Battle of Sovkhoz «Red Star» (Sovkhoz 79)

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ATH
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Post by ATH » 10 Mar 2007 04:08

So, the following divisions should hold front of defense by current of the rivers Krivaja (Curve) and Chir.
A) A mobile troops:
- Tank units: one tank corps, two tank brigades, two separate flamethrower tank batallions - 1TC, 8 GSTBr, 216 TBr, 510 and 511 SFTB;
- Cavalry units: two Cavalry Corpses - 3 GCC and 8 CC;
- Motorcycle units: one motorcycle regiment - 8 SMcR
B) A rifle troops:
- Eleven rifle divisions - 14-n Guards, 159-n, 47-n Guards, 50-n Guards, 346-n, 40-n Guards, 321-n, 119-n, 333-n, 4-n Guards, 258-n rifle divisions.

In total in these Rifle Divisions, Tank Corps, Tank Brigades and Battalions, Cavalry Corpses and motorcycle regiment was present 94,0 thousand person with which it was necessary to close front of defense on the rivers Chir and Krivaja (Curve) in the extent more than 186 kms.
The distance is measured on a map of scale 1 : 200 000 (1 sm - 2 kms) from the north on the south on direct lines on sites river Krivaja (Curve): Jagodnyj (Berry) - Bokovskaja and sites river Chir: Bokovskaja - Varlamov - Oblivskaja - Surovikino - Rychkovskij
The front on the river Krivaja and river Chir was held with the following German divisions, regiments and battle groups (under the order from the north on the south):
- 62 ID and 294 ID - not less than 20,0 thousand person (before arrival to Chir these divisions have received updating up to full staff, documents with such data have been grasped in 515 IR)
- 22 Pz. D - 5,0 thousand and about 50 tanks (the division had only one motor-infantry a regiment-129 PzGR, and in the previous battles there were serious losses).
- 354 IR 213 ID - 5,0 thousand (each company of a regiment has received a security, building or police batallion, in essence 354 IR colonel Rekovski has turned to an infantry brigade).
- Gr. SPANG - 5,0 thousand (has consisten mainly of security and building batallions);
- Gr. STAHEL - 10,0 thousand (the group has consisten mainly of air-defence regiments, divisional and batallions of ground service of air stations);
- 8 LFD - 6,0 thousand (the division had only four infantry batallions)
- Gr. SCHMIDT - 3,5 thousand (has consisten of six batallions)
- KG. WEIKE - 1,5 thousand and 18 tanks (has consisten of four batallions and 1-st tank company of 301-st tank batallion)
- KG. SELLE - 1,0 thousand person of an infantry and besides had strong artillery group and tanks.
- 7 LFD - 10,0 thousand (has consisten of two infantry regiments on three batallions in everyone - only six infantry batallions)
- 336 ID - 15,0 thousand (before arrival to Chir has received updating and as has received on effort of 3-rd heavy air-defence regiment of and 94-th ersatz-batallion)
Gr. STUMPFELD - 8,0 thousand
Gr. ADAM - 10,0 thousand (was strongest of all battle groups working in region of state farm 79)
11 Pz. Div - 12,0 thousand has arrived from a reserve.
9 LFD - 2,0 thousand (to Chir there has arrived only a part of a division, apparently, only one regiment which since December, 9 had the site of front more to the left of positions 7 LFD).

In total, thus, in German divisions, regiments and the battle groups working on Chir front, there was not less than 112,0 thousand person.
The aggregate number of the Romanian and German battle troops concentrated to the beginning of December, 1942 on the rivers Krivaja and Chir (from Jagodnyj (Berry) in the north up to Rychkovskij in the south), made 172,0 thousand person.
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Qvist
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Post by Qvist » 10 Mar 2007 08:57

Is there a point here ATH?

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Yuri
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Post by Yuri » 10 Mar 2007 14:49

Substantiation of number of the Germans who have arrived at the end of November in structure of divisions XVII AK (62 and 294 ID) on a boundary of the rivers the Krivaja (Curve) and Chir in region Bokovskaja.

(File 24, S. 176)
Regular, battle and numerical structure of a German and Romanian divisions /infantry/

German ID:

1. Human structure - 14.742
2. Rifles, carbines - 7.400
3. Pistols – 2.877
4. Pistols - machine guns - 705
5. Manual machine guns - 454
6. Heavy machine guns - 112
7. Anti-tank rifles - 90
8. Mortars of 50 and 81 mm - 141
9. 37 mm of guns - 75
10. Artillery pieces and howitzers - 74

Romanian ID

1. Staff - 17.715
2. Rifles - 13.833
3. Revolvers – 2.979
4. Manual machine guns - 384
5. Heavy machine guns - 188
6. Mortars - 60 mm - 54
7. Mortars of 81,4 mm - 18
8. Anti-tank guns of 37 mm - 18
9. - " - 47 mm - 36
10. Easy guns - 48
11. Easy howitzers - 24

The note: the Data on the organization both battle and numerical structure Italian ID I have no.

THE CHIEF OF THE INTELLIGENCE SECTION 5 TA
The major / FOMIN/

27/11/1942 near settlement Dulinskij (2 kms to the east Bokovskaja) scouts 5 TA have killed the German officer from which corpse documents of an army headquarters 515 IR 294 ID have been taken away. Among these documents of the sheet with the data on level of equipment of infantry battalions as of November, 5 and the sheet distribution of staff to November, 21.
From documents follows, that as of November, 5, 1942 infantry companies and battalions have been made up more than on 2/3 from TO&E.

