Operation Kutuzov: The Battle of Orel 1943

[Greg Liedtke]

Kameraden,

Currently I'm working on a book detailing Operation Kutuzov and the Battle of Orel in the summer of 1943 and am appealing to the forum members for any available documents.

I've accumulated a great deal of both German and Russian material related to it and no doubt once it's finished I'll be accused of including too many pedantic details. A great many thanks to Jeff Leach for providing an invaluable amount of documents, and I've also thoroughly mined the material publicly provided by both John Calvin and the German documents in Russia project.

Specifically, I would appreciate any and all Zustandberichte, Kriegsgliederung, or any other strength reports related to the German formations that fought in the salient (with 2. Panzerarmee, 9. Armee or arriving as reinforcements - I can list these if requested) or for the period of 1 June to 1 September 1943. Strength reports on the relevant Luftwaffe formations would also be welcome.

Feel free to either post your contributions here for all to enjoy or otherwise you can send me a private message. Any and all help would be greatly appreciated.

To give you a taste of what I've discovered about the battle thus far, I present what I believe was the total amount of German armor (tanks, assault guns and self-propelled anti-tank guns) committed to the battle. These figures come from a variety of sources and is still only an estimate; it also includes both operational and non-operational vehicles.

Date Pz II Pz III Pz IV Tiger StuG Befpz. Marder Total
Forces already deployed:
5. Panzer Division 10.7. - 17 76 - - 9 14 116
25. PzGren. Div. 1.7. - - - - - - 10 10
270. StuG Abt. 10.7. - - - - 24 - - 24

Reinforcements:
8. Panzer Division* 11.7. 14 59 64 - - 6 18 161
12. Panzer Division** 12.7. 6 36 36 - - 2 16 96
18. Panzer Division** 12.7. 5 28 25 - - 3 8 69
20. Panzer Division** 12.7. - 11 46 - - 7 30 94
2. Panzer Division**/* 15.7. 12 40 49 - - 6 30 137
9. Panzer Division** 19.7. 1 38 63 - - 6 16 124
36. Inf. Div. 30.6. - - - - - - 12 12
78. Sturm Division - - - - - - 25 25
10. PanzerGren. Div. 11.7. - - - - - - 39 39
20. PanzerGren. Div. 21.7. - - - - - - 6 6
PGD ‘GD’ 18.7. 4 34 52 15 34 8 23 170
189. StuG Abt. 20.7. - - - - 31 - - 31 (18 op
185. StuG Abt. 20.7. - - - - 25 - - 25 (13 op
190. StuG Abt. 20.7. - - - - 28 - - 28
244. StuG Abt. 31.7. - - - - 29 - - 29 (19 op
245. StuG Abt. 20.7. - - - - 20 - - 20 (5 op
600. StuG Abt. 20.7. - - - - 31 - - 31
909. StuG Abt. 31.7. - - - - 34 - - 34
216. Sturmpanzer
Abt.** 20.7. - - - - 35 Stpz - - 35
653. s.PzJagd Abt. 29.7. - - - - } 60 Ferdinands - 31
654. s.PzJagd Abt. 12.7. - - - - } - 12
505. s.Panzer Abt. 20.7. - 15 - 41 - - - 56
51. Panzer Abt. 20.7. 93 Panthers
Kp.521/655. s.PzJagd.
Abt. 3.7. 13 Hornets
Totals

Remaining with 9. AOK
4. Panzer Division** 15.7. - 15 74 - - 6 25 120
312. & 314. FKL Kps. 20.7. - - - - 16 - - 16
177. StuG Abt. 20.7. - - - - 29 - - 29 (13 op
904. StuG Abt. 20.7. - - - - 28 - - 28 (16 op
GRAND TOTAL 42 293 485 56 407 53 260 1,596
Plus Panthers 1,689
*Includes replacements dispatched 5-9 July 1943.
** Strength from 1.7.1943 minus Totalausfalle to 14 July.

[pintere]

While I do not possess any documents of this nature, I am pleased to hear about this project. One of the biggest gaps in the literature of the eastern front is that there are no really good books dedicated to either the northern or southern Russian counteroffensives after Citadel. I applaud your efforts to help fill in this gap. Good luck!

[Max Payload]

no doubt once it's finished I'll be accused of including too many pedantic details.

