The crossing of the Niemen 23jun41 XXXIX. PzK

[tigre]

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The crossing of the Niemen river by Olita 1941.

The point of impact of the XXXIX AK (Mot) was aimed at crossing the Neman at Olita (Alytus), while the 12th Panzer Division of the LVII AK (Mot) was moving towards the crossing of the same river at Merkine. An important advantage of the 3rd Tank Group was the lack of water barriers right on the border. The tank groups of Guderian and Kleist needed to force the Bug, and there was no such obstacle on the way of the Hoth Group. Mobile units of the XXXIX AK (Mot) were lined up shoulder to shoulder at the border, the 20th and 7th tank divisions and the 20th motorized division. The decision was typical of German military thought: to assign a narrow but independent line of offensive to tank divisions. The luxury of marching along the highway went to the 7th, and the 20th, moving along country roads.

In the first echelon of the 20th TD, attacked two motorized infantry regiments. After crossing the border line, the 20th tank division reported: “At 03:05 hours the strike groups cross the border and quickly attack the border posts occupied by only small forces. Only in Santake (Сантаке) does it come to violent street battles with casualties on both sides”. The 8th frontier post was the enemy of the German motorized riflemen in Santake. The head of the outpost, Lieutenant F. N. Platoshkin, was missing. The neighboring 9th frontier post at Rykatseya, Lieutenant I.V. Sereda, was also destroyed, the commander was missing.

At 07:00 hours came the order for employment a tank regiment of the 20. Pz, the attack continues with the support of armored vehicles. The 2nd battalion of the 366th Rifle Regiment, of the 126th Rifle Div saddles the Suwalki-Kalvariya highway, which remains in the strip of the neighboring 7. Pz, so the 20. Pz encounters weak resistance. The direction of the offensive was chosen quite correctly - the Sheshupa river with a marshy valley covers the flank of the attack. Although in the conditions of 1941, this precaution is excessive. By 10:30 hours, the 20. Pz breaks through to Kalvariya.

A veteran division of the battle for France, called the "Phantom Division", the 7. Pz also launched a tankless offensive. In the first echelon of the division there were two regiments of motorized infantry. The offensive of the 7. Pz started on time, at 03:05 Berlin time. Already in the first hours of the invasion, the heavy artillery fired on Kalvarija, a city 15 km from the border. The fire led by heavy howitzers 21 cm Mörser 18 of Art. Abt. 733 and 150 mm howitzers from Art. Abt 620. At 05:22 hours, the artillery attacked the Soviet units marching on the Suwalki-Kalvarija road. There were not even border posts in the sector of the offensive of the 7. Pz, only individual positions of the border guards, therefore, one hour after the outbreak of hostilities, the PR 25 was ordered to cross the border. Passing Kalvarija, the 7 and 20. Pz, turned east. The report of the 20. Pz says directly: "East of Kalvarija, the division finds no foe worthy of mention."

Sources: http://iknigi.net/avtor-aleksey-isaev/1 ... age-6.html
http://imf.forum24.ru/?1-2-0-00000010-000-40-0

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

Hello to all ; more...................

The crossing of the Niemen river by Olita 1941.

At the same time, the 20. ID (Mot) experienced completely the difficulties of moving outside the main roads. When describing the difficulties to move, the large masses of mobile equipment of the unit was emphasized: the impossibility of moving quickly with a motorized division in a sector where there is only a single road suitable for movement, so that even a weak opponent, making proper and intelligent use of the ground can delay a unit for several hours. "

A side effect of entering combat with all units at once was the grasping of enemy forces. For example, the 20. ID (Mot), which was advancing south of the Kalvariya-Alytus road, found some of the Soviet units that remained in the attack area of ​​the XXXIX AK (Mot). In the Skovogol area (south of Simno), around 14:30 hours, the Kradsch. Btl. 30 was confronted with an "entrenched enemy" and attacked it. However, the motorcyclists were not enough, and the III. Battalion IR 90 (Mot), reinforced by two artillery groups, was engaged from the reserve, which allowed to reject the Soviet infantry to the south. Part of the forces of Kradsch. Btl 30 remained as security.

