Art wrote:GaryD wrote:Eh, can you clarify this? Are you saying 1st Baltic Front's part in Operation Bagration was a reconnaissance in force?
The attack on 22.06 was supposed to be a reconnaisance in force in fact became the start of the main offensive a day earlier than planned.
Art,
This is not correct in the context of the discussion and of the events on 22 June 1944. Let's go back and see the original quote:
Gregory Deych wrote:Most of the large set piece battles were preceded by battalion-strength attacks on a division's frontage, which were designed to pinpoint the German defenses in the sector. However, if the reconnaisance proved to be sucessful and actually penetrated enemy MLR, it was considered entirely proper to escalate it into a full-fledged offensive - even if the original plan did not prescribe it at that exact place and time. Likewise, the deception operation, meant to draw off German attention had within it the seeds of a proper strategic operation - if it had succeeded beyond it's original aims.
The 1st Baltic Front's main offensive,
which was already planned for 23 June, was proceeded by a reconnaissance by combat on 22 June. The purpose, to quote Mr. Deych, was "designed to pinpoint the German defenses in the sector." In the case of the 1st Baltic Front, the main offensive was scheduled to begin, regardless of the outcome of the battles on 22 June, on 23 June. So this particular battle is not a good example of what he goes on to say, "if the reconnaisance proved to be successful and actually penetrated enemy MLR, it was considered entirely proper to escalate it into a full-fledged offensive - even if the original plan did not prescribe it at that exact place and time."
In the case of the 1st Baltic Front, the Germans were so weak that all by themselves the reconnaissance units were able to advance several kilometers into the German positions. The Germans committed their local reserves to counterattack, so when the main offensive began on 23 June
as planned, there were no reserves left and the result was devastating. The timing of the offensive was NOT advanced; the only thing that changed was the artillery preparation. This is based on the 6-volume history of the war, Bagramyan's memoirs, the articles by Bagramyan and Beloborodov, the 43rd Army commander, in THE LIBERATION OF BELORUSSIA 1944, and the Soviet General Staff Study (although the latter is a bit hazy on the subject).
Responding to Mr. Deych's post, Qvist then asked this question:
Qvist wrote:It was hardly feasible to improvise a strategic operation or escalate a reconnaissance into a full-fledged offensive on the spur of the moment? Do you know of any examples of this happening?
to which you replied:
Art wrote:Attack of 1st Baltic Front north of Vitebsk on 22.06.44. That is just an example of reconnassaince in force that was converted into a full-scale offensive. I'm not touching the main thessis of Gregory.
As I said, the 1st Baltic Front's attack north of Vitebsk is NOT an example of what Qvist asked. I frankly doubt there are ANY cases of reconnaissance by combat which let to a full-fledged offensive
which was not already planned, simply because the material requirements of an offensive are huge and require extensive prior planning and preparation.