by the Corps of command, the group Erdmann Lissinskij replace.

Despite the small combat force of Gren.Rgt.685 by high losses, as is possible using the Res.Btl. replace the group Erdmann at nightfall.

14,10
The commander of the Art.Rgt.336 reports:
In the area of the Luftw.Rgt.7, the 9. and 11. batteries, as well as the 8.Nb.Werf.Bttr., were surprised by the strenght of the tank attack and were overrun in spite of immediate use of countermeisures, the guns were shot up and most of the service destroyed.

18,00
Latest situation:

The Gren.Rgt.685 has reached its attack objective, the Height south of the Chir, with all its forces and there prepares for defense. Height 94, strongly defended by the enemy, could not immediately be taken. Strong flanking from the Tschir-finger north of Lissinskij is not switched off (disabled, eliminated, stopped, etc.), despite the use of artillery (The announced Luftw. units never came!) and causes further heavy losses for Gren.Rgt.685.

The Gren.Rgt.686 has reached with the Middle components the northern foothills of the Fork ravine and great north-south ravine.

By using the Res.Btl. and scattered parts of Luftw.Regts. managed to close the gap on the left wing of the regiment. to close. The heavily battered remnants Luftw.Rgts. extend the left flank of the division to the south and take over the protection of artillery positions in the area south of 161.

Kampfgruppe Selle essentially holds the original position east of height 122,1, its right-wing turned back to the west. Weak security “detachments” are resisting on height 129,0.

Strong enemy activity in Ssawinskij as well as Ostrowskoje. Individual tanks are detected.

In the course of the late afternoon more enemy forces, infantry-mot and mot-Pak gets through the point of breakthrough towards the south into the space around Sowch.Nr.79. The continuation of the attack on Nizhne Ssolonowskij and Verkhne Axenowskij is to be expected during the night and early morning hours of 8.12.

Plan:
336.I.D. still under XXXXVIII.Pz.Korps on 8 .12 under cover to continue today's attack on the west flank, to take Ssawinskij and Ulazkij and set up the defence on the line Lissinskij - Ulazkijam on the south bank of the River Chir. Gruppe Selle to continue to hold the current line. It is especially important to hold height 129 in all circumstances.

8.12.42
Strong patrol activity on both sides during the night. Enemy has been reinforced along the entire front of the division. It is suspected that attacks will start at dawn, especially on the right wing. Tank concentrations are reported in the ravines north and northwest of height 161, and 1500 m south of it.

The Division anticipates that the opponent will line up newly introduced armored forces against Height 161 and south of it, to expand the breakthrough.

By supplying antitank weapons under the leadership of Capt. Weike the anti-tank is there reinforced.

3,35
Ia informs the Commander on the critical situation on the left flank of the division. It is expected that the opponent will try to attack, from the North with infantry, and from the West and Southwest with tanks, to crush the left wing and to roll up the front of the division from the West.

Ia would like to point out that the sweeping impact of the 11.Pz.Div further north will not encounter any significant armored forces of the enemy, since the bulk of his armor is concentrated in the area west and north-west of height 161. The attack of the 11.Pz.Div. will go ahead in the intended way in any case.

The division will receive, in their defensive action on the left wing, initially only air support (schlacht + Stuka).

Rgts.Stab.687 has reached Verkhne Axenowskij and assembled the following parts of the regiment.

5,05
Issued an order to the regiment, that it is preferable for II./Gren.Rgt.687 to reach Verkhne Ssolonowskij faster. In the morning report to the Corps Headquarters, it is brought to the attention that the division (must do something about) another enemy grouping on the right wing and in the forest east of Ssawinskij and the tank concentration on the left wing.

5,15
Taking advantage of the dawn of the enemy attacked in strength of a company at the section of the III./Gren.Rgt.685 and is bloodily rejected.