Meanwhile, the 7. Panzer Division, which won Kalvariya, advanced quickly towards Alytus. The only concern was caused by a report of aerial observation about small groups of Soviet troops moving to the Niemen. In reality they were unarmed builders of fortifications that were launched towards the rear. The task of the armored divisions was to achieve a fast breakthrough towards the river, before it becomes an important line of defense.

The bridges in Alytus were guarded by the garrisons of the 7th Company of the 84th Regiment of the 9th Division of the NKVD troops under the command of Lieutenant MA Chernikov. The strenght was 21 men for each bridge (north and south, rail). At approximately 13:00 hours on June 22, the combat vehicles of the III. / PR 25 of the 7. Pz advanced towards the north bridge in Alytus. According to the memoirs of a participant in those battles, the German tanker Horst Orlov: "After about 20 tanks of the III. Battalion crossed the bridge, the 21st was hit by a Russian tank from a well camouflaged position near the bridge that was not detected by the German tanks. After that, the Russian tank rushed back to his unit. About 30 German tanks were scattered over a large area. Several tanks, including mine, tried to destroy the Russian tank with the help of a 37mm cannon. However, these attempts had no effect on the T-34, which we saw for the first time. "

However, the Soviet tanks in the city were not enough, and the Germans managed to form a bridgehead. Soon the German tanks will get the support of the motorized infantry thanks to the motorcyclists of Kradsch. Btl. 7 of his division. To the south bridge, first a company arrived, and then the whole II./ PR 25 of the 7.Pz. Later, the Germans wrote that an order was seized from a captured Soviet sapper officer ordering the blowing up of the bridges at 19:00 hours on June 22. This allowed them to conjecture that "not a single Soviet military commander made an independent decision to destroy the crosses and bridges". However, deciding to blast the bridge quite far from the border a few hours after the start of the war was not so easy, since the Soviet units withdrew from the border through the bridges. Blowing up the bridges in front of their noses would be a bad idea.

Sources: http://iknigi.net/avtor-aleksey-isaev/1 ... age-6.html
https://www.miestai.net/forumas/forum/b ... 29&page=11

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

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The crossing of the Niemen river by Olita 1941.

Following the successful capture of the bridges in Alytus, Hoth issues an order to move further east. In the war diary of the 3rd Armored Group specified: "The command of the armored group intends to move as far as possible from the Neman from the first day. The use of surprise. The LVII AK is directed to Verenov [Varenai], the XXXIX AK to Vilna [Vilnius]. " However, this ambitious plan was not destined to become a reality. The advance to Vilnius on the first day of the war did not take place.

It must be said that the Soviet version of the battle near Alytus differs significantly from the image of the quick capture of bridges painted by the Germans. Thus, according to the article by Dr. M. Yezhov, Doctor of Historical Sciences, "Tank battle on the first day of the war", the Germans were greeted with fire on the outskirts of Alytus: "... by order of the command of the 11th Army, the 5th Tank Division advanced to the western edge of Neman for the defense of the bridge positions ... "Accordingly, the bridges, as per this version, were taken in combat, with intensive aviation support: "... However the Chief of Staff of the 3rd Mechanized Corps, PA Rotmistrov, whom Yezhov refers to in his article, does not build any intricate cause-and-effect relationship of the failure. In his memoirs there is not a single word about the battles in the approaching to Alytus, on the west bank of the Neman. Rotmistrov wrote the following: "The commander of the division, Colonel F. F. Fedorov, managed to push to the bridge in Alytus only the artillery of the 5th Motorized Rifle Regiment, an independent antiaircraft artillery group and the 2nd battalion of the 9th Tank Regiment. The artillerymen and the tanks' crew, letting the tanks of the enemy cross between 200 and 300 meters, opened direct fire. In the 30-40 minutes of battle, they destroyed 16 enemy vehicles and temporarily stopped the tank column of the Fascist Motorized XXXIX Corps. "In this version there is no longer any conflict with the documents of the 3rd Armored Group. Colonel Fedorov advances to the bridge after its capture and delays the development of the offensive from the bridgehead on the eastern bank, eliminating a certain number of enemy tanks.

