Battle of Sovkhoz «Red Star» (Sovkhoz 79)

Yuri · Post by **Yuri** » 09 Mar 2007 15:19

About battle group STAHEL (8th Air Corps).

The basis of this battle group was made with air-defence units Luftwaffe: 99 air-defence regiments, 1-st and 2-nd battalions 88-th air-defence regiment, units 38-th air-defence regiment, 37-th heavy air-defence division. And, 37-th heavy air-defence divisional (800 person) has arrived to region Oblivskaja at the end of November on motor vehicles from Ukraine without the weapon. Before arrival in region Oblivskaja 37-th heavy divisional defended the bridge through the river Dnepr. In Oblivskaja has received two air-defence guns (calibre of 20 mm) guns and 10 machine guns. All these air-defence units operated as an infantry.

Except for these air-defence units in structure of battle group STAHEL of the profit from various places (including from Germany) separate air-defence batteries and airborne subdivisions of various number (from 80 up to 300 person).

In battle group STAHEL operated air station - building battalions, for example, an air station - building battalion 1/7. Here there were as usual building battalions, for example, 332-nd and 63-rd building battalions, and as 9-th bridge group. In Oblivskaja in structure of battle group STAHEL 83-rd railway battalion of 6-th railway regiment operated. At the moment of inclusion in structure of battle group STAHEL in 83-rd railway a battalion was 780 person. All 6-th railway regiment has been included in the battle group Adam, working in a corner formed by merge of currents of the rivers Chirs and Don.
Here were 1 and 2 company 404 motorized spare battalion

In battle group STAHEL (as, however, and in all other battle groups working on the river Chir in November - December, 1942) went the incalculable quantity of combined teams a battalion and companies which collected in near and deep rear (including Poland and Germany).
Such modular units were different number and had no own numbers and numbers of field mails. As a rule, these modular units were poured in in units already taking place here.
For definition of full structure of battle group STAHEL a lot of time is required.

My estimation of number of group STAHEL in 10 thousand person is the lowest estimation which can be admitted and at that huge quantity of a different sort of units which are fixed in region Oblivskaja in a strip of actions of battle group STAHEL.

(Source: file 24, pp. 143, 162, 207 and others from this file)

P. S. I could see some additional data on other units 213 ID which in December, 1942 were on a site the Voronezh front. So, on December, 9 other infantry regiment of this division, namely 318 IR 213 ID has been directed on a site of 8-th Italian army, more precisely, on a site Italian 5 ID.
From the Voronezh front here there were forces of 6-th army. On December, 16, 1942 in fight for height 190,7 it has been taken in a captivity about 100 German soldiers from 318 IR 213 ID and 29 Italians from 90 IR Italian 5ID.

Interrogation of these hundred captured Germans precisely establishs presence at first half of December, 1942 on a site of the Voronezh front in region of height 190,7 German 318 IR 213 ID.
(Source: TSAMO FR, fund 203, the inventory 2845, a file 86, a sheet 261-263.
«The battle report of commander by a troops Voronezh front No 00168» at 24 o'clock 00 minutes 16/12/1942).

P.P.S. For the information: No 07577 it is number field mail of 2-nd battalion 354 IR 213 ID - working in November - December, 1942 on the river Chir in region Varlamov. The commander 2/354 IR 213 ID major MAJA or MEIJA (probably an error in a transcription).
(Source: file 24, p. 143)

Jan-Hendrik · Post by **Jan-Hendrik** » 09 Mar 2007 15:41

No 07577 it is number field mail of 2-nd battalion 354 IR 213 ID

No , according to the Feldpostnummernübersicht this number belonged from 15.7.1942 till 24.1.1943 to the Wehrmachtstransport-Leitung Weichsel...

Bau-Btl 332 was already disbanded in 1940 .

37-th heavy air-defence division

What should that have been , please ??

Jan-Hendrik

..getting more and more doubts about the sources this may come from ...

Michate · Post by **Michate** » 09 Mar 2007 15:46

The basis of this battle group was made with air-defence units Luftwaffe: 99 air-defence regiments, 1-st and 2-nd battalions 88-th air-defence regiment, units 38-th air-defence regiment, 37-th heavy air-defence division. And, 37-th heavy air-defence divisional (800 person) has arrived to region Oblivskaja at the end of November on motor vehicles from Ukraine without the weapon. Before arrival in region Oblivskaja 37-th heavy divisional defended the bridge through the river Dnepr. In Oblivskaja has received two air-defence guns (calibre of 20 mm) guns and 10 machine guns. All these air-defence units operated as an infantry.