Don't trouble yourself with what potential critics might say. Write the book you want to write. Who knows, if you include enough 'pedantic details' you may find that you have written THE definitive account of the operation.
Good luck with the project.

[Juha]

Hello Greg
interesting info, especially those on StuG.Abt:en. But I'm surprised the info on some units withdrawn from Zitadelle. According to Dietrich von Saucken's 4. Panzerdivision. Divisionsgeschichte. Teil 2. Der Russlandfeldzug von Mai 1943 bis Mai 1945 (1968) p. 12 the div lost totally 22 Pz IVs and 2 PzIIIs 5th to 16th July 43 and had on 23.7. 24 Pz IVs combat ready, 5 Pz IVs in short-term and 12 Pz IVs in long-term repairs. on 1 Jul 43 it had had 15 Pz III(75)s, 80 Pz IVs and 6 PzBefs. According to von Saucken p. 13 div's Pz.Jg. Abt 49 had on 18 Jul 20 Marders + one mot a/t gun combat ready and 3 a/t guns in 8-10 days repairs.
And according to Jentz (both Panzer Truppen 2 and Panther Tank) the 51. Panzer Abt. had in the evening of 18th Jul 33 operational and 32 in need of repair Panthers. According to his Panther Tank book it was in early August when the 51. Panzer Abt., after giving its remaining Panthers to the the 52. Panzer Abt., got a complete new allotment of 96 Panthers as replacements.

Juha

[Greg Liedtke]

Hello all,

Max and Pintre - many, many thanks for the encouragement. As it stands, I'm hoping that this will be the first of a three (or four) volume series covering the goings on across the Ostfront during the summer of 1943 (until September). In my mind, it was these series of battles that ultimately signaled the beginning of the end for the Ostheer, not simply Operation Zitadelle. But we shall see.

Juha - thanks for pointing this out. As we know, armor strength figures can be fickle - none of these things are quite like the other - and I've found they constantly need tweeking. For the 51. Panzer Abt, the figure I cited comes from the panther1944.de website, which notes an Ist-bestand of 93 Panthers on 20 July (while the unit was refitting around Briansk). To be sure, 96 Panthers were supposed to be issued via H.Za. There are probably a number of reasons for the discrepancy - perhaps the final 3 showed up sometime later, or were lost when partisans blew up the train, or suffered from some sort of mechanical problem and were sent back, etc. I don't have Jentz's Panther Tank book - does he actually say all 96 Panthers arrived (as opposed to, were issued)? If so, does he cite any specific source?

As for the 4. Panzer Division, I have to admit that in my old age I've become extremely wary of Divisiongeschichte (example - I find it curious that the history of the 8. Panzer Division is very, very brief concerning the 3rd Guards Tank Army's breakthrough of its sector on 19 July), though Saucken's work is, by far, one of the top tier because of his obvious use of primary documents. My numbers for tanks were derived from Jentz's Panzertruppen 2 book minus the Totalausfalle reported to 14 July (see BA MA RH 10/65) which only lists 6 Pz IV. The discrepancy with the numbers you cited for 16 July (22 Pz IV and 2 Pz III) could possibly be the result of late reporting or perhaps damaged vehicles that had to be abandoned when the 9. Armee pulled back to its jump off point - one report from 10 July states that 6 Pz IV were Totalausfalle but another 12 Pz IV and 1 Pz III had yet to be recovered from the battelfiedl. However, according to official documents cited in Zetterling and Frankson, p. 121, throughout July the 4. Panzer Division sustained a Totalausfalle (for the entire month) of 3 Pz III, 15 Pz IV and 1 Befelpanzer (=19).

A bigger problem is trying to figure out what was going on with the 8. Panzer Division. According to Jentz, on 1 July it a hodgepodge of 14 Pz II, 3 Pz 38t, 59 Pz III (incl. 25 Pz III kz.), 22 Pz IV (incl. 8 Pz IV kz.) and 6 Beflepz (=104). At least some of these (probably the Pz 38t and Pz III and IV kz and possibly some of the Pz II) were handed over to the army group when the division moved to Orel, but exactly how many is unclear. If we assume it only took along the most combat-capable vehicles, we are left with something like 30 Pz III lg., 4 Pz III 7.5cm, 14 Pz IV lg and 6 Befelpz (=54). Between 5-9 July, the division was also sent 42 new Pz IV lg from Germany, which would now bring us to 96 vehicles. However, the documents I've seen that related to when the division was engaged east of Orel (14-19 July) usually cite that the division only had 30-40 panzers. For example, one report from 16 July notes 4 Pz IV kz and 29 Pz IV lg as operational; another from 18 July refers to 11 Pz III lg., 2 Pz IV kz and 15 Pz IV lg as operational, while another from later on 18 July lists an Ist-bestand of 11 Pz III lg., 3 Pz III 7.5cm and 32 Pz IV lg. So the division should have possessed (at least) roughly 100+ panzers, but because things arrived in drips and drabs, and not everything was operational, its ready tank strength was much less.

