Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

[MarkN]

tl;dr of the data available, Dniester become an impassable obstacle simultaneously and at the same time as units of the Twelfth Army were repurposed for Maritsa.

The 12.Armee was not "repurposed for Maritsa [sic]". Operation Marita was given the formal go-ahead before Barbarossa.

Therefore, the initial desired start date for Barbarossa (15 May) was either a random date chose by Hitler or one that the generals had calculated in the full knowledge that Operation Marita was also on the table. If delay to Barbarossa was had anything to do with Marita, then it implies the Greek adventure turned out badly for the Germans. Did it?

However, you may wish to consider the last minute impact of Unternehmen 25.

[MarkN]

Only one PZ div was involved with Greece.

Only one? Strange! I have the KTBs of three pantser divisions operating in Greece: 2., 5. and 9.Pz.Div.

[ljadw]

tl;dr of the data available, Dniester become an impassable obstacle simultaneously and at the same time as units of the Twelfth Army were repurposed for Maritsa.

The 12.Armee was not "repurposed for Maritsa [sic]". Operation Marita was given the formal go-ahead before Barbarossa.

Therefore, the initial desired start date for Barbarossa (15 May) was either a random date chose by Hitler or one that the generals had calculated in the full knowledge that Operation Marita was also on the table. If delay to Barbarossa was had anything to do with Marita, then it implies the Greek adventure turned out badly for the Germans. Did it?

However, you may wish to consider the last minute impact of Unternehmen 25.

There was ,when Barbarossa was delayed,still no start date for Barbarossa : the start date was depending on the weather,and at that moment (when the decision was taken to invade Yugoslavia) the weather was still uncertain .

[steverodgers801]

The troops for Marita were not needed for Barbarossa. The original date was an estimate based on when the rasputsa would end and not a firm date

[BDV]

The troops for Marita were not needed for Barbarossa. The original date was an estimate based on when the rasputsa would end and not a firm date

The Twelfth Army was originally scheduled to perform a double envelopment with the 1st Panzer in Western Ukraine. After Maritsa was ordered and the Twelfth Army was sent to Bulgaria, the Dnestr becomes "impassable".

The Twelfth did not move to a different position in the Barbarossa battle line, but moved to a different theater altogether - the German explanation very much sounds like "sour Dniester grapes."

[MarkN]

The Twelfth Army was originally scheduled to perform a double envelopment with the 1st Panzer in Western Ukraine.

Was that planned before or after Marita had been completed?

After Maritsa was ordered and the Twelfth Army was sent to Bulgaria, the Dnestr becomes "impassable".

Marita was ordered before Barbarossa was ordered.

The Twelfth did not move to a different position in the Barbarossa battle line, but moved to a different theater altogether - the German explanation very much sounds like "sour Dniester grapes."

The 12th stayed in the Balkans and was renamed.

[steverodgers801]

Hitler cancelled the envelopment worried about Soviet reaction. He delayed the advance from Rumania for a week or so, to make sure there were no attacks into Rumania

[BDV]

Hitler cancelled the envelopment worried about Soviet reaction.

What? How?

He delayed the advance from Rumania for a week or so, to make sure there were no attacks into Rumania

There were attacks into Romania, but were fought off by the three infantry armies deployed.

[BDV]

The 12.Armee was not "repurposed for Maritsa". Operation Marita was given the formal go-ahead before Barbarossa.

And the plan for the Twelfth Army to strike from Moldova was put out by the Army in February, long after the formal go-ahead for Marit(s)a.

Therefore, the initial desired start date for Barbarossa (15 May) was either a random date chose by Hitler or one that the generals had calculated in the full knowledge that Operation Marita was also on the table. If delay to Barbarossa was had anything to do with Marita, then it implies the Greek adventure turned out badly for the Germans. Did it?

Significant details were changed in BOTH plans, in my reading of Directives 20 and 21 and comparison with the historical attacks. Also while armored units of the 2nd Army were back in line in time, units of the 12th Army weren't.

To ask is to answer.

However, you may wish to consider the last minute impact of Unternehmen 25.

Fuhrer Directive 25?

[MarkN]

The 12.Armee was not "repurposed for Maritsa". Operation Marita was given the formal go-ahead before Barbarossa.

And the plan for the Twelfth Army to strike from Moldova was put out by the Army in February, long after the formal go-ahead for Marit(s)a.

Indeed.

Weisung Nr.20 (Unternehmen Marita viz Greece) was written on 13 December 1940. It stated no specific date for commencement of the operation and only offered this.
nach Eintreten günstiger Witterung - voraussichtlich im März - diese Kräftegruppe über Bulgarien hinweg zur Besitz nähme der Ägäischen Nordküste und - sollte dies erforderlich sein - des ganzen griechischen Festlandes anzusetzen (Unternehmen Marita).

Weisung Nr.21 (Unternehmen Barbarossa viz Russia) was written on 18 December 1940. It gave 15 May 1941 as kick off.

No doubt there had been much political and military discussion and planning before the two Weisung were issued. However, what cannot be denied is the fact that Marita (Greece) was officially on the books before Barbarossa (Russia). The point of this is simple, the forces planned to be used in the attack on Greece must have either been discounted from the Barbarossa planning or it was assumed Marita would be over in a couple of days with no great losses.

