Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

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Alixanther
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Re: Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

#91

Post by Alixanther » 10 Jan 2016, 12:39

ljadw wrote:
BDV wrote:
ljadw wrote:The SU was not mobilizing for war .
SU was switching industrial production to armaments, building new armament production capacity, and increasing its armed forces.
This is not mobilisation .
How about Stalin's decision to lower the minimum age for conscription from 21 to 18 in '39? Isn't that mobilisation? Why would the State give the new recruits anything for granted, if they were not required to do something in return? USSR is not famous for giving free meals for nothing. (hint: Ukrainian famine)

Also, you're practically using euphemisms. USSR is not "mobilizing", it is "calling up 3% of their population". They were probably going to have a large barbecue party that summer with so litlle of them. / end sarcasm.
You practically use as a logical scapegoat the very large Soviet manpower pool in order to justify that such a percent does not properly represent full-fledged mobilisation. Anyone can realize that - compared to their perceived European opposition, such a program was deemed big enough.

ljadw
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Re: Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

#92

Post by ljadw » 10 Jan 2016, 17:39

To lower the minimum age for conscription is not mobilisation .

The Soviets started their mobilisation on 22 june 1941 when they mobilised millions .


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BDV
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Re: Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

#93

Post by BDV » 11 Jan 2016, 16:40

ljadw wrote:To lower the minimum age for conscription is not mobilisation .

The Soviets started their mobilisation on 22 june 1941 when they mobilised millions .

Data were posted on this forum that mobilization, even in the narrowest sense of the term, was actually started prior to June 22 1941. Was that fake/incorrect?
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

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Appleknocker27
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Re: Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

#94

Post by Appleknocker27 » 11 Jan 2016, 19:01

KDF33 wrote:I've never understood why people think that 1 more month of campaigning would have defeated the Soviet Union. What prevented the Germans from defeating the Soviets in a single campaign were the tyranny of distance and their low force generation / the large Soviet force generation. IMO, it's all part of a certain viewpoint according to which the capture of specific territorial features, i.e. Moscow, would have sealed the deal. I don't see how that is the case.

Regards,

KDF
Hypothetically speaking, if the Germans had started a month earlier (assuming preparations were complete and weather/ground was dry) they stood a far greater chance of overall success. The fall rains came when Army Group Center had completed the Vyazma and Bryansk pockets and prevented a meaningful pursuit phase when little to nothing stood in their way. Had that been a month earlier, AGC would have encircled Moscow with little in it to hold for very long. The 2nd order effects of which are eastward displacement for Soviet staging areas for offensive and defensive operations, which means the Germans likely keep Moscow and suffer much less that winter.

All of that is obviously a non-starter since that spring was wet and the ground soft, the Balkans campaign happend, etc. The fact still stands that the weather and Balkan campaign DID play a role in the campaign's outcome.

KDF33
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Re: Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

#95

Post by KDF33 » 11 Jan 2016, 19:18

Appleknocker27 wrote:Hypothetically speaking, if the Germans had started a month earlier (assuming preparations were complete and weather/ground was dry) they stood a far greater chance of overall success. The fall rains came when Army Group Center had completed the Vyazma and Bryansk pockets and prevented a meaningful pursuit phase when little to nothing stood in their way. Had that been a month earlier, AGC would have encircled Moscow with little in it to hold for very long. The 2nd order effects of which are eastward displacement for Soviet staging areas for offensive and defensive operations, which means the Germans likely keep Moscow and suffer much less that winter.
I'm willing to accept that Moscow could have fallen with an earlier campaign. What I dispute, however, is that the loss of Moscow would have led to "success", in the sense of putting an end to Soviet resistance. I don't get the Moscow fetishization.
All of that is obviously a non-starter since that spring was wet and the ground soft, the Balkans campaign happend, etc. The fact still stands that the weather and Balkan campaign DID play a role in the campaign's outcome.
I dispute that taking Moscow would have changed the campaign's outcome. The Barbarossa plan was fatally flawed because it assumed that the USSR's force generation was insufficient to make good it's massive early losses. When that assumption proved wrong, "success" as defined by the initial campaign plan became impossible.