For example, level of equipment of soldiers and corporals in 3/515 IR 294 ID for November, 5 are characterized by the following figures:
(Source: file 24, s. 141)
Officers --
Corporals - 42 persons
The soldier - 364 person
Shortage - 184 persons
Simple calculation gives the following figures on soldiers and corporals.
TO&E = 590 person
Actual force = 406 person
Shortage = 184 persons or 31,2 % from TO&E.

Calculation of the data on 294 ID.
TO&E = 14,742
Shortage from TO&E 31,2 % = 4,598
Actual force on 5/11/1942 = 10,144

From documents for later dates it is visible, that expected updating has not arrived in 294 ID down to 21/11/1942 years.
For later period of data on level of equipment of battalions is not present.
The division has entered battle on November, 26, 1942 in region Bokovskaja.
Soldiers from 294 ID taken in a captivity gave data that the division has received updating some days prior to entry into combat., for example, that has shown captured to the north Kruzhnoj, ASMAN BERGORD - sergeant-major the same 515 IR 294 ID.
(file 24, s. 152 revers)
«515th regiment now with its full complement, is a little days back received updating. In each company there are 2 mortars - calibre of 50-80 mm. In a division there are heavy 100 and 150 mm of a gun ».
As follows from indications captured, in region Bokovskaja the Germans who have arrived on updating went as and to the Romanian infantry divisions. Each Romanian company included one platoon of Germans. It was done for increase in resistance of the Romanian subdivisions.
So, for example, together with German 294 ID in approach to Perelazovskij since a boundary of the river the Curve participated Romanian 7 ID in which were available German a platoon.
(file 24 s. 152 revers)
POW the Romanian soldier grasped 27/11/42 in ASTAKHOV (to the north Bokovskaja - Yuri), has shown: belongs to a prospecting battalion 7 ID /rum/. The division will consist from 14, 16, 37 IR and 51 AR.
18-19/11/1942 it has been it has been taken off from defense /RYBNYJ - SREDNIJ GROMOV/ and it is removed in a reserve.
23/11/1942 has replenished with Germans at the rate of a platoon on a company the Romanian and 26/11 it has been thrown in battle.
This implies, that to region Bokovskaja there has arrived for updating such amount of Germans which has sufficed not only for filling vacancies in 294 ID, but also there was yet not less than 1000 person which have used for strengthening resistance Romanian 7 ID.
In a division of 42 companies (3 regiments on 14 companies). A platoon from 25 up to 40 person. Total we have 25 x 42 > 1000 Germans in the Romanian division.
Proceeding from the aforesaid, it is necessary to recognize, that on a boundary of the rivers Chirs and the Curve at the end of November, 1942 has arrived in structure of XVII AK (62 and 294 ID) not less (I emphasize once again, not less) than 20,0 thousand Germans.
If to accept (and it it is lawful), that by analogy with 7 ID other Romanian divisions became stronger also the general number of Germans arrived in structure of XVII AK was not less than 25,0 thousand.
Already by the end of November German divisions XVII AK had serious losses.
So under indications captured from 174 IR, 185 IR, 190 IR and 162 AR 62 ID the heaviest losses to 29/11/1942 had 190 IR 62 ID - within several days of intensive battles this regiment has lost on the river Krivaja (Curve) up to 50 % of staff. (file 24. s. 143).
Taking into account the amendment that POWs losses in units are inclined to exaggerate, we receive a situation with number of Germans on a site XVII AK which has specified earlier - 20,0 thousand.

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Post by Jan-Hendrik » 10 Mar 2007 15:01

So we have on the hand : much specultation on the basis of some fragments (regarding the strenght data), but no vital evidences for the number provided in total ....

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Qvist
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Post by Qvist » 10 Mar 2007 17:35

Substantiation of number of the Germans who have arrived at the end of November in structure of divisions XVII AK (62 and 294 ID) on a boundary of the rivers the Krivaja (Curve) and Chir in region Bokovskaja.

(File 24, S. 176)

Quote:

Regular, battle and numerical structure of a German and Romanian divisions /infantry/

German ID:

1. Human structure - 14.742
2. Rifles, carbines - 7.400
3. Pistols – 2.877
4. Pistols - machine guns - 705
5. Manual machine guns - 454
6. Heavy machine guns - 112
7. Anti-tank rifles - 90
8. Mortars of 50 and 81 mm - 141
9. 37 mm of guns - 75
10. Artillery pieces and howitzers - 74

Romanian ID

1. Staff - 17.715
2. Rifles - 13.833
3. Revolvers – 2.979
4. Manual machine guns - 384
5. Heavy machine guns - 188
6. Mortars - 60 mm - 54
7. Mortars of 81,4 mm - 18
8. Anti-tank guns of 37 mm - 18
9. - " - 47 mm - 36
10. Easy guns - 48
11. Easy howitzers - 24

The note: the Data on the organization both battle and numerical structure Italian ID I have no.

THE CHIEF OF THE INTELLIGENCE SECTION 5 TA
The major / FOMIN/
1. This is a Soviet intelligence estimate. That is not a piece of factual basis, except for what RKKA intelligence thought German strength were.
2. Which divisions are bieng referred to here anyway?
Simple calculation gives the following figures on soldiers and corporals.
TO&E = 590 person
Actual force = 406 person
Shortage = 184 persons or 31,2 % from TO&E.