12th Army was the command HQ for Marita and the entry into southern Yugoslavia when that came onto the table.

Are you, BDV, suggesting that in February 1941, the OKW/OKH planned to...
a) be finished with Greece in a very short space of time - thus allowing for 12th Army to reposition for the attack on Ukraine, or
b) have 12th Army commanding both actions simultaneously, or
c) have some other formation commanding Marita and 12th Army was chosen after February 1941?

Moreover, when you use the words 12th Army, are you writing of just the Stab 12. Armee or are you writing of all the various corps and divisions it commands? I mean, moving Stab 12. Armee from one place to another would not be too taxing and would make little change to the outcome of Barbarossa. However, if by 12th Army you mean its entire combat potential, that's a different matter.

Significant details were changed in BOTH plans, in my reading of Directives 20 and 21 and comparison with the historical attacks.

And what were those "significant details".

Also while armored units of the 2nd Army were back in line in time, units of the 12th Army weren't.

And why was that?

[steverodgers801]

Because Hitler made the decision there were no formal reasons why, except his capacity to get nervous about things for no real reason. It is clear that while the Yugoslav campaign may have had some effects on the PZ units, there was no delay of the tank units for a May start. 2nd army was not scheduled to come in until the Pripyat marshes had been cleared and a new army was needed to cover the gap.

[BDV]

Are you, BDV, suggesting that in February 1941, the OKW/OKH planned to...
a) be finished with Greece in a very short space of time - thus allowing for 12th Army to reposition for the attack on Ukraine, or
b) have 12th Army commanding both actions simultaneously, or
c) have some other formation commanding Marita and 12th Army was chosen after February 1941?

I'm not suggesting anything as such. The point being that 2 months after the order for Marit(s)a, German Army was planning to have the 12th army participate in a major envelopment in western Ukraine.

"BDV" Significant details were changed in BOTH plans, in my reading of Directives 20 and 21 and comparison with the historical attacks.
And what were those "significant details".

"Unternehmen 25" and Dniester developing impassability are the most striking to me. Significance is in the eye of the beholder.

And why was that?

I dunno. You have any ideas?

[MarkN]

The point being that 2 months after the order for Marit(s)a, German Army was planning to have the 12th army participate in a major envelopment in western Ukraine.

But what is the relevance of you point? There must be something that you wish to conclude from your statement.

12th Army was assigned to command Operation Marita in December 1940. It commanded said operation in April-May 1941 and then remained in Greece thereafter.

"Unternehmen 25" and Dniester developing impassability are the most striking to me. Significance is in the eye of the beholder.

Neither of which has relevance to Greece. Yet you keep going on about Greece and 12th Army.

I dunno.

If you don't understand the significance/point, bit silly posting your comment to the world, wasn't it?

[Max Payload]

... what cannot be denied is the fact that Marita (Greece) was officially on the books before Barbarossa (Russia). The point of this is simple, the forces planned to be used in the attack on Greece must have either been discounted from the Barbarossa planning or it was assumed Marita would be over in a couple of days with no great losses.

At a military conference on 3 February 1941 it was acknowledged that six panzer divisions would be committed to action in the Balkans, and it was planned that these panzer divisions would be transferred for deployment against the SU. At the same conference Hitler required that a mechanised strike should be conducted by 12th Army from Romania (based an two panzer divisions and a motorised division) as part of the Barbarossa operational plan. Since no reference was made to a revised start date for Barbarossa, this suggests that in early February the assumption was that Operation Marita would be concluded in time for a redeployment of forces, particularly mechanised forces, for operations against the SU. It was not until 18 March that the planned mechanised strike from Romania was abandoned, ostensibly because of anticipated difficulties in reaching and crossing the lower Dnepr from jumping off points on the Prut. Twelve days later, (that is, after the Yugoslav coup) the motorised units which were to have been allocated to the Romanian operation were ordered to be transferred to First Panzer Group. So even on the eve of Operation Marita, when an invasion of Yugoslavia had to be factored into the operational equation, it seems no adverse impact on the timing or scope of Barbarossa was envisaged, but only a revision of AGS's operations from a pincer movement west of the Dnepr to a single scything advance from the northwest down the river's right bank to isolate Southwestern Front. It was not until the end of April that Hitler set 22 June as the start date for Barbarossa. By then it was apparent that ground conditions would be unsuitable for the offensive to begin in mid-May even if the operational deployments could have made in time, but no explanation appears to have been provided for this arbitrary 37 days delay to the original start date. At the end of April Hitler had no idea what the weather or ground conditions would be like at the beginning of June or at any time thereafter. Either he had been advised at the end of the Balkan campaign that it would take OKH and the Luftwaffe an extra five weeks to get their ducks in row (for which I have seen no evidence), or Hitler was somewhat relaxed about the start date and not desperately anxious to get the operation going as soon as the meteorological conditions permitted. Given that it was always envisaged that the operation would be brief, a few months at the most, the latter seems to be the most likely explanation - better to work to a specific timetable and get the details right than to work around unpredictable weather conditions in order to gain a couple of weeks.

[steverodgers801]

Mark, the fact that 12th army was not used in Russia, indicates it was not critical, there were still enough command available to absorb the troops originally assigned to 12th. The battle for Yugoslavia lasted only 10 days, which freed up units assigned to go back to their jump off points