Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

[Appleknocker27]

The reasonable assumptions used for the planning of Barbarossa did not exist : the Germans knew how strong they were, they knew til at what point they could defeat the Red Army,thus they gambled that the Red Army would not be to strong,and they gambled wrong .

This is your simplistic, unsupported opinion, not shared by anyone. Good thing too, since its horribly incorrect.

[BDV]

recon flights provide basic data, which is refined to information, which is analyzed and the end result part of the bigger picture of enemy capability and most likely course of action.

TBF, that is only for DEPLOYED strength. The additional forces that can be mobilized/called up are much less amenable to evaluation, but Soviets were pretty close to squeezing the maximum out of their population base.

Now, if one would not shoot out of hand thousands of "commissars" and "bolsheviks" and instead dedicate a large team of interrogators to squeezing them of information, one could, with effort, build a detailed picture of the Soviet State's workings and capabilities - extremely useful for a drawn out campaign. We'd laugh about the 'silly Germans' gathering intelligence AFTER the invasion, but it would still beat the historical.

After breaking the front German generals repeatedly rushed their thin strike force forward to plant flags on map, instead of assisting in the elimination of enemy strength, without asking if RKKA was 'playing' by the same rules.

That's why I think that less effort on achieving targets and more focus on destruction of enemy force would have held a higher chance of success.

my MMQB 2c, tho.



P.S.
LJADW's explanation is likely (partially) true; even if minimally true, the repeated German deviations from solid plans and battle openings once the Soviet resistance is not utterly folding (as per plan?) does require an explanation. Not only AGC and the bleeding sausage of Smolensk, but in October again, Guderian having to return to Briansk (also, note, the lack of support from 1st Panzer Army), Erich "120 wristwatches" Manstein in Crimea, and 1st Panzer at Kalinin, too.

[ljadw]

Assumptions are part of the doctrinal planning process and they aren't a wild guess as apparently you are thinking. A planning assumption is based on incomplete information (facts, known capabilities, etc.) coupled with analysis of enemy tendencies and most dangerous course of action. The assumptions are vetted through war games. The end result is a reasonable assumption that can be used for planning. No plan survives first contact with the enemy's main body and is then left as a framework from which to react...


To be perfectly clear, recon flights provide basic data, which is refined to information, which is analyzed and the end result part of the bigger picture of enemy capability and most likely course of action.

Apparently you are implying there is no value for planning a military campaign?

The war games were held after the plans were made and their aim was to confirm that Barbarossa would succeed :war games are not held to prove that the attack will fail .

What they are teaching the cadets of West Point is irrelevant for what happened 75 years ago . The Barbarossa plan was,opposing what you are thinking based on your actual experienced, no frame work : it was not flexible .Everything had to happen as was assumed ,otherwise the campaign would fail .

You are lacking on historical perspective and try to impose the today teachings on what happened 75 years ago . And you always will fail .

One exemple : it is not so that rec flights were giving the Germans a picture of the Soviet capability and course of action . Only a spy at the Kremlin could give the Germans an indication on the Soviet strategy .

[ljadw]

The Germans did not know the strength of the Red Army in the Western MD . They originally started from the assumption that the Soviets had only 75 divisions, finally they were convinced that it was 150 ,and reality was that after a few weeks, they were faced by 300 divisions . Thus the claims about the value of the informations from FHO ?

Your ability to properly process the details continues to underwhelm...

German Intel stated Soviet "DIVISION EQUIVALENTS" not divisions. The Germans defined that as part of the assumptions that Red Army divisions were smaller, poorly led and had inferior equipment and were thus of lesser combat power. For planning purposes a composite number was arrived at and called division equivalents (250 Soviet divisions = 100 division equivalents). Please do more research before posting, that was an AMATUER mistake.

Are you going to address questions previously put to you?
Are you going to admit errors in your posts that were pointed out and backed by proper source material that was linked?

You are wrong (again ) : I have the German text of Operationsetnwurf Ost from 5 august 1940 (drafted by Marcks) and he is talking about divisions, not division equivalents : he guessed that The Soviets could commit against the Ostheer

96 ID

23 CD

and an unknown number of motorised and mechanised brigades .

He also assumed (guessed) that the Red Army would retreat to the DD line,and he was wrong .

