In the Balkan campaign, I belive the only panzer divsion involved was the 2nd?
Also the SS regiments Leibstandarte and (das reich?) were only motorizied. The amount of troops involved, I wonder, would of haved any strategic impact of the russian campaign. Most were used anyway. Was time really the factor? most were diverted in other sectors and only one SS division was involved with the task of taking Moscow. Totenkopf or Das Reich?
So really does the balkan campaign have to do with the real reality of losing in Russia? Or as "Second" noted above, no long-distance strategic planning. In theory if they maybe took the 4 SS divisons operating in 1941 (Leibstandarte, Das Reich, Totenkopf and 4th SS polizi) made a massive push on Moscow... today would be a different world. Also to throw a question to the readers...
If Germany sacked Moscow, would Rusia have lost the war?
Without going into detail, my answer is no. Russia still would of decimated Germany.
Why didn't Hitler defeat Russia in 1941?
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Achtung Panzer Buff
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The 11th Panzer Div was involved also, I'm not sure exactly how many other units but it was good number. By Balkan, I mean to include Greece, Yugosalvia. I think the wasted time was far more important than the number of troops. An additional two months before winter could be significate.stoat17 wrote:In the Balkan campaign, I belive the only panzer divsion involved was the 2nd?
Also the SS regiments Leibstandarte and (das reich?) were only motorizied. The amount of troops involved, I wonder, would of haved any strategic impact of the russian campaign. Most were used anyway. Was time really the factor? most were diverted in other sectors and only one SS division was involved with the task of taking Moscow. Totenkopf or Das Reich?
I may not be making my point clear. It's the time spent in the Balkans that the critical part. The Germans must win before winter and time is the key. As for the SS units in 41, and their allocation I don't think that is really critical.
So really does the balkan campaign have to do with the real reality of losing in Russia? Or as "Second" noted above, no long-distance strategic planning. In theory if they maybe took the 4 SS divisons operating in 1941 (Leibstandarte, Das Reich, Totenkopf and 4th SS polizi) made a massive push on Moscow... today would be a different world. Also to throw a question to the readers...
It's for sure the Germans would have been in better shape taking Moscow and been closer to winning. Losing Moscow would have boosted German morale and hurt Russian etc. Since Russia wasn't easy to move around it losing Moscow would have hurt the Russia logistics a good bit. Harder (not impossible) to set things up for a counter-attack. Stalin might have found himself in political hot water with his peers. Stalin might have stayed in the city etc. Getting Moscow, could have set the stage for disrupting the Lend-Lease via Murmanksa (my spelling sucks so shoot me for it). I know Russia would still have been formidible and not entirely beaten due to size etc. However, with the decisive blow like getting Moscow, it might have been possible to get Turkey off the fence and to jump in. (Likewise for Spain) Life could get very hard for the Russian's...If Germany sacked Moscow, would Rusia have lost the war?
Without going into detail, my answer is no. Russia still would of decimated Germany.
My point is if the Germans were going to have any chance of winning, they can't make the blunders they did in 1941:
1. Balkans - wasted too much time
2. Indecisive leadership - thrust toward Moscow, then go south, then back to Moscow - wasted too much time
3. Fail to prepare for winter.
4. Fail to strike an impressive and decisive blow against the USSR to get Turkey and or Spain in the war on the Axis side.
5. Germany on a war economy might have had double the number of panzer and mech units in 41.
6. No cohert plan for the overall war effort.
If the Germans attack in April, they get two more months go find out what they are in for and might have prepared a little better for winter.
There are of course other blunders.
I have a bit of an argument with some of these points.German "superior technology" must have been a bit of a sick joke for the average German infantryman who was upposed to walk to Moscow because the Germans didn't have very many "superior" trucks. Or, the artillerymen whose guns were towed by horses because there were not enough trucks/half-tracks. Or, when there supplies could'nt reach them since their "superior" logistic support couldn't keep up. Or when their "superior" uniforms wern't quite "superior" enough to keep them warm. Or, the "superior" anti-freeze that froze in the winter.
What WW2 showed was that you needed was superior organization and superior man-management. Perfectly average equipment in sufficient numbers at the right place was quite adequate.