And at this point its time for a coffee and a smoke...
Cheers,
Greg

[Greg Liedtke]

In terms of the figures I mentioned for the 8. Panzer Division between 14-19 July - it could be that someone just didn't know the difference between a Pz III 7.5cm and a Pz IV kz. Either way, it points to how difficult trying to get firm numbers can be.

[Juha]

Hello Greg
I’m not so much a fan of von Saucken’s book but a real gem is Joachim Neumann’s Die 4. Panzer-Division 1938 - 1943. Bericht und Betrachtungen zu zwei Blitzfeldzügen und zwei Jahren Krieg in Rußland -, Selbstverlag, Bonn-Duisdorf 1985. Unfortunately, it stops just before the Zitadelle. He has written also the Teil 2, on the years 1943 – 45. It should have the answers to the strength of the 4. PzD on 15th July 1943 or around that date, in his Teil I Neumann has used 10 days reports etc. very much but I haven’t see the Tel II of his book. But anyway IIRC the Teil II was published in 1987.

If the old Feldgrau site is still somewhere the threat http://www.feldgrau.net/forum/viewtopic ... 24&t=28989

have info on the 51. Pz.Abt.

"Re: Panthers and Tigers after Zitadelle Aug 43: Help! by Martin Block on Sat Apr 26, 2008 12:24 am
Some data on Pz.Abt. 51 and 52 taken from original documents :

OKH/GenStdH/Org.Abt.(I) Nr. I/3320/43 g.Kdos. v. 15.7.1943 and 17.7.1943
Pz.Abt. 52 will immediately take over all Panthers of Pz.Abt. 51.
96 new Panthers originally intended to equip the I./Pz.Rgt. 26 will be sent to Pz.Abt. 51 from Grafenwoehr on 18.7.1943.

Gruppe V(J) Nr. I/41988/43 geh. v. 20.7.1943
Status of the 2 Panther-Abteilungen as of 18.7.1943, 1600 hours:
Abteilung 51:
operational 33 Panthers
under repair 32 Panthers
total write-offs 31
Abteilung 52:
operational 28 Panthers
under repair 40 Panthers
sent back to Germany for repairs 4 Panthers
total write-offs 24 Panthers

17./18.7.1943 96 Panthers shipped from H.Za. to Pz. Abt. 51
12 additional Panthers had already been shipped on 13./17.7.1943 as 'Nachschub' to Pz.Rgt. 39. Apparently these were taken over by Pz.Abt. 52.

OKH/GenStdH/Org.Abt. Nr. I/6567/43 geh. v. 28.7.1943
Pz.Abt. 51 (Heerestruppe) is tactically attached to der Pz.Gren.Div. ’Großdeutschland’.
Pz.Abt. 52 (Heerestruppe) is tactically attached to 11. Pz.Div. unterstellt.

31.7.1943 Pz.Abt. 51 reports 0 Panthers available, 94 intransit to unit
31.7.1943 Pz.Abt. 52 reports 132 Panthers available, 21 operational

10.8.1943 Pz.Abt. 51 reports 57 Panthers available, 31 intransit to unit
10.8.1943 Pz.Abt. 52 report not available
...

on Jentz, p.130 "Panzerabteilung 51 received a complete new allotment of 96 Panthers as replacements in early August..." No source is given.

HTH
Juha

[Juha]

Hello again Greg
Took a quick look at Panther44.de site, very impressive but the claim that Pz.Abt. 51 had 93 Panthers on 20 July is very odd. IMHO there was no chance that the Pz.Abt. 51 could have got the Panthers sent by the H.Za. from Grafenwoehr Bavaria on 17 and 18 Jul by 20 July. When 6. PzD was transported from France to Stalingrad area it took exactly two weeks to get the first units to Kotelnikovo SW of Stalingrad. Definitely longer trip but gives some indication to times needed to transport troops and vehicles. The rail transport in 1942 and 43, especially in the conquered areas in the SU, wasn't very fast.