---- pas traduit correct

6,00
Reports the Gren.Rgt.685 one tank unit (40 to 50) of section 160 in direction 161 and 7-propelled tank in space 800 meters north of the height. Another 12 tanks moving from 96.4 points also 161st in the direction The Division urges Air Force support for smashing the massaged feindl. Armored forces. However, due to unfavorable weather initially not expected with the use of Stukas.

7,30
Introduction more enemy forces assembling in the Sowch.Nr.79. Armored forces of unknown strength are reported from there driving to the west. Situation at present there (un)clarified.

Own tank attack that was to begin with dawn, affects up to now not yet relief from the tough defensive battle in division standing.

7,45
The enemy tank peak penetrates in the flank position in area northeast and west of Height 161. The infantry there makes their way fighting to the east and southeast.

Single forces still remain there, trapped by the enemy.

7,55
In the left section, it is thought that the opponent coming from the East with tanks goes towards Derbenowskij, situation there currently can not be overlooked.

8,20
The enemy pushes forward once again with weaker enemy armored forces coming from Sowch.Nr.79 in the direction of Height 132,1, but by the combined artillery fire of the used there 11.Pz.Div. Artillery, is forced to turn back to the northwest.

8,45
Encounters an enemy with superior armored forces, infantry follows from the south and west into the main line of resistance of the I./Gren.Rgt.686 northeast of. 161st Under the exemplary leadership of Capt. Niederländer maintains the battalion's position and defend against the infantry following. By rolling over the tanks destroying numerous heavy weapons.

The losses are great, but it is thanks to the dogged endurance of the battalion that the western flank of the division was not broken by enemy infantry forces, only push the tanks after they have overrun the battalion, the East continued against 156 .

8,55
Own tank attack reaches around the north of Sovkhoz Nr.79, without considerable resistance, go back to the area 160.3 and 155.0,.

The existence of separate tanks deep in the flank of the enemy armor prevents them not to continue the attack in the back of the division.

10,00
In the course of the morning makes continued strong enemy pressure in area of Lissinskij Ssawinskij and Ulazkij noticeable.

In the back of the division succeeds to the enemy in the room east of. 161 and 156 (-) to penetrate.

Heavy artillery fire from the woods north Lissinskij Ssawinskij and holds down the own armor-piercing weapons. Nevertheless, in the course of the fight 11 tank by the Division and Pak 4 by 8.8 cm flak from the height of 156.0 and destroyed by opponents stopped. It caused heavy casualties on armor-piercing weapons, partly by rolling over, partly by tanks and artillery shots.

10,30
Pressed again with Russian infantry forces massed against the still holding Battalion Niederlander (I./686) south of it and used of the remains of Luftw.Rgts. Here are some enemy tanks in the main line of resistance and roll the identified pockets of resistance and down positions of the heavy weapons Nevertheless, the battalion defended his tough positions, while the resistance on the left wing of the Luftwaffe slowly crumbling. This will be located there Bttrn. directly threatened. Because of this situation suggests the head of the Ia XXXXVIII.Pz.Korps immediate turning of parts of 11.Pz.Div. east on 161 height before, in there to relieve hard-pressed parts of the division and to avoid being outflanked by the enemy. Corresponding command is sent to 11.Pz.Div.

11,00
With its right wing, Group Selle jumped in with the tank attack on the Golaja ravine from area north of Height 129,0.

12,00
Reached the crisis on the left flank of the division its peak, as part of the enemy tanks Height 161 south bypass, followed by mot-infantry and motorized infantry, in the back to thrust of the Gren.Rgt.686 while your tank peak 1000 m west of the height 161 and is due to lack of ammunition can not intervene in the fight.

The batteries south Height 161 are in close combat with superior armored forces.
Following the reports of the commander of Art.Rgt.336 artillery should be out of action.

While it was possible in the morning to stop the tank that broke through north of Height 161 in front of Height 156, due to a lack of weapons (guns, heavy weapons, artillery, etc.) and a shortage of ammunition, it was possible for the enemy to break through to the northeast between Height 156 and 161 and to reach the foothills of the north-south ravine (Derbenzeva).

