4th Panzer Group screwed up in Barbarossa?

[BDV]

The original plan called for 18 Army cutting off and destroying Soviet forces south-east of Riga (see the directive of 31.01.41) but that seemed to be a less prioritized task.

Do you have a web resource for that?

[Stiltzkin]

Well then I have to apologize, jokes can be amusing and this forum lacks humor.
I simply cannot understand how you come up with the idea that the operational and tactical performance of the Wehrmacht during Barbarossa was bad. I mean they certainly screwed up a lot of maneuvers but to make territorial gains of this proportion in such a short amount of time while inflicting tremendous amount of casualties on the enemy, don't you think that the reasons for failure might lie elsewhere? This is like saying that Hannibal Barca screwed up during Trebia, Lake Trasimene and Cannae. You know, his army declined gradually with his ultimate defeat at Zama. This is against every rule of warfare, he minimized his losses and still it did not suffice, perhaps you should observe economic, demographic and geo strategical factors (just an advice)? Do you really think they could have turned it around somehow? They could not win, their strength did not suffice, probably even if they were rested and refitted. There are limitations.
Stg pointed out a flaw in a maneuver and then you stated that all Groups failed. This is confusing.

[stg 44]

I simply cannot understand how you come up with the idea that the operational and tactical performance of the Wehrmacht during Barbarossa was bad.

I don't think anyone is saying on the whole it was a bad performance, at the time they did was no other military in the world could have done, but that said that was heavily aided by the USSR's total lack of preparedness for the conflict and seriously compromised abilities to fight thanks to Stalin's efforts. So German mistakes were generally papered over because the Soviets were not capable of exploiting them; as a result they accumulated so that Germany ultimately fell short in achieving the strategic and even operational goals set out in the planning for the campaign. One such mistake I'm suggesting here was half of 4th Panzer Group not taking the opportunity to wipe out the Soviet 8th army before moving on, which ultimately came back to hurt AG-North later on.

I mean they certainly screwed up a lot of maneuvers but to make territorial gains of this proportion in such a short amount of time while inflicting tremendous amount of casualties on the enemy, don't you think that the reasons for failure might lie elsewhere? This is like saying that Hannibal Barca screwed up during Trebia, Lake Trasimene and Cannae. You know, his army declined gradually with his ultimate defeat at Zama. This is against every rule of warfare, he minimized his losses and still it did not suffice, perhaps you should observe economic, demographic and geo strategical factors (just an advice)? Do you really think they could have turned it around somehow? They could not win, their strength did not suffice, probably even if they were rested and refitted. There are limitations.

Part of the point is that gained territory isn't necessarily helpful or permanent if you don't demolish enemy forces; casualties that let the enemy recover and return to fight aren't enough, as Rommel found out in Africa or the Germans in Ukraine in 1943: you have to destroy total formations, because if you leave their leadership cadres and other elements intact they can add replacements/reinforcements and come back to fight later. Also the problem with 8th army in the 1941 campaign: it was allowed to survive and it was reinforced and a significant factor for the rest of the campaign and war. I don't know if you can really say they couldn't win; they'd need a better performance to win than they gave and it seems they missed a lot of opportunities because they were just expecting the Soviets to crumble if they struck deeply enough and quickly enough, mislearning the lessons of the French campaign.

[Stiltzkin]

the USSR's total lack of preparedness

For the millionth time. The Soviet Union was better prepared than France and Poland in 39 and 40 respectively. The 4th and 7th Tank Divisions, 6th Mechanised Corps, the 8th and 32nd Tank Divisions were present in the Western Special Military District on 22nd June 1941.

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1 ... 0008430452
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1 ... ode=fslv20
http://www.jstor.org/stable/260933?seq= ... b_contents
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1 ... 8908411797

They had their best units available. They perished. In 1942 the Soviets suffered the same losses, but it does not knock them out of the war, there is a consistency over all years. By 1943 you can't hardly suggest that they were "unprepared" or "startled", losses did not sink. It does not matter how well prepared the Soviets would be, as long as they wouldn't have absolute numerical superiority with the Wehrmacht offensive power strained and running out of steam, they could not do anything besides delay their advance, playing on time (and burn men for that matter). The Soviets were raising new Divisions at a higher pace than the Wehrmacht was able to kill them. Thats what happened.

[stg 44]

the USSR's total lack of preparedness

For the millionth time. The Soviet Union was better prepared than France and Poland in 39 and 40 respectively. The 4th and 7th Tank Divisions, 6th Mechanised Corps, the 8th and 32nd Tank Divisions were present in the Western Special Military District on 22nd June 1941.
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1 ... 0008430452
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1 ... ode=fslv20
http://www.jstor.org/stable/260933?seq= ... b_contents
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1 ... 8908411797

I highly suggest you read the book Stumbling Colossus by David Glantz about the readiness of the Soviet military in 1941. In no conceivable way were the Soviets as prepared for war as the French in 1940. For one thing they weren't even mobilized and were outnumbered by the Axis forces, which was the opposite case in 1940 (the combined Allied forces outnumbered in the Germans in just about all categories but for operational aircraft). Sure there were a lot more AFVs and aircraft in the Soviet arsenal and eventually mobilized manpower by September, but that doesn't mean any of that was seriously combat ready. The existence and presence of the units you mention means absolutely nothing in terms of their combat readiness, which was extremely marginal. The Soviets ended up losing more AFVs to mechanical or supply issues than combat by August 1941.

