Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

[ljadw]

More info on the German effort to gather information on the SU prior to Barbarossa:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axis_and_ ... telligence

500 aerial reconnaissance flights over 10 months revealed a very accurate picture of Soviet forces up to a depth of 500 km (Smolensk).

No : they did not ,because they could not reveal how weak were the Soviets .

So, you didn't bother to read the link (as usual)?

The Germans had a high degree of accuracy in knowing how many troops, aircraft and the locations of their concentrations and airfields. Its a fact.
It is also a fact that German assumptions regarding Soviet force generation and industrial potential were way off (as I stated pages ago). Putting those 2 together you end up with the operational plan for Barbarossa, in which the Wehrmacht destroyed the Red Army in the Western Districts as planned and then ran up against unforeseen reserves (after which the campaign was pure improvisation, as I stated many times).

To further demolish your foolish argument:
"German strategic planning for the invasion of the Soviet Union, which was referred to under the code names Otto, Fritz, and finally, Barbarossa, began in early July 1940, or shortly after the fall of France{1}. It is unclear exactly when Hitler decided to wage war against the USSR, but it can be said that by July 21, 1940, the German army was committed to finding a military solution for the growing series of problems posed by the Soviet Union{2}. On this date. Hitler held a conference with his service chiefs Brauchitsch (army), Jeschonnek (Goring's representative from the Luftwaffe), Raeder (navy), Keitel, and Jodi (Armed Forces High Command, or OKW) in attendance. During this conference the general framework was established for a future eastern campaign."

"The figures regarding Soviet strength used in the July 21 conference (presumably by Brauchitsch) were provided by Colonel Kinzel's General Staff Intelligence Department (Fremde Heere Ost)"

Can you read that aloud to yourself???

The final step in making the Soviet Union a military target was taken by Hitler at a conference with the OKH and OKW staffs at his palatial Berghof command post high in the Bavarian Alps on July 31, 1940. "
http://militera.lib.ru/h/fugate/02.html

You understand this timeline, no? 21 July is BEFORE 31 July. Admit your error.

1)Fugate is wrong (not for the first time):what happened before december is irrelevant : decision was taken in december .

2) The quantitative figures about the Red Army were useless, because they veiled the qualitative weakness of the Soviets : most tanks,trucks,aircraft,etc,were not operational . When ordered to go west, the Red Army broke down .There was also a big shortage of ammunition, only fuel for a few days, most of the tank korps existed since only a few months, some had to much tanks (for which there were no drivers,nor mechanics....) others had only a few tanks .

Besides : the figures of Kinzel were wrong : as Halder noted in his diary : we expected 150 Soviet divisions, now we have counted already 300 divisions .
But all this was irrelevant : victory of defeat depended in last instance on the willingness /capacity of the Soviet soldier/regime to fight . And nobody could measure this .

The WM destroyed the Red Army in the Western Districts not as planned, but as hoped and this was only temporarily. If everything was going well,execution going following plan, why was Hitler already before 25 july anxious? Why was he hoping on a japanese intervention, whille before 22 june,he had forbidden explicitly to give Japan any information about Barbarossa ?

It was very clear that already in june the German expectations were not coming up : controrary to these expectations,while the Red Army collapsed,the average Ivan continued to fight (as was noted by Halder in his diary)and every day the Red Army became stronger and the Germans became weaker :every one could calculate when the moment arrived when victory was no longer possible,and after a month,Adolf was anxious...We know why :he also was calculating .

[Appleknocker27]

1)Fugate is wrong (not for the first time):what happened before december is irrelevant : decision was taken in december . .

December of? 1939? December 1940 is obviously after July... So what are you saying?

2) The quantitative figures about the Red Army were useless, because they veiled the qualitative weakness of the Soviets

You clearly stated that German Intel was not part of the planning process (qualitative weakness was also assessed in the analysis, used in planning). I proved beyond any doubt they were. Your response it to avoid what was put to you.

Besides : the figures of Kinzel were wrong : as Halder noted in his diary : we expected 150 Soviet divisions, now we have counted already 300 divisions .

You stated the Germans knew this, yet clearly they did not as noted in Halder's diary which you admit to knowing.


You just keep polishing that turd....

[ljadw]

You said that 500 aerial reconnaissance flights over 10 months revealed a very accurate picture of Soviet forces up to a depth of 500 km (Smolensk) :


this is wrong : these flights (1.7 a day) gave no very accurate picture and they did not influence the planning of Barbarossa . Brauchitz (who knew better than you) said that the plans were based on assumptions, thus not on the results of reconnaissance flights . Reconnaissance flights are routine .

