Total size of the German and Soviet Armed Forces

[CJK1990]

I'm still not sure how it ultimately squares. The Soviets consistently pumped out more armaments than the Germans, especially in 1942, so how could the labor devoted be proportionately smaller? And you still have to factor in Hungary, Romania, and Finland as well.

[Qvist]

I'm still not sure how it ultimately squares. The Soviets consistently pumped out more armaments than the Germans, especially in 1942, so how could the labor devoted be proportionately smaller? And you still have to factor in Hungary, Romania, and Finland as well.

No, they did not pump out more armaments than the Germans, the overall volume of German armaments production was significantly larger, as was the overall size of the German economy. It was also a lot more diverse, which is why you get greatly superior Soviet output figures in the limited range of items they focussed on.

Hungary, Romania and Finland are irrelevant to the issue of German manpower. Finns, Romanians and Hungarians did not man German military units, nor German factories. Each of these states of course produced their own military forces, which to varying degrees made some contribution on the Eastern front, but that's a different matter. As well as a relatively marginal one. The Finnish front was essentially passive for nearly the whole campaign. The Romanians made a significant contribution mainly in the summer of 1941, fall of 1942 and spring of 1944, between which they fielded fairly marginal forces with limited combat power. The Hungarians were a factor only in the fall and winter of 1942, and again to a limited extent in late 1944. The contribution of these states to Axis combat power in the east was in no proportion whatsoever to their population, and it is entirely meaningless also for that reason to add those to the German general population. Again. This is the sort of thing that only makes sense as long as you are happy to operate in the fairytale land of cajoling historical meaning out of global demographics.

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

hence added something in the vicinity of 5 million men over that period.

You derived this figure just from casualty data or you have sources which really confirm this number?

2. Static comparison of strength figures tell only a part of the story. Soviet losses consistently vastly exceeded the German, hence the maintenance of their strength levels required the mobilisatoin of much more men than was the case for the German side.

The problem is that this statement of yours come from comparison of casualty data, instead of comparison of numbers of men who were mobilised on both sides. You estimate numbers of mobilised from casualty numbers... ?

3. When both of these things are taken into account, it is very quickly clear that the Soviet manpower stream was indeed massively larger than the flow of German personnell to the Eastern Front.

It would be clear if you had papers confirming this, but it isn't if you just estimate this from other data.

[Paul_Atreides]

On the German side, as already mentioned, they were essentialy already dry when Barbarossa started, except for the new age classes growing into military age and returning convalescents, which was entirely insufficient.

I think you are exaggerating. If we look at M-H's "Das Heer" we'll see that there were 7,4 mln mobilized before Barbarossa and 10,5 mln after.

Proportionately more men could be freed up for the military war effort, all of them could be devoted to the land campaign against Germany and they could be mobilised very quickly because the USSR had an enormous number of trained reservists.

You are mistaken about ''an enormous number of trained reservists''.

[Qvist]

hence added something in the vicinity of 5 million men over that period.

You derived this figure just from casualty data or you have sources which really confirm this number?

2. Static comparison of strength figures tell only a part of the story. Soviet losses consistently vastly exceeded the German, hence the maintenance of their strength levels required the mobilisatoin of much more men than was the case for the German side.

The problem is that this statement of yours come from comparison of casualty data, instead of comparison of numbers of men who were mobilised on both sides. You estimate numbers of mobilised from casualty numbers... ?

3. When both of these things are taken into account, it is very quickly clear that the Soviet manpower stream was indeed massively larger than the flow of German personnell to the Eastern Front.

It would be clear if you had papers confirming this, but it isn't if you just estimate this from other data.

Sure I've derived it from the casualty data, and there is no problem with doing so, it is a perfectly valid method for assessing the overall magnitude of manpower addition. If you have 2 million men at point a), suffer 3 million casualties and end up with 4 million men at point b) subsequently, then you have neccessarily somehow added roughly five million men, including returning sick and wounded. If you didn't, then you neccessarily either wouldn't have 4 million men, or the casualty figure is wrong. Strength development + casualties isn't just a simple way of determining force addition, it is the definition of force addition.