Calculation of the data on 294 ID.
TO&E = 14,742
Shortage from TO&E 31,2 % = 4,598
Actual force on 5/11/1942 = 10,144
Whoawhoawhoa! Hold it right there! :) That a given batallion from 294.ID has a given Fehl says nothing at all about the rest of the division - you can't extrapolate from the state of a single unit to that of the whole division. It could be that other units of the division were in much better shape, or in much worse shape, so this is simply a fundamental methodological error. The only thing this tells you anything about is the condition of III/ IR 515. If, that is, the captured document has been correctly understood - 590 men seems a somewhat low TOE strength for a batallion. And anyway, Fehl is not such a straightforward entity. If for instance some parts of the unit was not present, they might or might not be included in the calculatory basis. If companies had been temporarily amalgamated, which regularly happened, Fehl might be calculated according to the original Sollstärke or according to Notetat - ie, the temporarily reduced one.
27/11/1942 near settlement Dulinskij (2 kms to the east Bokovskaja) scouts 5 TA have killed the German officer from which corpse documents of an army headquarters 515 IR 294 ID have been taken away. Among these documents of the sheet with the data on level of equipment of infantry battalions as of November, 5 and the sheet distribution of staff to November, 21.
From documents follows, that as of November, 5, 1942 infantry companies and battalions have been made up more than on 2/3 from TO&E.
Also, you cannot extrapolate from the state of the rifle companies or infantry batallion to the overall state of the division, because infantry units took most of the losses, and were usually considerably more understrength than other parts of the division. But anyway, if this document gives strength figures for the division, why is it neccessary to make any such calculations? What strength figure is given?
POW the Romanian soldier grasped 27/11/42 in ASTAKHOV (to the north Bokovskaja - Yuri), has shown: belongs to a prospecting battalion 7 ID /rum/. The division will consist from 14, 16, 37 IR and 51 AR.
18-19/11/1942 it has been it has been taken off from defense /RYBNYJ - SREDNIJ GROMOV/ and it is removed in a reserve.
23/11/1942 has replenished with Germans at the rate of a platoon on a company the Romanian and 26/11 it has been thrown in battle.


This implies, that to region Bokovskaja there has arrived for updating such amount of Germans which has sufficed not only for filling vacancies in 294 ID, but also there was yet not less than 1000 person which have used for strengthening resistance Romanian 7 ID.
This, again, is just an intelligence estimation which may or may not be more or less correct.
n a division of 42 companies (3 regiments on 14 companies). A platoon from 25 up to 40 person. Total we have 25 x 42 > 1000 Germans in the Romanian division.
Proceeding from the aforesaid, it is necessary to recognize, that on a boundary of the rivers Chirs and the Curve at the end of November, 1942 has arrived in structure of XVII AK (62 and 294 ID) not less (I emphasize once again, not less) than 20,0 thousand Germans.
That may have been so, but the point is that you have absolutely no sort of basis for that conclusion.
If to accept (and it it is lawful), that by analogy with 7 ID other Romanian divisions became stronger also the general number of Germans arrived in structure of XVII AK was not less than 25,0 thousand.
By analogy?! What analogy would that be?
Already by the end of November German divisions XVII AK had serious losses.
So under indications captured from 174 IR, 185 IR, 190 IR and 162 AR 62 ID the heaviest losses to 29/11/1942 had 190 IR 62 ID - within several days of intensive battles this regiment has lost on the river Krivaja (Curve) up to 50 % of staff. (file 24. s. 143).
Well, this is again an intelligence estimation, even if it is based partially on captured documents. What does 50% mean in this context? 50% of what they had on a (unspecified) previous date? Losses that brought them down to 50% of TOE strength?
Taking into account the amendment that POWs losses in units are inclined to exaggerate, we receive a situation with number of Germans on a site XVII AK which has specified earlier - 20,0 thousand.
So, the basis isn't actually just captured documents but also reported captured? How exactly do you take that into account? According to what criteria?

Look - I am not trying to be difficult. But what you have here is, in effect, nothing - this is how demanding it is to work with documents. If you want to establish German strengths, then you need something much better and much more reliable than intelligence estimates from the opposition. You need, in short, German documentation. I do not wish to be discouraging, but even if you work systematically with German documentation, it is no easy task to find good sources for just the strengths you need for the just the period you're looking at. I work with the German documentation same as you do with the Soviet, and you can find lots of the same sort of thing you've quoted here for the Red Army - 1C (intelligence) officers reported two or three times a day on every level, and just like the examples you've quoted here, they worked on the basis of captured documents and interrogated prisoners, among other things. But I would never attempt to build a picture of RKKA strength on such a basis alone. You just can't gauge the accuracy, and you certainly cannot take it for granted. What you do occasionally come across is captured documents that are reproduced in facsimile and translated directly. That is a much more interesting type of source - have you come across any such?

cheers

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Yuri
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Post by Yuri » 10 Mar 2007 21:02

Qvist wrote: Whoawhoawhoa! Hold it right there! :) That a given batallion from 294.ID has a given Fehl says nothing at all about the rest of the division - you can't extrapolate from the state of a single unit to that of the whole division. It could be that other units of the division were in much better shape, or in much worse shape, so this is simply a fundamental methodological error. The only thing this tells you anything about is the condition of III/ IR 515. If, that is, the captured document has been correctly understood - 590 men seems a somewhat low TOE strength for a batallion. And anyway, Fehl is not such a straightforward entity.
If for instance some parts of the unit was not present, they might or might not be included in the calculatory basis. If companies had been temporarily amalgamated, which regularly happened, Fehl might be calculated according to the original Sollstärke or according to Notetat - ie, the temporarily reduced one.
I think it's enought to use "if" meaning in our negotiation, please be specific.
My offer remains former, namely, to use digital base. Naked the theory in concrete situations does not work and results in error. Of it convinces an example with 354 IR 213 ID.