[Greg Liedtke]

Hello Juha,

Many thanks for the details and the link - any and all details are welcome. I think I may want to dig up Kurt Gätzschmann's book on the 51. Panzer Abteilung and see what he says, as well as go through what archival documents I have to see if there are any pointers.

As for the travel times, you are correct - most of the time, it took longer to move things from Germany than just a few days. However, I have seen documents that do indicate that trains did sometimes arrive from Germany in just a couple of days (by 1943 most travel times seem to have varied between 5-7 days) and by mid-1943 things were running (all things considered - ie. pesky partisans) comparatively smoothly.

Bear in mind that the 6. Panzer Division had a longer distance to move and, probably more importantly, it was moved into something of a transportation desert - the region west of Stalingrad, east of Rostov and south of the Don River had very few rail lines and these would have heavily congested. In contrast, access to Briansk region would have been much easier.

It would all depend a) on the priority given to the trains movements, and b) the state of both the rail lines (whether these had been damaged by partisans, soviet bombing, or natural wear and tear) and the stations they arrived at (frequently the problem was less the actual rail lines and more the ability of the particular station to get things unloaded in a timely fashion). Given that the situation around Orel appeared to the German high command as extremely grave, I'd have to disagree and say it would be possible to move the Panthers to Briansk within a couple of days.

But your note that on 31 July the 51. Panzer Abteilung reported 0 Panthers available and 94 in transit is very curious - is this also taken from OKH/GenStdH/Org.Abt. Nr. I/6567/43 geh. v. 28.7.1943? (Also where are the other two Panthers?)
Cheers,
Greg

I think this discussion might merit a journal article entitled "The Curious Case of the Missing Panthers, or How German Primary Documents Made me go Apoplectic."

[Sean Oliver]

The only solution to the July 20th mystery that I could think of is that Pz.Abt.51 assumed official command responsibility of the 90-something Panthers upon their shipment July 15-18, even if they hadn't arrived at the unit's forward HQ near Briansk. German units at the front which had some of its elements far to the rear for training or refitting often reported those elements on strength when they submitted their monthly reports to Berlin, leading some researchers to assume those elements were at the front as well. That's just one of the possible problems with those Gen.Insp.d.Pz.Tr. Zustandberichte. It's also good to search through Army + Corps level docs, esp. Eisenbahn/transport and other rear-area branch Anlagen. Sometimes they can clarify mysteries like these about tank/weapon strengths, etc.
According to Spaeter's divisional history of Grossdeutschland, Pz.Abt.51 first reported to G.D. on the evening of July 29 near Karachev and some Panthers went into action the next day.
- Sean O

[Juha]

Hello Juha,

Many thanks for the details and the link - any and all details are welcome. I think I may want to dig up Kurt Gätzschmann's book on the 51. Panzer Abteilung and see what he says, as well as go through what archival documents I have to see if there are any pointers.

As for the travel times, you are correct - most of the time, it took longer to move things from Germany than just a few days. However, I have seen documents that do indicate that trains did sometimes arrive from Germany in just a couple of days (by 1943 most travel times seem to have varied between 5-7 days) and by mid-1943 things were running (all things considered - ie. pesky partisans) comparatively smoothly.

Bear in mind that the 6. Panzer Division had a longer distance to move and, probably more importantly, it was moved into something of a transportation desert - the region west of Stalingrad, east of Rostov and south of the Don River had very few rail lines and these would have heavily congested. In contrast, access to Briansk region would have been much easier.

It would all depend a) on the priority given to the trains movements, and b) the state of both the rail lines (whether these had been damaged by partisans, soviet bombing, or natural wear and tear) and the stations they arrived at (frequently the problem was less the actual rail lines and more the ability of the particular station to get things unloaded in a timely fashion). Given that the situation around Orel appeared to the German high command as extremely grave, I'd have to disagree and say it would be possible to move the Panthers to Briansk within a couple of days.