12,30
Urgent requirement of the Division attacked on the first dive-bomber units into battle, and be on the back of BTLE. standing on the southern slopes of the great enemy tanks north-south canyon set.

Since longer no wire connection to the Rgtrn. and Btlen. exists, the location on the left flank of the division is not to be overlooked.

12,30
Reached the beginnings Pz.Gren.Rgt.110 with the western edge of the harsh Sowch.Nr.79 and houses located in combat with enemy tanks and motorized infantry.

In the course of the morning, 20 tanks are destroyed by 11.Pz.Div. and 15 by 336.I.D., of which 11 by Pz.Jg.Abt.336 and 4 by the Bttrn 9.Flak Div.

13,45
Tanks come from the west again and take the left wing of about 1500 meters south Gren.Rgt.686 Height 161 connection.

14,00
Sowch.Nr.79 is cleared of the enemy, who withdrew with the remnants of the tanks in north-east direction.

Pz.Gren.Rgt.110 occurs further to the northeast, to close the gap between Gren.Rgt.111 with height 161 and Selle group.

15,00
Situation with the onset of darkness:

The Gren.Rgt.685, and remnants of the Gren.Rgt.686 Luftw.Rgts.7 continue holding the position, though strong enemy armored forces are in the back and wire connections are interrupted, and traffic reporting.

Repeated hostile attacks from Kp to Battalion strength from the wood piece to the east, Ssawinskij and Ulatzkij by the "Gren.Rgt.685" rejected. "Gren.Rgt.686" which is the cornerstone of his height 161 constantly attacked from some 40 tanks and heavy infantry mot, defends the mass from the attacks. Another enemy tank attack (-) on "height 161", which was lost after a tough defensive action and the loss of "8-Pak guns" and came from the back of the "III./Gren.Rgt.686" was broken up by Stukaangriffe .

The I./Gren.Rgt.686 under the leadership of its commander, Captain Niederländer, despite two-time rollover from enemy tanks continue to hold position east of and northeast of Height 161.

The rooms in "southern Height 161" located Bttrn. the III./AR336 and 10./AR336 and participate actively in the defense of the tank attack and provide excellent support to hard-pressed (?) parts of the infantry.

On the rumors suggest that the Russian has been raging in an inhuman way to Sowch.Nr.79, the I c of the division sent there and report the following report:

In the clean-up in the Sowch.Nr.79 was determined that about 100 officers, NCOs and enlisted men have been slain in the cruelest way. After proper findings have escaped the German soldiers on the morning of 8.12. when approaching the counter-attack and rounded up with MP and M.G. were shot and stabbed in large part, and the officers were killed by neck shot. Even the wounded who remained there at the appointed place under the direction of the association Ass.Arzt Dr. Höppner (-) did not stop the opponent.

There are a large part of the residual material, as well as the IG of the 13./Gren.Rgt.685 could be recovered.

15,20
If Col. Wagner with the capture and of the re-formation of the numerous retreating commissioned Air Force members.

Since no more officers available, it is planned to distribute them amont the regiments of the Division to increase the combat effectiveness.

15,30
The attack by the Pz.Gren.Rgt.110 from Sowch.Nr.79 and closing the gap between the left wing of the division and right wing of Gruppe Selle by units of Pz.Div.11 cut off strong enemy forces composed of Tanks and Mot-Infanterie, from their lines of communication, and pushed them, in the course of the afternoon, to the east in the back of the division.

General lack of clarity due to the situation, caused by inadequate communications and the uncertainty of the present everywhere scattered enemy, forcing the groups to take an all-around defense.

15,40
II./Gren.Rgt.686 commander receives the command at 9.12. early start on Br (Nordostw. Nishne Ssolonowskij) to reach the Derbenzewa Gorge. In space eastward 118.3 is expected scattered enemy. The path to the regiment is to clean up the enemy.