99 Flak regiment was only a regimental staff, which was used to control and direct the subordinated battalions.

A 37 heavy flak division is nowhere mentioned in Tessin. Until the end of 1942, flak divisions 1 - 20 had been built. It seems of these, flak divisions 2, 6, 9, 10 15, 17, 18 were on Eastern front. Perhaps it should read 37 flak regiment or battalion?

Interrogation of these hundred captured Germans precisely establishs presence at first half of December, 1942 on a site of the Voronezh front in region of height 190,7 German 318 IR 213 ID.
(Source: TSAMO FR, fund 203, the inventory 2845, a file 86, a sheet 261-263.
«The battle report of commander by a troops Voronezh front No 00168» at 24 o'clock 00 minutes 16/12/1942).

318 IR did indeed belong to 213 Sich.Div., which had the following composition at the time :
- Sich.Reg. 177 from battalions II/610, 380, II/318.
- Sich.Reg. 318 from battalions I/318, II/612, I/57.
- Sich.Reg. 57 from battalions 414, 415 and Sich.Reit.Abt (security cavalry detachment) 213.
Source: Tessin, Vol. 1.

P.P.S. For the information: No 07577 it is number field mail of 2-nd battalion 354 IR 213 ID - working in November - December, 1942 on the river Chir in region Varlamov. The commander 2/354 IR 213 ID major MAJA or MEIJA (probably an error in a transcription).
(Source: file 24, p. 143)

The 354 Security regiment was indeed in the area, Kehrig has it appearing in AD Hollidt's sector on 23/24 November 1942. It finally was incorporated into 62 ID but may have been temporarily subordinated to 213 Sec. division.
Source: Tessin, Vol. 1 and Kehrig, Manfred: "Stalingrad - Analyse und Dokumentation einer Schlacht".

Kehrih also has an OoB of 6 army, 4 Pz. army and 48 Pz corps for mid November 1942, in most instances down to battalion level. I will have a look during the next days.

Yuri · Post by **Yuri** » 09 Mar 2007 16:05

Jan-Hendrik wrote:
No 07577 it is number field mail of 2-nd battalion 354 IR 213 ID
No , according to the Feldpostnummernübersicht this number belonged from 15.7.1942 till 24.1.1943 to the Wehrmachtstransport-Leitung Weichsel...

Bau-Btl 332 was already disbanded in 1940 .

37-th heavy air-defence division
What should that have been , please ??

Jan-Hendrik

..getting more and more doubts about the sources this may come from ...

no division - his divisional (battalion)

It is necessary to make the important addition. Frequently archival documents are carried out on not so qualitative paper and a pale font. Therefore for accuracy of figures of number of field mail with me it will be charged difficultly. However I tried to restore true figure of number of field mail if any figure is badly read with the maximal opportunity. And still it is not always possible for the reasons not dependent on me.
But I have decided to publish these numbers. Who has an opportunity to take advantage these numbers of field mails (I shall be and to publish further them) should have it in a kind and at not concurrence to try different variations. For example, figure 0 frequently can be accepted for figure 8 and on the contrary. The same is possible to tell about pair figures 3 and 8 or pair 7 and 1.

Yuri · Post by **Yuri** » 09 Mar 2007 16:07

It is found out, in my opinion, important the information on 213 ID.

Intelligence summary of an army headquarters of the Voronezh front ¹ 20 about an enemy situation.

On January, 20, 1943
06 hour of 00 minutes.
…
Ostrogozhsk - Valujkis a direction.
...
On the specified data, POWs, grasped in region Rossosh' (10 kms to the east of Semedesjatyj) 16/1/1943, on interrogation have shown: belong 168-th ski batallion 68 ID Germans. The batallion of 15/1/1943 has been hastily thrown from region Prudki (20 kms to northeast from Kastornoe) in region of break of positions of the Hungarian troops with a problem to stop approach of Russian parts in region Rossosh'. In a batallion four companies, in companies till 70-80 the person in everyone. 2 easy mortars, 2 heavy machine guns, 9 manual machine guns and 9 automatic devices.