I would contend that the Germans would have been much better off with no Tigers or Panthers but lots more PzIV's...no ME262's but a C47 clone...no Waffen SS but a larger better equipped "normal" army...no half-tracks but lots of 4WD trucks.
1. No matter how many trucks they had had, the Germans could not have motorised their whole army. The reason is that they hardly had enough fuel to use even what they did have.
2. adequate weapons in adequate numbers: This is a point I often see, and IMO it is a fallacy when applied to the German situation. The basic reason is that it was completely beyond their means to achieve adequate numbers, compared to the three major allies. So, what they could in fact have had was adequate weapons in slightly less inadequate numbers. This is also to make a virtue out of an allied state of affairs that was hardly planned. Obviously, the Western allies did not consciously choose to fight the war with inferior tanks, f.e - like any sane organisation, they endeavored to have better equipment than their opponents. They just weren't critically hampered by it. The Germans on the other hand had little choice but to rely on superior quality, since they certainly weren'rt going to be able to compete on quantity.
3. Lots more PZ IVs, no Panthers or Tigers. Another old acquaintance. A Panther in fact cost less than 10% more to produce than a Pz IV, and had much better survivability. Thus it was a more economical weapon, and it would not have improved the German position to concentrate on the Pz IV, nor would it in itself have increased output much.
4. No W-SS but a larger army. How would no W-SS have tranformed into a larger army? In effect, the German army was Heer+W-SS, so the numbers would have been the same. Nor did W-SS divisions appear to have been particularly prioritised for equipment, except the fact they had a somewhat larger structure. The number of soldiers and weapons are in any case exactly the same, whether you organise them in the army or the W-SS.
5. No halftracks, lots of 4WD trucks. Meaning that you are removing all motorised battlefield mobility for the tanks' infantry support, instead increasing the number of motorised formations that you have no fuel for.
cheers
In this question their are many aspects that we need to clarify.
1. The first one was the underestimating of the Russian will to fight and the amount of man power that the Russians could put up against the Germans.
2.The German army was by 1941 suppose to be mobilised infantry, but the german infantry was far from mobilised that's why they suffered so many set at the beginning of the campaign.
3.The Greek campaign was a major set back for the Barbarossa campaign, Hitler gave up major forces to secure the completion of this campaign and when they invaded Greece aswell that was a setback, and this eventuality of the war setback the Russian Campiagn by about a month.
4. If the Germans had started the campiagn when it was suppose to and started in May then maybe the Germans would be able to withstand the Russian winter and got to Moscow in time.
5. Another part of their down fall was Hitlers decision to capture the cities of Leningrad and Kiev before the main thrust at Moscow, because he wanted the raw materiala that these cities offered and they would open up the Flanks of the Moscow defence and maybe could surrond them in a pincer movement.
6. The main problem with the attacks on Leningrad was that when they Started Hitler thought that the Armour would destroyed if they did not have adequate infantry protection, so the Armour could have pushed on to the city and taken it before the defenders had time to put up an adequate defence structure.
7. A very important decision by Stalin is important when he said nobody retreat and nobody give ground,so the furhter the Germans got into the Soviet Union the more stiffer the resistance was to them like the springing of partisan units behind the German lines.
1. The first one was the underestimating of the Russian will to fight and the amount of man power that the Russians could put up against the Germans.
2.The German army was by 1941 suppose to be mobilised infantry, but the german infantry was far from mobilised that's why they suffered so many set at the beginning of the campaign.
3.The Greek campaign was a major set back for the Barbarossa campaign, Hitler gave up major forces to secure the completion of this campaign and when they invaded Greece aswell that was a setback, and this eventuality of the war setback the Russian Campiagn by about a month.
4. If the Germans had started the campiagn when it was suppose to and started in May then maybe the Germans would be able to withstand the Russian winter and got to Moscow in time.
5. Another part of their down fall was Hitlers decision to capture the cities of Leningrad and Kiev before the main thrust at Moscow, because he wanted the raw materiala that these cities offered and they would open up the Flanks of the Moscow defence and maybe could surrond them in a pincer movement.
6. The main problem with the attacks on Leningrad was that when they Started Hitler thought that the Armour would destroyed if they did not have adequate infantry protection, so the Armour could have pushed on to the city and taken it before the defenders had time to put up an adequate defence structure.