In the final analysis, the Germans needed to physically destroy the Soviet state's capacity to produce and to fight, something that couldn't be achieved in a single campaign.

Regards,

KDF

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Yuri
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Re: Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

#96

Post by Yuri » 11 Jan 2016, 19:29

ljadw wrote:To lower the minimum age for conscription is not mobilisation .

The Soviets started their mobilisation on 22 june 1941 when they mobilised millions .
strictly speaking the first day of mobilisatie - June 23, 1941.

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Yuri
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Re: Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

#97

Post by Yuri » 11 Jan 2016, 20:07

Appleknocker27 wrote:
KDF33 wrote:I've never understood why people think that 1 more month of campaigning would have defeated the Soviet Union. What prevented the Germans from defeating the Soviets in a single campaign were the tyranny of distance and their low force generation / the large Soviet force generation. IMO, it's all part of a certain viewpoint according to which the capture of specific territorial features, i.e. Moscow, would have sealed the deal. I don't see how that is the case.

Regards,

KDF
Hypothetically speaking, if the Germans had started a month earlier (assuming preparations were complete and weather/ground was dry) they stood a far greater chance of overall success. The fall rains came when Army Group Center had completed the Vyazma and Bryansk pockets and prevented a meaningful pursuit phase when little to nothing stood in their way. Had that been a month earlier, AGC would have encircled Moscow with little in it to hold for very long. The 2nd order effects of which are eastward displacement for Soviet staging areas for offensive and defensive operations, which means the Germans likely keep Moscow and suffer much less that winter.

All of that is obviously a non-starter since that spring was wet and the ground soft, the Balkans campaign happend, etc. The fact still stands that the weather and Balkan campaign DID play a role in the campaign's outcome.
The last 20 years I have been building objects in Moscow region (power line included). Spring-Summer period in the Moscow region is May-September, autumn-winter period in October-April. In the period from 15 March to 15 may, the movement on unfortified roads and out expensive is strictly prohibited. From the point of view of movement in unfortified expensive weather conditions in the spring-summer of 1941 cannot be called remarkable, but them can be called very good. For example, in 2013 autumn rains started from August 20 until the beginning of October, the rain poured down in torrents. Movement outside expensive was not possible even on truck technique. Even worse was in 1998 - the first snow fell in August, and in September was rain then snow. The best conditions in the last hundred years were in 2010. From late April to early october had temperatures - that resulted in wildfires.

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BDV
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Re: Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

#98

Post by BDV » 11 Jan 2016, 21:26

Appleknocker27 wrote:The fall rains came when Army Group Center had completed the Vyazma and Bryansk pockets and prevented a meaningful pursuit phase when little to nothing stood in their way.

That is incorrect. "General Mud" is no less a munchausenian CYA fabrication than "General Frost". Observe Operatsiya Uran that had no problems covering hundreds of miles in few short days (November 20-24) when there was no resistance. The counterstrike at Moscow was just the LAST of the Soviet counterstrikes against German overextension following the RKKA disasters at Kiev and Vyazma (Rostov, Tikhvin).

Post-war claims by Nazi Generals are just astonishing when compared to historical facts, but fit a pattern in line with "Leningrad was ripe for the taking", and "Moscow was ripe for the taking" from July events.
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

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Appleknocker27
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Re: Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

#99

Post by Appleknocker27 » 11 Jan 2016, 23:45

BDV wrote:
Appleknocker27 wrote:The fall rains came when Army Group Center had completed the Vyazma and Bryansk pockets and prevented a meaningful pursuit phase when little to nothing stood in their way.

