German logistics in the east

[Larry D.]

Does anyone have details of this divisional/corps level supply system. In the Great War much had been done by light railways.

Normal flow was railhead > Feldmunitionslager > Divisions-Munitionsausgabestelle > Divisions-Einheiten. Transportation to the divisions was done using trucks belonging to the division, or belonging to its Korps, or quasi-independent NSKK trucking units assigned to the Armee. There were a couple of Feldeisenbahnen in Belorussia but none that I am aware of in the Bryansk-Orel-Kursk area. IIRC, there was one in the swampy Nevel – Velizh - Velikye Luki area and another in the Vyazma – Rzhev area.

[julian23]

Donat's study has an illustration in annexe 7 which shows the road the ammmunition follows.
The ammunition supplies in the Heeres Munitionsanstalten travel by train or big truck colums to the Army group ammo dumps or direct by train to the Army ammo dumps. From the army ammo dumps it goes by medium or small truck columns first to the Divisionsumschlagsstelle and then by smalll truck columns to the Divionsausgabestelle or direct by medium or small truck column to the Divisionsausgabestelle. The ammunition can also be transported by train from the army ammo dumps to an offload railway station of the division and then by small transport column to the Divisionsausgabestelle. The troop fetches the ammunition from the Divisionsausgabestelle.

[Leo Niehorster]

Greetings,

Yeeeeeees. About all those trucks moving the goods to the divisions > regiments > battalions > companies …

Many reports by German divisions showed a marked lack of sufficient motor vehicles and/or parts/tires/fuel therefor. East and West Fronts. As the war progressed even Panzer Divisions were forced to resort permanently to horse-drawn carts to link them to the supply depots.

The difference in capacity between horse-drawn and motorized transport is staggering. No wonder that there were supply bottlenecks, especially in the mud and snow months. I don't know offhand what percentage of the year that was, but it had to be pretty high.

One also reads of depots filled to capacity, but not enough or no supplies getting through to the troops. (Of course, soldiers always feel that the depots are full and that they are not getting enough. Probably the Roman legionary felt the same way.)

In addition, some portions of the front got more than others, a typical example is the Fall Blau operation in 1942. The units in Army Group South were filled up to capacity and more, whereas the rest of the East Front was left more or less to its own resources, and only minimally supplied.

Owing to the pace of the advance in 1941 and 1942, the railheads fell far behind the leading units, especially as the tracks had to be relaid and the facilities/installations correspondingly adapted/repaired. So the normal complement of divisional vehicles (both motorized and horse-drawn) quickly proved inadequate. The additional GHQ truck units, the motorized supply column battalions (Nachschub-Kolonnen-Abteilungen (mot)) only partially filled the gaps.

And it is one thing to be dependent for supply upon a nice dual railway line with all the bells and whistles in Germany, and another upon a hastily-relaid, low-capacity, single track (which was not of a comparable standard to start with) somewhere in the Ukraine subject to frequent interruptions from breakdowns, not to mention "partisans".

So, the point I am trying to make (finally ) is that the flow of supplies was not as tidy, swift, or efficient as shown. One thing is production and transport to the operational area, it is quite another to put it into the hands of those using it.

Leo

[Larry D.]

Nice summary, Leo. How many times have we all read about the Wehrmacht's motor transport problems? The Heinz 57 variety of different vehicles of every size, make, age, country of origin imaginable, the impossibility of trying to stock spare parts for this menagerie of vehicles and, as you pointed out, the intolerable conditions near the front that caused them to break down all the time. It was a nightmare scenario that the Fahrkolonnen could hardly be a substitute for.

L.

[steverodgers801]

Do not forget the partisan effort, especially later on. The German army forsaw the issues that would happen once the army went past Smolensk, this is discussed in the US Army historical guide on planning for Barbarossa, which has some good basic numbers on supply. It is not well known that it was the army that decided not to ship winter clothing in 1941, because of the breakdown of supply.

[Der Alte Fritz]

In cases like tbis I tend to look at the more common infantry divisions who had by 1943:
6300 horses
1300 wagons
400 trucks
400 motorcycles
the motorised part was used to transport tbe AT Bn, fuel and workshop companies leaving the horse drawn elements to manage the supply side.

Army and Army Group had more motorised supply units as described above.
The picture that emerges is of a supply system capable of moving large tonnages to the higher level dumps but had a limited capacity from tbere to the fighting units especially in the mobile phases of the fighting.

As a measure of the number of troops involved, there is a story during the retreats in the South, that some officers needed some men so they set up a dummy fuel dump and within a few hours had 5,000 men from all tbe trucks wandering around behind tbe front hoping that no one noticed them

_

[Der Alte Fritz]

The other question that remains is: were the German supply services able to move the supplies from the railhead to the fighting units or is this where we have a potential for supply failures?

We have established that
1) German industry supplied enough ammunition

Point 1 would not be correct as the already mentioned study by Gerhard Donat points out. The main problem was producing enough not only to cover daily usage but also to build up reserves which are necessary for periods of very high usage where what is delivered is lower than what is consumed. In the summer of 1943 the usage of ammunition on the eastern front was so much higher than what was delivered that by the end of august the amounts at the front were lower than the 'Erste Munitionsausstattung'. In september 1943 the Generalquartiermeister judged on 28.09.1943 that "if the heavy fighting on the eastern front continues, the supply of ammunition is not secured"(Donat pp38-39).
Some numbers. In july 1943 2124000 LFH shells were supplied and 3476000 fired. In august it was 285000 supplied and 3674200 fired. In september it was 2350000 supplied and 2893000 fired. For october only 1900000 could be supplied. The Generalquartiermeister judged the situation as serious(Donat p.38).
In november and december measures by the Generalquartiermeister allowed again to deliver 60000 to 70000 tons more to the eastern front than was used so that a certain winter reserve could be attained and the severe ammunition crisis of the fall was overcome(Donat p.39).

