Importance of Artillery

[Art]

That piece doesn't describe a "lane" in barrage, from what I can see and it's vaguely worded in general.
That infantry should exploit the effect of artillery fire and for this end it must cling closely to the barrage was somehow a commonplace already in WWI. However a narrow lane or passage deliberately left in a barrage is another idea. That is how the scheme from Middeldorf depicts it:
http://nozdr.ru/militera/h/middeldorf/s09.gif
Again I doubt the practical value of this trick and I don't remember it described in any Soviet document, manual or secondary source.

[Richard Anderson]

IIRC, "Powder" is the typical English-language translation for the German Pulver and Russian Poroshok

Porokh. Poroshok is more like a washing powder.

Thanks! I wasn't sure on that one.

[Yuri]

Again the only source for the "favorite trick" is "Tactics in the Russian campaign" by Eike Middeldorf. In no Soviet document you can such a "lane" arrangement. From a common sense the "lane" was of no practical value since it would be easily swept by machine gun fire.

No, it is not the only source.

THE EXAMINATION RECORD OF THE COMMANDER OF 402ND SPARE DIVISION LIEUTENANT GENERAL Z.SHPEINITS
On March, 18th, 1945
Ziegmund v. Speiniz, 1890 of a birth, was born in Berlin, education - average, is married, the non-party, the German, in army since 1909.
Question: Describe in brief the battle way to armies.
Answer: I have entered German army in 1909, in 1911 have received a rank "lieutenant", in 1915 - a rank «the senior lieutenant», in 1918 - a rank "captain".
Participated in the First World War as an aide-de-camp of a batallion, then the officer on commissions at a headquarters of 1st reserve grenadierial division. With 1914 on 1916 I was on east front. With 1918 for 1919 I was in the same division on the western front.
With 1919 till 1921 I worked as the chief of branch on affairs of younger commanding and ordinary structure at 3rd division. With 1923 till 1929 I was the company commander in the same division.
With 1929 to 1933 I was an aide-de-camp at the commander of three infantry regiments. (The note: in German army in a peace time, except the division commander, there was a post of the commander only infantry regiments of this division, submitting to the division commander).
In 1931 I have received a rank "major", in 1934 - "lieutenant colonel".
In 1937 I have received a rank "colonel".
With 1932 to 1934 I was the commander of a batallion in 5th Prussian to a shelf of 2nd infantry division deploying in Stettin.
With 1934 till autumn of 1937 I was an aide-de-camp of the commander of 2nd case, at first at general Bock, then at general Blaskovits.
In December, 1940 I have received a rank "major general", in September, 1942 - "lieutenant general". Since autumn of 1937 till the end of 1940 I was the commander of 48th regiment of 12th infantry division.
Since January, 1941 till August, 1943 I was the commander of 9th infantry division, participated with it in struggle on east front as a part of army Reichenau.
Since August, 1943 till November, 1943 I was in a reserve, since November 1943 till August, 1944 was the commander of 361st infantry division and operated with it in battles in region Brody.
In August, 1944 I should receive in command a division in France, but this division has not appeared (has been routed by the moment of my arrival), I have returned to Berlin. On September, 20th, 1944 I have been appointed by the commander of 402nd reserve division.
I have a number of the awards received in the First World War and in this war, in 1939 has received «Buckles to iron crosses I and II class», in 1941 - «German cross in gold», in August, 1943 - «Knightly Cross».

[...]
Question: What, in your opinion, is the most characteristic in tactics and carrying out of large offensive operations by the Soviet command?
The answer: I would like to illustrate following moments on this question:
[...]
3. Skilful interaction of various combat arms and first of all artillery and an infantry.
4. Application in each large offensive operation of any new tactical receptions. In January operation, for example, Russian as to me our officers told, have managed to bite into our defence during an artillery preparation. It has been reached by that during the certain moment of storm artillery preparation and a continuous line of fire on other sites "corridors" on which separate Russian subdivisions have broken to our positions have been created and storm have seized them. In this question I would like to note still following moments:
Exclusive skill in concentration in short terms of the big mass of artillery and a skilful massing of artillery fire, and also flexible maneuvering by it;
Excellent equipment of Russian troops;
Infantry saturation the automatic weapon.
[...]
TsAMO RF. F. 233. Op. 2374. D. 154. LL. 86, 88, 89-92. The original
(Skipping questions and answers, not related to the topic - Yuri)

[Yuri]

How to serve two years in the infantry in Europe, and then four years studying the theory of artillery tactics at the military Department at the Polytechnic Institute, and then six months of practice shooting in the desert in Turkmenistan (the Soviet-Iranian border) and one month in the mountains of Tianshan, I can say that such tactics were used. For conventional artillery is considered a safe distance of 150 meters from the explosion of a 122 mm projectile.
The apotheosis of such tactics began exercises with the use of nuclear weapons on Totsky Polygon (Orenburg region) in September 1954. It was found that the safe distance in the dugout 1.8 km long.
True, I was at a distance of 70 km and I was six months old .