POWs heard, that 68 ID should be with its full complement thrown in region of break.
POWs 2/417 IR 168 ID, the grasped 16/1/1943 in region Ternovoe (14 kms to northwest from Ostrogozhsk), have shown: 417 and 442 IR 168 ID were in a reserve in region Kamyshenki (7 kms to a southwest Krasnyj) and 12.1 have been thrown on motor vehicles 417 IR in region Ternovoe, 442 IR region Ostrogozhsk. 417 IR in structure of two batallions, in companies on 40 person in everyone. The commander 168 ID - general - major Kreis.
In region of farm Orlov 17.1 at the killed soldier the documents showing his belonging to 246 IR 88 ID are withdrawn.

POWs, grasped 16/1/1943 in region Lesnoe, Ukolovo, on interrogations have shown: 8 and 22 CDs of Hungarians belong to ski groups. From structure 8 and 22 CDs are created 2 ski groups, with number on 360 person everyone and operate as mobile groups. 8 and 22 CDs are in Hungary.

Rossosh a direction

Within 19/1/1943 the opponent rendered weak resistance the rests of the broken parts: 10, 12 ID, 1 TBr Hungarians and 26 ID Germans withdrawal in western southwest directions and subdivisions 19, 23 ID continued Hungarians - in a southern direction. On site Novaja Mel'nitsa, Stoyanov, Blizhnij the opponent rendered persistent resistance to actions of our parts and by an outcome of day conducted battle in regions Blizhnij Polubjankin (15 kms to a southeast Ostrogozhsk), to the west Karpenkovo (10 kms to a southwest Kamenka) and to the south Saguny (6 kms to southwest Kolodezhnoe).

On a southern site of a direction the opponent rendered weak resistance, continued withdrawal in western and northwest directions.

The surrounded parts (19 and 23 ID Hungarians, 2, 3, 4 ID and 156 ID Italians, the rests 385 ID, 543 IR 387 ID, 318 IR 213 ID Germans) rendered weak resistance, were to knock out from Basovki, Ukrainian Bujlovki (both points 25 of km to the east Podgornoe), Staraja Kalitva, Antonovka, Subotin, Jasnoj Poljany (all points to northeast Rossosh) and by an outcome of day conducted battle on boundary Igolkin (10 kms to northeast Rossosh) Kretschatyj (5 kms to southwest Nizhnij Karabut). To I shall wipe 19/1/1943 opponent was to knock out from Alekseevka.

On a boundary Valujki, Urazovo the opponent units 382 ID and the rests 387 ID Germans, units of a unstated belonging undertook repeatedly counter-attacks, constraining approach of our troops, and by an outcome of day has been rejected on western surburb Urazovo and to knock out from Valujki.

Supervision establishs a congestion up to an infantry division of the opponent in region of a wood northeast Alekseyevka and Goroditsche.

POW 1/32 IR 23 ID the Hungarians, grasped 18/1/1943 in region Kamenka, on interrogation has shown: 1/32 IR 14/1/1943 on motor vehicles has been thrown from region Shirokij (4 kms to southeast Saguny) in Verkhnie Marki (15 kms to northeast Kamenka) and has held defense. 15/1/1943 batallion with the big losses in the disorder ran in Kamenka where the rests of it have been captured.

POW 54 IR 23 ID the Hungarians, grasped 18/1/1943 in region Kamenka, has shown: the regiment 14/1/1943 is thrown from Saguny in region Marki where 17/1/1943 has been broken, and his rests ran in region Kamenka where are completely captured.

POW 78 IR 26 ID the Germans, grasped 17/1/1943 in region Volch'e (8 kms northeast of Kamenka) has shown: the regiment was in region of the city of Orel. On the night of 10/1/1943 has plunged and by rail through Kursk, Volokonovka 13/1/1943 has arrived on station Matoma (8 kms to the east of Alekseyevka), whence a march through Tatarino 17/1/1943 has arrived to region Wolf (8 kms to northeast of Kamenka) with a problem of area defense Wolf. Under impacts of our parts 78 IR departed on Evdakovo, Kamenka.
In region of Kamenka 17/1/1943 it is grasped POW, belonging 39 IR 26 ID Germans (interrogation proceeds).

By radio reconnaissance it is established:

1. Portable radio sets of 2-nd Hungarian army during 18-19/1/1943 did not work, and also work of a network 3 AK Hungarians with the main radio station in Rogatovo - Pogoreloe is not marked.