But does this mean a supply Shortage or just that we are running through our stocks and am worried?
In general
1941 shortages due to supply infrastructure problems
1942 Fuhrer Target to increase ammunition produce. Low point in middle of year but situation improves towards end.
1943 Stocks build up in Spring but heavy fighting in middle of year depletes these and the increased production. A shell SHORTAGE?
1944 Smaller army and low level of fighting is met by production and stocks.

Is this right? According to Donat?

[julian23]

Donat states that in the summer of 1943 there were for the first time nreakdowns in production because of bombing damage.
He also mentions quality problems at the end of 1943. For 1944 he also mentions difficulties because of breakdowns in production due to bombings. More and more emergency measures had to be taken to increase prodution of particular types of ammunition which were rare.
Saving measures and continuous demand of increase of ammunition produvction were the only means to avoid crisises.
In the report of october 1944 it is stated under point 2 " The supply situation is extraordinary tense. Without notable reserves the ammunition supply has to rely on what enters from production. This is already insufficient and in addition unreliable because of the transport situation in the heimat. THe munition trains allocated to the front are in an increasing measure not ready for loading in time, so that daily it has to be worked with improvisations. In this there are considerable difficulties because of the communications situation."

[ljadw]

A question:
from Lexicon der Wehrmacht
number of daily trains for the AG's in november 1941
AGN:needed 20,arriving :19
AGC:needed 32 ,arriving 16
AGS:needed 22,arriving :15
Is therean explication for the fact that AGC received (comparatively) much less than the others ? Were there more single-track lines in the sector of AGN ?

[Jon G.]

A question:
from Lexicon der Wehrmacht
number of daily trains for the AG's in november 1941
AGN:needed 20,arriving :19
AGC:needed 32 ,arriving 16
AGS:needed 22,arriving :15
Is therean explication for the fact that AGC received (comparatively) much less than the others ? Were there more single-track lines in the sector of AGN ?

Ljadw, could you give us a more precise reference to this item of statistics? A direct link perhaps?*

The numbers you provide are interesting, but I would tend to read them differently than you seem to do. HGM (or AGC if you so prefer) didn't receive comparatively less than the other two army groups - rather, they needed more trains than their southern and northern neighbours, but got roughly the same number of trains through. To me that suggests that the rail net in occupied USSR was not yet up to capacity.

HGN (or AGN) would have been somewhat closer to Germany proper at the time, and would, apart from needing slightly fewer trains, perhaps also have been able to rely on supplies shipped in over the Baltic. The slightly higher number of trains could simply denote trains travelling over shorter distances compared to the trains for the other two HGs.


* How to do it: click your browser's address line while you're on the page you want to link to until the adress line turns blue. Then right-click atop the blue text and select 'copy' (in the language of your browser), then write your AHF post, then hold your mouse over the line in the post where you want to insert your link, right-click and select 'insert' (again in your browser's chosen language)

[Paul_Atreides]

Ljadw, could you give us a more precise reference to this item of statistics? A direct link perhaps?*

Halder, 19.11.41.

[Urmel]

A question:
from Lexicon der Wehrmacht
number of daily trains for the AG's in november 1941
AGN:needed 20,arriving :19
AGC:needed 32 ,arriving 16
AGS:needed 22,arriving :15
Is therean explication for the fact that AGC received (comparatively) much less than the others ? Were there more single-track lines in the sector of AGN ?

AGN simply had a much shorter connection which was also much better in terms of quality, as I understand it. AFAIK AGN was also smaller, could rely on coastal shipping to an extent as Jon points out, and had a better road network to work with.

[ljadw]

I have :
lexicon-der-wehrmacht.de/Soldat/Versorgung-R.
It's a thread of 8 pages,the information is on P 7 (but,without source)
It also mentions,for the whole Ostfront,the following monthly figures:
september :arriving :2093 trains (daily 70)
october:1860,daily 60
november:1701 :57
december:1643 :53
january 1942:1420 :46

[ljadw]

A question:
from Lexicon der Wehrmacht
number of daily trains for the AG's in november 1941
AGN:needed 20,arriving :19
AGC:needed 32 ,arriving 16
AGS:needed 22,arriving :15
Is therean explication for the fact that AGC received (comparatively) much less than the others ? Were there more single-track lines in the sector of AGN ?

AGN simply had a much shorter connection which was also much better in terms of quality, as I understand it. AFAIK AGN was also smaller, could rely on coastal shipping to an extent as Jon points out, and had a better road network to work with.

yes,but,the coastal shipping does not explain why for AGN 95 % of the trains were arriving,and,for AGC only 50 %,and,that AGN received daily 19 trains,and AGN only 15 .
I think that the cause is the railways,but is the problem at the "start points",on the way,or at the end (the railheads)? Sadly enough,ther is nothing to compare with:we don't know how much the different AG's received during the former/later months.If AGC had problems since the beginning,the conclusion is that these were structural,if not:I don't see a reason .

[ljadw]

An other point,but probably for an other topic,I have found on the following source:geschichtsforum.de/f68/winterkleidung-oder-munition-40640, some informations which are contradicting the general belief that the Ostheer did not receive any winterclothing .The source claims that the individuel winterclothing was partially reaching the front in december,and that the special winter equipment was reaching the front in january.(Operation Bogen).This is of course in contradiction with the fact that there were big transportproblems in december and january .
Maybe that some one has information about this operation "Bogen"?