[per70]

On 23 june,the geniusses of FHO claimed the following about the strength of the Red Army in the European part of the SU (which is much more than the Western MD) :

Rifle divisions : 150
...

And what was the truth ?

In the Western MD only :

Rifle divisions : 274

Im curious about your source for this figure of 274 Rifle Divisions in the Western MD on 23 June.

For example, the figure from http://www.teatrskazka.com/Raznoe/Boevo ... 10701.html is significantly lower.

[Appleknocker27]

Assumptions are part of the doctrinal planning process and they aren't a wild guess as apparently you are thinking. A planning assumption is based on incomplete information (facts, known capabilities, etc.) coupled with analysis of enemy tendencies and most dangerous course of action. The assumptions are vetted through war games. The end result is a reasonable assumption that can be used for planning. No plan survives first contact with the enemy's main body and is then left as a framework from which to react...


To be perfectly clear, recon flights provide basic data, which is refined to information, which is analyzed and the end result part of the bigger picture of enemy capability and most likely course of action.

Apparently you are implying there is no value for planning a military campaign?

The war games were held after the plans were made and their aim was to confirm that Barbarossa would succeed :war games are not held to prove that the attack will fail .

What they are teaching the cadets of West Point is irrelevant for what happened 75 years ago . The Barbarossa plan was,opposing what you are thinking based on your actual experienced, no frame work : it was not flexible .Everything had to happen as was assumed ,otherwise the campaign would fail . .

Look at this: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/p ... /MR114.pdf

In the context of this:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_ ... ng_Process

After you've digested all of that, wrap your mind around the fact that all of the same planning procedure/elements are contained in H.Dv.300. OKH did everything detailed in those links and did it based on Intel provided by FHO (Abwehr) and various other organizations.

You are lacking on historical perspective and try to impose the today teachings on what happened 75 years ago . And you always will fail .

No, I have a Masters degree in WW2 history from AMU that is 12+ years old....
My professional education as a Field Grade staff officer allows me to identify AND RELATE to the Wehrmacht and Red Army's systems in a way that you as a civilian cannot (I know what a staff estimate is among many other things discussed here and what goes into it since I am trained to do them and have done dozens). That's a fact that apparently you cannot accept. I am a staff officer, so looking at work done by other staff officers whose doctrinal systems I understand in proper historical context isn't too tough to relate to...
I have formal education in historical process and professional training in analysis of military systems, but you resort to trying to dumb it down to meet your argument?

One exemple : it is not so that rec flights were giving the Germans a picture of the Soviet capability and course of action . Only a spy at the Kremlin could give the Germans an indication on the Soviet strategy

Do you always have to oversimplify things or is that really the depth of your understanding? Since when would a recon flight give an enemy strategic course of action (as you are implying)? A recon flight provides Intel that is part of the overall picture and is actually indispensable.

Since you like simple, follow this timeline and understand everything you wrote about intel not forming the basis of the plan is crap. Dir 21 was the end result of strategic planning that was based on Intel estimates, and the OPERATIONAL plan wasn't formulated until AFTER Dir 21 was published:

Initial Discussions (July 1940)
The Marcks Plan (5 August 1940)
Staff Work (August-September 1940)
Strategic Survey (October 1940)
The Preliminary Plan (November-5 December 1940)
Economic Survey (November 1940)
General Staff and Command Post Exercises(November-December 1940)
Directive BARBAROSSA (18 December 1940)
Planning -"The Army's Operation Order (3 February 1941)
-During January 1941 each army group was informed of its mission as stipulated in Directive No. 21 and ordered to carry out intra-command map maneuvers for the purpose of studying the operation plan in detail and examining the proposed courses of action. A number of command post exercises took place at each army group headquarters, and the ideas formulated on these occasions were discussed in great detail during meetings of Army High Command and army group representatives. At a conference that took place in Berlin on 31 January, Field Marshal von Brauchitsch told the commanding generals of the army groups that his plans were based on the assumption (assumption, as described by me earlier) that the Russians would give battle west of the Dnepr-Dvina line." (assumption proven correct)
http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/ ... 104-21.pdf Chaps 1-2

[Appleknocker27]

recon flights provide basic data, which is refined to information, which is analyzed and the end result part of the bigger picture of enemy capability and most likely course of action.

TBF, that is only for DEPLOYED strength. The additional forces that can be mobilized/called up are much less amenable to evaluation, but Soviets were pretty close to squeezing the maximum out of their population base.

