Importance of Artillery

[Art]

Interesting statistics but are these comparison s on a like for like basis?

I suppose so. "Explosives" for both sides are mostly TNT which is said to make about 95% of Soviet production and not less than 80% of German. Also included in totals are more powerful explosives like hexogen which Germany produced in substantial numbers whereas corresponding German production was negligible.

What does "powder" mean?

German figures include generally negligible tonnage of black powder, which found some military usage for example in panzerfausts. Soviet - nitrocellulose and pyroxilyn powders.

How much of the German figures was expended as flak over the Reich?

There are two different set of figures, somewhat different in details but generally in the same vein. One is from Strategic Bombing Survey:
http://www.wrk.ru/forums/attachment.php?item=28474.
The second from original German docs:
http://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/ru/n ... ect/zoom/9
http://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/ru/n ... ect/zoom/9
Here "explosives" tonnage stands for total weight loaded into shell/bomb which includes mixtures with extenders like ammonium nitrate. Hence a difference when compared with production figures quoted above.
Also allocations of TNT produced between military branches:
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/ ... ermany.gif

My understanding is that ground artillery (including mortars, AT and infantry guns) was the biggest consumer or powders, Flaks were on the second place and together they dwarfed allocations to small arms, aircraft board cannons, naval and coast artillery. Explosives were mostly divided between ground artillery and air bombs. Bombs seem to consume proportionally less TNT and more extenders than ground ammo.

[Art]

It often seems like the allies the least efficient users of artillery due to the sheer volume expended to create a casualty.

Well, cost-wise the most effective military ever was a neanderthal man with a stone. All the centuries of warfare, all the tremendous technical progress beginning from the stone age - the principal results was that killing one man was becoming more and more expensive and required an ever-increasing amount of materiel.

[Richard Anderson]

What does "powder" mean? WW2 era artillery ammunition used more modern propellent than gunpowder?

IIRC, "Powder" is the typical English-language translation for the German Pulver and Russian Poroshok, which are their generic terms for propellant.

[Jeff Leach]

I've been reading about Soviet artillery lately and came across some references to Soviet artillery being pretty bad overall due to heavy losses of trained personnel early in the war,

I've seen comments in both Soviet and German records from the summer of 1941 on how Soviet artillery excelled at targeting their own troops. One Soviet unit commented that it had lost half of its effective strenght, without every encountering German troops, after having been targeted by their own artillery. I doubt that Soviet artillery personnal of 1941 was any better than Soviet artillery personnel of 1942.

[stg 44]

I've been reading about Soviet artillery lately and came across some references to Soviet artillery being pretty bad overall due to heavy losses of trained personnel early in the war,

I've seen comments in both Soviet and German records from the summer of 1941 on how Soviet artillery excelled at targeting their own troops. One Soviet unit commented that it had lost half of its effective strenght, without every encountering German troops, after having been targeted by their own artillery. I doubt that Soviet artillery personnal of 1941 was any better than Soviet artillery personnel of 1942.

Well, that is a problem artillery and aircraft had in all wars; I've come across German records of being attacked by their own artillery and aircraft in 1940 and 1941, same with the US throughout the war too.

[Jan-Hendrik]

An usual problem: artillery does not see friend or foe, just targets....

Jan-Hendrik

[stg 44]

An usual problem: artillery does not see friend or foe, just targets....

Jan-Hendrik

"When your only tool is Thor's Hammer all infantry look like ants that need hammering"

[Sheldrake]

An usual problem: artillery does not see friend or foe, just targets....
Jan-Hendrik

True for blind deaf and dumb artillery and ignorant supported arm. This is where C3 and survey matters.

[Sheldrake]

This was posted a long time ago in the forums:

Another favorite trick employed by the Russians was the creation of ‘channels’ of safety in their preparatory fires by halting the fire of one or more batteries or battalions. Infantry units then advanced swiftly through these lanes to the very edge of the enemy’s position and often caught his troops still in their holes, deceived into believing that their area was still under fire.