2. The radio communication of two Hungarian portable radio sets was observed: the first - Bykovoî (35 kms to northeast Novyj Oskol), the second - Ivanovka (30 kms to a southwest of Voronezh), presumably at an army headquarters 9 ID.

3. The ð/item in region Big Skorobyga worked German (10 kms to the west Podgornoe), has passed from Kurenyj, and kept in contact with portable radio sets in Budyonny, Birjuche (20 kms to a southwest of Alekseyevka) Kupjansk, Kharkov.

4. Two German radio stations from region Uspenskoe (20 kms to a southwest Budyonny) and Ilovskoe (10 kms to the north of Alekseyevka) continued to work actively the open text.
Transition of the Italian radio station from Samarino (25 kms to northwest Valujki) to Kupjansk is marked.
…
The chief of an army headquarters of the Voronezh front
general - major of Kozakov

The chief of an intelligence section of the Voronezh front
colonel KORNEEV

TSAMO RF
found 203, inventory 2874, file 42, p. 48-54.
(Russian Arkhiv. VOV. vol 15-4 (3). p.73-75)

Apparently from prospecting report No 20 from 20/1/1943 army headquarters of the Voronezh front, surrounded by a troops of this front in triangle Ostrogozhsk-Valujki-Podgornoe international Hungarian - Italian - the German grouping a part has been destroyed and the part is taken in a captivity.
Thus, with the help of archival documents of a troops of the Voronezh and Southwest fronts we can find out now, that happened at the end of 1942 beginning of 1943 with German 213 ID and her infantry regiments 354IR and 318 IR.

So. Prior to the beginning a troops of Red Army of operation "Uranus" 213 ID was in a reserve on a site of Hungarian 2-nd army near the city of Lisichansk. Assuming, that winter approach of Red Army will begin in sector of Romanian 3-rd army, command of an army group "B" decides to throw 213 ID sector of Romanian 3-rd army and to include her in structure XLVIII Pz. Korp (general Heim) together with 22 Pz. D, rum.1Arm Div and German 62 ID.
However to a start of an attack of Red Army in sector ðóìûícêîé 3-rd armies in Morozovskaja there has arrived only a regiment 354 IR 213 IR.
Fast rout of defense of the Romanian army has forced to throw 354 IR 213 ID on a boundary of the river Chir (in region Varlamov).
Here on the basis of a regiment of colonel Rekovsky the battle group of division scale has been created. It has been made by submission to subdivisions 354 IR 213 ID of a various sort non-infantry units, namely, security, building and modular batallions.

When operation "Uranus" began the main forces 213 ID led by 318 IR were in sector of 8-th Italian army. And command of an army group "B" decides to hold back her in this sector for strengthening of defense of Italians.

On December, 9 318 IR 213 ID has arrived on a site Italian 5 ID. On December, 19, 1942 in fight for height 190,7 by units of Soviet 6-th army have been taken in a captivity about 100 Germans from structure 318 IR 213 ID and 29 italian from 90 IR 5 ID.

A month later, in the middle of January, 1943 a troops of the Voronezh front have started to fulfilment Ostrogask-Rossosh ’ operations in which it was planned to destroy the left flank of Italian 8-th army and the right flank of Hungarian 2-nd army. During realization Ostrogask-Rossosh ’ operation in triangle Ostrogozhsk-Valujki-Podgornoe have been surrounded, and then a part it is destroyed also by a part it is taken in a captivity international Italian - Hungarian - a German grouping.
Among destroyed region of triangle Ostrogozhsk-Valujki-Podgornoe of German divisions there were main forces 213 ID led by 318 IR.

Deserted 354 IR 213 ID has been included at the end of January in structure 62 ID XVII AK from structure AA " Hollidt ".

Thus, we managed to liquidate one more white stain and to find out about a genuine history 213 ID and two her infantry regiment 354 IR and 318 IR.

Qvist · Post by **Qvist** » 09 Mar 2007 17:13

Well, at least we know what Red Army intelligence thought had happened to the 213. Division, which is very interesting but not neccessarily accurate. For instance, they do not seem to have realised that this was not in fact 213.ID - which I can only repeat did not exist in 1942 - , but 213.Sicherungsdivision. Thanks for posting this, but you have one or two methodological issues to iron out there.