You are right that rail connections beyond Rostov were poor but the transfer of 6. PzD was ordered by Hitler personally and at least by 21 Nov 42 the movement of a full-stregth PzD to area SW of Stalingrad should have got the highest possible priority because the situation around Stalingrad was gettig desperate. I have only vaguest recollection of the partisan attacks but IIRC their frequency was high during Operation Kutuzov and from 18 July onwards VVS/ADD made series of heavy air attacks on German rail connections, hiting particulaly hard the railway stations of Navlya, Karachaev and Orel, even dropping two 5 tons bombs on a railroad yard near Orel see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FAB-5000_bomb but notice that the damages mentioned are only Soviet claims, at least those of the damages inflicted in Helsinki are bogus.

But your note that on 31 July the 51. Panzer Abteilung reported 0 Panthers available and 94 in transit is very curious - is this also taken from OKH/GenStdH/Org.Abt. Nr. I/6567/43 geh. v. 28.7.1943? (Also where are the other two Panthers?)...

Its part of Martin Block's answer, I forgot to put the end quotation mark to that quote, so all I can say that Martin gave it as his source. And it is also in line the info Jentz gives, namely that according to him Pz.Abt. 51 got its new Panthers in early August. Now the problem is the GD history but maybe 51 still had a few of its original Panthers or maybe it had got some of the 6 + 6 Panthers sent to Pz.R. 39.

Juha

[Sean Oliver]

The report of 93 einsatzbereit Panthers on July 20 1943 is clearly an error. There's no way it could be 'true'.
My guess is that it should say July 2 1943, when the unit actually did have 93 einsatzbereit Panthers (or very close to that number).

[unkle_shadow]

Greg,

How is coming out this project? Any timeline or ETA for this series?

TY
Ivo

[Greg Liedtke]

Hello Ivo,

Thanks for asking. Well, I think most of the research for Operation Kutuzov is complete, or at least as complete as I can make it. The problem is that I've really been distracted by research into the air war - this has ballooned from what I thought was going to be a chapter into what will have to be its own book covering aerial operations across the Ostfront from April till September 1943. It's very unfortunate I never learned Russian because going through Russian sources via Google Translate is extremely laborious - although I now can recognize the Russian terms for "shot down" and "crash-landing"! At the same time, I've also been accumulating info on all the other battles on the Ostfront (the Mius and Leningrad sectors, Kharkov, etc) whenever I stumble across it.

So, I can probably churn out two books relatively quickly once I actually start writing, though I would say we're still a few years away before anything actually comes out it hard copy. I have no idea how David Glantz managed to keep the pace he did.

But to give you something of an idea of what might be in store, here are a few things I've concluded:

1) The German strategic air attacks upon Soviet industry were more damaging than most sources give it credit for (Russian authors have done some great work in this area), though the attacks were too short lived to have a lasting impact.

2) Regarding German division commanders with 9. AOK and 2. PzAOK - many of these had little to no experience commanding large number of troops in combat and were freshly assigned to their divisions (a number had only occupied staff positions), which resulted in a slew of errors and screw ups.

3) The account of General Lothar Rendulic found within Steven Newton's Kursk: The German View (2002) regarding the fighting east of Orel is completely inaccurate (to Rendulic's credit he admits that he may have incorrectly recalled many of the details) - German records provide no indication that he purposely stripped resources from the rest of his command to focus upon the Soviet attack sector.

4) The fighting around Orel sucked in huge amounts of resources from both sides. For the Germans, this not only included divisions from the neighboring 9. AOK but from all around Army Group Center. For the Soviets, once their initial attacks against 2. PzAOK had stalled, these included the 3rd Guards and 4th Tank Armies, the 11th Army, and one tank and one cavalry corps - from what I've seen, none of these formations were initially assigned to Op Kutuzov (despite what a number of other authors have claimed) and were in fact originally intended to support other operations.

So those are some of my observations at this point. Comments and questions are always welcomed. I hope you and yours are well.
Cheers,
Greg

[Art]

For the Soviets, once their initial attacks against 2. PzAOK had stalled, these included the 3rd Guards and 4th Tank Armies, the 11th Army, and one tank and one cavalry corps - from what I've seen, none of these formations were initially assigned to Op Kutuzov (despite what a number of other authors have claimed) and were in fact originally intended to support other operations.

I believe 11 Army and 3 G. Tank Army were assigned to the Bryansk Front late in the evening of 13 July when it was too early to speak about "stalled".