Velikiye Luki 1941

[BDV]

Hello,

I am very confused by the developments involving the german-soviet clashes around Velikiye Luki in July/August 1941 (appears that germans entered the town temporarily, then soviets recaptured and held out for a month). I was wondering whether there is a good resource that clarifies these issues?

[AJFFM]

Glad to be of help.

According to Glantz's excellent Book "Barbarossa Derailed" (vol. 1 pg. 261 and after), Knobelsdorff's 19 Pz. took Velikiye Luki on July 18th by mistake. Orders were to send recon while protecting Nevel but Knobelsdorff decided to attack based on earlier orders from Pz group command.

In the confusion Ershakov's 22nd army (two corps of which were encircled around Nevel and lead the attack to escape) with tanks lauched attacks in Nevel and V. Luki that broke through German lines. Over extended and having already sent a significant number of his troops to support another German division (14th Motor.) Knobelsdorff was forced to retreat on July 20th.

[BDV]

Thank you very much!

P.S. It also means that the 16th army had made very little headway against the Soviets in the July 10-25 timeframe in this direction, so it could not support the spearhead in VLuki.

[JC]

In the middle of July 1941, 19th Panzer Division, which was leading LVII Pz.K. along Panzergruppe 3’s northern flank, was ordered, by OKH, to cooperate with elements of A/G North, to encircle enemy forces along the boundary between the two Army Groups south of Lake Illmann. On 15 July the 19th captured Nevel, this closed the encirclement of the Soviet LI Rifle Corps which was operating west of Nevel. The LI Rifle Corps’ encirclement jeopardized their neighbor, the LXII Rifle Corps, which therefore began to pull back toward the northeast. The next day, the 19th was ordered to attack and take Velikie Luki, toward the northeast. The 19th entered Velikie Luki on 17 July capturing considerable supplies and equipment in an assault that surprised the recently behind-the-lines supply troops. By the night of 19 July the pressure against the entire corps in the Nevel – Lovat River– Velikie Luki area was becoming unbearable, and it was coming from the west, from enemy troops withdrawing eastward in front of German 16th Army units pushing from the west. At 7:00AM on 20 July the 19th was ordered to withdraw from Velikie Luki and pull back to Nevel. Cooperation between A/G North and A/G Center to encircle enemy units on their common boundary south of Lake Illmann never did work out.

JC

[BDV]

... because the 56th panzer corps was busy getting its brains bashed in hundreds of km to the north, around Soltsy. This was part of 4th Panzer Grup's ill fated dash towards Leningrad. He who chases too many rabbits.

Another question in the theater. The Opochka - Pustoshka - VLuki direction crosses extensive marshes (AFAIK historically used as an explanation-excuse by Manstein). However, per Googlemaps, the alternate route through Pushkinskyie Gory and Novorzhev goes through a corridor of open terrain.

Any knowledge whether this resulted from post-WWII land reclamation?

[JC]

... because the 56th panzer corps was busy getting its brains bashed in hundreds of km to the north,

LVI Pz.K. had nothing to do with the attempted encirclement of enemy forces along the boundary between the two Army Groups south of Lake Illmann. 16 AOK was on the south flank of A/G North and therefore had responsibility for the A/G North part of the op.

[BDV]

LVI Pz.K. had nothing to do with the attempted encirclement of enemy forces along the boundary between the two Army Groups south of Lake Illmann. 16 AOK was on the south flank of A/G North and therefore had responsibility for the A/G North part of the op.

I disagree, conducting deep thrusts, that would have met AGC's armored thrusts was beyond the abilities of an infantry formation like the 16th Army. Also by design, german infantry units were light on the heavy artillery required to deal with the entrenched soviet units. The pertinent Directive 21 paragraph is very clear:

"The bulk of the Russian Army stationed in western Russia will be destroyed by daring operations led by deeply penetrating armored spearheads."

So, while the northern flank was AGN's responsibility, only armored units had the capabilities required for meeting the 19th Panzer in Velikyie Luki on July 19th. Ergo, 41st Panzer, 56th Panzer or some hybrid of the two.

[JC]

Nonsence, they should have kept hold of V.Luki and they didn't need LVI Pz.K to do that! Hoth protested at the time that it was better to hold V.Luki than it would be to take it back in a month! He was certainly right about that.

I'm not going to argue doctrine with you, it's all quite clear in retrospect.

[BDV]

they should have kept hold of V.Luki and they didn't need LVI Pz.K to do that!

They most obviously did, otherwise they would not have reported that "By the night of 19 July the pressure against the entire corps in the Nevel – Lovat River– Velikie Luki area was becoming unbearable, and it was coming from the west, from enemy troops withdrawing eastward in front of German 16th Army units pushing from the west."

Hoth protested at the time that it was better to hold V.Luki than it would be to take it back in a month! He was certainly right about that.

Will take the position of the local commander ("the pressure was unbearable") over a glorified deskjockey's wishful thinking.

I'm not going to argue doctrine with you, it's all quite clear in retrospect.

Yup, the classic he who chases two "Velikiye" rabbits, catches none.


P.S. After looking into the description by Glantz of the situation about July 10th, I understand your point on 16th Armee, but it was then a big missed opportunity (mistake) by VLeeb and his AGN underlings.

