Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

[ljadw]

The Germans did not know the strength of the Red Army in the Western MD . They originally started from the assumption that the Soviets had only 75 divisions, finally they were convinced that it was 150 ,and reality was that after a few weeks, they were faced by 300 divisions . Thus the claims about the value of the informations from FHO ?

Your ability to properly process the details continues to underwhelm...

German Intel stated Soviet "DIVISION EQUIVALENTS" not divisions. The Germans defined that as part of the assumptions that Red Army divisions were smaller, poorly led and had inferior equipment and were thus of lesser combat power. For planning purposes a composite number was arrived at and called division equivalents (250 Soviet divisions = 100 division equivalents). Please do more research before posting, that was an AMATUER mistake.

Are you going to address questions previously put to you?
Are you going to admit errors in your posts that were pointed out and backed by proper source material that was linked?

You are wrong (again ) : I have the German text of Operationsetnwurf Ost from 5 august 1940 (drafted by Marcks) and he is talking about divisions, not division equivalents : he guessed that The Soviets could commit against the Ostheer

96 ID

23 CD

and an unknown number of motorised and mechanised brigades .

He also assumed (guessed) that the Red Army would retreat to the DD line,and he was wrong .

I see, so you answer one question out of many because you apparently have a source to back yourself up?
You could be right, so please post your source, with a proper quote and citation. I simply went from memory on this issue and based on my earlier post that was linked: http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 7#p1999817
Glantz also speaks in terms of Soviet division equivalents, look in Barbarossa derailed and Stumbling Colossus for proof.
I may have it wrong regarding Soviet division equivalents (which has no bearing on the core issue), lay your evidence out there. Or do you intend to apply this dishonest debate technique next?
"29. Finding small error: Citing a slight error or typo as evidence that everything the opponent says is false or that the opponent is “unprofessional” or incompetent"

1) For this case, Glantz is not a good source

2) My source : Unternehmen Barbarossa (by Walter Post) :Dokument 11 : Generalmajor Marcks:operationsentwurf Ost vom 5 august 1940

PP of the book : 376-384.

On P 376, Marcks writes the following :

Russland besitzt 151 ID, 32 KD, 38 mot.mech.Brigaden .

Von diesen Kräften sind gebunden gegen Japan, Finnland, die Turkei 55 ID, 9 KD, 10mot.mech.Brig.

Gegen Deutschland bleiben 96 ID,23 KD und 28 mot.mech. Brig.

In this (not correct) assessment is the term of division equivalent not used .

[ljadw]

I know all this but it does not prove ,as you said, that these flights gave a very accurate picture of Soviet forces . The technology of 1941 did not allow aircraft to make very accurate pictures : there were no U2 aircraft in 1941 .Besides, a picture gives only a instanteneous exposure . And the value of an instanteneous exposure can be high the moment the picture was made, but the day after,the value is going down and after a week,its value has disappeared .

I clearly stated it gave them an accurate picture of the Red Army/VVS in the Western Military Districts, no? You are disputing that the Germans had an accurate picture of Soviet strength in the WMD? The assumption was made that the Red Army would fight and that the Germans would destroy the Red Army west of the Dnieper (which constitutes the WMD).

It is not because you stated this that it is true .

I am not disputing that the Germans had an accurate picture of Soviet strength in the WMD: the reality is that the Germans had no accurate picture of the Soviet strength in the WMD .Halder said that he expected 150 divisions, but there were very quickly 300 divisions . Marcks guessed that there were no tank divisions, but there were 40 tank divisions, he was thinking of 25 cavalry divisions, there were 7 CD. The picture was wrong and not accurate .

[BDV]

So your thesis on German field commanders is? I have a good idea what it is and it appears to color all of your analysis.

I'm only trying to work out the incongruence between plans, actions, field developments, and wartime and post war statements.

[Appleknocker27]

The Germans did not know the strength of the Red Army in the Western MD . They originally started from the assumption that the Soviets had only 75 divisions, finally they were convinced that it was 150 ,and reality was that after a few weeks, they were faced by 300 divisions . Thus the claims about the value of the informations from FHO ?

Your ability to properly process the details continues to underwhelm...

