Significance of lack of replacement equipment in Barbarossa

[Stiltzkin]

The tanks for Typhoon arrived only in the period 25 oktober/5 november

No, it just says that the tanks which were assigned to operations conducted in October, were registered later in the 10 days reports for the 25th october and 5th November. They arrived earlier. The same goes for registration past December 41, thats why Askey included Jan 42. The reporting system (just like the casualty reporting system) frequently lagged behind.
This does not necessary tell us anything about the decisions of the OKH, (or as many people assume, the industry, it does so indirectly), but more likely about the logistical strain, battle intensity (forces further procurement) and of the priorities for equipment.

[Yoozername]

I posted this in a 'what if' thread regarding panzers....Compared to Panzerworld data...which I think is 'total write-offs'...I consider this to be that plus knockouts requiring more than first line repairs...Totals are on the right

The data below is taken from 'Operation Typhoon' Hitler's march on Moscow -David Stahel

Combat losses for June 1941 were 39 (PI) 16 (PII) 33 (38t) 30 (PIII+StuG) 16 (PIV)
Totals are on the right in graph.

Panzer 38(t) losses are substantial

[Yoozername]

This sort of tells the story of building up after 1941...The operational numbers would be both the replacements and repaired non-runners added to existing operational? Basically the Germans start 1942 losing a lot of tanks with replacements and repairs slowly building the force back up.

tank1month1942.jpg (31.22 KiB) Viewed 8010 times

[Yoozername]

I guess this fills in some numbers....

https://books.google.com/books?id=UmwwB ... sa&f=false

[Yoozername]

An interesting stat in a Glantz book is that the Germans had about 1/3 of the tanks on hand in the Soviet Union as runners in September. I will check for the date but I believe it is the first week.

Considering that the Germans had additional stock before they invaded Russia, and they had manufactured tanks during the invasion, it might be they held back. But, again, were they shipping replacement parts? Engines and guns, etc.?

September and October shows an uptick in tanks sent. Nov/Dec/Jan shows a little less. I suspect they sent most 37mm Panzer III initially.

[Sean Oliver]

To get back to the "significance" of tanks, few were sent during June-Sept because other items were more important. A significant example of this was the increasingly urgent need for more artillery ammo for HG Mitte from late July onwards. Its frontage had been doubled by Hitler's irrational and stupid insistence - first articulated in very early July - that its flanks were to be cleared of any Red Army units before continuing its advance. This was entirely unnecessary and wasteful in several ways, and is a good example of Hitler's incompetence. None of these fearsome Red Army flank 'threats' were dangerous until Hitler decided they were. This naturally dispersed the Army Group across many hundreds of kilometers of front which crippled its ability to concentrate for any decisive attack, and made it vulnerable to the Red Army's clumsy but persistent attacks. These attacks against widened and thin German lines could be defeated as long as German defenders had artillery to cover the distances. But artillery is no good without ammo, which can be expended very rapidly while defending, especially against the Soviet's infantry-heavy assaults. In 1941 HGMitte consumed far more supplies defending in 4 weeks of Aug than they did advancing in 4 weeks of June-July due to artillery ammo.
Artillery ammo became the greatest drain on Mitte's logistic/transport capacity - largely but not entirely due to Hitler's nervousness about 'flank-clearing'. Some of the generals also thought this was prudent, like Kluge and sometimes even v.Bock. But this kind of concern over flanks and supply lines is attrition warfare, not maneuver/blitzkrieg.

[ljadw]

I disagree with the old claim about Hitler's incompetence .

[stg 44]

I disagree with the old claim about Hitler's incompetence .

Well, the outcome of the war doesn't really prove your point.

In 1941 HGMitte consumed far more supplies defending in 4 weeks of Aug than they did advancing in 4 weeks of June-July due to artillery ammo.

You have a source on that claim?