I am incidentally still waiting for your answers to previous questions before there's much basis for proceeding. I hope you will answer them - any new documentation on these complicated battles would be most welcome.

cheers

Attached: From OKH Kriegsgliderung 22.12.

Qvist · Post by **Qvist** » 09 Mar 2007 18:08

Deserted 354 IR 213 ID has been included at the end of January in structure 62 ID XVII AK from structure AA " Hollidt ".

Nafziger on 62.ID:

Qvist · Post by **Qvist** » 09 Mar 2007 18:39

Among destroyed region of triangle Ostrogozhsk-Valujki-Podgornoe of German divisions there were main forces 213 ID led by 318 IR.

Well, 213.Sich.D. continued to exist without pause until 1944. See below snip from the 9 April 1943 OKH Gliederung, for example. Incidentally, Haupt confirms what Nafziger writes on IR354 - see second scan. That also contains a brief overview of the continued operations of 213.Sich.D. So, all in all it would seem that some caution would be in order rather than assuming that RKKA intelligence struck the bullseye in this case. Lesson: Don't treat intelligence estimations about the enemy as if they were solid factual information. Sometimes they will be right, but you always, always check them against other sources.

cheers

Qvist · Post by **Qvist** » 09 Mar 2007 19:25

Art,

Sorry, I've been meaning to reply to your post of a couple of days ago.

Thanks for weighing in. I have little to offer on the composition of the Red Army forces, beyond what I can find in Glantz, so this is a welcome clarification. I take it that 5SA may have taken over some of 51A's forces then, or?

You are of course right concerning 4PzA - my point was that there seems little reason to take into account the whole of PzAOK4/AG Hoth.

cheers

Yuri · Post by **Yuri** » 09 Mar 2007 20:30

Qvist wrote:Well, at least we know what Red Army intelligence thought had happened to the 213. Division, which is very interesting but not neccessarily accurate. For instance, they do not seem to have realised that this was not in fact 213.ID - which I can only repeat did not exist in 1942 - , but 213.Sicherungsdivision. Thanks for posting this, but you have one or two methodological issues to iron out there.

I am incidentally still waiting for your answers to previous questions before there's much basis for proceeding. I hope you will answer them - any new documentation on these complicated battles would be most welcome.

cheers

Red Army Supreme commander in chief comrade Stalin was strict with those who wasted time on trifles.
Comrade Stalin demanded from Red Army intelligence will be concentrated on the main thing, namely, to find out the real enemy forces, working before front friendly troops, instead of how the opponent called these forces.
Comrade Stalin demanded from Red Army intelligence to find out about the opponent of data of the following grade:
a/ Exact number of infantry batallions and their distribution on sites of front, and as their presence in a reserve.
b/ Will find out exact number of artillery batteries and their fire power;
c/ To define precisely amount of enemy tanks which could will appear on a battlefield;

Such data define power of a grouping of the opponent. The name of this grouping of the opponent it already affair insignificant, as the name of a grouping it always only a legend and no more that. In each concrete case it is necessary to fill this legend the real contents, namely:
number of infantry batallions, number of artillery batteries and number of tanks.

And, it is necessary to tell directly - comrade Stalin was right.
Today we know, that the name of any unit of a Wermacht in itself did not speak the equal account anything in sense of the validity - both in sense of her number, and in sense to her arms.
By the way, a unbridled imagination of commanders about enemy forces, - which, for example, gushs forth in reports of field marshal a of the von Manstein, - comrade Stalin stopped on a root.

Will take our case. Whether referred to 213 Infantry Division or it was 213. Sicherungsdivision did not allow will find out about real number of infantry batallions which had colonel Rekovsky's 354 IR on the river Chir.
On the one hand, you know that the division with number 213 was named not Infantry Division, and named Sicherungsdivision.
On the other hand, I know, - due to insistence of comrade Stalin to not waste time on finding-out of trifling problems - that on the river Chir of colonel Rekovsky's unit had 5,0 thousand person, and you did not know it.
From here a question: What knowledge are of great value? Knowledge of the exact name of colonel Rekovsky's unit or knowledge of real battle force of this infantry regiment, extracted Red Army intelligence?

In that sea of a variety of types of divisions which were bred for years of war with German Supreme command, it has got confused thoroughly.
There was no still that it of presence of set of types of divisions in a Wermacht the head at Red Army intelligence was sick.

