On Reading Glantz's Red Storm over the Balkans

[Qvist]

However, if the reconnaisance proved to be sucessful and actually penetrated enemy MLR, it was considered entirely proper to escalate it into a full-fledged offensive - even if the original plan did not prescribe it at that exact place and time. Likewise, the deception operation, meant to draw off German attention had within it the seeds of a proper strategic operation - if it had succeeded beyond it's original aims.

It was hardly feasible to improvise a strategic operation or escalate a reconnaissance into a full-fledged offensive on the spur of the moment? Do you know of any examples of this happening?

cheers

[Art]

Attack of 1st Baltic Front north of Vitebsk on 22.06.44. That is just an example of reconnassaince in force that was converted into a full-scale offensive. I'm not touching the main thessis of Gregory.

[Qvist]

Fair enough, thanks.

cheers

[Art]

To be closer to the topic, Konev mentioned Focsani as an operational objective in his report to Stavka of 5.04.44

[F/PAUL]

As far as criticising Glantz ("who are you to critize him!!!") anyone who writes a book opens themselves to others opinions. I had no idea a PHD was necessary to express opinions on an author. There are things about him I like and dislike and I actually liked his Kursk volume. Granted, he's not perfect, but his works offer some insights on which other authors can build.

[Urmel]

However, if the reconnaisance proved to be sucessful and actually penetrated enemy MLR, it was considered entirely proper to escalate it into a full-fledged offensive - even if the original plan did not prescribe it at that exact place and time. Likewise, the deception operation, meant to draw off German attention had within it the seeds of a proper strategic operation - if it had succeeded beyond it's original aims.

It was hardly feasible to improvise a strategic operation or escalate a reconnaissance into a full-fledged offensive on the spur of the moment? Do you know of any examples of this happening?

cheers

I guess it depends on the quality of your staff work in preparation, and the mental flexibility of your command, as far as offensives are concerned. Neither of which the Red Army gets credited with that often, unfairly as it appears. In case of a Maskirovka operation it will also depend on what is actually available in theatre. I have my doubts about this level of flexibility being the norm in those cases.

[GaryD]

Attack of 1st Baltic Front north of Vitebsk on 22.06.44. That is just an example of reconnassaince in force that was converted into a full-scale offensive. I'm not touching the main thessis of Gregory.

Eh, can you clarify this? Are you saying 1st Baltic Front's part in Operation Bagration was a reconnaissance in force?

I tend to agree with Qvist; the supply requirements for a full-scale Soviet-style offensive are tremendous and are not likely to be at hand if such an offensive isn't planned.

[Art]

Eh, can you clarify this? Are you saying 1st Baltic Front's part in Operation Bagration was a reconnaissance in force?

The attack on 22.06 was supposed to be a reconnaisance in force in fact became the start of the main offensive a day earlier than planned.

[GaryD]

Eh, can you clarify this? Are you saying 1st Baltic Front's part in Operation Bagration was a reconnaissance in force?

The attack on 22.06 was supposed to be a reconnaisance in force in fact became the start of the main offensive a day earlier than planned.

Art,

This is not correct in the context of the discussion and of the events on 22 June 1944. Let's go back and see the original quote:

Most of the large set piece battles were preceded by battalion-strength attacks on a division's frontage, which were designed to pinpoint the German defenses in the sector. However, if the reconnaisance proved to be sucessful and actually penetrated enemy MLR, it was considered entirely proper to escalate it into a full-fledged offensive - even if the original plan did not prescribe it at that exact place and time. Likewise, the deception operation, meant to draw off German attention had within it the seeds of a proper strategic operation - if it had succeeded beyond it's original aims.

The 1st Baltic Front's main offensive, which was already planned for 23 June, was proceeded by a reconnaissance by combat on 22 June. The purpose, to quote Mr. Deych, was "designed to pinpoint the German defenses in the sector." In the case of the 1st Baltic Front, the main offensive was scheduled to begin, regardless of the outcome of the battles on 22 June, on 23 June. So this particular battle is not a good example of what he goes on to say, "if the reconnaisance proved to be successful and actually penetrated enemy MLR, it was considered entirely proper to escalate it into a full-fledged offensive - even if the original plan did not prescribe it at that exact place and time."