This sounds like a screw up. It is foolish to leave channels in a barrage. The British Fourth Army left 100 yard channels in the barrage 15th September 1916 to avoid hitting the first tanks.It was a disaster. The machine guns of the un-suppressed defenders were able to take a heavy toll.

This is a misreading of a tactic developed by the British and French in the First World War - the creeping barrage. Put a barrage in front of the advancing infantry and ask the infantry to get as close as possible - 50m with shrapnel. 200m with HE. The infantry learned that the secret of success was to be close enough to take some casualties from artillery (zone etc) It was better to take 2% casualties from artillery than 30% from enemy fire and for the attack to fail. The British used this in WW2 too. The Germans didn't understand how it worked, and assumed that the 25pdr fired dummy. "glass" shells.

It sounds as if the soviet artillery screwed up and the infantry who had lost their covering fire found their only option was to close with their enemy as fast as possible.

[Stiltzkin]

To me, this sounds rather like a testimony to insufficient coordination, communication and fire discipline.

[Art]

This was posted a long time ago in the forums:

Another favorite trick employed by the Russians was the creation of ‘channels’ of safety in their preparatory fires by halting the fire of one or more batteries or battalions. Infantry units then advanced swiftly through these lanes to the very edge of the enemy’s position and often caught his troops still in their holes, deceived into believing that their area was still under fire.

This sounds like a screw up. It is foolish to leave channels in a barrage.

Again the only source for the "favorite trick" is "Tactics in the Russian campaign" by Eike Middeldorf. In no Soviet document you can such a "lane" arrangement. From a common sense the "lane" was of no practical value since it would be easily swept by machine gun fire.

[Art]

IIRC, "Powder" is the typical English-language translation for the German Pulver and Russian Poroshok

Porokh. Poroshok is more like a washing powder.

[Michate]

Again the only source for the "favorite trick" is "Tactics in the Russian campaign" by Eike Middeldorf. In no Soviet document you can such a "lane" arrangement. From a common sense the "lane" was of no practical value since it would be easily swept by machine gun fire.

I have seen this "trick" being mentioned in a few experience reports on enemy tactics from the late war period (I do not remember which ones exactly).
I guess this may have stemmed from misinterpretation of matured Soviet attack technique, with infantry following closely behind creeping barrage of artillery and mortors and entering German positions before defenders had fully recovered from effects of artillery preparation.

One has to take into account that one of the major effects of an artillery preparation was the - at least temporary - loss of command and control capabilities. The defenders' observation and listening posts were blinded and deaf and that the communication system was disrupted - all wire cut, even many radios not working. Under such conditions it was very difficult to identify in a timely manner where and when exactly the enemy would attack, and attackers could frequently surprise the defenders.

One of the important points of German late war defensive tactics was to ensure own artillery, but also the heavy weapons of the infantry, would "automatically" fire strong concentrations on suspected enemy concentration areas, while artillery was blind (later on, it was to switch to observed fire again).

[Art]

I can suggest that nonuniform movement of barrage due to mistakes or accidents could create an impression of the deliberately designed "lane". In any case that was hardly an effect sought since normally barrage would form a straight line.

[Jeff Leach]

This was posted a long time ago in the forums:

Another favorite trick employed by the Russians was the creation of ‘channels’ of safety in their preparatory fires by halting the fire of one or more batteries or battalions. Infantry units then advanced swiftly through these lanes to the very edge of the enemy’s position and often caught his troops still in their holes, deceived into believing that their area was still under fire.

Again the only source for the "favorite trick" is "Tactics in the Russian campaign" by Eike Middeldorf. In no Soviet document you can such a "lane" arrangement. From a common sense the "lane" was of no practical value since it would be easily swept by machine gun fire.

I had posted about a German report from 1941 that says pretty much just as Stiltzkin (Eike Middeldorf)wrote http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 6&t=224792. The discussion there led me to the idea that what the Germans saw was just a lucky coincidence for the Soviet. The Soviet barrage landed just in front of the Soviet armor, instead of on top of it. Without some proof otherwise it is safest to accept Art's statement that the Soviets didn't leave 'safe lanes' in some of their barrages.