If you do not accept a level of a regiment and a level of a battalion can give data on companies 515 IR 294 ID.
Give, please, (if, certainly, can) the concrete data on the location and amount infantry companies 515th infantry regiment 294th infantry division, and as about degrees of level of equipment and movement in these companies of people and arms for the period of stay of this regiment of a Wermacht in region Bokovskaja - that is, for the period from November till December 1942.
In this case I can compare the data given by you to what were extracted with investigation of Red Army, for example, about level of equipment people and about presence of arms in 9-th company 515 IR 294 ID.
Thus to me it is absolutely indifferent what method you will take advantage for reception of the data. To me the method of calculation is indifferent, the final figure is necessary for me.
I need to know:

a/ Date;
b/ A place;
c/ Presence of people in 9-th company 515 IR;
d/ Presence of arms in 9-th company 515 IR.

If to you on what that to the reasons is inconvenient to carry out calculation for 9-th company take 1-th or 6-th or 8-th, can take a company of the heavy weapon (or as she there at you refers to). More shortly, take any company 515 IR.
If for you it is convenient to use a level of a platoon give the data on a concrete platoon.
The main thing that the base was digital.
Without concrete figures your criticism, alas, much to our regret, is not convincing.

And still. On yours reasonings can be assumed, that you did not serve in army and do not know one thing which know in all armies of any country in the world.
If my assumption is true, I can tell the following - Feldwebel knows about a state of affairs in units better any chief of an army headquarters (if I am not mistaken, in a Wermacht it is called 1a)!
That is why data have been chosen from all possible variants informed Feldwebel 515 ID - ASMAN BERGORD.

And if Feldwebel has told, that 515 IR has received updating before the beginning of battle so it and was even if about it there is no record on a paper. Not without reason Feldwebel in French - adjudant-chef.

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Post by Qvist » 10 Mar 2007 21:41

I think it's enought to use "if" meaning in our negotiation, please be specific.
My offer remains former, namely, to use digital base. Naked the theory in concrete situations does not work and results in error. Of it convinces an example with 354 IR 213 ID.
I'm sorry, but I do not understand what you are trying to say here.
If you do not accept a level of a regiment and a level of a battalion can give data on companies 515 IR 294 ID.
Fine - if you have strength figures for IR515 quoted directly from a German report in a way that is clear, then you have a good basis for the strength of IR515 at that time, and yes, I'd be quite interested to hear those. However, that does not put you in a position to assess the rest of the division.
Give, please, (if, certainly, can) the concrete data on the location and amount infantry companies 515th infantry regiment 294th infantry division, and as about degrees of level of equipment and movement in these companies of people and arms for the period of stay of this regiment of a Wermacht in region Bokovskaja - that is, for the period from November till December 1942.
If I had that, I would already have quoted them.
In this case I can compare the data given by you to what were extracted with investigation of Red Army, for example, about level of equipment people and about presence of arms in 9-th company 515 IR 294 ID.
What are you talking about? I have not given any data, for the simple reason that I don't have any. The point is that RKKA intelligence's estimation of 9th Company 515 IR is a) an intelligence estimate and b) no relevant source for extrapolating the strength of the whole divisin from. If they directly quote a captured German document, then that is interesting. But it is the document they have that is the point, not their assessment - at least if the object is to find out what the strength of 9/515 was.
Thus to me it is absolutely indifferent what method you will take advantage for reception of the data. To me the method of calculation is indifferent, the final figure is necessary for me.
:roll: I really don't know how much clearer I can make this. The method is the whole point, because that is what ensures you have a figure that has something to do with reality, as opposed to just a figure. "Method of calculation is indifferent"!? If you don't care about the method, I can give you any figure you want, for anything whatsoever.
If to you on what that to the reasons is inconvenient to carry out calculation for 9-th company take 1-th or 6-th or 8-th, can take a company of the heavy weapon (or as she there at you refers to). More shortly, take any company 515 IR.
If for you it is convenient to use a level of a platoon give the data on a concrete platoon.
The main thing that the base was digital.
Without concrete figures your criticism, alas, much to our regret, is not convincing.
Okay. Three deep breaths. Now look, I am trying to help you here. I find it hard to believe that you can really be so monumentally stupid that you actually think that because you have some figures, they are reliable and accurate as long as someone can't give you better figures.
And still. On yours reasonings can be assumed, that you did not serve in army and do not know one thing which know in all armies of any country in the world.
If my assumption is true, I can tell the following - Feldwebel knows about a state of affairs in units better any chief of an army headquarters (if I am not mistaken, in a Wermacht it is called 1a)!
Tell me that you are joking. Oh, please do.
And if Feldwebel has told, that 515 IR has received updating before the beginning of battle so it and was even if about it there is no record on a paper. Not without reason Feldwebel in French - adjudant-chef.
Sure. Any Feldwebel is of course bound to know in detail the exact size and composition of his regiment and any replacement transport that arrived to it. It's inbuilt in their genes. And not least, any captured Feldwebel always and without exception gives full and accurate information to his captors.

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Post by Yuri » 11 Mar 2007 14:36

Before finally defining borders within the limits of which there was a battle on the river Chir and as for definition of the periods of this battle, it is necessary to make a pair important, in my opinion, remarks.

Necessity for these remarks is caused by that descriptions of battle existing up to today on the river Chir has the big distortions. And, any sort of distortions suffices from different directions. Russian (Soviet) side here is not exception though this statement can seem paradoxical as the victory over battles on the river Chir has remained behind Red Army.