They had their best units available. They perished. In 1942 the Soviets suffered the same losses, but it does not knock them out of the war, there is a consistency over all years. By 1943 you can't hardly suggest that they were "unprepared" or "startled", losses did not sink. It does not matter how well prepared the Soviets would be, as long as they wouldn't have absolute numerical superiority with the Wehrmacht offensive power strained and running out of steam, they could not do anything besides delay their advance, playing on time (and burn men for that matter). The Soviets were raising new Divisions at a higher pace than the Wehrmacht was able to kill them. Thats what happened.

Their best units in 1941 were completely unprepared to fight and weren't even mobilized on June 22nd 1941. So they perished very easily in the opening weeks and then ad hoc replacements show up to fight and they were smashed, as they were even less ready to fight an organized invader. In 1942 Soviet loss rates were way down compared to the >5 months of 1941. Loss rates sank dramatically for 1942 compared to 1941; they suffered similar losses for 12 months that they did in less than 6 in 1941, while inflicting more than double the casualties on the Germans in 1942 than they took in 1941. German loss rate at least stayed constant if not increased, the Soviet one went down.

[Stiltzkin]

You sure about that? They make them pay dearly for every inch. If not for the constant replacements for the RKKA and the support of the United Nations, I am not sure if the USSR could have continued its offensives. The reason for the German defeat in the east was a lack of manpower, quite obvious. No military genious would have turned that around.

[stg 44]

You sure about that? They make them pay dearly for every inch. If not for the constant replacements for the RKKA and the support of the United Nations, I am not sure if the USSR could have continued its offensives. The reason for the German defeat in the east was a lack of manpower, quite obvious. No military genious would have turned that around.

What does that have to do with my point? The Axis coalition initially outnumbered the Soviets until they started mobilizing their military and were able to actually expand their military to larger than the Axis forces by September. Still the German could have taken Moscow with a better conduct of the war and wiping out Soviet army formations when they had the chance, it wasn't a deterministic affair entirely

[Stiltzkin]

The Axis coalition initially outnumbered

Thats not really the case, the forces involved in Barbarossa had numerical parity (with the Soviets having a substantial amount of AFVs, planes and guns available), even if we accept the "Soviet numbers" this numerical disadvantage is gone after a week. The reason why Soviet numbers remain low during the late phase of 41 is simply because they are losing men at a faster pace they can replace. The Axis forces committed are 2,8 million Iststärke against a Soviet force of 3,3 million. People like to add the Allies (who did not participate in the intial attack), exaggerate with German reserves and substract Soviet reserves (while also NKVD and other forces are not included). Total Luftwaffe personnel wasn't even present. It supports my claim that numerical parity did not suffice to stop the Wehrmacht, the conditions of the EF, the geostrategical factors and the massive inflow of Soviet replacements saved the day. These are the reasons for the failures of Barbarossa and not suposedly a tactical misconduct by Panzer Groups.

[stg 44]

The Axis coalition initially outnumbered

Thats not really the case, the forces involved in Barbarossa had numerical parity (with the Soviets having a substantial amount of AFVs, planes and guns available), even if we accept the "Soviet numbers" this numerical disadvantage is gone after a week. The reason why Soviet numbers remain low during the late phase of 41 is simply because they are losing men at a faster pace they can replace. The Axis forces committed are 2,8 million Iststärke against a Soviet force of 3,3 million. People like to add the Allies (who did not participate in the intial attack), exaggerate with German reserves and substract Soviet reserves (while also NKVD and other forces are not included). Total Luftwaffe personnel wasn't even present. It supports my claim that numerical parity did not suffice to stop the Wehrmacht, the conditions of the EF, the geostrategical factors and the massive inflow of Soviet replacements saved the day. These are the reasons for the failures of Barbarossa and not suposedly a tactical misconduct by Panzer Groups.

On the border Soviet forces did not number even 2.5 million men in the first echelon. Their total strength was around 5 million all over the country, including in garrison, deep reserve, and in the Far East, but less than half was in the first strategic echelon on the western border. It wasn't just the Germans either (who had over 3 million men committed to the East including the navy and Luftwaffe), it was also the Finns, Romanians, Italians, Hungarians, and Slovaks. Altogether they were around 4 million Axis troops even if not all were front line manpower; all Soviet manpower wasn't front line either. That's the point, the Axis forces at the front outnumbers Soviet troops at the front initially and Soviet mobilizations only replaced manpower being smashed. Soviet AFV and aircraft numbers are deceptive too as that is total on hand, not operational (or soon to break down). In fact in 1941 alone something like 10,000 Soviet aircraft were lost to non-combat reasons, more in fact than were lost in combat.