P.S. We shall necessarily understand with a question on what actually was force XLVIII Pz. Korp on the river Chir from which generals the Balck and von Mellenthin have prevented flood of ocean of hordes Russian.

Qvist · Post by **Qvist** » 09 Mar 2007 22:01

Red Army Supreme commander in chief comrade Stalin was strict with those who wasted time on trifles.
Comrade Stalin demanded from Red Army intelligence will be concentrated on the main thing, namely, to find out the real enemy forces, working before front friendly troops, instead of how the opponent called these forces.
Comrade Stalin demanded from Red Army intelligence to find out about the opponent of data of the following grade:
a/ Exact number of infantry batallions and their distribution on sites of front, and as their presence in a reserve.
b/ Will find out exact number of artillery batteries and their fire power;
c/ To define precisely amount of enemy tanks which could will appear on a battlefield;
Such data define power of a grouping of the opponent. The name of this grouping of the opponent it already affair insignificant, as the name of a grouping it always only a legend and no more that. In each concrete case it is necessary to fill this legend the real contents, namely:
number of infantry batallions, number of artillery batteries and number of tanks.

Yes, well, but we are not Stalin, and the difference between a Sicherungsdivision and an Infantry Division was more than mere nomenclature - security forces were manned and equipped essentially for rear areas duty and anti-partisan operations, were usually staffed with older men and indifferently equipped compared to infantry divisions. They were generally only used in the frontline in emergencies. So if RKKA intelligence did not care to make the distinction, they were doing themselves someting of a disservice. In any event, there is no reason not to use the correct designation here and now.

And, it is necessary to tell directly - comrade Stalin was right.
Today we know, that the name of any unit of a Wermacht in itself did not speak the equal account anything in sense of the validity - both in sense of her number, and in sense to her arms.

He was not right in this instance.

On the other hand, I know, - due to insistence of comrade Stalin to not waste time on finding-out of trifling problems - that on the river Chir of colonel Rekovsky's unit had 5,0 thousand person, and you did not know it.

Well, I am still waiting for you to tell me how you know that. And I am sure you know lots of things I don't, but then, this isn't a trivia competition. The general idea is that by collective effort we try to establish as much as possible, from the sources we variously possess.

From here a question: What knowledge are of great value? Knowledge of the exact name of colonel Rekovsky's unit or knowledge of real battle force of this infantry regiment, extracted Red Army intelligence?

I merely point out that the division was incorrectly identified. If you don't think it is important, I suggest you concede the point so we can get on to other things. The "real battle force" of the regiment certainly is important, but I had rather hoped you had a better source for that than Red Army intelligence, which is in fact a very bad source for that kind of thing.

In that sea of a variety of types of divisions which were bred for years of war with German Supreme command, it has got confused thoroughly.
There was no still that it of presence of set of types of divisions in a Wermacht the head at Red Army intelligence was sick.

Again, the distinction in this case is both simple and significant. 213.Sich.D. differed fundamentally from a Infantry Division, and had also been present on the Eastern Front since the beginning of Barbarossa, so it wasn't exactly a novel surprise. Beyond that of course, there is the point that 354.IR does not appear to have belonged to 213.Sicherungsdivision, but apparently to the 286th.

P.S. We shall necessarily understand with a question on what actually was force XLVIII Pz. Korp on the river Chir from which generals the Balck and von Mellenthin have prevented flood of ocean of hordes Russian.

Well, I suggest we get the facts in place first, and then we can worry about what to think about how Manstein and Mellenthin described the battle.

cheers

Qvist · Post by **Qvist** » 09 Mar 2007 23:03

OK, let's look at status before we lose ourselves too much in detail. We have yet to define two critical things without which the discussion is essentially impossible, namely:

- Exactly what section of the front are we comparing? Alternatively, what operation?
- Which point in time are we referring to?

Despite several queries, Yuri has still not seen fit to define either, so for the time being I am going to to define it as 5TA's attack sector ("southern wing") during the offensive across the Chir against XXXXVIII Pz Corps 2-11 December (which is the operations discussed by Mellenthin and Knobelsdorrff, which seems to have been the starting point for the discussion), and the point for the force comparison as 2 December.