Two examples in this occasion.
In official «The History of the second world war. 1939-1945 » (v.6. Voenizdat, M., 1976, p.64) it is told, that the village Nizhne-Chirskaja has been freed, ostensibly, on December, 14, 1942 in result, ostensibly, tank attack 7th TC.
«Then to distract a part of forces of a shock grouping of the opponent, commanding front has commanded to 5-th Shock Army to proceed in approach to Nizhne-Chirskaja and to beat out from bridgehead a German troops. On December, 14 connections of this army have broken through enemy defense, have seized Nizhne-Chirskaja and, have dumped the enemy from bridgehead, have reliably provided the right flank of 51-st army. In these battles connections of the general P.A. Rotmistrov’s 7-th tank corps of successfully operated».

The same is asserted also with the encyclopedia «Velikaja Otechestvennaja vojna. 1941-1945 » let out after nine years in 1985. However on December, 14 Nizhne-Chirskaja nobody freed a village, the given description the cleanest imagination. Actually the village Nizhne-Chirskaja has been freed last day 1942, that is on December, 31. The one who has written date on December, 14, did not understand value of this settlement in system of battles on the bottom Chir.

Besides the indication of incorrect date of clearing of a village Nizhne-Chirskaja distorts representation about a course of operations in region of Stalingrad during carrying out by group of army " Don " (field marshal a von the Manstein) operations «The Winter thunder-storm».

The same editions (v. 6 and the encyclopedia) contain a color map on which position of the sides as of 31.12.1942 is shown. Here an error that the front line put on a map is displaced to the west more than on 50 km from that place where the front passed actually.

These examples show, that composers of the Soviet official version of a history or have not wished or have not wanted to restore a true course of development of events.

It is possible to guess the reasons of occurrence of such gross blunders only.

It seems to me, that in part the answer contain that has set up ART about stages of creation 5th SA and her order of battle. Probably, I am mistaken, however to that has informed ART, it is visible, that he had no opportunity to read initial documents of army headquarters of armies, corpses and divisions.

Apparently, and composers of the Soviet official version of a history of war have not used initial documents, and read only the secondary documents made in army headquarters of fronts and armies on results of operations, so-called «Reports on a conduct of an operation».
After perusal of initial documents I had an opportunity to familiarize with some from such secondary documents. As a rule, these documents were made some months later after end of these operations. For this time position on fronts varied most significally - and new cares did not allow will be concentrated on that that was behind. Varied commanding and chiefs of army headquarters. Behind prescription of time and consequently, that operation in region of Stalingrad were completed by large success of Red Army, there was no rigid requirement to accuracy of a statement of the facts.

There is no doubt that "The Report on operation " is necessary for studying. There, as a rule, great volume authentic, and frequently very interesting information. However, it is necessary to understand always that these documents do not reflect the valid course of development which can be seen only in initial documents.

Coming back to 5th SA I shall tell, that the army headquarters of this army has taken up management of a troops passing from 5th TA only on December, 14.
Only after it has been liquidated attempt XLVIII Pz. Korp (the von Knobelsdorff and the von Mellenthin) to dump Russian from bridgehead in region Ostrovskij and to grasp a line of the railway Morozovskaja - Stalingrad on a site Surovikino - the bridge through the river Don near Rychkovskij. Only after that and when these objects - the railway bridge through Don and Rychkovskij have been grasped, - only then the army headquarters 5th SA has undertaken management 3 GCC, 4 GRD and 258 RD.
Here the important value has the following circumstance. Transfer under command 5th SA 3GCC, 4GRD and 258RD, working on the left flank 5th TA (mainly in a corner formed by merge of currents of the rivers Chirs and Don), has resulted in paradoxical effect - a number of troops of Red Army working against divisions XLVIII Pz. Korp (the von Knobelsdorff and the von Mellenthin) it was reduced. And it can be be found out only from initial sources. But about it it will be told later.

The second source of information which composers of the Soviet and Russian official histories of war used are memoirs of former commanders. And it, as is known, the most unreliable source. All references to memoirs, and it is equal also the historical clauses{articles} based on memoirs of commanders, follows at once if not to ignore, to put under the big doubt.
Very remarkable words in this occasion were made in 1989 far already by the military historian from GDR the colonel of National army of GDR (NVA) von Witzleben (by the way, he the nephew of that Generalfeldmarschall Erwin von Witzleben):
«In works of concerning events Great Patriotic War, it is necessary to base on genuine archival documents, first of all. Memoirs the literature can be used only as help, and that is desirable for search of authentic documents».
(Litvin G. A. I was air rifleman. Semfiropl: Tavrija, 1990. p11)

Only for one these gold words an image the colonel von Witzleben, in my opinion, should be perpetuated in bronze, and the monument to the colonel should stand opposite to a gate of military - historical faculty.

And here there is such collision. Owing to the above, my messages on a course of battle for state farm «Red Star» (based as it is told, on primary sources) will contradict those data which contain in official Soviet both Russian military - historical works and encyclopedias.
I will contradict the information as also to that inform in the memoirs:
1/commander 7th TC general Rotmistrov.
2/commanding 1-st Guards army general Leljushenko (on the river Chir 1-n the Guards army was it is cut on two Guards armies and Leljushenko began commanding 3-rd Guards army).


Further it will be necessary to tell a little concerning my contradictions with German sources. It, probably, will allow to take off some questions or objections.
As my information will contradict and with messages from these sources.

The request. It is desirable to have the maps No 17 and No 18 of the book Hans Dyorr « the Campaign to Stalingrad. The operative review » in English, at me is only Russian, and translation takes away a lot of time. Who could specify such maps?