German Intel stated Soviet "DIVISION EQUIVALENTS" not divisions. The Germans defined that as part of the assumptions that Red Army divisions were smaller, poorly led and had inferior equipment and were thus of lesser combat power. For planning purposes a composite number was arrived at and called division equivalents (250 Soviet divisions = 100 division equivalents). Please do more research before posting, that was an AMATUER mistake.

Are you going to address questions previously put to you?
Are you going to admit errors in your posts that were pointed out and backed by proper source material that was linked?

You are wrong (again ) : I have the German text of Operationsetnwurf Ost from 5 august 1940 (drafted by Marcks) and he is talking about divisions, not division equivalents : he guessed that The Soviets could commit against the Ostheer

96 ID

23 CD

and an unknown number of motorised and mechanised brigades .

He also assumed (guessed) that the Red Army would retreat to the DD line,and he was wrong .

I see, so you answer one question out of many because you apparently have a source to back yourself up?
You could be right, so please post your source, with a proper quote and citation. I simply went from memory on this issue and based on my earlier post that was linked: http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 7#p1999817
Glantz also speaks in terms of Soviet division equivalents, look in Barbarossa derailed and Stumbling Colossus for proof.
I may have it wrong regarding Soviet division equivalents (which has no bearing on the core issue), lay your evidence out there. Or do you intend to apply this dishonest debate technique next?
"29. Finding small error: Citing a slight error or typo as evidence that everything the opponent says is false or that the opponent is “unprofessional” or incompetent"

1) For this case, Glantz is not a good source

2) My source : Unternehmen Barbarossa (by Walter Post) :Dokument 11 : Generalmajor Marcks:operationsentwurf Ost vom 5 august 1940

PP of the book : 376-384.

On P 376, Marcks writes the following :

Russland besitzt 151 ID, 32 KD, 38 mot.mech.Brigaden .

Von diesen Kräften sind gebunden gegen Japan, Finnland, die Turkei 55 ID, 9 KD, 10mot.mech.Brig.

Gegen Deutschland bleiben 96 ID,23 KD und 28 mot.mech. Brig.

In this (not correct) assessment is the term of division equivalent not used .

Fair enough. See what I did there? A humble acknowledgement that my information was inaccurate. Try it sometime, people with think more of you. Considering the long list of errors you've made just in this thread and that in 10 years you've NEVER once admitted an single error.

[Appleknocker27]

So your thesis on German field commanders is? I have a good idea what it is and it appears to color all of your analysis.

I'm only trying to work out the incongruence between plans, actions, field developments, and wartime and post war statements.

I get that, you seem to paint with a pretty broad brush and make pre-judgments while holding some field commanders in contempt. Its not uncommon and from what I've personally seen, not unjustified in some cases. I think we're basically on the same page.

[Appleknocker27]

It is not because you stated this that it is true .

I am not disputing that the Germans had an accurate picture of Soviet strength in the WMD: the reality is that the Germans had no accurate picture of the Soviet strength in the WMD .Halder said that he expected 150 divisions, but there were very quickly 300 divisions . Marcks guessed that there were no tank divisions, but there were 40 tank divisions, he was thinking of 25 cavalry divisions, there were 7 CD. The picture was wrong and not accurate .

The Germans continued to adjust their estimates, plans/targets up until 22 June. So why do you bother to mention the Marcks plan which was a year old by then and based on Intel available at that time. Clearly there were more overflights, more radio intercepts, etc. and the Germans had better up to date Intel by the time the campaign started. You are trying to move the goal posts, denied.

In October 1940, the strategic survey revealed:
"d. Intelligence Information. The intelligence picture revealed two major Russian concentrations-one in the Ukraine of about 70 divisions and the other in White Russia near and west of Minsk of some 60 divisions. There appeared to be only 30 divisions in the Baltic States."
http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/ ... 104-21.pdf

That was October 1940, the Soviets had 170 some divisions in the WMD in June 1941. So the Germans knew they had somewhere near 160 in October and also where the airfields, supply depots, etc. were but you feel they didn't?

[ljadw]

And in july 1941 there were 300 divisions .Thus ?


The Germans didn't know of the system of the "invisible " divisions .

[ljadw]

Besides ,all this is not very important : in last instance the Barbarossa info was not decisive and one can not blame FHO for its failure:its failure was a given ,unless there was a miracle .