In the case of the 1st Baltic Front, the Germans were so weak that all by themselves the reconnaissance units were able to advance several kilometers into the German positions. The Germans committed their local reserves to counterattack, so when the main offensive began on 23 June as planned, there were no reserves left and the result was devastating. The timing of the offensive was NOT advanced; the only thing that changed was the artillery preparation. This is based on the 6-volume history of the war, Bagramyan's memoirs, the articles by Bagramyan and Beloborodov, the 43rd Army commander, in THE LIBERATION OF BELORUSSIA 1944, and the Soviet General Staff Study (although the latter is a bit hazy on the subject).

Responding to Mr. Deych's post, Qvist then asked this question:

It was hardly feasible to improvise a strategic operation or escalate a reconnaissance into a full-fledged offensive on the spur of the moment? Do you know of any examples of this happening?

to which you replied:

Attack of 1st Baltic Front north of Vitebsk on 22.06.44. That is just an example of reconnassaince in force that was converted into a full-scale offensive. I'm not touching the main thessis of Gregory.

As I said, the 1st Baltic Front's attack north of Vitebsk is NOT an example of what Qvist asked. I frankly doubt there are ANY cases of reconnaissance by combat which let to a full-fledged offensive which was not already planned, simply because the material requirements of an offensive are huge and require extensive prior planning and preparation.

[Art]

In the case of the 1st Baltic Front, the Germans were so weak that all by themselves the reconnaissance units were able to advance several kilometers into the German positions. The Germans committed their local reserves to counterattack, so when the main offensive began on 23 June as planned, there were no reserves left and the result was devastating. The timing of the offensive was NOT advanced; the only thing that changed was the artillery preparation.

In the sector of the 22nd Guards Rifle Corps a part of the main forces was committed following unexpectedly weak enemy resistance. By the end of the 22nd the corps had broken through the first defensive position and advanced as deep as 4-7 kilometers into German defense. So in a part of the front sector of attack some tasks sheduled for 23rd June began to be de-facto carried out on 22nd. It's worth to add that the breakthrough in other sectors was greatly facilitated by this tactical succes and as you've said the front command refused from the full-scale artillery preparation on 23rd because it believed that the German defense was weakened during the previous day.

In the case of the 1st Baltic Front, the main offensive was scheduled to begin, regardless of the outcome of the battles on 22 June, on 23 June. So this particular battle is not a good example of what he goes on to say, "if the reconnaisance proved to be successful and actually penetrated enemy MLR, it was considered entirely proper to escalate it into a full-fledged offensive - even if the original plan did not prescribe it at that exact place and time."

Why? The plan didn't contemplate breaking the first position in that exact time (D-1) but Soviet commanders considered proper to do that when they were granted with an opportunity. I think it's an adequate example.
In that case there was evidently no thorough plan to escalate the succes of forward detachment. You can take the Vistula-Oder operation as a classical example of pre-planned development of reconnaissance in force into full-scale offensive if you don't like the previous one.

As I said, the 1st Baltic Front's attack north of Vitebsk is NOT an example of what Qvist asked.

Sorry, Qvist asked for examples of escalation of r-in-f. There were no words about was the offensive pre-planned or not, at least in explicit form. To summarize Gregory said that there was some Soviet tactical practise. Here he is right, it really existed. If you noticed he didn't say that reconnaisance in force could be developed into strategic operation, but used this tactical example as an analogy of what as he thinks happened on strategical level. I've never subscribed to this analogy I and specially emphasized it, so the questions regarding it should be adressed to Gregory.

[GaryD]

As I said, the 1st Baltic Front's attack north of Vitebsk is NOT an example of what Qvist asked.

Sorry, Qvist asked for examples of escalation of r-in-f. There were no words about was the offensive pre-planned or not, at least in explicit form.

Qvist said "on the spur of the moment" which means on impulse, without planning or preparation.