Therefore, for the Soviet troops, the battle was developed according to the scenario of "attack to the bridgehead", and not to the "defense of the bridgehead position". On the afternoon of June 22, the armored division of F. F. Fedorov launched a series of attacks on the enemy bridgeheads, but all failed. It should be recognized here that the withdrawal of the 5th Tank Division from Alytus was a fateful decision of the Northwest Front Command, however the decision of F. I. Kuznetsov with regard to the 5th TD, on the one hand, was quite reasonable. Who, if not him, knew that on the left flank of the 11th Army there were weak and isolated forces of individual battalions. In the center of the army deployment of V.I. Morozov, near Kaunas, at least there were reserves coming from inland (units such as the 23rd and 126th Rifle Div). The Niemen limit from Alytus to Druskininkai did not have effective coverage. In this context, the 5th TD was shifted from Alytus to cover the Niemen on a 40-kilometer front.

Sources: https://iknigi.net/avtor-aleksey-isaev/ ... age-6.html
https://www.miestai.net/forumas/forum/b ... 29&page=11

Cheers. Raúl M .

[tigre]

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The crossing of the Niemen river by Olita 1941.

In the conditions of shortage of forces, the Soviet command needed to choose the concept of building defense. Either the retention of key points, or the curtain on a broad front. The choice of the first option seemed to be more promising: major bridges and road junctions were attacked first. Therefore, the presence of forces in such key points, enough to protect them, would give a definite advantage. In any case, the withdrawal of almost all of the 5th TD of Alytus was one of the decisions of the Soviet command on June 22, 1941, which led to serious consequences.

It should also be noted that the reformed units of the armies of the Baltic republics became a real headache for the Northwest Front command. The Chief of Staff of the 29th Territorial Corps, Tishchenko, recalled: "... we face the question of withdrawing our troops to Vilna, closer to our base. At the same time, a sense of discipline required that the authorities give the order, and there was no connection with it. At night, after the continuous calls on the radio, the district headquarters responded suddenly and transmitted a short encryption. It said: "Commander of the 29th Rifle Corps. Retire to Vilna, taking all measures to avoid an uprising in Corps parts. Kuznetsov. Dibrova

An interesting question is the moment of the departure of the 5th TD of Alytus. Here, a lieutenant and sapper who served in the mentioned tank division reported: "The tank regiment advanced on June 18 or 19 to the east. The infantry regiment remained first in Olita. He left the city around 14:00 hours on June 21. "In the following interrogation, he clarified:" Already in the morning at 05:00, after receiving an order to repair the road to the barracks, damaged by a bomb, the division began to leave Olita. There were no signs of offensive. He believed that the division should have moved north. "Here Kozin is wrong: the division headed south, towards Merkin and Druskininkai.

Lieutenant Kozin was generally very talkative and informed the Germans about the new KV-2 tank and its technical data. This is doubly surprising in view of the fact that the KV-2 never existed in the 5th Tank Division, in this division there were T-34 and KV-1 with an F-32 cannon. However, the talkative lieutenant did not even give a clue about these armored vehicles. Perhaps the prisoner deliberately distorted his name, title and position. There were such examples.

The capture of the bridges in Alytus forced the units of the 5th DT to return to the just abandoned city and counterattack the bridgeheads conquered by the enemy. Despite the fact that they won the first round with the capture and retention of the bridgeheads, the German attempts to get out of the bridgeheads were also initially unsuccessful. The command of the Armored Group planned to "move as far as possible from the Niemen on the first day". However, the Soviet tanks took advantageous positions in the reverse slopes of the heights in the approaches to Alytus. As recalled by the tanker of the 7th Panzer Division, Horst Orlov, an attempt to move eastward from the southern bridgehead immediately led to the loss of six tanks. They were victims of an ambush by Soviet tanks.

Sources: https://iknigi.net/avtor-aleksey-isaev/ ... age-6.html
https://www.miestai.net/forumas/forum/b ... 29&page=11

Cheers. Raúl M .

