Significance of lack of replacement equipment in Barbarossa
Re: Significance of lack of replacement equipment in Barbarossa
A few years ago on one of topic (which are can't find it.) of this forum I gave the record of interview the prisoners of the 23rd Panzer division (more than 60 soldiers and unter-officers captured may 12-15 1942 ). There in detail when, where and from whom was formed this division. Briefly. 23 Panzer division was formed and trained in Paris, from October ' 41 to March 42, during the period of study were the French tanks. On the Eastern front went at the end of March 42 without tanks, the tanks received in April-May, 42 in Charkow.
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Re: Significance of lack of replacement equipment in Barbarossa
I believe they were issued German tanks before they got to 'Charkow'? I will link a source.
https://books.google.com/books?id=8_2qI ... e&q&f=true
https://books.google.com/books?id=8_2qI ... e&q&f=true
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Re: Significance of lack of replacement equipment in Barbarossa
Indeed. According to the entry in Lexikon, the issue of German tanks to Panzer Regiment 201. was complete 23 December 1941, when the division was still in France.Yoozername wrote:I believe they were issued German tanks before they got to 'Charkow'? I will link a source.
https://books.google.com/books?id=8_2qI ... e&q&f=true
Richard C. Anderson Jr.
American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell
American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell
Re: Significance of lack of replacement equipment in Barbarossa
No you're just asserting an opinion without proof. Find a source that says that was the specific reason and then we can accept it as fact. Besides they could have literally driven them to the front if needed.ljadw wrote: The reason is obvious : transport problems .
I will give the figures for 4 quarter later .
Other questions : what was needed ? More tanks? More crew ? More tanks and crew ? More caterpillars ? If more tank crew were needed, the tank schools would need more tanks .
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Re: Significance of lack of replacement equipment in Barbarossa
This may be the reason or part of the reason. But, I would question why they would still be sending Panzer II or Panzer 38(t)? Especially in the 4th Qtr. They would probably take up a rail car just the same as a Panzer III or IV.The reason is obvious : transport problems .
Driving the Panzers to the front lines begs the question "Where are the gas stations along the way?". And the much needed maintenance and parts?
Re: Significance of lack of replacement equipment in Barbarossa
Original source (Germany and the Second World War, Vol. IV) provides somewhat different numbers which are essentially the same as given in KTB OKW:Stiltzkin wrote:https://books.google.de/books?id=UmwwBw ... e&q&f=true
From Operation Barbarossa: the Complete Organisational and Statistical Analysis, and Military Simulation Volume IIB p.178,
https://archive.org/stream/kriegstagebu ... 4/mode/2up
I don't understand where a difference comes from.
In any case they don't seem to include whole units sent to the Eastern Front. According to Yentz by the end of 1941 2 and 5 Panzer Divisions and Panzer-regiment 203 arrived to EF bringing at least 522 tanks with them (163 Pz-II, 281 Pz-III, 60 Pz-IV, 18 Bef.) in addition to at least 537 (12 Pz-I, 24 Pz-II, 277 Pz-III, 108 Czech tanks, 80 Pz-IV, 12 StuGs, 9 command and 15 flame tanks) replacements sent by batches.
Re: Significance of lack of replacement equipment in Barbarossa
Thats because you are comparing units acceptances to logistics acceptances. Look at his sources, as he uses the (very lacking) "compendium", as well. Askey most likely makes the mistake of believing they were not issued, he is right, but he could not know everything about their whereabouts. Furthermore, he inlcudes the beginning of 42, as the majority of vehicles arrived not before December.
Re: Significance of lack of replacement equipment in Barbarossa
1) Tanks would never made it to the front if they were driven from Germany :for long distances tanks were transported by rail .stg 44 wrote:No you're just asserting an opinion without proof. Find a source that says that was the specific reason and then we can accept it as fact. Besides they could have literally driven them to the front if needed.ljadw wrote: The reason is obvious : transport problems .
I will give the figures for 4 quarter later .
Other questions : what was needed ? More tanks? More crew ? More tanks and crew ? More caterpillars ? If more tank crew were needed, the tank schools would need more tanks .
