Operation Barbarossa - The Case Against Moscow
Re: Moscow Region Coal Production
Quite. So, point being?
P.S. "Moscow region". What is that?
P.S. "Moscow region". What is that?
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion
Re: Operation Barbarossa - The Case Against Moscow
Moscow region is the region of Moscow.
The point is,that one should not exaggerate these "staggering" Soviet losses,and,that I doubt the biblical story of the Soviets transporting everything to the region between Moscow and the Urals and reconstructing there their industry,because,that's assuming that there was nothing east of Moscow,which is wrong .
About the tank production in 1941:
july:595
august:820
september:716
october:637
november:880
december:1219
Conclusions
1)only in september/october was there a problem
2)the evacuations of the tank industry did not start on 22 june
3)a big part of the tank industry was located east of Moscow(exemple:Nizhniy Tagil)
The point is,that one should not exaggerate these "staggering" Soviet losses,and,that I doubt the biblical story of the Soviets transporting everything to the region between Moscow and the Urals and reconstructing there their industry,because,that's assuming that there was nothing east of Moscow,which is wrong .
About the tank production in 1941:
july:595
august:820
september:716
october:637
november:880
december:1219
Conclusions
1)only in september/october was there a problem
2)the evacuations of the tank industry did not start on 22 june
3)a big part of the tank industry was located east of Moscow(exemple:Nizhniy Tagil)
Re: Moscow Region
? What are the geographic limits of this region? Or is it whatever the propagandist writing the piece says it is?
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion
- John Hilly
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Re: Operation Barbarossa - The Case Against Moscow
Moscow Region is actually Moscow Oblast.
"The oblast was founded in 1929. It borders Tver Oblast in the northwest, Yaroslavl Oblast in the north, Vladimir Oblast in the northeast and east, Ryazan Oblast in the southeast, Tula Oblast in the south, Kaluga Oblast in the southwest and Smolensk Oblast in the west. In the center stands the federal city of Moscow, which is a separate federal subject in its own right. The oblast is highly industrialized, with its main industrial branches being metallurgy, oil refining, and mechanical engineering, food, energy, and chemical industries."
From: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moscow_Oblast
With best
J-P
"The oblast was founded in 1929. It borders Tver Oblast in the northwest, Yaroslavl Oblast in the north, Vladimir Oblast in the northeast and east, Ryazan Oblast in the southeast, Tula Oblast in the south, Kaluga Oblast in the southwest and Smolensk Oblast in the west. In the center stands the federal city of Moscow, which is a separate federal subject in its own right. The oblast is highly industrialized, with its main industrial branches being metallurgy, oil refining, and mechanical engineering, food, energy, and chemical industries."
From: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moscow_Oblast
With best
J-P
"Die Blechtrommel trommelt noch!"
- Appleknocker27
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Re: Operation Barbarossa - The Case Against Moscow
A case in point:
First Factory No.183 - Charkovskiy Traktornyj Zawod (ChTZ), Kharkov
Production of the T-34 began at Factory No.183 at Kharkov, where the tank had been designed. On 5 June 1940 the Central Committee passed a resolution ordering the Kharkov plant to produce 600 tanks in 1940, with another 100 to be produced at Stalingrad. In fact only 183 T-34s were completed during 1940, all of them at Factory No.183. Production stepped up in the first half of 1940, when 553 tanks were produced at Kharkov, and reached a peak in the second half of the year, when despite the rapid approach of the Germans another 939 T-34s were completed. A total of 1,675 T-34s were produced at Kharkov.
By September 1941 it was clear that there was a real danger that Kkarkov would fall to the Germans. On 13 September 1941 the factory was ordered to evacuate to Nizhniy Tagil, east of the Urals. The first of 43 trains left on 17 September, the last on 19 October. Although much of the factory equipment reached the new site, only 10% of the work force and 20% of the engineers followed the machinery.
Production Summary
T-34-76: 1,675
Second Factory No.183 - Uralskiy Tankovyj Zawod No.183 (UTZ), Nizhniy Tagil
The staff and machinery from Factory No.183 reached Nizhniy Tagil in the middle of winter. The facilities remained primitive for some time – at first parts of the factory were unroofed, despite the low winter temperatures (as low at -40 degrees C at some times). Most of the original workforce had been lost, and much of the burden of production fell on children and women. There was barely enough food and virtually no medical care.
Despite these terrible circumstances production at Nizhniy Tagil began in December 1941, when 25 T-34s were completed. Hardly surprisingly the quality of these tanks was not high, but as the factory became better established many of the problems were ironed out.