[Art]

Its frontage had been doubled by Hitler's irrational and stupid insistence - first articulated in very early July - that its flanks were to be cleared of any Red Army units before continuing its advance. This was entirely unnecessary and wasteful in several ways, and is a good example of Hitler's incompetence.

Von Bock wrote in his diary (30.7.41): "Rogachev, Roslavl, Toropets - they are all minor operations, but we need to make them if we do not want problems at flanks when our large offensive starts". This opinion didn't come from a military amateur.
Generally speaking HGM lost momentum several weeks after the war start as a result of objective factors rather then due to some Hitler's interference.

[stg 44]

Its frontage had been doubled by Hitler's irrational and stupid insistence - first articulated in very early July - that its flanks were to be cleared of any Red Army units before continuing its advance. This was entirely unnecessary and wasteful in several ways, and is a good example of Hitler's incompetence.

Von Bock wrote in his diary (30.7.41): "Rogachev, Roslavl, Toropets - they are all minor operations, but we need to make them if we do not want problems at flanks when our large offensive starts". This opinion didn't come from a military amateur.
Generally speaking HGM lost momentum several weeks after the war start as a result of objective factors rather then due to some Hitler's interference.

Sean can correct me if I'm misinterpreting him, but I think he's referring to the Leningrad-Kiev operations in August-September rather than the early-mid August immediate flank security operations.
P.101 of Stahel's "Kiev 1941" cites the early July conflicts between Hitler and his generals about Moscow vs. the flanks/economic objectives.

Germany’s recent command crisis over the future employment of Army Group Centre’s panzer forces did much to antagonize the already strained relations between the army and Hitler, but the dispute also soured relations within Army Group Centre itself. The roots of the dispute go back as far as December 1940 when a clear divergence emerged between the plans of the OKH, on the one hand, and those of Hitler, on the other, for the second phase of the eastern campaign. Yet nothing was openly discussed because the generals at the OKH simply hoped that the initial phase of the campaign would either prove decisive to the outcome of the war or at least convince Hitler of their strategic preference. When neither option eventuated the two sides openly clashed in the last week of July and the dispute rumbled on for a month.

[Max Payload]

Sean can correct me if I'm misinterpreting him, but I think he's referring to the Leningrad-Kiev operations in August-September rather than the early-mid August immediate flank security operations.

That's not how it reads.
The problem that Bock and OKH faced with regard to the flanks was that the pressure being applied to the AGC perimeter could barely be contained, let alone ignored, and because of that pressure AGC did not have the resources to advance much beyond Yartsevo/Elnia. Dealing with the Velikie Luki and Gomel groupings was not an option to be considered, it was an urgent problem to be addressed.

[Jack Sundaram]

There in detail when, where and from whom was formed this division. Briefly. 23 Panzer division was formed and trained in Paris, from October ' 41 to March 42, during the period of study were the French tanks.

[steve248]

This is interesting topic for some research I am involved with. All the posters above have considered armaments as the main subject if only because armaments win battles.
My interest is more mundane: spare parts and tyres for Pkw. and Lkw.
One particular SS-Polizei unit (not a field unit) every quarter sent a truck back to scour Germany for parts and tyres. Most of the Pkw's they were supplied with in 1941 were confiscated Pkw's from the civilian population and from the usual German manufacturers (Adler, BMW, Union (Audi) etc), Blitz and Citroen trucks.
No doubt the Army and Luftwaffe suffered similar problems with similar vehicles.

[ljadw]

This is interesting topic for some research I am involved with. All the posters above have considered armaments as the main subject if only because armaments win battles.
My interest is more mundane: spare parts and tyres for Pkw. and Lkw.
One particular SS-Polizei unit (not a field unit) every quarter sent a truck back to scour Germany for parts and tyres. Most of the Pkw's they were supplied with in 1941 were confiscated Pkw's from the civilian population and from the usual German manufacturers (Adler, BMW, Union (Audi) etc), Blitz and Citroen trucks.
No doubt the Army and Luftwaffe suffered similar problems with similar vehicles.

To say that armaments win battles is very questionable .