2) in june and july 87 tanks were sent to the front
in august : 9
in september : 14
in october : 316
in november :74
in december : 0
There are only 2 possible explanations :production problems or transport problems .It is obvious that if no tanks were sent to the east,the reason was transport problems .
The theory that it was the decision from Hitler to hold the tanks in Germany is nonsense, because it implies that Hitler ordered in october to send tanks and that he ordered in december not to send tanks .
Re: Significance of lack of replacement equipment in Barbarossa
In your mind that is the only two explanations, but there is at least 1 more: they were held back to build up new Panzer divisions and rebuild existing divisions after the campaign season was complete, as Stahel claims.ljadw wrote:1) Tanks would never made it to the front if they were driven from Germany :for long distances tanks were transported by rail .stg 44 wrote:No you're just asserting an opinion without proof. Find a source that says that was the specific reason and then we can accept it as fact. Besides they could have literally driven them to the front if needed.ljadw wrote: The reason is obvious : transport problems .
I will give the figures for 4 quarter later .
Other questions : what was needed ? More tanks? More crew ? More tanks and crew ? More caterpillars ? If more tank crew were needed, the tank schools would need more tanks .
2) in june and july 87 tanks were sent to the front
in august : 9
in september : 14
in october : 316
in november :74
in december : 0
There are only 2 possible explanations :production problems or transport problems .It is obvious that if no tanks were sent to the east,the reason was transport problems .
The theory that it was the decision from Hitler to hold the tanks in Germany is nonsense, because it implies that Hitler ordered in october to send tanks and that he ordered in december not to send tanks .
Re: Significance of lack of replacement equipment in Barbarossa
I would say that they sent Pz2 and Pz38 (t ) because these were immediately available and the others not . Guderian was whining for more tanks and from 21 to 31 october 72 Pz 38 (t) were sent/arrived and 56 Pz4, if he wanted more Pz 4 ,he would have to wait.Yoozername wrote:This may be the reason or part of the reason. But, I would question why they would still be sending Panzer II or Panzer 38(t)? Especially in the 4th Qtr. They would probably take up a rail car just the same as a Panzer III or IV.The reason is obvious : transport problems .
Driving the Panzers to the front lines begs the question "Where are the gas stations along the way?". And the much needed maintenance and parts?
One can also argue that,opposite to what a lot of people were writing after the war, Pz2 and Pz 38 (t) were not completely useless in 1941 . The PzD had always a collection of different types .
Re: Significance of lack of replacement equipment in Barbarossa
1 ) There is no proof for what is saying Stahelstg 44 wrote:In your mind that is the only two explanations, but there is at least 1 more: they were held back to build up new Panzer divisions and rebuild existing divisions after the campaign season was complete, as Stahel claims.ljadw wrote:1) Tanks would never made it to the front if they were driven from Germany :for long distances tanks were transported by rail .stg 44 wrote:No you're just asserting an opinion without proof. Find a source that says that was the specific reason and then we can accept it as fact. Besides they could have literally driven them to the front if needed.ljadw wrote: The reason is obvious : transport problems .
I will give the figures for 4 quarter later .
Other questions : what was needed ? More tanks? More crew ? More tanks and crew ? More caterpillars ? If more tank crew were needed, the tank schools would need more tanks .
2) in june and july 87 tanks were sent to the front
in august : 9
in september : 14
in october : 316
in november :74
in december : 0
There are only 2 possible explanations :production problems or transport problems .It is obvious that if no tanks were sent to the east,the reason was transport problems .
The theory that it was the decision from Hitler to hold the tanks in Germany is nonsense, because it implies that Hitler ordered in october to send tanks and that he ordered in december not to send tanks .
2) How to explain that 316 tanks were sent in october and no tanks in december : was there no need to build new Panzer Divisions in october,but suddenly this need appeared in december ?
Re: Significance of lack of replacement equipment in Barbarossa
If you read he book there is more evidence than what you've presented for your inference.ljadw wrote: 1 ) There is no proof for what is saying Stahel
The generals finally pried tanks out of Hitler's grasp for the Moscow offensive. And yes as was already noted earlier in December a Panzer division in France was being equipped.ljadw wrote: 2) How to explain that 316 tanks were sent in october and no tanks in december : was there no need to build new Panzer Divisions in october,but suddenly this need appeared in december ?