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Post by Qvist » 11 Mar 2007 18:54

Apparently, and composers of the Soviet official version of a history of war have not used initial documents, and read only the secondary documents made in army headquarters of fronts and armies on results of operations, so-called «Reports on a conduct of an operation».
After perusal of initial documents I had an opportunity to familiarize with some from such secondary documents. As a rule, these documents were made some months later after end of these operations. For this time position on fronts varied most significally - and new cares did not allow will be concentrated on that that was behind. Varied commanding and chiefs of army headquarters. Behind prescription of time and consequently, that operation in region of Stalingrad were completed by large success of Red Army, there was no rigid requirement to accuracy of a statement of the facts.

There is no doubt that "The Report on operation " is necessary for studying. There, as a rule, great volume authentic, and frequently very interesting information. However, it is necessary to understand always that these documents do not reflect the valid course of development which can be seen only in initial documents.
Very interesting. And indeed, the same can be said for your post as a whole. I look forward to the continuation.

Concerning 5SA, and what Glantz writes on that point (ie, that it was ordered to join 5TA in its attacks from 11 December), that is referenced to Rokossovskij p. 307-309. IF 5SA did not receive forces from 5TA this early, is it possible that it received forces from elsewhere? For example from 51st Army, or from Stavka reserve?
Further it will be necessary to tell a little concerning my contradictions with German sources. It, probably, will allow to take off some questions or objections.
As my information will contradict and with messages from these sources.


I do not know exactly what you have in mind with this, but the general point here would be that information on things like German force composition, strength and losses can only be reliably found in German documentation, just like information on RKKA force composition, strength and losses can only reliably be found in Soviet documentation.

cheers

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Post by Qvist » 12 Mar 2007 16:08

As a small contribution, relevant parts from the OKH Tagesmeldungen 30 November - 1.December. Not much I'm afraid, and I have only bits and pieces of the following days. Didn't know at the time I'd need them. Source, BA-MA RW4/101. Should however the discussion ever proceed to January 1943, I have a good deal of information on AA Hollidt, including exhaustive data on replacements.


30 November

Rum. 3.Armee:

Strong enemy attacks against the Chir line and Ssurowikino area were repulsed in heavy fighting. 1 Local enemy brekathrough SE of Ssurowikino were cordoned off ("Abgeriegeld").

AG (Which at this time stands for Angriffsgruppe, not Armeegruppe) Hollidt: XXXXVIII Pz.Korps extended its left flank in the direction of Tschistjakowka. On the rest of its front, no notable combat actions.
rum. I AK: Attack of 11.rum.ID against the enemy bridgehead N of Nishnoje Gerbatowo gained only little ground.

Transport: Further transports 11.PzD and 336.ID arrived. 1 Rgt-Gruppe of 294.ID in the area SW of Bokowskaja, directly subordinated to Angriffsgruppe Hollidt.

Changes in command: 11.PzD, 336. ID directly under HGr Don upon arrival

1 December

Rum. 3.Armee:

Enemy attacks against the Chir front in the Rytschkoff-Ssurowikino-Obliwakanja sector were repulsed, save for a break-in around the S-bend of the Chir by Ostrowskij. The penetration was cordoned off. No report yet available concerning enemy attack at Karaitschoff.

Gr. Hollidt:

Tschistjakowa was recaptured, enemy thrown back across the Chir.

Transports: Transport of 11.Pz, 336.ID proceeding according to plan

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Post by Yuri » 12 Mar 2007 21:56

The list of armies, corpses and the divisions working to Chir front in November and first half December, 1942.

RED ARMY

1-st Guards army - general - lieutenant Leljushenko

203 RD - colonel Zdanovich G.S. - (operated to the west of river Krivaja - on the circuit it is not shown)
197 RD - general - major Zaporozhchenko M.I. - (operated to the west of river Krivaja and on northern coast of Don - on the circuit it is not shown)
14 GRD - general - major Grjaznov
--------------------------------------------------
Generals - lieutenants - 1
Generals - majors - 2
Colonels - 1
In total - 4

5 TA - general - lieutenant P.L.Romanenko (a frontage of 186 kms)

159 RD - colonel Anashkin M.B.
50 GRD - general - major Belov A.I.
47 GRD - general - major Fokanov J.S.
346 RD - general - major Stankevskij D.I.
8 CC - general - major Borisov M. D.
- 112 MCD - general - major Shajmuratov M. M.
- 21 MCD - general - major Yakunin N.P.
- 55 MCD - colonel Chalenko I.T.
40 GRD - general - major Pasterevich A.I.
321 RD - general - major Makarenko A.I.
119 RD - colonel Danilov M. M.
333 RD - colonel Zherebin D.S. (till 26.11 - Matveev M.I.)
1 TC - general - major Butkov V.V.
3 GCC - general major Pliev I.A.
- 6 GCD - colonel Belogorodskij A.I.
- 5 GCD - colonel Chepurkin N.S.
- 32 CDs - colonel Chudesov A.F.
4 GRD - general - major Lilenkov G.P.
258 RD - colonel Fursin I.J.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
General-lieutenants - 1
General-majors - 11
Colonels - 8
In total - 20

GLOBAL RED ARMY
General-lieutenants - 2
General-majors - 13
Colonels – 9
================
Generals - 15
Colonels - 9


The list commanders of armies, corpses and divisions
AXIS

+++ AA «Hollidt» - General der InfanterieHollidt

++ rum. I ÀÊ - Lieutenant General Ionescu
+- rum. 7ID - Brigadier General Trestioreanu
+- rum. 11ID – Brigadier General Nedelea
+ rum. 9ID - Major General Panaitiu

+++ XVII AK - General der Infanterie von Choltitz
+ 62 ID - Generalmajor Richard-Heinrich von Reuss
++ 294 ID - Lieutenant General Block +

++ rum. II ÀÊ - Lieutenant General Nicolae Dascalescu
+ Êîìàíäèð rum. 14ID - Major General Stavrescu
+- rum. 7CD - Brigadier General Munteanu
+ rum. 1AD - Major General Radu Gherghe
++ 22 Pz.Div - Generalleutnant Eberhard Rodt
- 354 IR 213 ID – colonel Recovsky

++++ rum 3. A - General Petre Dumitrescu

++ rum. V – Lieutenant General Aurelian Son
++ Gr. «Spang» - Generalleutnant Willibald Spang
++ Gr. «Stachel» - Generalleutnant Stahel
- 8 Lw-FD – colonel Heidemeyer
units 9 Lw-FD – ?