That is correct for personnel, but how do you account for equipment? Equipment that requires vehicle parks, warehouses, training/mobilization centers, etc. The scale of the facilities must meet the scale of the personnel in multiple ways. The facilities and equipment are trace signs of reserve force structure and lend some insight into overall strength.

Now, if one would not shoot out of hand thousands of "commissars" and "bolsheviks" and instead dedicate a large team of interrogators to squeezing them of information, one could, with effort, build a detailed picture of the Soviet State's workings and capabilities - extremely useful for a drawn out campaign. We'd laugh about the 'silly Germans' gathering intelligence AFTER the invasion, but it would still beat the historical.

Wholeheartedly agree, but that is politics bleeding into the military's sphere.

After breaking the front German generals repeatedly rushed their thin strike force forward to plant flags on map, instead of assisting in the elimination of enemy strength, without asking if RKKA was 'playing' by the same rules.

Planting flags?

That's why I think that less effort on achieving targets and more focus on destruction of enemy force would have held a higher chance of success.

my MMQB 2c, tho.

Agreed

P.S.
LJADW's explanation is likely (partially) true; even if minimally true, the repeated German deviations from solid plans and battle openings once the Soviet resistance is not utterly folding (as per plan?) does require an explanation. Not only AGC and the bleeding sausage of Smolensk, but in October again, Guderian having to return to Briansk (also, note, the lack of support from 1st Panzer Army), Erich "120 wristwatches" Manstein in Crimea, and 1st Panzer at Kalinin, too.

I agree to a certain extent, but the argument here is about his egregious opinions on Wehrmacht planning. He's wrong, never admits it, ignores evidence and tries to spin the conversation away from his errors. Then he shows up in another thread spewing the same simplistic crap as if no one is the wiser.

Two of the largest German blunders were underestimating Soviet force generation and Soviet industrial capacity to quickly churn out modern weapons in great numbers. There was no precedent in history for this and every sign the Germans had pointed to Soviet incompetence in these areas. So what are the operational commanders to think when their own Intel is telling them "the enemy is down to his last battalion, push on" ?

[Appleknocker27]

You said that 500 aerial reconnaissance flights over 10 months revealed a very accurate picture of Soviet forces up to a depth of 500 km (Smolensk) :


this is wrong : these flights (1.7 a day) gave no very accurate picture and they did not influence the planning of Barbarossa . Brauchitz (who knew better than you) said that the plans were based on assumptions, thus not on the results of reconnaissance flights . Reconnaissance flights are routine .

Squadron Rowehl was formed by the Luftwaffe in 1937 as: Aufkl. Gruppe d. Ob. d.L. to carry out photo-reconnaissance flights above Soviet Union. It used He-111 aircraft, disguised as commercial transports.
- From Spring 1939 the unit opererated from Budapest and flew missions above Kiev, Dnepropetrovsk, Zhitomir, Zaporozhye, Krivoy Rog and Odessa.

- From Januray 1941 they mainly flew missions above the Soviet Union. Their bases were in Seerappen (East Prussia), Czechoslovakia, Poland, Finland, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria. The industrial districs of Moscow and Leningrad were important targets, but also the oil producing region from Maykop to Grozny and Baku as well the western territory of the USSR.

- From 28th April 1941 they operated also from Bardufoss airfield in northern Norway. The first flights went to Murmansk and the railway line leading to the port as well as Arkhangelsk.

More info from: Bloody Triangle: The Defeat of Soviet Armor in the Ukraine, June 1941
https://books.google.com/books?id=dJoR0 ... 22&f=false

keyword: squadron Rowehl

Besides, BARBAROSSA was based on strategic military intelligence that would turn out to be very wrong; Hitler was biting off more than he could chew, and it is hard to demonstrate that the delay in the start of the campaign made a decisive difference in the future course of events.
http://www.vectorsite.net/twsnow_03.html

[ljadw]

There were no German blunders ;talking of German blunders is to deny that the Germans were defeated by the Soviets :they were not defeated by their own blunders :even without blunders they would be defeated . The Soviet force generation was not underestimated, it was assumed it would not happen and this was not a blunder (a blunder is something that causes defeat) but a condition sine qua non for victory . No force generation = victory is possible;if there was force generation,defeat was inevitable .