- 62 ID and 294 ID - not less than 20,0 thousand person (before arrival to Chir these divisions have received updating up to full staff, documents with such data have been grasped in 515 IR)

Status: No source quoted, nor any indication of the nature of the source used. Haupt states that most of 294.ID was inside the Stalingrad pocket, uncomfirmed elsewhere. The OKH Tagesmeldungen refer only to a "Regimentsgruppe"of 294.ID during the first days of December. However, the OKH Kriegsgliederungen simply lists 294.ID, and with no indication of any part of it being part of AOK 6.

Both divisions were with ital. 8th Army.

- 22 Pz. D - 5,0 thousand and about 50 tanks (the division had only one motor-infantry a regiment-129 PzGR, and in the previous battles there were serious losses).

Status: No source offered for that so far. 22.PzD was also well to the North of the front scope.

- 354 IR 213 ID - 5,0 thousand (each company of a regiment has received a security, building or police batallion, in essence 354 IR colonel Rekovski has turned to an infantry brigade).

This appears to derive from a Soviet intelligence estimate, which puts the strength estimate severely in doubt. 213.ID was in fact 213.Sicherungsdivision, but it does not appear to have had a 354.Rgt at this time - that formation apparently belonged to 286.Sich.D.. I have no source showing 354.IR on the Chir at this time. Glantz refers to a "Group 354", which was part of Gruppe Spang. Both the identity of this unit and its strength appear at the moment obscure.

- Gr. SPANG - 5,0 thousand (has consisten mainly of security and building batallions);

No source has been quoted for this. The Gruppe is listed in the OKH-Gliederungen, and is mentioned by Glantz as consisting of 619.Sicherungsrgt. and "354 Group".

- Gr. STAHEL - 10,0 thousand (the group has consisten mainly of air-defence regiments, divisional and batallions of ground service of air stations);

Significant detail have been added for this by Yuri, including a TSAMO file reference. It has however not been clarified what is the nature of the source quoted - specifically, if it is a captured GErman document or another Soviet intelligence estimate. There appears to be several problems with the units listed, some of whom do not match existing units and which in part appears to include units who had already been dissolved.

Glantz lists this as consisting of 8.LW-FD, after its arrival on 18 December. Yuri lists it as consisting of units from 8. Air Corps, so it seems possible that one of the two has misinterpreted something.

The OKH-Gliederungen does list the group, calling it "Lw.Kampf-gruppe Stahel" on the 22.12. Gliederung.

If Glantz is correct, then Gr. Stahel is not relevant to the comparison (as 18.LW-Fd had not yet arrived early in the month). If Yuri is correct, the question remains if the strength has been reasonably estimated. From the units listed, I would have to strongly disagree that 10,000 is the lowest possible strength. He lists a Flak Division (which did not in fact exist), 1 Flak regiment (which was subsequently shown to be just a staff) and units of another, 2 Flak batallions, "separate batteries and airborne subdivisions", 2 Bau-bataillone, 1 of whom had been already dissolved, a bridging unit, a railway batallion and "incalculable quantity of combined teams". This is above all extremely vague, and in need of further elucidation. Much though Yuri has already written on the subject, the problem is partly that it still is not clear if this information is deroived from an intelligence assumption or solid documentation and partly that part of the information quoted is wrong or insufficiently understood.

- 8 LFD - 6,0 thousand (the division had only four infantry batallions)

The OKH Tagesmeldungen does not mention this division at all, ythe OKH Gliederung of 22.12. still has it "in antransport", and Glantz states that it arrived on the 18th and formed Gruppe Stahel. Hence, there are possible issues of both arrival time and double counting. No source from Yuri regarding either of these, or the strength estimate.

- Gr. SCHMIDT - 3,5 thousand (has consisten of six batallions)

No source or further explanation. Not listed in 22.12. Gliederung, or in OKH Tagesmeldungen, or in Glantz.

- KG. WEIKE - 1,5 thousand and 18 tanks (has consisten of four batallions and 1-st tank company of 301-st tank batallion)

Ditto.

- KG. SELLE - 1,0 thousand person of an infantry and besides had strong artillery group and tanks.

Ditto.

- 7 LFD - 10,0 thousand (has consisten of two infantry regiments on three batallions in everyone - only six infantry batallions)

No source given for the strength, except the reference to Stolfi which gives a mysteriously high figure (20,000 - way beyond the establishment strength of any LW-FD). Is mentioned as arriving in OKH Tagesmeldungen in early December. Yuri's strength estimate seems plausible to me. Was in the relevant sector from early December, at least in part.