If on 1 june, the local tv station in Tulsa was forecasting good weather,but suddenly there was a big storm and Tulsa was destroyed, one could not blame the tv station (although given the US law system, people would sue the station for hundreds of millions )because a warning would not prevent the storm .

The Soviet superiority would not disappear if the Germans knew of it .

Other point : what was the importance of knowing that the MD of the Baltics had 26 divisions, the WMD 44 ,Kiev 58 and Odessa 22 ?

Did it shape the German planning ? No : the fact that AGC had 2 PzG and 2 armies and was stronger than the other AG's was not caused by the knowledge of the strength of the Soviet MD's : the reason was that it was easier to supply AGC because the distance was shorter and the roads and railways were better . And this last knowledge dated from long before 1941 and was not the work of FHO .If it was the opposite(WMD 58 and Kiev 44) would AGS have 2 PzG and 2 armies ?

FHO was giving during the war mostly wrong /unreliable reports ,but the influence of these reports was not very big : in the autumn of 1942 it predicted a big Soviet attack against AGC,not at Stalingrad, but even if the Germans knew of Uranus, there was nothing they could do about . It was the same for Bagration:FHO predicted an other big attack in the south,where most German mobile divisions were stationned,and Bagration was a surprise,but even if FHO knew of Bagration, there was nothing the Germans could do about . The Soviets knew of Citadel,if they didn't, they still would win .

It was the same for Fall Gelb:even if the French knew more about of the planned German attack through the Ardennes, the result would be insignificant .
Even if Napoleon knew that Blücher was coming, he still would lose at Waterloo .

If the Germans knew more of Overlord, Overlord would still succeed,because of the Allied superiority .

[Max Payload]

The Soviet superiority would not disappear if the Germans knew of it .

Other point : what was the importance of knowing that the MD of the Baltics had 26 divisions, the WMD 44 ,Kiev 58 and Odessa 22 ?

Did it shape the German planning ? No : the fact that AGC had 2 PzG and 2 armies and was stronger than the other AG's was not caused by the knowledge of the strength of the Soviet MD's : the reason was that it was easier to supply AGC because the distance was shorter and the roads and railways were better . And this last knowledge dated from long before 1941 and was not the work of FHO .If it was the opposite(WMD 58 and Kiev 44) would AGS have 2 PzG and 2 armies ?

Ease of supply was a factor, but in addition to the envelopment and destruction of the Soviet frontier armies, the strategic objectives were Leningrad, Smolensk and Kiev. That was what shaped German planning. AGC was to encircle the three frontier armies in Byelorussia and strike for Minsk from the northwest and southwest, for which it needed two mechanised groupings. AGS was to strike for Kiev to the east and southeast from Galicia and to continue its scything action down the right bank of the Dnestr to isolate much of SWF, for which one powerful mechanised grouping was deemed to be sufficient.

As for the rest -

even if the Germans knew of Uranus, there was nothing they could do about . It was the same for Bagration:FHO predicted an other big attack in the south,where most German mobile divisions were stationned,and Bagration was a surprise,but even if FHO knew of Bagration, there was nothing the Germans could do about . The Soviets knew of Citadel,if they didn't, they still would win .

It was the same for Fall Gelb:even if the French knew more about of the planned German attack through the Ardennes, the result would be insignificant .
Even if Napoleon knew that Blücher was coming, he still would lose at Waterloo .

If the Germans knew more of Overlord, Overlord would still succeed,because of the Allied superiority .

utter off-topic nonsense.
(Paulus could have created a stronger mobile reserve, von Kluge could have procured mechanised forces from AGNU to protect Vitebsk and Bobruisk, the Soviets may have lost several armies in the nose of the Kursk salient, the French could have more effectively defended the Dinant and Sedan crossing points instead of advancing into Belgium, the Belgians could have made the Eban Emael fort secure against paratroop attack, Napoleon could have withdraw from the battlefield earlier with a largely intact army, and von Rundstedt could have heavy reinforced Normandy.)

[ljadw]

No nonsense:
Paulus had no strong mobile reserve.

Busch (who had succeeded Kluge in the winter) could not procure mechanised forces from AGNU,because AGNU was under very heavy pressure and needed these forces .

If the French did not advance in Belgium, the Germans (Bock and Rundstedt) would go to Paris .