That is incorrect. "General Mud" is no less a munchausenian CYA fabrication than "General Frost". Observe Operatsiya Uran that had no problems covering hundreds of miles in few short days (November 20-24) when there was no resistance. The counterstrike at Moscow was just the LAST of the Soviet counterstrikes against German overextension following the RKKA disasters at Kiev and Vyazma (Rostov, Tikhvin).

Post-war claims by Nazi Generals are just astonishing when compared to historical facts, but fit a pattern in line with "Leningrad was ripe for the taking", and "Moscow was ripe for the taking" from July events.
Don't over simplify...

Over-extension at Moscow (lead combat elements of AGC seeking to encircle) in mid Oct WAS DUE TO THE MUD making motorized resupply impossible. Tracked combat vehicles can negotiate muddy roads, Infantry can move cross country, logistical services REQUIRE a road net... A heavily laden, 2-wheel drive truck is NOT going to be able to get forward to resupply combat elements, thus the forward momentum is stopped. The few 4wd and 6wd trucks were all that kept Typhoon moving at a crawl at the time.

Your attempt to equate Operation Uranus is a non-starter for multiple reasons, not the least of which are frozen ground (sans-mud) and the Soviets operating with fresh troops from established supply depots right behind the start point and only conducting a very shallow double-envelopment (check a map, neither pincer moved more than an average of 50-60 miles and did so over solid ground).

Max Payload
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Re: Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

#100

Post by Max Payload » 12 Jan 2016, 11:16

KDF33 wrote:
Appleknocker27 wrote:Hypothetically speaking, if the Germans had started a month earlier (assuming preparations were complete and weather/ground was dry) they stood a far greater chance of overall success. The fall rains came when Army Group Center had completed the Vyazma and Bryansk pockets and prevented a meaningful pursuit phase when little to nothing stood in their way. Had that been a month earlier, AGC would have encircled Moscow with little in it to hold for very long. The 2nd order effects of which are eastward displacement for Soviet staging areas for offensive and defensive operations, which means the Germans likely keep Moscow and suffer much less that winter.
I'm willing to accept that Moscow could have fallen with an earlier campaign. What I dispute, however, is that the loss of Moscow would have led to "success", in the sense of putting an end to Soviet resistance.
The loss of Moscow earlier in the campaign (either as a result an earlier start date had ground conditions permitted, or as a result of dry weather in October) would have taken much of the Soviet industrial infrastructure off the table, and it would have made the transfer of Soviet troops, equipment and supplies between north and south far more difficult. It may not have put an end to Soviet resistance but it would have made that resistance less effective.

Appleknocker27 wrote: Over-extension at Moscow (lead combat elements of AGC seeking to encircle) in mid Oct WAS DUE TO THE MUD making motorized resupply impossible.
Additionally THE MUD meant that the subsequent axes of the German advance were highly constrained and predictable, enabling relatively small Soviet forces to block and delay that advance with little risk of being rapidly outflanked.

KDF33
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Re: Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

#101

Post by KDF33 » 12 Jan 2016, 11:28

Max Payload wrote:The loss of Moscow earlier in the campaign (either as a result an earlier start date had ground conditions permitted, or as a result of dry weather in October) would have taken much of the Soviet industrial infrastructure off the table, and it would have made the transfer of Soviet troops, equipment and supplies between north and south far more difficult. It may not have put an end to Soviet resistance but it would have made that resistance less effective.
Soviet industry wasn't concentrated in Moscow. As for transfers on a North-South axis, this is frequently mentioned but, frankly, I don't see it as being 1. decisive, 2. actually rendered that much more difficult without Moscow. Look at this map, for instance.

The biggest impact of losing Moscow would have been unhinging the Soviet Fronts operating to it's north.