7. A very important decision by Stalin is important when he said nobody retreat and nobody give ground,so the furhter the Germans got into the Soviet Union the more stiffer the resistance was to them like the springing of partisan units behind the German lines.
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Achtung Panzer Buff
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Britian could have been neturalized in any case, if the Germans had actually had a stragety before the war started.
Germany should have:
More u-boats and no capital ships.
Not have allowed the British to extract the Army at Dunkirk. About 300,000 British POW's would have hurt the British from having much of an army in the desert for a while.
Had a drop tank for the 109 BEFORE the Battle of Britian
Pressed the development of anti-ship rockets & missiles launched from aircraft.
The list is almost endless.
Germany should have:
More u-boats and no capital ships.
Not have allowed the British to extract the Army at Dunkirk. About 300,000 British POW's would have hurt the British from having much of an army in the desert for a while.
Had a drop tank for the 109 BEFORE the Battle of Britian
Pressed the development of anti-ship rockets & missiles launched from aircraft.
The list is almost endless.
Hitler v russia 1941
Ahh this question again. please remember it was not the German intention to lose in invading Rusia. They believed they could win and we must consider if were they right.
I think comments about the Balkans is misleading. While true there was a diversion of forces into the Balkans surely this was justfiied. There was an active front here - Greeks v Italians, and there was a British presence, prinicpally the RAF -a possible threat to oil supplies from Rumania.
The need to redirect and refurbish the forces used in the Balkans was not the primary reason for delaying Barbarossa.
The weather was the primary delay. The winter of 1940-1 was harsh and the Spring late. While it could be expected for the spring thaws and rain to have dried out by mid may 1941 as was typical, in 1941 the floods and rain were such that Operation Barbarosa would have been delayed till very late May or early June on these grounds alone.
The question of winter equipment is surely irrelevant as it was the intention to win in some 2 and half to 4 months, before winter set in.
Although German production was low in 1940/1941 there were sufficient stock piles for the planned campaign. Similarly replacements for the expected casualties were on hand and the logistical support was planned carefully. Russian production and replacements were rapidly under pressure from the speed of the German advance limiting the chance for the Red army to re equip.
The vast russian tank park had eg 12000 T26 and 5000 BT series tanks with guns capable of dealing with any german tank at reasonable battle ranges. These were destroyed in large numbers by both panzer units and by the infantry divisions. eg 256th ID destoyed 250 tanks on 24 to 26 June at Kuznica. The rare KV and T34 numbered some 600 and 1200 and were scattered in a number of units. Although dangerous they were dealt with by superior tactics and the use of Flak and heavy artillery though admittedly with difficulty.
Logistics would be a vital element in Barbarossa. A G Centre had truck columns to shift c. 45000 tons from rail heads and the rail system could be adapted to German guage at a rate of c. 20km a day. eg supplies reached Minsk by rail on 5 July, 330 km into Russia and by the end of July into Smolensk.
In mid July the quarter master general stated that as of 15 July 1941 Army Group Centre could attack Moscow with 4Pz, 3 mot and 10 infantry divisions + support trops and reserves while the rest of the group fought in the Smolensk area. The likely timing for an offensive on Moscow would be early / mid August allowing further stock piling of supplies.
Barbarossa failed at the strategic level as the main goal of destruction of the russian army and the maintainence of objectives was lost due in part to Hitler's interference. The attack south of Guderians second panzer group to Kiev cost the russians 600, 000 men and probably cost Germany the war. The advance of Operation Typhoon in October in poorer weather and against stronger russian forces must suggest that an attack in august could have taken Moscow. With Moscow gone the russian's principal rail hub would have been lost, links to Leningad been cut and a major armaments centre removed. The political repurcussions are harder to judge, could Stalin have survived the loss of the capitol?. Possible but unlikely. The germans with the Moscow region held could have strengthehed their logistical system, brought forward supplies for winter and probably have recieved some sort of request for peace from the remains of the russian government. Even if this did not happen with Moscow in german hands Leningrad would have been taken freeing up significant parts of Army Group North. A major source of eg T34 production would have gone and russian startegic movements would have been hampered greatly.