The Germans knew their own strength : A .

They did not know the Soviet strength.

But the knew that if the Soviets had a strength higher than B,they would be defeated .

Thus they assumed that the Soviet strength would be lower than B .

The German intel did not tell them that the enemy is down to his last batallion(this is only the usual attempt from defeated field commanders to blame some one else for their defeat),the German intel received the order to give an optimistic assessment of the situation. It was the same for the war games : their aim was to prove that Germany would win .

And this was not characteristic of the Germans : during the Vietnam War Johnson was pressured by Congress that was pressured by the liberal media and Johnson "asked" intelligence reports that would prove that victory was closer .He received such reports ;who said that victory was probable under the condition that more men were sent to Vietnam . The white House did not want to hear the truth, it only wanted positive news . And no one wants to be the messenger with bad news .

If Kinzel had said that the Soviet strength was C , Hitler would have said that Germany with a strength A still would defeat the SU with a strength C and Kinzel would leave for a long vacation to a place as Dachau, or Buchenwald,

The German attitude about the chances of Barbarossa was the same as about the chance to win in 1914 .They could win in 1914 only if everything that could cause defeat,would not happen . Thus they assumed that this would not happen .

[Appleknocker27]

The Germans did not know the strength of the Red Army in the Western MD . They originally started from the assumption that the Soviets had only 75 divisions, finally they were convinced that it was 150 ,and reality was that after a few weeks, they were faced by 300 divisions . Thus the claims about the value of the informations from FHO ?

Your ability to properly process the details continues to underwhelm...

German Intel stated Soviet "DIVISION EQUIVALENTS" not divisions. The Germans defined that as part of the assumptions that Red Army divisions were smaller, poorly led and had inferior equipment and were thus of lesser combat power. For planning purposes a composite number was arrived at and called division equivalents (250 Soviet divisions = 100 division equivalents). Please do more research before posting, that was an AMATUER mistake.

Are you going to address questions previously put to you?
Are you going to admit errors in your posts that were pointed out and backed by proper source material that was linked?

You are wrong (again ) : I have the German text of Operationsetnwurf Ost from 5 august 1940 (drafted by Marcks) and he is talking about divisions, not division equivalents : he guessed that The Soviets could commit against the Ostheer

96 ID

23 CD

and an unknown number of motorised and mechanised brigades .

He also assumed (guessed) that the Red Army would retreat to the DD line,and he was wrong .

I see, so you answer one question out of many because you apparently have a source to back yourself up?
You could be right, so please post your source, with a proper quote and citation. I simply went from memory on this issue and based on my earlier post that was linked: http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 7#p1999817
Glantz also speaks in terms of Soviet division equivalents, look in Barbarossa derailed and Stumbling Colossus for proof.
I may have it wrong regarding Soviet division equivalents (which has no bearing on the core issue), lay your evidence out there. Or do you intend to apply this dishonest debate technique next?
"29. Finding small error: Citing a slight error or typo as evidence that everything the opponent says is false or that the opponent is “unprofessional” or incompetent"

[ljadw]

You said that 500 aerial reconnaissance flights over 10 months revealed a very accurate picture of Soviet forces up to a depth of 500 km (Smolensk) :


this is wrong : these flights (1.7 a day) gave no very accurate picture and they did not influence the planning of Barbarossa . Brauchitz (who knew better than you) said that the plans were based on assumptions, thus not on the results of reconnaissance flights . Reconnaissance flights are routine .

Squadron Rowehl was formed by the Luftwaffe in 1937 as: Aufkl. Gruppe d. Ob. d.L. to carry out photo-reconnaissance flights above Soviet Union. It used He-111 aircraft, disguised as commercial transports.
- From Spring 1939 the unit opererated from Budapest and flew missions above Kiev, Dnepropetrovsk, Zhitomir, Zaporozhye, Krivoy Rog and Odessa.

- From Januray 1941 they mainly flew missions above the Soviet Union. Their bases were in Seerappen (East Prussia), Czechoslovakia, Poland, Finland, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria. The industrial districs of Moscow and Leningrad were important targets, but also the oil producing region from Maykop to Grozny and Baku as well the western territory of the USSR.

- From 28th April 1941 they operated also from Bardufoss airfield in northern Norway. The first flights went to Murmansk and the railway line leading to the port as well as Arkhangelsk.