19,00
To meet the order of XXXXVIII.Pz.Korps command, according to which the Div. On the 9.12. again with our left wing attacks and takes Ssawinskij and Sulazkij and sets up defense on the south bank of the Chir. To the left, the 11.Pz.Div. attacks from the area Pkt. 160 - 155 and to take Ostrowskoje. Selle group joins the attack and is subordinated to the 11.Pz.Div.

19,25
Commanding General expressed his appreciation for the achievements of the division.

20,00
Opponent in an initially unknown strength from the northeast by the weak own backups in Lissinskij is broken. The last reserve-Kp. the Gren.Rgt.685 is used to counter-attack and the opponents thrown.

It develops in the evening and night hours at the command posts and in the convoy areas fierce dogfighting with enemy parts that are trying to break out to the east.

Was able to seal off the enemy, but the situation is partly the fact that enemy tanks to be confused with its own and the Russian has created the winter coveralls from some captured inventories in Sowch.Nr.79 used, partly from German dead and loot trucks. completely unclear.

The bloody and material losses of the Russians are extremely high and are not to be overlooked in their proportions.

Alone at the height 156, 11 tank was shot, 4 trucks and 4 motorcycles, and 12 MG captured.

Due to this situation, make traffic reporting, catering and transportation of casualties extremely difficult. Through the use of "convoys" with strong Pakschutz manages the troop supply during the night with the essentials.

The combat power of the force is constantly decreasing.

Among the dead and wounded are numerous frostbite and colds.
The inability to warm up the troops in a heated room and spend warm meals promotes these failures.
In Div.Tagesbefehl says the Div.Kdr. his division thanks and recognition for proven benefits.

During the night, multiple attacks of the enemy (kp-strength) were dismissed against the northern front of the division.

[ATH]

Teile 24. Pz. Div. –
It is 1st company a shooting regiment of 24th tank division.
Company it has been cut off from the basic forces of a division near Kalatch.
Has departed on Chir to Surovikino where it has been subordinated to battle group of colonel Selle.
At a withdrawal on Chir had 16 armoured troop-carriers, 8-10 20 mm guns and to 16 manual machine guns, numerical structure nearby 280 man.
During the period from December, 2 till December, 6th around height 129.0 (it is a site Gr.Selle) from this company six man were taken prisoner

Could be Schwadron Overbeck.
When Gr.Stumpfeld was absorbed by 336 ID, two elements were excluded: Kp.v.Alvensleben - 29ID(mot) - and Schwadron Overbeck - 24PzD - which were, along with 11 PzD, sent towards Tatsinskaja.

2 things today that are gonna make things a lot clearer.

Rittmeister Overbeck was an officer (captain) in Krad.Btl.4. He took control of the remnants of 24.Pz.Div's kradshutzen bataillon and other mobile units that got separated from the main body of the division in Stalingrad. This Schwadron was the mobile element of Gruppe Stumpfeld and Selle. In this image, the northern platoon (2nd platoon of 2.kp./K.4 of Leutnant H. Schulz) was part of the Schwadron. It might be the same Hubertus Schulz that wrote this unit history (Die Aufklärer (Rf. 1, K4, PzAA24) der 1. Kavallerie-Division/24. Panzer-Division). I have also not read the history of von Senger und Etterlin, but both of them might have been in the same unit along the Chir. If anybody that have access to these books could confirm or infirm, that would be really appreciated.

Also, and this is the most important breakthrough, on the same image, their is a company named Molinaris. Actually, that would be a unit under the future Pz.Rgt.36 commander Major Karl-Theodor Molinari, who was actually a member of Panzer-Verband 700 (!!!)

The unit has, on 3.12.42, 202 men, 3 lmg, 1 IG, 3 45mm ATG, 1 75mm ATG, 1 armored car, 1 APC, 3 Pz IV lg (from 1./301).