- 336 ID - 15,0 thousand (before arrival to Chir has received updating and as has received on effort of 3-rd heavy air-defence regiment of and 94-th ersatz-batallion)

No source for the strength estimate or for the composition, but may be more or less plausible. Was in the relevant sector from early December.

Gr. STUMPFELD - 8,0 thousand

No source for the strength estimation. According to Glantz, this encompassed a number of rumanian units, and the two Sicherungsdivisionen (213. and 403.). Parts of this command were in the appropriate sector.

Gr. ADAM - 10,0 thousand (was strongest of all battle groups working in region of state farm 79)

No source for the strength estimate. Uncertain if in the relevant sector.

11 Pz. Div - 12,0 thousand has arrived from a reserve.

No source for strength estimation except reference to Stolfi, but strength seems reasonable to me. Present in relevant sector.

9 LFD - 2,0 thousand (to Chir there has arrived only a part of a division, apparently, only one regiment which since December, 9 had the site of front more to the left of positions 7 LFD).

Pure fantasy - 9.LW-FD was with HG Nord, with no indication whatsoever of missing one of its regiments (I happen to have several divisional Ration strengths for December - from AOK 18's report). No mention anywhere of any element of it being on the Don sector.

So, perhaps we can start working from that?

cheers

Yuri · Post by **Yuri** » 09 Mar 2007 23:05

Qvist wrote: Again, the distinction in this case is both simple and significant. 213.Sich.D. differed fundamentally from a Infantry Division, and had also been present on the Eastern Front since the beginning of Barbarossa, so it wasn't exactly a novel surprise. Beyond that of course, there is the point that 354.IR does not appear to have belonged to 213.Sicherungsdivision, but apparently to the 286th.

I need to repeat only earlier told, on that case if me have not understood. Only the name is an empty phrase if is not determined battle force which is generalized in this name .
If battle force is determined, name this force any abbreviation - either 213 ID or 213 S or « GR. 354 » or « Gr. Recovsky », - number of batallions, the number of artillery batteries and number of tanks from it will not be added and to not be lowered.
In Red Army enemy forces on a concrete site of front during each concrete moment defined so: number of batallions used as an infantry, number of artillery batteries and number of tanks.
If you will not name such data it will mean only one - before you there is no opponent.

To be occupied with games in manipulation with names of forces in Red Army it was strictly forbidden.
The method of calculation of forces accepted in Red Army is the most full and, hence, true.
The method of calculation with the help of names which is offered by you, conducts to errors, therefore into my intentions does not enter to use such method.

Polemic takes away a lot of time, and I would like to continue transfer of data on actions on the river Chir. I ask to not count mine temporarily silence as impoliteness. I can continue participation, after distribution of the next portion of the information on battle for state farm " Red Star ".

Qvist · Post by **Qvist** » 09 Mar 2007 23:34

There is no polemics involved, this is much too important to indulge in that and also there is no reason for it. It's just that information must be sourced and put on a footing that enables other participants to relate to it in a meaningful way. As it is, the information you have posted on the German forces so far is for the most part not even a basis for discussion, because we for the most part know nothing about it except that this is how you look at it. You would profit as much as anyone else from putting it on a better footing, and there is much that other posters here could contribute. There is little point in adding further things until you have clarified what you have already posted. And could you please at least see fit to clarify what point in time we are supposed to be discussing here?!

For my part, I would like nothing better than if you had come across solid documentation to enable a tenable estimate of German strengths - this is a chaotic period, with fairly little documentation available. But I would not exercise due caution as a researcher if I took such figures on face value without a much clearer idea of its exact basis. I hope you understand that.

I agree with you that there is no reason to get hung op on questions of pure terminology. However, as I have tried to explain, the difference between a Sicherungsdivision and an Infanteriedivision is not a question of terminology, but of substance. Compared to an Infanteriedivision, a Sich.D. was badly armed, consisted of inferior manpower and had a low strength. I find it difficult to believe that RKKA intelligence did not care about this distinction, and if they didn't care about it then they did not do a good job. And you are still missing the main point, which is that IR354 does not appear to have been a part of this division at all, and hence that there is a fundamental misidentification involved. That is not "polemics", that is a serious indication that there may be problems with your sources which you'd do well to take seriously.

Anyway, all in your own good time, of course.

cheers

mars · Post by **mars** » 10 Mar 2007 00:09

guys, how about let Yuri finish his article then we begin our discussion ?