There were reconnaissance flights before may 1940 and they did not shape the German planning,nor did the Allied reconnaissance flights shape the planning of MG.Such flights do not reveal the intentions of the enemy commander, the quality of his force, the willingness of his men to fight .

Your attempts to excuse the German failure by blaming intelligence or by blaming the commanders for not following the plans are fruitless .

[BDV]

The stop and argument about direction during the Smolensk pause were because it was clear the Germans did not have the means to go after all three objectives at the same time but no decision was made.

The plan was clear in what progression would objectives be attacked (destruction of armed forces in Baltics and White Russia, Leningrad/Kronstadt, then Moscow). Why was there such a dramatic (and IMO disastrous for Axis) ad-hoc departure from plan? LJADW offers some semblance of explanation.

Personally I incline to think is that the generals panicked and started improvising; the size and difficulty of the task, and the promises they had made to the Fuhrer both played roles. We are reduced to reading tea leaves/ between the lines because the German generals were less than forthcoming about their mistakes (see Erich "120 wristwatches" Manstein's insistence that on July 1st the road to Leningrad was open).

[Yuri]

You understand this timeline, no? 21 July is BEFORE 31 July. Admit your error.

The basic situation is as follows.
1. The USSR was a state with a population of 190 million people.
2. The USSR is a state with an area of 22 million square kilometers.
3. The USSR is a state that has the world's second largest industrial capacity. In this case, the state with the world's first potential (USA), hostile-neutral to Germany.
4. You don't have (and never had) plans for war with the USSR.

And what?, do You believe that in ten days (from 21 to 31 July) intelligence could provide information that could change the decision of Hitler to start a war against the USSR?
If Yes, you are a great humorist.

[BDV]

The basic situation is as follows.
1. The USSR was a state with a population of 190 million people.
2. The USSR is a state with an area of 22 million square kilometers.
3. The USSR is a state that has the world's second largest industrial capacity. In this case, the state with the world's first potential (USA), hostile-neutral to Germany.
4. You don't have (and never had) plans for war with the USSR.

And what?, do You believe that in ten days (from 21 to 31 July) intelligence could provide information that could change the decision of Hitler to start a war against the USSR?

And that's why the time to fight Soviet Union (if ever) was 1940, not 1941, preferably immediately after a bloody Soviet Union invasion of the Baltics and/or Romania.

[steverodgers801]

BDV the decision on priority was not set before the operation started. It was German fantasy that all three would happen because the Soviets would simply collapse and offer no resistance. When that failed then the bickering started. The problem is that despite the claims postwar there is no guarantee that Moscow could be reached before winter and that the capture would end the war.

[ljadw]

Moscow could be reached before the winter if the Soviets were defeated : the capture of Moscow would follow the Soviet defeat , not the opposite : the capture of Moscow would not cause the Soviet defeat .

[BDV]

BDV the decision on priority was not set before the operation started. It was German fantasy that all three would happen because the Soviets would simply collapse and offer no resistance. When that failed then the bickering started. The problem is that despite the claims postwar there is no guarantee that Moscow could be reached before winter and that the capture would end the war.

Barbarossa Directive sets things as plainly as they can be stated, I think. Beyond the mindless adherence to a silly timetable I see no good reason for the July 10 panic , especially given that Soviet Union had >1.5 years of warning.

I disagree that Germany HAD to defeat Soviet Union in one quick campaign. It would have been fantastic, but it turned out even Summer 1943 would have worked.

[steverodgers801]

Jdaw, Ive pointed out why it would be difficult for Germany to take Moscow. There simply wasn't the time to reach the capital before the mud and it would be difficult during the frosts. Surrounding the city I think was beyond German capacity

[Appleknocker27]

You understand this timeline, no? 21 July is BEFORE 31 July. Admit your error.

The basic situation is as follows.
1. The USSR was a state with a population of 190 million people.
2. The USSR is a state with an area of 22 million square kilometers.
3. The USSR is a state that has the world's second largest industrial capacity. In this case, the state with the world's first potential (USA), hostile-neutral to Germany.
4. You don't have (and never had) plans for war with the USSR.

And what?, do You believe that in ten days (from 21 to 31 July) intelligence could provide information that could change the decision of Hitler to start a war against the USSR?
If Yes, you are a great humorist.