The above was of course just a very rough reckoning, but as pointed out, you could give or take a few million on either side and the point would stand. The point being simply that it is overwhelmingly clear that the Soviet manpower addition completely dwarfed the German.

It would be clear if you had papers confirming this, but it isn't if you just estimate this from other data.

Why? How exactly is that not clear? Do you know of a way to grow from 3 to 6 million strength while suffering about 27 million casualties that only involves adding a number of men that could be remotely comparable to whatever you consider a credible magnitude for the German manpower flow? Certainly I could write a 300-page thesis detailing and documentating the German force flow (actually, I have written such a thesis, at least largely) but it is quite unneccessary for the general point involved here.

EDIT: I do hope it is clear what the nature of fhe point is? This is of course not a measure of the manpower mobilised by the states for war - it is a measure of the manpower addition to the operational army formations on the main front. As such, it is neccessarily more or less all-encompassing to the same extent as the strength and casualty data used.

[Qvist]

On the German side, as already mentioned, they were essentialy already dry when Barbarossa started, except for the new age classes growing into military age and returning convalescents, which was entirely insufficient.

I think you are exaggerating. If we look at M-H's "Das Heer" we'll see that there were 7,4 mln mobilized before Barbarossa and 10,5 mln after.

What do you mean "after"? When was that exactly? The Wehrmacht did not reach that strength until it peaked in late 1943. And if that's what you're referring to, you haven't understood my point.

There was no pool of manpower available to the Wehrmacht by summer-fall 1941 that they could draw on, apart from the new age cohorts as they reached military age. This is consistently reflected in the relevant sources,and is also unsurprisingly the conclusion of analysis drawing on it (such as f.e. Tooze). As I keep pointing out, any additional resources could only come from the several million men who were excempted due to war-important work. But these couldn't just be called up just because the army needed them, unless they wanted armaments output to plummet. They were freed up gradually over the coming years, to the extent they could be replaced with foreign labor and always reluctantly and after much political wrangling. From a manpower perspective, a worker in a munitions factory was already mobilised for the war effort as much as a soldier. And by 1941 there was no manpower slack left in the German war effort.

Actually, though the influx of foreign labor was the general factor that made it possible to call up additional men from the economy at all, what actually governed the rhytm of call-up was rather the extent of crisis at the front - without this leverage, the Wehrmacht was rarely able secure the call-ups they wanted. Hence, it went in stops and starts. The winter of 41/42 saw the first great wave of call-ups, for obvious reasons.Then again in late 1942 and early 1943, following the twin crisis of Stalingrad and Torch and the resulting strategic shock. In both cases, strategic shocks had overturned the whole German strategic calculus, which led to intense wrangling and debate between the armed forces and the various economic authorities which resulted in agreements on further call-ups, such as the 900,000 men-plan in 1942/43. It was a more or less constant issue also in late 1943 and early 1944, when however the number of call-ups subsided, before the disasters of the summer of 1944 resulted in a number major schemes for procuring additional manpower for the forces, and the army in particular.

In short: That there was no manpower slack left in the German war effort in 1941 doesn't mean that it was impossible to find any additional men for the coming years of the war. It just means that doing so was a zero-sum game - procuring additional manpower for one part of the war effort would mean weaknening another part of it. That game could in turn only be circumvented if you had net addition to the manpower pool. This the Germans had, in the form of the annual new age cohorts and foreign labor. And this was what enabled them to continue to generate a significant manpower flow to the Wehrmacht in the coming years without gutting their industrial output.

You are mistaken about ''an enormous number of trained reservists''.

Really? Not sure where I have that from actually, presumably Glantz or Tooze. I'll have to check, in the mean time consider the point suspended if you like. However, it's rather hard to see how it is possible to have a long period of general conscription for a large army like the USSR did without accumulating a considerable number of million men with military training.