[GregSingh]

Another question in the theater. The Opochka - Pustoshka - VLuki direction crosses extensive marshes (AFAIK historically used as an explanation-excuse by Manstein). However, per Googlemaps, the alternate route through Pushkinskyie Gory and Novorzhev goes through a corridor of open terrain.

German 1942-43 maps show marshes between Puschkinskije Gory and Noworshew; and no roads...
The same maps show no marshes between Opotschka - Pustoschka - Newel and a major road.

Extensive marshes were east of Newel - Nowosokolniki, although with major west-east roads and railroads.

[BDV]

from Opochka, on Google Maps, extensive marshy terrain to the east and south-east (dark green pockmarked by dark dots - lakes). However, from Pushkinskiye Gory (P. Gory), Novorzhev, Loknya, and ending either at Velikiye Luki or Novosokolniki, it appears there is a open terrain corridor (light green).

Obvious question whether this is due to post-war land reclamation, or was present at the time.

In any case, on July 9th, 8th Panzer was in front of P. Gory, the 3rd motorized was immediately North and Northeast of P. Gory and Totenkopf was in front of Opochka. A strike towards Velikiye Luki via Loknya is possible (TK slipping past Opochka, protecting 8th's right flank, and 3rd mot doing likewise from the Northeast), but only in conjunction with a action from South from the 3rd Panzer group.

pushkinkyie gory.jpg

With AGN's leaders mesmerized by Leningrad (3rd mot. itself moved to 8th's left flank as to assist the 41st panzer in its breakthrough northeast into the Pskov-Ostrov area and beyond), easy to understand how it got overlooked. However this oversight meant that 16th and 18th got stuck slugging it mano-a-mano with the Soviet 27th and 22nd in Pustoshka marshes and 8th in Estonia respectively, VLuki had to be abandoned, and the advance of the 4th Panzer was checked on the Luga by the Soviet 11th.

Also in "Operation Barbarossa 1941 (3): Army Group Center" by Robert Kirchubel, a description similar to that of Glanz of the 19th dash into nothingness. 19th was lucky not to share 8th Panzer's fate of 4 days prior.

[GregSingh]

Pity Germans could not use Google maps in 1941...

The area you mentioned looks clear, because there is no forest there, but as I already pointed out German maps (and also Russian ones) show marshes there in the open. To the contrary the other area (with forests and small lakes) does not have marshes (just small patches) on those maps. But I can't really tell how accurate were those maps back there.

I included German map from Pushkinskiye Gory to Novorzhev - no forest, marshes everywhere.

German 1943 map.jpg

[BDV]

Thank you for the map!

Too bad for the Wehrmacht because 40 km due east from P. Gory the terrain opens up (see the big number of established settlements in the right side of the map). 60 km due east two important regional roads (P58 running East-West, and P51 running North-South) and the big railine from Leningrad to Vitebsk would be intercepted.

Once East of Novorzhev, the 56th Panzer would have the option to swing either north (trapping the 27th Soviet in conjunction with the 41st Panzer corps) or swing South (trapping the 22nd in conjunction with AGC's 19th Panzer Division). Maybe both, given the weakness and discombobulation of the Soviet forces in the area.

Score one early point for the Soviet maskirova?

PGory East.jpg

[AJFFM]

Here is the thing, those distances are simply too great to cover by an overstretched armoured Corps suffering from poor supply routes behind it (Glantz mention that all the bridges were successfully blown) and facing mounting well organised (as proven by the successful escape of the 22nd Army) with adequate reserves in the rear (30 series Armies were organising in that region).

It was simply irresponsible for the Germans to move forward and their decision to retreat (given resistance in other fronts facing AGC and AGN especially from the Soviet 16th Army in Smolensk region) was ultimately right. The only guaranteed thing was more Soviet resistance and more casualties.

[BDV]

Here is the thing, those distances are simply too great to cover by an overstretched armoured Corps suffering from poor supply routes behind it (Glantz mention that all the bridges were successfully blown) and facing mounting well organised (as proven by the successful escape of the 22nd Army) with adequate reserves in the rear (30 series Armies were organising in that region).

The 56th (without Totenkopf!) was ordered to get all the way to Velikiye Novgorod. That is not too great to cover?!?

Totenkopf spent the few quiet days following the bloody assault on Opochka building bridges around Porkhov. The Soviets were blowing bridges whichever way Germans advanced.

It was simply irresponsible for the Germans to move forward and their decision to retreat (given resistance in other fronts facing AGC and AGN especially from the Soviet 16th Army in Smolensk region) was ultimately right.

However the 19th Panzer made it all the way to V.Luki and had to withdraw only when no help was forthcoming. Also, I was unaware of either 56th Panzer Corps and 16th army having anything to do (even indirectly) with the Smolensk pocket (its formation and/or liquidation). Care to clarify?

Also, the decision was not to withdraw but to pursue a different objective, namely the acquisition of jump-off points for the storming of Leningrad.

BTW, if Soviet maps are to be believed, elements of 3rd (mot) were within 10 miles of Novorzhev on the evening of July 9th, i.e. in excellent position to cut off Soviet forces in the Pushkinskiye Gory area.

The only guaranteed thing was more Soviet resistance and more casualties.

I disagree, separating infantry from armor, when they were in as good as possible position to help each other was a major blunder, most likely explained by the AGN generals being blinded by a most shiny object(ive), Leningrad. A blunder that, while not causing, facilitated Soviet successful resistance north of Riga Moscow line. That, more than anything guaranteed more Soviet resistance and casualties.