Production Summary
T-34-76: 15,014
T-34-85: 13,938
Total: 28,952
http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/we ... ction.html
First Factory No.183 - Charkovskiy Traktornyj Zawod (ChTZ), Kharkov
Production of the T-34 began at Factory No.183 at Kharkov, where the tank had been designed. On 5 June 1940 the Central Committee passed a resolution ordering the Kharkov plant to produce 600 tanks in 1940, with another 100 to be produced at Stalingrad. In fact only 183 T-34s were completed during 1940, all of them at Factory No.183. Production stepped up in the first half of 1940, when 553 tanks were produced at Kharkov, and reached a peak in the second half of the year, when despite the rapid approach of the Germans another 939 T-34s were completed. A total of 1,675 T-34s were produced at Kharkov.
By September 1941 it was clear that there was a real danger that Kkarkov would fall to the Germans. On 13 September 1941 the factory was ordered to evacuate to Nizhniy Tagil, east of the Urals. The first of 43 trains left on 17 September, the last on 19 October. Although much of the factory equipment reached the new site, only 10% of the work force and 20% of the engineers followed the machinery.
Production Summary
T-34-76: 1,675
Second Factory No.183 - Uralskiy Tankovyj Zawod No.183 (UTZ), Nizhniy Tagil
The staff and machinery from Factory No.183 reached Nizhniy Tagil in the middle of winter. The facilities remained primitive for some time – at first parts of the factory were unroofed, despite the low winter temperatures (as low at -40 degrees C at some times). Most of the original workforce had been lost, and much of the burden of production fell on children and women. There was barely enough food and virtually no medical care.
Despite these terrible circumstances production at Nizhniy Tagil began in December 1941, when 25 T-34s were completed. Hardly surprisingly the quality of these tanks was not high, but as the factory became better established many of the problems were ironed out.
Production Summary
T-34-76: 15,014
T-34-85: 13,938
Total: 28,952
http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/we ... ction.html
Soviet Tank Producers
WIKIPEDIA - Soviet Tank Producers, pre-, during, and post- WWII
J-P, indeed, but we don't know whether the source parroted by lj means actually that. It may mean Moscow Oblast and the surrounding oblasts, or maybe something completely different, having to do in some manner with the general geographic area containing the city and/or the river Moscow. As to the word "production" it may mean not only mean "dug out of ground", but also dug out of ground elsewhere and briqueted for consumption in the Moscow "region".
J-P, indeed, but we don't know whether the source parroted by lj means actually that. It may mean Moscow Oblast and the surrounding oblasts, or maybe something completely different, having to do in some manner with the general geographic area containing the city and/or the river Moscow. As to the word "production" it may mean not only mean "dug out of ground", but also dug out of ground elsewhere and briqueted for consumption in the Moscow "region".
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion
Re: Operation Barbarossa - The Case Against Moscow
For what time interval and what portions of the Ostfront does this apply?Qvist wrote: 1. That there would have to be a halt for logistical reasons somewhere around the Dnepr-Berezina line was acknowledged from the beginning - you will find that already in the Marcks draft of August 1940. It was not a result of anything the Red Army did.
For what time interval and what portions of the Ostfront does this apply?2. The halt in the German advance was not due to the Soviet counterattacks.
For what time interval and what portions of the Ostfront does this apply?3. Said counterattacks never seriously threatened the German position in any way.
Definte "more", please. For example as absolute number of soldiers, as existing materiel, as fraction of reserve/potential human or materiel resources (if potential, for what timeframe?) What does "more" mean?4. The soviet offensives wore down the Red Army far more than it wore down the Germans. In late August and september, Army Group Center received considerably more men in replacements than it lost in combat, and all in all the AG was in pretty decent shape when the advance recommenced.
The historical timeline does not support this rosig asessment. A severe blow was inflicted on the Soviets, but the Soviet Center was far from obliterated, as the reinforced AGC's failure to actually reach Moscow in the 8 weeks following (and subsequent debacle) amply demonstrates.5. As Typhoon showed, the counteroffensives had not done anything to remove or even curtail German offensive capabilities - inside of two weeks, the Soviet center was obliterated.
As the opening losses of Typhoon demonstrate, that could have been a very poor decision for the Soviet Union, in July 1941. It was essential for an agrarian economy like the USSR to gain the breathing room until December, to allow the induction of peasants into the army after the harvest. If Leningrad, Moscow, and Ukraine are lost, the Soviet Union would very very close t defeat (especially if they are lost quickly).The point on which you are right is that it did show that the Soviets had a far greater ability to mobilise and deploy new formations than the German had presupposed. This was absolutely crucial, but of course it was not in any way a result of the Smolensk counteroffensives. I should think it would have served the Red army better to conserve and build their forces than to squander them in these ceaseless offensives that were ultimately without any major gain.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion
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Re: Operation Barbarossa - The Case Against Moscow
AGC was not in great shape, the replacements mentioned were the last the replacement army had and they did not make up for the losses 409 thousand, received 217 thousand. In September tracked vehicle strength was at 47% prime movers for artillery were at 67% Source US army historical studu on Barbarossa 1940-1942. The battles around Yelna were partial victories becase without their tank units the Germans did have to withdraw from the salient.