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

Sure I've derived it from the casualty data, and there is no problem with doing so, it is a perfectly valid method for assessing the overall magnitude of manpower addition.

Certainly not "perfectly valid" since the casualty data you used is dubious.

You should base this on documents showing how many were mobilised - quite simple.

BTW - your estimations of reinforcements sent to the Eastern Front include also those who returned to duty after being wounded or sick. And for the Germans your estimate say just 5 - 6 million. What do you think how many of these 5 - 6 million returned after being wounded or sick? Maybe some of them returned more than once?

If your numbers are correct then German reinforcements to the Eastern Front during the entire war were minimal.

[CJK1990]

No, they did not pump out more armaments than the Germans, the overall volume of German armaments production was significantly larger, as was the overall size of the German economy. It was also a lot more diverse, which is why you get greatly superior Soviet output figures in the limited range of items they focussed on.

I'm not sure what you are talking about. The Soviets consistently produced more tanks, airplanes, and artillery pieces than the Germans did in 1942-44.

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

Sure I've derived it from the casualty data, and there is no problem with doing so, it is a perfectly valid method for assessing the overall magnitude of manpower addition.

The problem being this number of 3 million casualties is more than dubious.

And I already wrote something about this for example here:

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... w#p1545716

OKW reports - on which you base - seems to have the lowest casualty numbers out of all reporting channels.

How comes that Armies almost always reported their own losses as higher than OKW reported their losses?

You also claim that these 3 million casualties already include sick - which is completely not true.

Remember also that some of the wounded return to duty. Some of them even more than once.

Another thing is that apart from casualties you would have to include also discharged from service for other reasons (for example being too old) to your count to receive accurate numbers of real manpower changes.

BTW - what did Overmans write about number of war invalids in Germany after WW2?

This number of war invalids indicates that there were much more wounded. Also comparing post-WW2 Krivosheev's data to WW2 OKW data is wrong because these figures have different nature. Krivosheev presents already - at least partially - verified (and in most cases this verification increased numbers) data. OKW - not.

And I'd like to know what exactly does your number of 27 million Soviet casualties include.

Because if it includes also for example POWs who were recaptured during the war, it would be another thing which makes your estimation as unreliable, considering that most of them probably returned to service.

This is of course not a measure of the manpower mobilised by the states for war - it is a measure of the manpower addition to the operational army formations on the main front.

And if your estimate is right then German effort on the main front compared to overall effort was surprisingly tiny.

As I keep pointing out, any additional resources could only come from the several million men who were excempted due to war-important work. But these couldn't just be called up just because the army needed them, unless they wanted armaments output to plummet.

So foreign forced-labourers and German women could not work in war industry or other war-important work?

Strength development + casualties isn't just a simple way of determining force addition, it is the definition of force addition.

Not exactly. Documents concerning force addition + documents concerning force strength are.

The above was of course just a very rough reckoning, but as pointed out, you could give or take a few million on either side and the point would stand.

In the post from 8:33 you claimed 3 million German casualties compared to 27 million Soviet casualties...

So I guess it would be the matter of a bit more than just adding "a few million" to "either" side...

Do you consider these numbers (3 and 27) comparable to each other? Then exactly what do they include?

=====================================

BTW - are there no documents devoted directly to manpower flow that you have to rely on estimates?

[ljadw]

No, they did not pump out more armaments than the Germans, the overall volume of German armaments production was significantly larger, as was the overall size of the German economy. It was also a lot more diverse, which is why you get greatly superior Soviet output figures in the limited range of items they focussed on.

I'm not sure what you are talking about. The Soviets consistently produced more tanks, airplanes, and artillery pieces than the Germans did in 1942-44.

I thought it was obvious :tanks,airplanes and artillery pieces are those things in the limited range of items they focussed on :the SU did not produce UBoats,only a few antiaircraft weapons (the Russian cities were not subject to air attacks,as the German ones )

[ljadw]

And,I forgot,there also was the Atlantikwall ,and a lot of resources were used to make oil from coal .