More info from: Bloody Triangle: The Defeat of Soviet Armor in the Ukraine, June 1941
https://books.google.com/books?id=dJoR0 ... 22&f=false

keyword: squadron Rowehl

Besides, BARBAROSSA was based on strategic military intelligence that would turn out to be very wrong; Hitler was biting off more than he could chew, and it is hard to demonstrate that the delay in the start of the campaign made a decisive difference in the future course of events.
http://www.vectorsite.net/twsnow_03.html

I know all this but it does not prove ,as you said, that these flights gave a very accurate picture of Soviet forces . The technology of 1941 did not allow aircraft to make very accurate pictures : there were no U2 aircraft in 1941 .Besides, a picture gives only a instanteneous exposure . And the value of an instanteneous exposure can be high the moment the picture was made, but the day after,the value is going down and after a week,its value has disappeared .

[BDV]

Two of the largest German blunders were underestimating Soviet force generation and Soviet industrial capacity to quickly churn out modern weapons in great numbers. There was no precedent in history for this and every sign the Germans had pointed to Soviet incompetence in these areas.

Victory disease of the worst kind. French were a few weeks away from reaching sustained monthly production of 300+ fighter planes and 300+ modern tanks. Also, soviet weapons had been encountered in Spain, with some significant troubles.

So what are the operational commanders to think when their own Intel is telling them "the enemy is down to his last battalion, push on" ?

This does not add up with their actions, as I keep repeating.

[Appleknocker27]

There were no German blunders ;talking of German blunders is to deny that the Germans were defeated by the Soviets :they were not defeated by their own blunders :even without blunders they would be defeated .

The Germans had a small margin for error, they made mistakes and they failed. Some people call those blunders...

The Soviet force generation was not underestimated, it was assumed it would not happen and this was not a blunder (a blunder is something that causes defeat) but a condition sine qua non for victory . No force generation = victory is possible;if there was force generation,defeat was inevitable .

Soviet force generation was severely underestimated, its a known fact. Move on...

The Germans knew their own strength : A .

They did not know the Soviet strength.

But the knew that if the Soviets had a strength higher than B,they would be defeated .

No....

Thus they assumed that the Soviet strength would be lower than B .

No, but I'll ask again that you support your statements with a source.

The German intel did not tell them that the enemy is down to his last batallion(this is only the usual attempt from defeated field commanders to blame some one else for their defeat),the German intel received the order to give an optimistic assessment of the situation. It was the same for the war games : their aim was to prove that Germany would win .

No, but source please.

If Kinzel had said that the Soviet strength was C , Hitler would have said that Germany with a strength A still would defeat the SU with a strength C and Kinzel would leave for a long vacation to a place as Dachau, or Buchenwald,

Kinzel reported the best information he had. It was inaccurate due to a lack of focus on the SU for 20 years. The information was incomplete, thus reasonable assumptions were based on what was available. What part of that is so hard for you to deal with?

[Appleknocker27]

I know all this but it does not prove ,as you said, that these flights gave a very accurate picture of Soviet forces . The technology of 1941 did not allow aircraft to make very accurate pictures : there were no U2 aircraft in 1941 .Besides, a picture gives only a instanteneous exposure . And the value of an instanteneous exposure can be high the moment the picture was made, but the day after,the value is going down and after a week,its value has disappeared .

I clearly stated it gave them an accurate picture of the Red Army/VVS in the Western Military Districts, no? You are disputing that the Germans had an accurate picture of Soviet strength in the WMD? The assumption was made that the Red Army would fight and that the Germans would destroy the Red Army west of the Dnieper (which constitutes the WMD).

[Appleknocker27]

Two of the largest German blunders were underestimating Soviet force generation and Soviet industrial capacity to quickly churn out modern weapons in great numbers. There was no precedent in history for this and every sign the Germans had pointed to Soviet incompetence in these areas.

Victory disease of the worst kind. French were a few weeks away from reaching sustained monthly production of 300+ fighter planes and 300+ modern tanks. Also, soviet weapons had been encountered in Spain, with some significant .

So what are the operational commanders to think when their own Intel is telling them "the enemy is down to his last battalion, push on" ?

This does not add up with their actions, as I keep repeating.

So your thesis on German field commanders is? I have a good idea what it is and it appears to color all of your analysis.