Total size of the German and Soviet Armed Forces

[ljadw]

I think he means the GPOE(predecessor of the NKVD and successor of the Tsjeka),but,if one would include the NKVD,one also should do the same for the SIPO and KRIPO on German side.
Whatever,I think that the number of NKVD units participating on the combats,was limited .

[Art]

Do you mean OGPU? It ceased to exist in 1934. NKVD forces were formally a part of the USSR Armed Forces unlike German police, according to the Law on Military Service of 1939, Article 4 "Armed forces of the USSR consist of the Peasants' and Workers' Red Army, Peasants' and Workers' Navy, border and internal forces". There were also regular military personnel in civil organizations, most important of them railroad troops of the NKPS. Then there were civil personnel in all the branches of the armed forces, not counting various paramilitary organizations. The answer to the question what should be taken as the total size of the armed forces is not as straightforward as it may seems.

[CJK1990]

I actually was referring to the GKO. I don't know what that is, but it is mentioned in Glantz's book.

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

When one strips away all the Soviet minorities, there were about 120 million Russians.

The Reich contained 80 million Germans.

Thus the core reliable manpower of the two states was of the order of 3:2 in the Russian favour - very different from the massive superiority usually attributed to the Russians.

The problem is that in the Soviet Union (as even the name of this state suggests) not only Russians could be considered as "reliable manpower". I don't think the attitude of an average Russian towards the Stalin's regime was much different than for example the attitude of an average Ukrainian towards this regime.

The German racist and nationalist ideology made it more difficult to make other nationalities also "reliable".

Another thing is that in the first months of the war Germans captured the most populated areas of the USSR.

[ljadw]

But,if the Germans captured 20% (an ex.) of the Soviet population,that will not mean 20% of the male population that could be called up for military service .

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi ljadw,

That is true, but significant numbers of men were left behind. This, and horrendous losses, led to a manpower shortage that in 1943-44 was made up by recruiting these men, mostly of non-Russian minorities, as the front advanced. After basic training, they were usually fed straight into rifle divisions in order to bring them up to strength for the next advance.

The shortage of infantry towards the end of the war was partly made up by using Polish, Czechoslovak, Romanian and Yugoslav forces to fill out the line.

The Soviet Union was not blessed with an inexhaustible supply of manpower. It was just profligate with the manpower it had.

[ljadw]

Well,if you are looking at the following figues,I doubt there was a manpower crisis .
1 december 1941:
Operational Forces :4.018.068
Stavka reserve :544.616
inoperational forces:4.360.857
1 november 1942:
OF :6.605498
SR:202965
IF:3.800.620
1 january 1944:
OF:6.390046
SR:533110
IF:4.087.081
1 january 1945:
OF:6750149
SR:431838
IF:4226376
Some points
1)That there was an infantry shortage,is a fact,but this happened already in the beginning of the war :the theoretical strength of a préwar rifle division was 14400 men,very quickly,it was decreasing,and already before 1945, a lot of these divisions had a strength of less than 5000 men .But,infantry shortage does not mean manpower crisis.
2)When the Soviets were advancing in 1943-44,all able young men in the liberated regions were immediately called up .
3) The classes that were called up during the war ,(1923,1924,1925,1926,1927)were exceptionally numerous:these classes counted more than 2 million men,while the same German class only had some 550000 men .

[CJK1990]

I don't see the massive numerical superiority usually attributed to the Soviets. In 1942 there were only about 120-130 million Soviets under Stalin's control compared to 115 million Germans, Finns, Hungarians, and Romanians.

[ljadw]

that's irrelevant :how much of these Finns,Hungarians,Romanians were fighting in Russia?
And ,how much Germans ?
Numerical superiority has nothing to do with the population figure:there were 5 Chinese for one Japannese,and,if I am not wrong,the Chinese army did not chase away the Japannese .
And,the SU had a numerical superiority (massive is debatable) against the Germans :the Russian frontstrength was some 6 million,the Germans:less than 3 million

[Paul_Atreides]

3) The classes that were called up during the war ,(1923,1924,1925,1926,1927)were exceptionally numerous:these classes counted more than 2 million men,

During war were mobilized:

1922-23 - 2 222 thousands
1924 - 1 142,8 thousands
1925 - 1 168,9 thousands
1926 - 1 134,2 thousands
1927 - 870,2 thousands

[Paul_Atreides]

the Russian frontstrength was some 6 million,the Germans:less than 3 million

For Germans in 1941-43 not less than 3,5 mln, you forget about LW.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi ljadw,

If you apply Paul Atreides Soviet figures (which average 1,089,683 per year) with your for the Germans (which average 550,000 per year), we get almost a 2:1 ratio.

If one were then to subtract the non-Russian minorities, who amounted to about one third of the total, one is left with a Russian:German ratio of about 1.4:1.

As I said earlier, "For nationalist reasons, the largely reliable core of the Third Reich and the USSR came down to about 80 million Germans and 120 million Russians. The smaller peoples standing between them mostly wanted independence and had more or less negotiable loyalties. In the event, Soviet policy made them more available cannon-fodder for the USSR than Nazi policy did for Germany."

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

Germans also called up mostly not before 1942 the so called "white classes" (ca. 1902 - 1913) and at the beginning they were called up to Ersatz-Heer, only later (maybe yet in 1942, maybe in 1943) to frontline units.

Before that vast majority of German army were classes 1914+ and Landwehr (1901 minus).

[Paul_Atreides]

Hi ljadw,

If you apply Paul Atreides Soviet figures (which average 1,089,683 per year)

Class 1927 wasn't mobilized fully because of end of the war. So average number must be higher - ~ 1 140 thousands.

with your for the Germans (which average 550,000 per year), we get almost a 2:1 ratio.

Though it doesn't matter for ratio.

As I said earlier, "For nationalist reasons, the largely reliable core of the Third Reich and the USSR came down to about 80 million Germans and 120 million Russians.

The 1939 population census.

[ljadw]

Well,I haven't seen any proofs that the non-Russians were considered unreliable by the regime .It's the opposite,Table 121 of "Russia and the USSR in the 20th century -the losses of the armed forces"is giving the % (following the nationality) of those that had been killed
Russians :66,4 % of the total number
Others :33,6 %
Ukrainians :15,9
Bielorussians:2.9
Thus,a third from the killed belonged to the not reliable core .