[ljadw]

It is obvious that the SU was mobilizing and sending to the front much more men than the Germans .
In june 1941,the Soviet forces were some 5.4 million,the operational forces some 2.7 (without the Stavka reserve)
In december 1941,it was 8.9,operational forces (without Stavka reserve) 4 million.
The Soviet Combat losses in 1941 were some 4.2 million (irrecoverable losses 3 .1 million).
It is very easy to see that the SU was mobilizing in 1941 some 7 million men,and,was sending to the front:4.4 million
The German figures are also a wellknown fact :they lost some O.83 million (combatlosses) ,and some 0.5 million were sent to the front .
About Overmans:I am surprised that someone would use him to argue that the German losses were bigger .There is a crtique of Overmans available on the net .

[ljadw]

If one would look at the AHF,one should see the Russian losses(derived from Krivosheev)
these are (combat losses):
1941 :4.2
1942:6.6
1943:6.9
1944:5.7
1945:2.6
The German figures for the same years are:
0.83 million
1.1 million
1.6 million
2 million
There is nothing reliable for 1945.

[Qvist]

Certainly not "perfectly valid" since the casualty data you used is dubious.

The quality of the data is irrelevant to the issue of whether the method is valid or not, so kindly don't mix separate issues. I stated quite clearly that I gave rough figures, because that is quite sufficient for the purpose of the point made. I can provide more precisely accurate ones if neccessary, but they will not make a different point. I suggest you try to deal with the point as made.

You should base this on documents showing how many were mobilised - quite simple.

Sorry, but in that case you do not understand the point made. The number of men mobilised can easily enough be given, but it is an entirely different issue from the force addition to the field formations on the eastern front.

BTW - your estimations of reinforcements sent to the Eastern Front include also those who returned to duty after being wounded or sick.

You don't say. Perhaps that was why I stated more than once that that was the case?

And for the Germans your estimate say just 5 - 6 million. What do you think how many of these 5 - 6 million returned after being wounded or sick? Maybe some of them returned more than once?

Certainly. And? Is that really so difficult to get one's head around? You could of course attempt to isolate out that portion of the force addition and deal only in uniquely first-time additions, and similarly waste your time figuring out what part of the losses exactly consisted in casualties that were permanent losses, but that would merely achieve exactly the same thing in a vastly more complicated and considerably less reliable way. This method of assessment makes no distinction between temporary and permanent losses, and with 100% certainty catches returnees with absolute precision. The beauty of it, you see, is that the strength development (once casualties are considered against it) is in effect the net result of every factor impinging on the situation.

Genesene normally amounted to ~50,000 men or so in a month, and a fairly typical level of replacements (including Genesene) would be somewhere around 100,000. Additionally of course, reinforcing divisions and whole units which added considerably to that.

If your numbers are correct then German reinforcements to the Eastern Front during the entire war were minimal.

[/quote]

My numbers are correct - German force addition was of roughly that order. 5-6 million men were hardly minimal, but it certainly was a very great deal smaller than the Soviet. But what else would you expect, given 3 1/2 years of consistently losing 3-5 times as many men as the Germans did? That requires a corresponding superiority in force addition just to maintain balance. And the Red Army did more than maintain balance.

Really, these are not well thought-through objections.

[Qvist]

No, they did not pump out more armaments than the Germans, the overall volume of German armaments production was significantly larger, as was the overall size of the German economy. It was also a lot more diverse, which is why you get greatly superior Soviet output figures in the limited range of items they focussed on.

I'm not sure what you are talking about. The Soviets consistently produced more tanks, airplanes, and artillery pieces than the Germans did in 1942-44.

Yes, but armaments production is not equivalent to just tanks, airplanes and artillery pieces. They also produced a lot less of items like ammunition, naval vessels and trucks, which were major components of the German armaments production.