So could the germans have beaten rusia? i think i must say yes it was possible and suggest that an attack on Moscow in august 1941 was both possible and likely to succeed. The result of taking Moscow would I think have been the end of a war in russia.
Just be thankful that germany did not succeed
I think comments about the Balkans is misleading. While true there was a diversion of forces into the Balkans surely this was justfiied. There was an active front here - Greeks v Italians, and there was a British presence, prinicpally the RAF -a possible threat to oil supplies from Rumania.
The need to redirect and refurbish the forces used in the Balkans was not the primary reason for delaying Barbarossa.
The weather was the primary delay. The winter of 1940-1 was harsh and the Spring late. While it could be expected for the spring thaws and rain to have dried out by mid may 1941 as was typical, in 1941 the floods and rain were such that Operation Barbarosa would have been delayed till very late May or early June on these grounds alone.
The question of winter equipment is surely irrelevant as it was the intention to win in some 2 and half to 4 months, before winter set in.
Although German production was low in 1940/1941 there were sufficient stock piles for the planned campaign. Similarly replacements for the expected casualties were on hand and the logistical support was planned carefully. Russian production and replacements were rapidly under pressure from the speed of the German advance limiting the chance for the Red army to re equip.
The vast russian tank park had eg 12000 T26 and 5000 BT series tanks with guns capable of dealing with any german tank at reasonable battle ranges. These were destroyed in large numbers by both panzer units and by the infantry divisions. eg 256th ID destoyed 250 tanks on 24 to 26 June at Kuznica. The rare KV and T34 numbered some 600 and 1200 and were scattered in a number of units. Although dangerous they were dealt with by superior tactics and the use of Flak and heavy artillery though admittedly with difficulty.
Logistics would be a vital element in Barbarossa. A G Centre had truck columns to shift c. 45000 tons from rail heads and the rail system could be adapted to German guage at a rate of c. 20km a day. eg supplies reached Minsk by rail on 5 July, 330 km into Russia and by the end of July into Smolensk.
In mid July the quarter master general stated that as of 15 July 1941 Army Group Centre could attack Moscow with 4Pz, 3 mot and 10 infantry divisions + support trops and reserves while the rest of the group fought in the Smolensk area. The likely timing for an offensive on Moscow would be early / mid August allowing further stock piling of supplies.
Barbarossa failed at the strategic level as the main goal of destruction of the russian army and the maintainence of objectives was lost due in part to Hitler's interference. The attack south of Guderians second panzer group to Kiev cost the russians 600, 000 men and probably cost Germany the war. The advance of Operation Typhoon in October in poorer weather and against stronger russian forces must suggest that an attack in august could have taken Moscow. With Moscow gone the russian's principal rail hub would have been lost, links to Leningad been cut and a major armaments centre removed. The political repurcussions are harder to judge, could Stalin have survived the loss of the capitol?. Possible but unlikely. The germans with the Moscow region held could have strengthehed their logistical system, brought forward supplies for winter and probably have recieved some sort of request for peace from the remains of the russian government. Even if this did not happen with Moscow in german hands Leningrad would have been taken freeing up significant parts of Army Group North. A major source of eg T34 production would have gone and russian startegic movements would have been hampered greatly.
So could the germans have beaten rusia? i think i must say yes it was possible and suggest that an attack on Moscow in august 1941 was both possible and likely to succeed. The result of taking Moscow would I think have been the end of a war in russia.
Just be thankful that germany did not succeed
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ChristopherPerrien
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German Army in Russia 1941
Actually the German Army did much worse than most people think.
Napoleon's Grande Armee attacked later( 2 weeks?), took Moscow, and got caught by the winter on the way home.
To simplify it the horse drawn cannons of the french were a whole lot lighter than the horse drawn cannon's of the Wermacht. Also Napoleon was a military genius whereas the commander of the OKW was not (i.e. Hitler).
After 1941 the idiotic policies of the Nazi's as to not forming a White Russian Army and their horrible treatment of the Russian peasants ensured that they could never have conquered Russia.
Napoleon's Grande Armee attacked later( 2 weeks?), took Moscow, and got caught by the winter on the way home.