The fall of Eben-Emael was irrelevant for the allied defeat north of the Meuse.

If Napoleon would have retreated earlier,he still would have lost

Rundstedt (better : the OKW) could not have done more to reinforce Normandy,because these reinforcements did not exist .

[ljadw]

Ease of supply was a factor, but in addition to the envelopment and destruction of the Soviet frontier armies, the strategic objectives were Leningrad, Smolensk and Kiev. That was what shaped German planning. AGC was to encircle the three frontier armies in Byelorussia and strike for Minsk from the northwest and southwest, for which it needed two mechanised groupings. AGS was to strike for Kiev to the east and southeast from Galicia and to continue its scything action down the right bank of the Dnestr to isolate much of SWF, for which one powerful mechanised grouping was deemed to be sufficient.
)[/quote]



NO:the strategic objectives were not Leningrad,Smolensk and Kiev : the strategic objectives were the envelopment and the destruction of the Soviet forces between the border and the DD line .After this happened, it was a question of mopping-up : the pursuit of a defeated enemy .


the distribution of the German forces: 3 AG's,of which one was stronger than the others,was dictated by the availability of the railroads and the distances :a stronger AG in the north or the south could not be supplied

[Appleknocker27]

[Appleknocker27]

German Intel stated Soviet "DIVISION EQUIVALENTS" not divisions. The Germans defined that as part of the assumptions that Red Army divisions were smaller, poorly led and had inferior equipment and were thus of lesser combat power. For planning purposes a composite number was arrived at and called division equivalents (250 Soviet divisions = 100 division equivalents). Please do more research before posting, that was an AMATUER mistake.

Are you going to address questions previously put to you?
Are you going to admit errors in your posts that were pointed out and backed by proper source material that was linked?

You are wrong (again ) : I have the German text of Operationsetnwurf Ost from 5 august 1940 (drafted by Marcks) and he is talking about divisions, not division equivalents : he guessed that The Soviets could commit against the Ostheer

96 ID

23 CD

and an unknown number of motorised and mechanised brigades .

He also assumed (guessed) that the Red Army would retreat to the DD line,and he was wrong .[/quote]

I see, so you answer one question out of many because you apparently have a source to back yourself up?
You could be right, so please post your source, with a proper quote and citation. I simply went from memory on this issue and based on my earlier post that was linked: http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 7#p1999817
Glantz also speaks in terms of Soviet division equivalents, look in Barbarossa derailed and Stumbling Colossus for proof.
I may have it wrong regarding Soviet division equivalents (which has no bearing on the core issue), lay your evidence out there. Or do you intend to apply this dishonest debate technique next?
"29. Finding small error: Citing a slight error or typo as evidence that everything the opponent says is false or that the opponent is “unprofessional” or incompetent"

[/quote]

1) For this case, Glantz is not a good source

2) My source : Unternehmen Barbarossa (by Walter Post) :Dokument 11 : Generalmajor Marcks:operationsentwurf Ost vom 5 august 1940

PP of the book : 376-384.

On P 376, Marcks writes the following :

Russland besitzt 151 ID, 32 KD, 38 mot.mech.Brigaden .

Von diesen Kräften sind gebunden gegen Japan, Finnland, die Turkei 55 ID, 9 KD, 10mot.mech.Brig.

Gegen Deutschland bleiben 96 ID,23 KD und 28 mot.mech. Brig.

In this (not correct) assessment is the term of division equivalent not used .[/quote]

Fair enough. See what I did there? A humble acknowledgement that my information was inaccurate. Try it sometime, people with think more of you. Considering the long list of errors you've made just in this thread and that in 10 years you've NEVER once admitted an single error.

Oh, by the way... (found the source of my error)

Glantz

Capture.PNG (16.72 KiB) Viewed 584 times

Admitted my error, corrected it with source. Try it out...

[BDV]

... holding some field commanders in contempt. Its not uncommon and from what I've personally seen, not unjustified in some cases.

A natural reaction to the bald faced lies uttered by some of these characters, no?

[Appleknocker27]

... holding some field commanders in contempt. Its not uncommon and from what I've personally seen, not unjustified in some cases.

A natural reaction to the bald faced lies uttered by some of these characters, no?

I take it case by case and hold judgment until I really get a feel for the individual. I'm sure we're on the same page with Guderian and a few others.