++++ 4 Pz.A – ãåíåðàë-ïîëêîâíèê Hoth

++ XLVIII - Lieutenant General von Knobelsdorff
- Gr. «Schmidt» - colonel Schmidt
- Gr. «Selle» - colonel Herbert Selle
+ 7 Lw-FD – Generalmajor von Biedermann
+ Gr. «Stumpfeld» - Generalmajor Stumpfeld
++ 336 ID – Generalleutnant Lucht
+ 11 Pz.Div – Generalmajor Balck (Strip of actions of 25 kms)
- Gr. «ADAM» - colonel Adam (Generalleutnant Eccard Freiherr von Gablenz )

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

GLOBAL AXIS
General – 2
General Infantry – 2
General Lieutenant – 9
General Major – 7
Brigadier General – 3
Colonel – 5
=====================
Generals - 23
Colonels - 5


From here it is visible, what huge break in levels of responsibility commanding 5 TA the general - lieutenant the Romanenko and the commander 11 Pz. Div general Balck. It is visible that to compare actions of these two generals as it is done in article by the American professor of military history Stolfi, it is absolutely impossible.

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Post by Qvist » 13 Mar 2007 00:03

units 9 Lw-FD – ?
No. For the fourth time, 9.LW-FD was with AOK 18, Heeresgruppe Nord.
- 8 Lw-FD – colonel Heidemeyer
Had by all accounts not yet arrived at the Chir by mid-December
- 354 IR 213 ID – colonel Recovsky
There was no 213.ID, and 213.Sich.D. DID NOT HAVE AN IR 354.Are you planning to just go on ignoring these points?

Apart from the impossibility of relating to an OOB for no specific point but "the period mid-November to mid-December", several of the divisions you list under AA Hollidt generally belonged to ital.AOK 8.
corpses
Just a little linguistic detail, but "corpses" mean "dead bodies". The plural of "Corps" is "Corps".

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Post by Abel Ravasz » 13 Mar 2007 23:15

Gentlemen,

perhaps a little bit of mutual empathy could remove some of the conflicts here.

(1) 294. Inf Div was outside of the pocket – Pi Bn 294 was the only part inside. It was fully posted to the Chir by 25/11 and operated with one detached regimental group, also on the Chir.

(2) 213. Sich Div was deployed behind the frontline and had GR 354 and GR 318 (plus III./Pol Reg 6 and Kos Abt 213). Both were Grenadier regiments, therefore, the division was very often referred to (in German documents!) as 213. Grenadier Division. GR 354 was a reserve behind Morozovsk and sent to the frontline very soon after Uranus. GR 318 was during 12/42 moved to the frontline between the Ravenna and Cosseria Divisions.

(3) 8. Lw Feld Div arrived at the frontline around 10/12/42. It is not the same as Gruppe Stahel – elements fought under Stahel but the two were distinct and different!

(4) Elements of 9. Flak Div (and not Lw Feld Div) were at the Chir – Flak Abt 774. As a sidenote, Stab/Flak Reg 99, g.Flak Abt 236 and l.Flak Abt 723 were all present at Oblivskaja.

(5) Gruppe Adam, Gruppe Heilmann, Gruppe Stumpfeld (incorporating KGs Schmidt, Selle, Wandke, Stumpfeld), Gruppe Spang and Gruppe Stahel were the main ad-hoc units on the Chir, and all are clearly distinct in composition from the other (fresh!) units on the Chir.

(6) At least in 1/43, Gruppe Spang had Stab SR 610 and Gruppe GR 354 but these staffs were beefed up with may security battalions (III./GR 360, II./SR 602, elements of 62. ID, alarm units etc). And yes, there was a GR 354 at the time.

Hope this helps,

Abel

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Post by Qvist » 14 Mar 2007 00:32

Hope this helps,
It certainly does - thanks for this excellent post. I take it from your wording that this is all based on German documentation?
(1) 294. Inf Div was outside of the pocket – Pi Bn 294 was the only part inside. It was fully posted to the Chir by 25/11 and operated with one detached regimental group, also on the Chir.
Thanks for clearing that up - that'd be the regimental group referred to in the OKH Tagesmeldung then.
(2) 213. Sich Div was deployed behind the frontline and had GR 354 and GR 318 (plus III./Pol Reg 6 and Kos Abt 213). Both were Grenadier regiments, therefore, the division was very often referred to (in German documents!) as 213. Grenadier Division. GR 354 was a reserve behind Morozovsk and sent to the frontline very soon after Uranus. GR 318 was during 12/42 moved to the frontline between the Ravenna and Cosseria Divisions.
If you have clear documentary references for GR 354, then I (and Haupt and Nafziger) stand corrected.
(3) 8. Lw Feld Div arrived at the frontline around 10/12/42. It is not the same as Gruppe Stahel – elements fought under Stahel but the two were distinct and different!
And thanks for clearing that up. In that case, Glantz' OOB is not accurate on this point. That the two were distinct commands is not in question (though Glantz as mentioned lists it as the only entry under Gr. Stahel), but there is the question of taking these elements into account when calculating strengths, in order to avoid double counting.
(4) Elements of 9. Flak Div (and not Lw Feld Div) were at the Chir – Flak Abt 774. As a sidenote, Stab/Flak Reg 99, g.Flak Abt 236 and l.Flak Abt 723 were all present at Oblivskaja.
Seems a likely source for that misidentification.
(5) Gruppe Adam, Gruppe Heilmann, Gruppe Stumpfeld (incorporating KGs Schmidt, Selle, Wandke, Stumpfeld), Gruppe Spang and Gruppe Stahel were the main ad-hoc units on the Chir, and all are clearly distinct in composition from the other (fresh!) units on the Chir.
Gruppe Stumpfeld did not have units of 403.Sich.D., 213.Sich.D. and 336.ID under command, as listed by Glantz (unfortunately, without any very clear dating) ?