[Sheldrake]

Again the only source for the "favorite trick" is "Tactics in the Russian campaign" by Eike Middeldorf. In no Soviet document you can such a "lane" arrangement. From a common sense the "lane" was of no practical value since it would be easily swept by machine gun fire.

No, it is not the only source.

THE EXAMINATION RECORD OF THE COMMANDER OF 402ND SPARE DIVISION LIEUTENANT GENERAL Z.SHPEINITS
On March, 18th, 1945
Ziegmund v. Speiniz, 1890 of a birth, was born in Berlin, education - average, is married, the non-party, the German, in army since 1909.

3. Skilful interaction of various combat arms and first of all artillery and an infantry.
4. Application in each large offensive operation of any new tactical receptions. In January operation, for example, Russian as to me our officers told, have managed to bite into our defence during an artillery preparation. It has been reached by that during the certain moment of storm artillery preparation and a continuous line of fire on other sites "corridors" on which separate Russian subdivisions have broken to our positions have been created and storm have seized them. In this question I would like to note still following moments:
Exclusive skill in concentration in short terms of the big mass of artillery and a skilful massing of artillery fire, and also flexible maneuvering by it;
Excellent equipment of Russian troops;
Infantry saturation the automatic weapon.
[...]
TsAMO RF. F. 233. Op. 2374. D. 154. LL. 86, 88, 89-92. The original
(Skipping questions and answers, not related to the topic - Yuri)

That isn't quite the same thing as leaving lanes in the barrage.

A corridor can be created to protect the flank of the assault troops either by screening them with smoke, or a linear concentration on the flank (s) to isolate the defences under attack and protect the assault troops from fire or counmter attack.

It was common practice in WW1 to isolate a sector of the enemy defences with a box barrage as a raid took place and to use HE and or smoke to screen the flank of an attack.

Several fireplans used this idea. The Fireplan "Honker" for Op Diadem the assault on the Gustav Line on 11th May 1944 had all sorts of flanking concentrations. e.g. German observers in Monte cassino were blinded bya continuous smokescreen maintained for several days.

[Yuri]

Again the only source for the "favorite trick" is "Tactics in the Russian campaign" by Eike Middeldorf. In no Soviet document you can such a "lane" arrangement. From a common sense the "lane" was of no practical value since it would be easily swept by machine gun fire.

No, it is not the only source.

THE EXAMINATION RECORD OF THE COMMANDER OF 402ND SPARE DIVISION LIEUTENANT GENERAL Z.SHPEINITS
On March, 18th, 1945
Ziegmund v. Speiniz, 1890 of a birth, was born in Berlin, education - average, is married, the non-party, the German, in army since 1909.

3. Skilful interaction of various combat arms and first of all artillery and an infantry.
4. Application in each large offensive operation of any new tactical receptions. In January operation, for example, Russian as to me our officers told, have managed to bite into our defence during an artillery preparation. It has been reached by that during the certain moment of storm artillery preparation and a continuous line of fire on other sites "corridors" on which separate Russian subdivisions have broken to our positions have been created and storm have seized them. In this question I would like to note still following moments:
Exclusive skill in concentration in short terms of the big mass of artillery and a skilful massing of artillery fire, and also flexible maneuvering by it;
Excellent equipment of Russian troops;
Infantry saturation the automatic weapon.
[...]
TsAMO RF. F. 233. Op. 2374. D. 154. LL. 86, 88, 89-92. The original
(Skipping questions and answers, not related to the topic - Yuri)

That isn't quite the same thing as leaving lanes in the barrage.

A corridor can be created to protect the flank of the assault troops either by screening them with smoke, or a linear concentration on the flank (s) to isolate the defences under attack and protect the assault troops from fire or counmter attack.

It was common practice in WW1 to isolate a sector of the enemy defences with a box barrage as a raid took place and to use HE and or smoke to screen the flank of an attack.

Several fireplans used this idea. The Fireplan "Honker" for Op Diadem the assault on the Gustav Line on 11th May 1944 had all sorts of flanking concentrations. e.g. German observers in Monte cassino were blinded bya continuous smokescreen maintained for several days.