[Max Payload]

Later, the Germans wrote that an order was seized from a captured Soviet sapper officer ordering the blowing up of the bridges at 19:00 hours on June 22. This allowed them to conjecture that "not a single Soviet military commander made an independent decision to destroy the crosses and bridges". However, deciding to blast the bridge quite far from the border a few hours after the start of the war was not so easy, since the Soviet units withdrew from the border through the bridges. Blowing up the bridges in front of their noses would be a bad idea.

It seems to have been a combination of strict adherence to orders in fear of the consequences and lack of appreciation of how quickly German forces could advance from the frontier. As you indicate, no meaningful attempt appears to have been made to confront the panzers west of the bridges. Yet NWF HQ was not ignorant of events in May ’41 and the use of paratroops, so it does seem incredible that no advanced preparations had been made to monitor the western approaches to the town to give the engineers on the bridges adequate time to recognise the potential danger and to delegate to them the authority to act accordingly.

[Art]

There are known historical examples of what happened when people didn't strictly adhered to orders:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of ... 19_October
So blowing up bridges by initiative of a local commanders was simply not considered an option. Note that the Baltic MD's order prescribed to concentrate demolition groups and explosives near bridges. Installation of explosives and preparations for demolition was going to take some time and couldn't be made in a moment anyway.

[tigre]

Hello to all ; thanks for those two complements . More...................

The crossing of the Niemen river by Olita 1941.

At night (June 22), the tanks of the 20th Panzer Division approached Alytus. They were sent to the northern bridgehead with the subordination of an armored regiment and a battalion of motorcyclists to the command of the 7. Panzer Division. At the same time, the tanks that arrived transferred approximately one third of their ammunition to the armored division of Hans Freiherr von Funck. As a result of an intense battle during the day, they consumed most of the ammunition. The arrival of reinforcements changed the balance of power.

However, the units of the Soviet 5th TD did not know about the approach of reinforcements to the enemy, so that in the darkness another attack was made against the bridgehead. The elements of the Feldgendarmerie of the 20th Panzer Division affirmed: "As darkness fell, hostilities resumed in the area of ​​Olita. The enemy artillery opened fire on Olita, the city is on fire. At 22:00 hours, the 20. ID (Mot), with the support of the PR 21, rejected the attacks of the enemy's rearguard against the bridgehead (aerodrome), and as a result suffered certain losses. "

The capture of two bridgeheads in the Niemen at the same time by the Germans gave them some freedom to choose the direction of the main attack. Already on the morning of June 23, the northern bridgehead was "open." In addition, as a result of the capture by the Germans of the bridge in Merkine and the advance to Varenai, the Soviet 5th TD was in danger of being attacked by the flank and the rear. The idea of ​​eliminating the German bridgehead in the Niemen had to be abandoned. The battered units of the Fedorov division began to withdraw from Alytus to the northeast.

In the evening report of the 3rd Panzer Group, the battle near Alytus was described as "the greatest tank battle during the period of this war" for the 7. Panzer Divison (since the beginning of World War II, which began on September 1, 1939). The losses of the Soviet 5th TD were estimated at 70 tanks. Consequently, the losses inherent to the report of the 3rd Pz Gr amounted to 11 tanks, including 4 "heavy" (apparently, Pz Kw IV). It is not entirely clear what the losses mean. Most likely - irreparable. Consequently, the total losses must be at least two or three times greater. According to Soviet data, 16 of the 24 T-28 tanks that participated in the battle, 27 of the 44 T-34 and 30 of the 45 BT-7 were lost. Total of 73 tanks, which fits quite well with the German data.

In the war diary of the 20. Motorized Division, the results of the day were summed up in the following expressions: "The behavior of the enemy: skillfully uses the terrain (masking and earth movements), persistent, cold-blooded, cunning. Allow our soldiers to approach, shoot from grain fields, forests, houses, shelters. Fight in the doomed position until the end. Our soldiers are very sensitive to this kind of war". During the day the losses of the division were 15 dead and 39 wounded.

Sources: https://iknigi.net/avtor-aleksey-isaev/ ... age-6.html
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File ... Panzer.jpg

Cheers. Raúl M .