Seriously? Perhaps you are not aware that the Abwehr existed since 1920 and was the legacy German Army Intelligence organization from the Imperial era? Are you honestly daft enough to think that German Intel services did not have a dedicated branch whose sole function was to gather information on the Soviet Union? The information is there, 10 days to put a brief together for senior leadership is a more than enough.

[Appleknocker27]

You said that 500 aerial reconnaissance flights over 10 months revealed a very accurate picture of Soviet forces up to a depth of 500 km (Smolensk) :

Correct, and I linked the source that said exactly that. Did you not read it? (as usual)

this is wrong : these flights (1.7 a day) gave no very accurate picture and they did not influence the planning of Barbarossa .

So the Luftwaffe's extraordinary success early in the campaign was by chance? They found the majority of Soviet airfields in the first hours of the campaign and destroyed hundreds of aircraft on the ground by luck? The Germans knew the strength of the Red Army in the Western districts from a crystal ball?

Brauchitz (who knew better than you) said that the plans were based on assumptions, thus not on the results of reconnaissance flights . Reconnaissance flights are routine .

Assumptions are part of the doctrinal planning process and they aren't a wild guess as apparently you are thinking. A planning assumption is based on incomplete information (facts, known capabilities, etc.) coupled with analysis of enemy tendencies and most dangerous course of action. The assumptions are vetted through war games. The end result is a reasonable assumption that can be used for planning. No plan survives first contact with the enemy's main body and is then left as a framework from which to react...

That's COA (course of action) development 101 taught to 2nd Lieutenants. Basically a 22 year old 2LT is a better analyst than you.
To be perfectly clear, recon flights provide basic data, which is refined to information, which is analyzed and the end result part of the bigger picture of enemy capability and most likely course of action.

There were reconnaissance flights before may 1940 and they did not shape the German planning,nor did the Allied reconnaissance flights shape the planning of MG.Such flights do not reveal the intentions of the enemy commander, the quality of his force, the willingness of his men to fight

.

Is that your comprehensive list of Intel requirements? So in your expert opinion what is the value of recon flights? Apparently you are implying there is no value for planning a military campaign?

Your attempts to excuse the German failure by blaming intelligence or by blaming the commanders for not following the plans are fruitless .

Your attempts to dodge and parry the questions and arguments put to you is what is fruitless. Should I do a roll up everything that you've ignored, not answered or just plain been wrong about in this thread?

[ljadw]

The Germans did not know the strength of the Red Army in the Western MD . They originally started from the assumption that the Soviets had only 75 divisions, finally they were convinced that it was 150 ,and reality was that after a few weeks, they were faced by 300 divisions . Thus the claims about the value of the informations from FHO ?

They were wrong about the number of tanks : they guessed 10000 reality was 23000.

On 23 june,the geniusses of FHO claimed the following about the strength of the Red Army in the European part of the SU (which is much more than the Western MD) :

Rifle divisions : 150

Cavalry divisions : 25 1/2

Tank divisions : 7

Mech brigades :38

And what was the truth ?

In the Western MD only :


Rifle divisions : 274

Tank divisions : 40 : NOT 7

Mechanised divisions : 21: THERE WERE NO MECHANISED BRIGADES

Cavalry divisions : 7: NOT 25 1/2

Conclusion : the reports from FHO were totally unreliable .

The reports from KGB/GRU were not better . These bunglers predicted that the LW would commit 12000 aircraft for Barbarossa .

10 years later, the CIA reports were on the same level .And those from today the same .

[ljadw]

The reasonable assumptions used for the planning of Barbarossa did not exist : the Germans knew how strong they were, they knew til at what point they could defeat the Red Army,thus they gambled that the Red Army would not be to strong,and they gambled wrong .

[Appleknocker27]

The Germans did not know the strength of the Red Army in the Western MD . They originally started from the assumption that the Soviets had only 75 divisions, finally they were convinced that it was 150 ,and reality was that after a few weeks, they were faced by 300 divisions . Thus the claims about the value of the informations from FHO ?

Your ability to properly process the details continues to underwhelm...

German Intel stated Soviet "DIVISION EQUIVALENTS" not divisions. The Germans defined that as part of the assumptions that Red Army divisions were smaller, poorly led and had inferior equipment and were thus of lesser combat power. For planning purposes a composite number was arrived at and called division equivalents (250 Soviet divisions = 100 division equivalents). Please do more research before posting, that was an AMATUER mistake.

Are you going to address questions previously put to you?
Are you going to admit errors in your posts that were pointed out and backed by proper source material that was linked?