ljadw wrote:The first and foremost operational use of tanks (assault guns are not tanks,but mobile artillery) is NOT breaching a fortified line,that's the mission of the artillery .
The mission of cavalry (tanks are motorised and armoured cavalry) is to go through a breach in a fortified line and to attack the enemy's soft points .
In WWI the artillery conquered the terrain, the infantry occupied the terrain and the cavalry/tanks exploited the success.
It was not different in WWII.
It is not different today .
Sorry to burst your bubble, but this was the mission of the artillery up to WW1. Not even artillery was always able to breach the Western lines, that's the reason for the bloody deadlock on the Western Front. (otherwise it would have been a manoeuvering warfare, like in WW2, since they had plenty of horses - if they lacked the tanks)
French doctrine presupposed that Artillery was STILL instrumental in breaching a fortified line - that's the reason for Maginot line - a line designed to counter what could counter a fortified line. It may look absurd today - but that was the yesterday logic.
However: no country (and certainly not Soviet Union) was able to man up their front towards the enemy in a continuous, contiguous line. NONE. This is true especially in the large spaces in the East where it made more sense to "breach" a (non-existent) line using mobile assets instead of bringing artillery to a place where the enemy could simply swing back and render the action moot.
The only place in the entire history of warfare where there were trenches upon trenches in a continuous, uninterruptible line - was Western Front in WW1. The one and only place.
Artillery was (and still is) instrumental in breaching a particular fortified position which could not be bypassed through other means: fortresses, cities, usually static defences, not army groups. The peculiarity of the Eastern Front rendered obsolete such a military mindset, especially when RKKA had such large tracts of land to bargain with in order to gain time at their disposal.
Yes, there are several examples of dogged, stubborn city defences during the war in the East - but they were the exception, not the rule. What made this war something new were the mobile assets - be they self propelled artillery, assault guns, tanks, tank-hunters and other snippets.
This role of artillery started to get old during WW1 (it was gradually replaced by aerial bombardments - bombers and zeppelins) and is nowadays completely replaced by planes*. Today artillery has a suppresion role during an offensive operation, trying to get the defenders of a line to run for cover instead of manning it up against attackers. You can find this role even in prior wars, if you dig up enough.
* in the 3d environment of today warfare it makes more sense to deny supplies through aerial operations than bombing the line in order to breach it.
BDV wrote: [
Thus the problem can be traced to the idea that German infantry had not enough armored support, either as Mobile AT or SPArt components.
No:the problem is that German tanks had not enough infantry and artillery support and that the available support was not motorized . The tanks could only advance at the speed of the infantry/artillery= 4 km per hour .
If you add up the number of days spent by Germans during their advance you can probably find out that there was plenty of time to get to Moscow at 4 km per hour - provided the RKKA offered no resistance. The reason they could not advance 4 km / hour while fighting has nothing to do with logistics and nothing to do with fighting. It has - however - everything to do with military planning, kriegspiels and contingency plans. It sucks to go in the East without any of these.