Regards,

KDF

Max Payload
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Re: Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

#102

Post by Max Payload » 12 Jan 2016, 11:59

Moscow was (is) a major industrial centre.
If the Moscow communication hub had been lost, then moving reserves/supplies by rail from SE of Moscow to NE of Moscow would have been the equivalent of having to move reserves/supplies from SE of Paris to NE of Paris via Berlin.

ljadw
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Re: Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

#103

Post by ljadw » 12 Jan 2016, 14:06

Do you have proofs that Moscow was used as a communication hub during the war ? And if so :how much of the transports were going via Moscow ?

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BDV
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Re: Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

#104

Post by BDV » 12 Jan 2016, 16:32

Appleknocker27 wrote:
Don't over simplify...

Over-extension at Moscow (lead combat elements of AGC seeking to encircle) in mid Oct WAS DUE TO THE MUD making motorized resupply impossible. Tracked combat vehicles can negotiate muddy roads, Infantry can move cross country, logistical services REQUIRE a road net... A heavily laden, 2-wheel drive truck is NOT going to be able to get forward to resupply combat elements, thus the forward momentum is stopped. The few 4wd and 6wd trucks were all that kept Typhoon moving at a crawl at the time.

Your attempt to equate Operation Uranus is a non-starter for multiple reasons, not the least of which are frozen ground (sans-mud) and the Soviets operating with fresh troops from established supply depots right behind the start point and only conducting a very shallow double-envelopment (check a map, neither pincer moved more than an average of 50-60 miles and did so over solid ground).

Oversimplification cuts both ways. Guderian was no stuffed at Mtsensk by mud, neither had to return to help the encirclement due to the mud, but because the kessel was more of a loose net. The 1st panzer division could either moved onto Kalinin or complete the Rzhev kessel. It did not reach Torzhok also not because of mud. Did mud force Kleist whole Panzer grouping to fall back on the Mius line? Angry mud?! No, angry mud-zhyks, rather.

Germans were entering the most build-up area of Russia, with the road and rail network converging on Moscow. The success of Taifun had just opened the M9 route which is a straight shot from Riga to Moscow. So they were stopped because Russians stopped them.

AFAIK, November in the Don Steppe was pretty much an affair run in positive Celsius temperatures
Nobody expects the Fallschirm! Our chief weapon is surprise; surprise and fear; fear and surprise. Our 2 weapons are fear and surprise; and ruthless efficiency. Our *3* weapons are fear, surprise, and ruthless efficiency; and almost fanatical devotion

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Appleknocker27
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Re: Barbarossa, Delay: Balkans or Rain

#105

Post by Appleknocker27 » 12 Jan 2016, 17:01

BDV wrote:
Oversimplification cuts both ways. Guderian was no stuffed at Mtsensk by mud, neither had to return to help the encirclement due to the mud, but because the kessel was more of a loose net. The 1st panzer division could either moved onto Kalinin or complete the Rzhev kessel. It did not reach Torzhok also not because of mud. Did mud force Kleist whole Panzer grouping to fall back on the Mius line? Angry mud?! No, angry mud-zhyks, rather.

Germans were entering the most build-up area of Russia, with the road and rail network converging on Moscow. The success of Taifun had just opened the M9 route which is a straight shot from Riga to Moscow. So they were stopped because Russians stopped them.

AFAIK, November in the Don Steppe was pretty much an affair run in positive Celsius temperatures

The main supply routes (MSRs) that were feeding the lead elements you are referencing were a muddy mess and lacked the trafficability to allow 2wd trucks to meet demand. In basic logistical terms, when demand exceeds capacity the offensive combat capability of the lead elements is greatly hindered. Regardless of their strength relative to the enemy, if they are out of fuel, ammunition, etc. they are combat ineffective. A lack of critical supply due to the MSRs being choked by mud is what made the difference of success and failure during Typhoon. A month earlier and this situation is unlikely.
OKH declared a halt to all offensive movement on 31 Oct due to the mud, that was in effect until the ground froze. In the weeks leading up to that the logistical situation on the MSRs was almost impossible.

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