I agree. Amazing to me that this tactic is credited with the Russian. In 1941-42 the Germans used this technique. I was only pointing out that the source is not only Middeldorf

[Sheldrake]

I agree. Amazing to me that this tactic is credited with the Russian. In 1941-42 the Germans used this technique. I was only pointing out that the source is not only Middeldorf

The problem is that too few people understand how artillery firerpower works.

Reading some of the post war interviews with the Germans makes it clear the they simply did not understand how the British were using artillery.

[Art]

In January operation, for example, Russian as to me our officers told

So it's not even a first-hand experience. The key question, however, is if there is anything like this description in Soviet fire plans or after-action reports or other documents pertaining to the "January operation" - Vistula-Oder operation of the 1 Belorussian Front, I guess.

I was only pointing out that the source is not only Middeldorf

Ok, point taken.

[Sheldrake]

Art and Yuri,

I too was trained in the Soviet artillery doctrine...

Courtesy of 7 Intelligence Company, 1 BR Corps Bielefeld

[Sheldrake]

This is a NATO interpretation of Soviet Cold War Doctrine, but the concepts evolved from 1941-45 and can be seen in the WW2 era documents

Somewhere I have some tables of norms of how many units of fire per hectare to suppress or destroy the enemy

[Stiltzkin]

These guides can be considered a joke, I cannot take them seriously.
Furthermore , the napoleonic stuff is a myth (made up in modern history, it was adressed not long ago). Napoleon was the master of Artillery, the Russians have since all eternity had this inferiority complex to state that everything was copied from them. That is found in Soviet literature, as well.

[Michate]

The problem is that too few people understand how artillery firerpower works.

Reading some of the post war interviews with the Germans makes it clear the they simply did not understand how the British were using artillery.

Just out of interest, which misunderstandings did you notice? Part of the problem is IMHO, that many translations of these interviews, or studies, seem to be very shoddy, in particular, when referring to more technical terms.
There are one or two artillery reports from the Normandy battle available at germandocs, that, while not particularly detailed or insightful, seem about right on the basics, e.g. this one: http://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/de/n ... ect/zoom/6 (and following pages)

Reading about alleged German artillery practices in sources from the Anglo-sphere IMHO also shows frequent misunderstandings.

[Sheldrake]

These guides can be considered a joke, I cannot take them seriously.
Furthermore , the napoleonic stuff is a myth (made up in modern history, it was adressed not long ago). Napoleon was the master of Artillery, the Russians have since all eternity had this inferiority complex to state that everything was copied from them. That is found in Soviet literature, as well.

A JOKE!!!!?

Threat publications were not a joke, but written for ordinary soldiers and contain the key information that soldiers at company or battalion level might need to know. Nothing wrong with a comic book style. Tigerfibel and Pantherfibel worked for the Panzerwaffe

This is a (1980s) joke...

P1130946_zpsa647c2bf.jpg (39.26 KiB) Viewed 752 times

[Sheldrake]

The problem is that too few people understand how artillery firerpower works.

Reading some of the post war interviews with the Germans makes it clear the they simply did not understand how the British were using artillery.

Just out of interest, which misunderstandings did you notice? Part of the problem is IMHO, that many translations of these interviews, or studies, seem to be very shoddy, in particular, when referring to more technical terms.
There are one or two artillery reports from the Normandy battle available at germandocs, that, while not particularly detailed or insightful, seem about right on the basics, e.g. this one: http://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/de/n ... ect/zoom/6 (and following pages)

Reading about alleged German artillery practices in sources from the Anglo-sphere IMHO also shows frequent misunderstandings.

Lets start with the battle of the Somme in 1916. "Through German Eyes" by Christopher Duffy is an assessment of the British Army on the battle of the Somme through the German documents - PW reports and Intelligence assessments. The Germans did not understand how a creeping barrage worked. They credited the allies with far greater C2 than they really had. and assumed that a moving barrage was controlled and adjusted from the air by the British and French Corps aircraft.

Possibly because the Germans didn't grasp how allied artillery worked in WW1, they misunderstood in WW2.

ARKO II SS Panzer Korps FMS B666 commented on the "radiopsychosis" that prevented the Germans makinmg full use of wireless communications in his debrief post war.

II SS Corps reported that the British used glass or dummy shells to allow the infantry to get close to the defenders. No such munitions existed.

[Paul Lakowski]

WOW I WAS JUST THINKING....

"We should send Sheldrake back through a time portal to tell the Germans how to fight. That way they would win the war and we wouldn't have to listen to him."

GOOD THING I DIDNT ACTUALLY SAY THAT OUT LOUD.... :roll:
phew!!