[Art]

Qvist said "on the spur of the moment" which means on impulse, without planning or preparation.

He said "escalate reconnaissance on the spur of the moment". As far as I can guess there were no elaborated plans to start commitment of the main forces of 1st Baltic on 22 June in my example, so in that partilcular case the escalation was improvised. The entire Vitebsk operation, of course, wasn't. But let's remeber the context:

Most of the large set piece battles were preceded by battalion-strength attacks on a division's frontage, which were designed to pinpoint the German defenses in the sector.

So the thesis that we started to discuss was about probing attacks which were an element of pre-planned offensive operation and not about making operations from air.

[GaryD]

In the case of the 1st Baltic Front, the Germans were so weak that all by themselves the reconnaissance units were able to advance several kilometers into the German positions. The Germans committed their local reserves to counterattack, so when the main offensive began on 23 June as planned, there were no reserves left and the result was devastating. The timing of the offensive was NOT advanced; the only thing that changed was the artillery preparation.

In the sector of the 22nd Guards Rifle Corps a part of the main forces was committed following unexpectedly weak enemy resistance. By the end of the 22nd the corps had broken through the first defensive position and advanced as deep as 4-7 kilometers into German defense. So in a part of the front sector of attack some tasks sheduled for 23rd June began to be de-facto carried out on 22nd. It's worth to add that the breakthrough in other sectors was greatly facilitated by this tactical succes and as you've said the front command refused from the full-scale artillery preparation on 23rd because it believed that the German defense was weakened during the previous day.

You're supporting my argument, not your own. No one is arguing that the Soviets could not reinforce success in a limited way. That "part of the main force" which you mention was a mere six battalions out of the approximately 80 rifle battalions in the four corps of the 6th Guards Army which were not involved in the reconnaissance, most of which were to take part in the offensive on July 23rd.

The main offensive was still on the 23rd. Please identify one source which states otherwise and therefore contradicts all of the major participants' writings.

In the case of the 1st Baltic Front, the main offensive was scheduled to begin, regardless of the outcome of the battles on 22 June, on 23 June. So this particular battle is not a good example of what he goes on to say, "if the reconnaisance proved to be successful and actually penetrated enemy MLR, it was considered entirely proper to escalate it into a full-fledged offensive - even if the original plan did not prescribe it at that exact place and time."

Why? The plan didn't contemplate breaking the first position in that exact time (D-1) but Soviet commanders considered proper to do that when they were granted with an opportunity. I think it's an adequate example.
In that case there was evidently no thorough plan to escalate the succes of forward detachment. You can take the Vistula-Oder operation as a classical example of pre-planned development of reconnaissance in force into full-scale offensive if you don't like the previous one.

Let's finish with this one first.

[GaryD]

As far as I can guess there were no elaborated plans to start commitment of the main forces of 1st Baltic on 22 June

True. As I said, no one argued that the Soviets weren't flexible enough to reinforce success in a limited way, but that had no effect on the start date of the offensive or on most of the units which would attack on the 23rd. Only the form of the offensive changed somewhat, i.e. the artillery preparation was changed so as not to hit their own troops or empty trenches, and a relatively few units were sent in 12-15 hours early.

[Art]

That "part of the main force" which you mention was a mere six battalions out of the approximately 80 rifle battalions in the four corps of the 6th Guards Army [/u].

Of four corps only two were in the second echelon, of these two only one had committed addtitional forces. The expansion of reconnaisance in force was a local phenomenon that took place only in the sector of one corps, so the phrase about commitment of the main forces pertains to this cops only. And I didn't invent it myself, you can find it in "Proryv" by Radzievksy, page 102 and IIRC in the abovementioned Soviet General Staff study. If you so concerned with my words about the start of the main offensive in the entire sector of the front, I wrote it from memory and used the words "1st Baltic Front" as an approximate location, simply because I didn't remember how many units were engaged in development of reconnaissance and which exactly. I don't argue that when describing the situation in the entire attack sector north of Vitbesk the statement "the main offesnive began on 22 June" is too strong.