To simplify it the horse drawn cannons of the french were a whole lot lighter than the horse drawn cannon's of the Wermacht. Also Napoleon was a military genius whereas the commander of the OKW was not (i.e. Hitler).
After 1941 the idiotic policies of the Nazi's as to not forming a White Russian Army and their horrible treatment of the Russian peasants ensured that they could never have conquered Russia.
Re: German Army in Russia 1941
The leaders of White Russian army never supported Hitler and would never raise arms against their own brethren. Read Denikin's notes. The only forces Hitler could rely on were collaborators out of those living under commie rule but not the cadre and elite Russian officer corps who immigrated from Russia and had a clear understanding about courage and officer honour.ChristopherPerrien wrote:Actually the German Army did much worse than most people think.
Napoleon's Grande Armee attacked later( 2 weeks?), took Moscow, and got caught by the winter on the way home.
To simplify it the horse drawn cannons of the french were a whole lot lighter than the horse drawn cannon's of the Wermacht. Also Napoleon was a military genius whereas the commander of the OKW was not (i.e. Hitler).
After 1941 the idiotic policies of the Nazi's as to not forming a White Russian Army and their horrible treatment of the Russian peasants ensured that they could never have conquered Russia.
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ChristopherPerrien
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Yea Right
If those "superior" Germans had pursued any sort of accomodation with those millions of Russian "untermenchen" they would have been able to fight mass with mass. I don't they would have been offered any of the higher ranking positions. Peasants don't care who they fight for as long as they get a slightly better deal from one warlord/czar/president/etc. or the other. Trouble was that the "einzatgruppen?" of the nazis were worse than Stalin's police , and the also the the "master race" (i.e, higher ranking Nazi's) could not imagine needing any help from scum like the oppressed Russia peoples,(nazi philosophy not MINE), to beat Stalin. There was never a "real" effort by the Nazi's to form pronazi Russian units except for that "Vaslov" bs with was never given much support and by the time it was realized it was too late.
Kealty90 I like what you wrote.
Kealty90 I like what you wrote.
If the Einstzgruppen are used as an example of the barbaric side to the Third Reich in Russia, then I agree. I think more of the 'sympathetic' peoples could have been got onside. The Einsatzgruppen didn't come into contact with a high percentage of the general population. They didn't travel around looking for people to shoot (not suggesting you put your point in this crass way Christopher), but went to locations with high populations of Jews. Many Jews, communists, etc were taken prisoner by Feild police units attached to combat units, and if they weren't executed, were then handed over to the relevant authority. Many 'White Russians' disliked the Jewish population in any case, the history of anti-semitism is well documented in pre and post Stalin eras. In answer to Achtung Panzer Buff, Britain wouldn't have been neutralised 'if': We had more U-boat detroyers, we had evacuated troops prior to Dunkirk, had more fighters to shoot down any ME109's with drop tanks or carrying anti-sailing vessel rockets. No offence, but that is more of a What If statement than a realistic one. Kind regards.
Kind regards.
Re: German Army in Russia 1941
A.A. VlasovISU-152 wrote: The leaders of White Russian army never supported Hitler and would never raise arms against their own brethren. Read Denikin's notes. The only forces Hitler could rely on were collaborators out of those living under commie rule but not the cadre and elite Russian officer corps who immigrated from Russia and had a clear understanding about courage and officer honour.
Re: Hitler v russia 1941
daveh wrote:Ahh this question again. please remember it was not the German intention to lose in invading Rusia. They believed they could win and we must consider if were they right.
Or ,that they were to blind to see the mess they were about to enter.
German espionage was so crappy that they had no idea of the second echelon,nor the third and the true russian capabilities.
The question of winter equipment is surely irrelevant as it was the intention to win in some 2 and half to 4 months, before winter set in.
Destroy Russia in 2 to 4 months??
Even if you capture/kill 2 million russian soldiers/month and advance 1000kms/month you still couldn't defeat Russia in 4 months.
We can really doubt the logic in Hitler's mind about winning in 4 months.What if you don't win in 4 motnhs??Don't you have a backup plan??