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Re: Significance of lack of replacement equipment in Barbarossa
I suppose it is worth looking into what the effect of the extreme weather had on the rail transport also.
Before the cold, the rainy season also had an effect on the existing Russian rail lines. The Germans were frantically trying to repair and then improve and finally switch them to the standard narrow gauge. All this during horrendous conditions in October and then the winter. In one example, Lenigrad, things were going better...
Before the cold, the rainy season also had an effect on the existing Russian rail lines. The Germans were frantically trying to repair and then improve and finally switch them to the standard narrow gauge. All this during horrendous conditions in October and then the winter. In one example, Lenigrad, things were going better...
http://www.allworldwars.com/Comments-on ... -Bork.htmlThe first cold wave of the season, accompanied by a light snowfall, set in during the first week of October. This was the first taste of the tough winter which was to follow. The first cold wave was succeeded by several weeks of autumn mud. Demands on the rail lines increased. The completion of the Gdov - Veymarn line (the last leg of which the Russians had been unable to complete) now produced favorable results in the Lenin¬grad area. During the following weeks, however, this line began at some spots to sink into the bottomless mud, so that a ride on a train in this area resembled a trip in a roller coaster. Around the turn of the year had
the temperatures, which/dropped lower than usual this year, placed further heavy demands on railroad personnel and equipment. Frost damage to switches and turntables at times reduced the capacity of the line to well under ten trains per day; yet Army Group North needed about thirty trains per day. At Pskov ten locomotives were stalled for several days because of frost damage to the turntables.
When the Germans concluded their offensive operations against Leningrad and went over to the defensive in this sector, supplies could be shipped by rail directly from Germany to the front despite the distance of more than 600 miles. This accomplishment was due in large measure to the devotion to duty of the German railway construction and operating personnel, as well as to the co-operation of Latvian and Estonian rail¬roaders, who were willing to make great sacrifices in order to be liberated from Bolshevism. Another important factor that made possible the success of the German offensive and the strengthening of the German positions facing Leningrad was the failure of the Russian Air Force to launch any serious attacks on the rail net. However, there were two exceptions: The Russian Air Force attacked German troops and installations near the front at Leningrad, and briefly interfered with German operations in Estonia. Sketch 3 shows the capacity of the rail net used by the Germans the beginning of 1942.
Re: Significance of lack of replacement equipment in Barbarossa
Typhoon over Brjansk. Build up phases vs replacement phases. E.g.: You are comparing pre-Kursk to something like Wintergewitter. Also, the further you go, the less consolidated the positions are.How to explain that 316 tanks were sent in october
Re: Significance of lack of replacement equipment in Barbarossa
Typhoon started at the end of september, the 316 tanks were moving at the end of october (21-31 october ) ,thus it was not Typhoon,otherwise the tanks would move 21-30 september, and only 2 were going east that period .
From Vabanque P 89 :
"Die vor Beginn der Oktober Operationen zugewiesenen Panzerfahrzeuge wurden zwar erst in den 10-Tage meldungen vom 25 Oktober und 5 November 1941 aufgeführt ."
The tanks for Typhoon arrived only in the period 25 oktober/5 november .
This means
a ) that Hitler had decided to send 316 tanks to the east at a time when he had ordered to form new PzD :the east had priority
b ) these tanks arrived a month too late : the only explanation for this is transport problems .
It can not be production problems : it is impossible that on 1 september,there were not enough tanks,while there were sufficient tanks on 1 october .
From Vabanque P 89 :
"Die vor Beginn der Oktober Operationen zugewiesenen Panzerfahrzeuge wurden zwar erst in den 10-Tage meldungen vom 25 Oktober und 5 November 1941 aufgeführt ."
The tanks for Typhoon arrived only in the period 25 oktober/5 november .
This means
a ) that Hitler had decided to send 316 tanks to the east at a time when he had ordered to form new PzD :the east had priority
b ) these tanks arrived a month too late : the only explanation for this is transport problems .
It can not be production problems : it is impossible that on 1 september,there were not enough tanks,while there were sufficient tanks on 1 october .