German operational misconduct hinged around not dealing with Soviet armies early on like the 8th and 22nd, while rushing after Leningrad without the logistics to actually capture it quickly, plus Guderian wasting huge resources taking and holding Yelnya instead of closing the Smolensk pocket. Thereafter the Germans wasted even more time going after Leningrad in August-September rather than destroying Soviet armies attacking them along the Smolensk axis. There were any number of missed opportunities at the operational level throughout the campaign that resulted in Moscow not falling.

[ViKinG]

Are you saying that it was panzer group 4 then who was in charge of maintaining contact with AGC?? It can be no other unit then 16th army with that task . i'm not saying that was its ONLY task.

[ViKinG]

Very good points guys. Also I'd like to ask, if anybody knows. What is a good source that contains details of the fighting regarding Manstein's LVI panzer korps between crossing the Dvina and the battle of Sol-tsy? so roughly from July 5th to July 20th I'd say. I've found lots of detailed information regarding Reinhardt's XXXXI PzKp fighting for OStrov and Pskov region and then onto Luga. I haven't seen much of what the LVI PZkp went through before Sol-tsy. Particularly the area of Rezekne !

[stg 44]

Very good points guys. Also I'd like to ask, if anybody knows. What is a good source that contains details of the fighting regarding Manstein's LVI panzer korps between crossing the Dvina and the battle of Sol-tsy? so roughly from July 5th to July 20th I'd say. I've found lots of detailed information regarding Reinhardt's XXXXI PzKp fighting for OStrov and Pskov region and then onto Luga. I haven't seen much of what the LVI PZkp went through before Sol-tsy. Particularly the area of Rezekne !

Manstein's "Lost Victories" would probably be the most direct source, even given the flaws of the book in general.

What's your sources regarding Rheinhart's corps?

[ViKinG]

Thanks STG! You know you're starting to have a large library when you forgot you had Lost victories and someone reminds you haha. My sources for Reinhardt's group run from Raus' books, to Glantz- Leningrad and Forczyk Tank warfare on the eastern front to name a few. I have more for sure. Glantz is great for painting the large picture while Forczyk's book likes to go down to small scale armoured action which is also nice. (This includes the soviets attempt at Ostrov with the 3rd Tank division from 1st Mechanised Corps, 21st Mechanised corps attacks against Manstein's at the Dvina bridgeheads etc. Also has lots of info regarding Baranov's 1st tank division near Kingisepp on the Luga line. I also have Charles Trang Waffen-SS during Barbarossa which may contain some info regarding Totenkopf at Rezekne, not to mention I have a couple books on Tkopf but those like to focus mostly on the make up of the division then actual combat history.

[Kelvin]

Pz Gr 4 was always jumping at Leningrad and heading via the Luga (though 56th Panzer Corps was sent east to cut the Moscow-Leningrad rail line and got ambushed near Soltsy). Pz Gr. 3 did their thrust toward Velikyi Luki (sp?) against 22nd army (thrust deep and let the army retreat yet again) in early July before turning East/Southeast to close the Smolensk pocket. IIRC that was around July 3rd.

Advance on Leningrad was to follow AGC's conquest of Byelorussia AND the destruction of Soviet units in the Baltics.

From what I gather from the planning the Leningrad push was left to be decided after a central culmination point was achieved (Smolensk historically), which was something the cropped up in planning because guys like Halder kept trying to convince Hitler to go straight at Moscow, while he started to wonder about the issue himself, before going back to that directive in the end.

Thus, if Hoth and Guderian started their dash past Smolensk before Hoepner jumped his panzers towards Luga we have a clear culprit duo; !! but only considering the small issue of July within its small local timeframe. Although Directive 21 can be criticized for disregarding altogether the question of AGC-AGS linkage and not prescribing more specifically how the AGC-AGN linkage was to happen; these limiations, in addition to the vague "deep armored strikes" backdoor proved a prescription for disastrous improvisation, that no amount of tactical brilliance and individual bravery could surmount.

Führer Directive 21 was issued in December 1940, planning for Barbarossa started after that (there was the earlier Marcks and Lossberg study, but Barbarossa wasn't started by OKW's operations department until late December 1940) where things evolved considerably...don't put too much weight on that outdated directive for how things played out in June-July. It gave a very basic strategic framework for operations...and perhaps too wide of one. However commanders on the ground didn't exactly improvise effectively when they did so (Hoth's failure to destroy 22nd army during his VL thrust, 4th Panzer Group letting 8th army get away and continue to resist in Estonia rather than destroy them as intended).

Hi, stg44, AFAIK, Hoth Panzer group annhilated Soviet 22nd Army in Velikie Luki in August 1941,taking over 30,000 POW. U mean other battle ?

[stg 44]

Hi, stg44, AFAIK, Hoth Panzer group annhilated Soviet 22nd Army in Velikie Luki in August 1941,taking over 30,000 POW. U mean other battle ?

In August yes, I'm talking about doing so in early July/maybe late June. It proved to be a significant problem until late August when part of 3rd Panzer army attacked it.