The still remains the issue of strengths. Would you have anything to contribute on that point? I am as said painfully short on sources for this particular period.

cheers

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Post by Abel Ravasz » 14 Mar 2007 22:40

Hi Quist,

the source of information is the manuscript I'm working on, using some 50+ books (German, Russian, English, Hungarian), several original documents and many internet sources.

(1) Grenadier-Regiment 354

Well, most of the sources dealing with the subject (f.e. see Wolf Höpper - Against The Flood, an excellent article available on the net) would agree this regiment was at the moment part of the 403. Sicherungs-Division. (The 286. Sich Div is a total nonsense, the 62. Inf Div comes into picture later and I'll tell you how and why). I would go against this statement.

During 11-12/42, there were five German "security" regiments deployed at the HGr B / Don sector. These were the SR 57, SR 177, SR 610, GR 318 and GR 354, making up the 213. and 403. Sicherungs Divisionen.

The OKH Kriegsgliederung as of 1/1/43 reports the following:
tle. 403. SD at HGr Don reserve.
tle. 403. SD at Agr Hollidt. / became A-A Hollidt 2/1/43.
tle. 213. SD at Agr Hollidt.
tle. 213. SD at HGr B reserve.
tle. 213. SD at XXIV. PzK.

Anyone who has extensively worked with such OKH papers will know that in this context, Teile almost exclusively means regiments. It is therefore reasonable to argue these groupings are thus identical with the five above regiments. Let's tackle them one by one.

SR 57 was detached from 213. SD to r.Heeresgebiet B on 10/10/42 and remained there throughout the winter campaign. Therefore, this most be identical with the tle. 213. Sich Div at HGr B.

SR 177 was part of the 403. SD. On 2/43, this regiment was only entered into the frontline at Belaja Kalitva, as "Gruppe SR 177" of A-A Hollidt. This regiment should therefore be identified as the tle. 403. SD at HGr Don reserve.

SR 610, also a part of 403. SD, has been "cleared" as part of Gr. Spang (Gruppe SR 610 - Gruppe Wandke). It is reasonable to identify it as tle. 403. SD at Agr Hollidt.

GR 318, a part of the 213. SD, was deployed to the Italian 8. Army on 9/12/42. It fought as Gruppe Mielke in the structure of XXIV. PzK until 2/43. Clearly, this is the tle. 213. SD at XXIV. PzK.

What remains? The GR 354 and the tle. 213. SD at Agr Hollidt, which is in support of my claim.

Also, it would be quite strange if the 403. SD would be beefed up to 3 regiments (177, 610, *354*) versus the lone regiment of the 213. SD (318).

And, yes, the fact that the Russians thought it was part of the 213. SD is also of relevance.

I know this theory is far from sure but I will hold on to it until any "real" proof about it being false is shown. I would be very interested in your opinion, Quist!

(2) Gruppe Stumpfeld

This grouping is a hard nut. It was formed around Arko 108 on 23/11/42, and by the time of the combat by State Farm 79, it had incorporated the KG Schmidt and KG Selle into itself. For a certain period, it also contained KG Wandke - which is the Gruppe SR 610, later attached to Gruppe Spang.

In mid-12/43, it would contain KG Schmidt (Pi Reg 516 with 5 Alarm Bataillonen - Schöne, Kamenberg, Lindner, Eisenacker, Korherr), KG Selle (PiFührer AOK 6 with 2 Alarm Bataillonen - Engert, von Caddenbruck) and the units of the former KG Stumpfeld (Alarm Bn Morosowskaja IV., Alarm Bn Charkow II.). Also attached were the famous PzKp Abendrot (3./Pz Abt (Fkl) 301), a Flak group of the 9. Flak Div, and for a certain period, the 36. Estonian Schuma Bn "Arensburg".

It was attached to the XXXXVIII. PzK on 13/12/42 and dissolved 24/12/42.

(3) Gruppe Spang

Another hard nut. It was formed around Korück AOK 6 on 23/11/42, mostly containing Alarm units. Its most important components were two groupings around the Stab SR 610 (KG Wandke) and Stab GR 354 (KG von Rekowsky), but of course this is not so easy - it had Alarm units (f.e. Alarm Bn Gorlowka), Romanian stragglers etc., and after Little Saturn, it was totally incorporated into the 62. Infanterie Division - GenLt Huffmann took command of the grouping, labelled DivStab 62 (Gr. Huffmann) containing the meager remnants of the 62. ID and also the remnants of the Spang grouping. It is because of this that the GR 354 ended up in 62. Inf Div when it was replenished in 1/43!!!!!

Hope everything is clear by now,
And looking forward to your notes and comments,

Abel

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