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Re: Operation Barbarossa - The Case Against Moscow
note the losses were for all army groups
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Re: Operation Barbarossa - The Case Against Moscow
as far as the stop, it was for all of the eastfront and was expected once the army reached the north south line running through Smolensk.
Even if the Germans had not gone south the planned halt meant the Germans could not move till September. The next pocket would have been about half way to Moscow and assuming the average of one month to finish the pocket means the bound to Moscow would be starting just as the mud is about to arive. The next question is direct assault or surrounding. Can the Gemrnas afford to assualt Moscow directly and if they try to surround it they have only a few weeks once the mud ends before the winter starts in earnest, can the Germans maintain their forces on the outer limits of Moscow in December.
Even if the Germans had not gone south the planned halt meant the Germans could not move till September. The next pocket would have been about half way to Moscow and assuming the average of one month to finish the pocket means the bound to Moscow would be starting just as the mud is about to arive. The next question is direct assault or surrounding. Can the Gemrnas afford to assualt Moscow directly and if they try to surround it they have only a few weeks once the mud ends before the winter starts in earnest, can the Germans maintain their forces on the outer limits of Moscow in December.
Re: Operation Barbarossa - The Case Against Moscow
Not to worry, who needs bullets, benzin, and bread when one has willpower?steverodgers801 wrote: Can the Gemrnas afford to assault Moscow directly and if they try to surround it they have only a few weeks once the mud ends before the winter starts in earnest, can the Germans maintain their forces on the outer limits of Moscow in December.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion
Re: Operation Barbarossa - The Case Against Moscow
I will ask the question again,hoping on a convincing answer (not that I have much illusions,considering the fact that a lot of people are very enthusiast to believe what are,IMHO,mainly propaganda stories)
1) Why was the evacuation of Soviet Industries to the East important?
2)How much was it important? Give a figure on a scale from 1 to 10
3)Defend the adjudication of this figure :if it was 5/10:why ?
1) Why was the evacuation of Soviet Industries to the East important?
2)How much was it important? Give a figure on a scale from 1 to 10
3)Defend the adjudication of this figure :if it was 5/10:why ?
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Re: Operation Barbarossa - The Case Against Moscow
Its hard to know what Soviet production would have been, but the loss of the factories and their machine tools would have had an effect on production.
Re: Role of the Evacuated Heavy Industry
A quick estimate based on the wikipedia data would be that the evacuated plants and personnel were responsible for 30-50% of the soviet tracked vehicle production, and likely same for wheeled vehicles.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion
Re: Operation Barbarossa - The Case Against Moscow
The following is from Mark Harrison:"Soviet planing in peace and war" P78:
1532 enterprises had been evacuated,while 32000 were not.
And,this is without the enterprises east of Moscow,and,a lot of what was evacuated was lost during the evacuation .
Let's say that on a total of 50000 enterprises,1500 were evacuated.While I am not saying that 3% quantitative =3 % qualitative, I like to see proofs for the claims that the evacuation of 3% of the factories would be that important/decisive .
That the evacuated plants and personnel were responsible for the production of 30/50 % of the soviet tracked/wheeled vehicles,maybe,but,that does not mean that without these plants and personnel,30/50% less would be produced .
The coal mines could not be evacuated,and,notwithstanding the loss of the Don Bassin,the soviet coal production was going up from 146 million ton in 1940,to 156 million ton in 1945.
Let"s assume the same for the plants and personnel for the production of the tracked/wheeled vehicles : no evacuation,why would it be impossible that the production would go up ?
1532 enterprises had been evacuated,while 32000 were not.
And,this is without the enterprises east of Moscow,and,a lot of what was evacuated was lost during the evacuation .
Let's say that on a total of 50000 enterprises,1500 were evacuated.While I am not saying that 3% quantitative =3 % qualitative, I like to see proofs for the claims that the evacuation of 3% of the factories would be that important/decisive .
That the evacuated plants and personnel were responsible for the production of 30/50 % of the soviet tracked/wheeled vehicles,maybe,but,that does not mean that without these plants and personnel,30/50% less would be produced .
The coal mines could not be evacuated,and,notwithstanding the loss of the Don Bassin,the soviet coal production was going up from 146 million ton in 1940,to 156 million ton in 1945.
Let"s assume the same for the plants and personnel for the production of the tracked/wheeled vehicles : no evacuation,why would it be impossible that the production would go up ?