The Werhmacht reached Moscow using russian resources they captured near the border in the first weeks of the war.Although German production was low in 1940/1941 there were sufficient stock piles for the planned campaign. Similarly replacements for the expected casualties were on hand and the logistical support was planned carefully. Russian production and replacements were rapidly under pressure from the speed of the German advance limiting the chance for the Red army to re equip.
German production was minimal.In october the Wermacht used 561000 75mm rounds and received from industry 76000.In december they used 494000 and received 18000.
Only then Hitler realized that he had to put his industry on a war footing.
Stalin on the other hand not only lost some 0,5 million t of ammo,he also lost 85% of the ammo producing industry.
As early as September german tank corps were decimated.Guderian's one had only 1/4 of its tanks.
Russian replacement system worked briliantly since in the first week of war another 5,335 million men were called into the army.
But they lost so much equipment and men in the first weeks that they almost crumbled.
But you leave Ukraine and some 60% of the Russian army intact.Barbarossa failed at the strategic level as the main goal of destruction of the russian army and the maintainence of objectives was lost due in part to Hitler's interference. The attack south of Guderians second panzer group to Kiev cost the russians 600, 000 men and probably cost Germany the war. The advance of Operation Typhoon in October in poorer weather and against stronger russian forces must suggest that an attack in august could have taken Moscow. With Moscow gone the russian's principal rail hub would have been lost, links to Leningad been cut and a major armaments centre removed. The political repurcussions are harder to judge, could Stalin have survived the loss of the capitol?. Possible but unlikely. The germans with the Moscow region held could have strengthehed their logistical system, brought forward supplies for winter and probably have recieved some sort of request for peace from the remains of the russian government. Even if this did not happen with Moscow in german hands Leningrad would have been taken freeing up significant parts of Army Group North. A major source of eg T34 production would have gone and russian startegic movements would have been hampered greatly.
They had the possibility to regroup and counter-attack your flanks.Acording to Konev the german did right by attacking Ukraine.
PS: If Guderian was so smart why didn't he convince Hitler to attack Moscow??He could have said : dismiss me,shoot me,but i won't folow your stupid order.But Guderian keeps quiet and folows Hitler's order.
Smart man..but only after the war....
Imo,they had no chance of defeating Russia.So could the germans have beaten rusia? i think i must say yes it was possible and suggest that an attack on Moscow in august 1941 was both possible and likely to succeed. The result of taking Moscow would I think have been the end of a war in russia.
Just be thankful that germany did not succeed
They attacked in the most favourable circumnstances when the russian army had anything but defense in mind.
What would have happened if the Russians had prepared for defense in 1941??
Re: German Army in Russia 1941
--> The commander of the OKW was Willhelm Keitl and Alfred JodlChristopherPerrien wrote:
Napoleon's Grande Armee attacked later( 2 weeks?), took Moscow, and got caught by the winter on the way home.
To simplify it the horse drawn cannons of the french were a whole lot lighter than the horse drawn cannon's of the Wermacht. Also Napoleon was a military genius whereas the commander of the OKW was not (i.e. Hitler).
Greetings!
I don't think that it isn't wise to compare a war with one that was approxematily 200 years before
The Wehrmacht was very successfull during their barbarossa campaign. I think they could have beaten Russia and defeated it when
1. Hitler hadn't interefered with his leading Generals. von Mannstein and so on would have done the job well.
2. If Hitler would have changed to war economy they would have more tanks, artillery and other mechanized units.
3. Hitler gave the order "hold the fort" but a panzer division is only succesfull when they are moveably. This was a command that Guderian also criticized. Without the Order they could have overtaken Moscow and Leningrad.
4. After the Wehrmacht was trapped in Stalingrad, Goering promised that he would support the VI Army with food, munition and so on. But the Luftwaffe failed despite they did really a great job to support them.
(This was by the way Goerings second mistake: he also promised to beat the Royal Airforce in two weeks.. funny)
5. The Heeresgruppen A and B was torn up and spread out ... so some improtant divisions from Heeresgruppe A with the order to attack Moscow were blanched to Heeresgruppe B. So Heeresgruppe A was no match for attackers.
6. The Sourround of Stalingrad was only possible through the Romanian and Italian troops in the South was very bad armed. Why there weren't some Reinforcments from the Waffen SS or the Wehrmacht?
Christian