ljadw wrote:It is the old trick to blame Hitler for the defeat ;
the truth is
a) that due to production problems and due to the fact that Barbarossa lasted longed than expected, there were not enough replacements available
b ) that due to transport problems the available replacements could not / not soon enough be transported
c ) that most that was available and could be transported,was transported to the east :
example : in the 4th quarter of 1941 1152 tanks were build of which 391 went to the east :if more could go to the east, more would go to the east .
From 21 to 31 october 316 tanks went to the east .Why ? Because they were available and because they could be transported .Of these 316 there were 56 Pz IV:if Hitler wanted to hold back tanks ,why was he sending 56 of his newest tanks to the east .
You are absolutely right. All types of transport were used primarily for transporting infantry and artillery. Increased aircraft, tanks went on the back burner.
FHQ 16.12.1941
Top secret.
Only for the command
Führer and Supreme commander
of the armed forces.
The Supreme command
of the armed forces.
The staff of the operational management.
The Department of defense country.
No. 442182/41 G.
Order:
1. To allow a group of armies "North" to make removal of the inner flanks of the 16th and 18th armies, the line of the Volkhov river and the railway line, passing from the station of Volkhov in the North-West. On the line of this railroad to establish a direct link with the right flank of the 28th army corps.
The task of army is to defend the specified line until the last man, no retreat more than a step, and thus to further the implementation of the blockade of Leningrad.
I especially pay attention to strengthen the air defense to the South and South-East of Leningrad.
2. Army group "Center".
Only after the rear compartment position of the arriving reserves, you to think about moving away for these positions.
3. Army group "South". To maintain the barrier.
With all the energy you should achieve the capture of Sevastopol, to release reserves and transfer them from the Crimea to other parts of the front of army group.
4. Air force:
a) commander of the air force for the immediate release for the 8th aviation corps the following strengthening:
three bomber air group from among the new units;
one bomber air group (augmented) from the Western front;
one group fighters out of parts of night-fighter (two to replenish the air groups of fighters of the 8th air corps);
one transport group, 4th air fleet;
four transport air group from among the new units;
b) for the formation of four transport air groups to withdraw the last remaining order of the chief educational institutions of the air force aircraft, "u-52", delete all the aircraft from all commands and staffs, leaving them with only the absolutely necessary the aircraft communications;
C) according to the instructions of the headquarters of the main command of the land forces, the transport group of the 4th air fleet, the transmitted part of the 8th air corps, must in the event of relocation to transfer the marching battalion of the army group "South";
g) the newly formed transport group needs to be focused in Krakow with the aim of transferring from there into the area of army group "Center" units of the 4th regiment of the SS.
5. Reinforcements for the front:
a) it is very important to transfer the marching battalions for the most weak divisions. Compared with this task, transfer tanks is not so important. The next task is to transfer divisions from the West, equipped with winter clothing and equipment (perhaps by being already on the Eastern front divisions), army group "Center" and putting them into action on the most poorly defended parts of the front.
In the head echelons to distinguish infantry units of several divisions and strengthen them to the extent necessary artillery. In addition, all trains required to provide a sufficient supply of food.
The army group to provide increased speed of movement of trains with troops at the expense of the echelons of supply. To the state border of Germany trains followed with the increased speed;
b) in Germany must be mobilized all the forces able to build, to carry on security service or to participate in the fights and not employed in vital industries. They should provide on-site winter clothing and prepare to send (security battalions of the land forces, air force, waffen SS in Berlin, the battalions RAD — from the West and from Poland).
About the readiness of these units to convey;
C) chief of armament and commander of the army reserve to be formed from the composition of the army reserve, in addition to the already scheduled four divisions, the largest possible number of fighter command force of up to battalion, providing them with skis.
On the number of formed fighter command and their readiness to convey to me.
Adolf Hitler
Right: captain of the General staff
(signed)
Source: "Military history journal", 1960, № 12, p. 75-76.
From a speech by Himmler before the SS officers and the police in April 1942 to be:
in just three months of winter from Germany and Poland were moved by railroad and by air to Moscow 150 000 police. Lost 15,000 police, including 715 (possibly 705) police officers.
