Political importance of Moscow in 1941

[stg 44]

I've seen several arguments about how important or not Moscow was to the Soviet regime's ability to continue the war were it to fall in 1941, ranging from David Glantz claiming the Soviets would have fought on to the bitter end to Stolfi claiming that the fall of Moscow would have unraveled the Soviet regime via it losing it's legitimacy with the loss of the capital of the nation. Putting aside the material factors, in terms of politics/psychology was holding Moscow in 1941 critical to Stalin/the Soviet regime being able to continue their rule and ability to actually run the nation?

[abvoronin]

I think Moscow has great importance as an economic and logistic center. And secondary it was a political center. Most of the Narkomats have already been evacuated beyond the Urals or in Asia.
The loss of Moscow would lead to a rapid loss of supplies to troops in the Kalinin region, Leningrad, the fall of Yaroslavl and, most likely, Vologda.
Perhaps the Wehrmacht could not reach the Volga in 1941. However, even without this, territorial and moral losses would be enormous.

[stg 44]

I think Moscow has great importance as an economic and logistic center. And secondary it was a political center. Most of the Narkomats have already been evacuated beyond the Urals or in Asia.
The loss of Moscow would lead to a rapid loss of supplies to troops in the Kalinin region, Leningrad, the fall of Yaroslavl and, most likely, Vologda.
Perhaps the Wehrmacht could not reach the Volga in 1941. However, even without this, territorial and moral losses would be enormous.

Perhaps I should be more specific by what I mean about political in this sense, I mean as a psychological/morale center for the public, the loss of which could undermine their faith in the government. Materially speaking yes the government offices and personnel were being evacuated East and Stalin could evacuate as needed with STAVKA if the city were about the fall, but I was more curious whether the regime itself would be fatally undermined in the sense of public/military willingness to follow it.

[MarkN]

At the time, the political directive issued by Hitler for Barbarossa assumed Soviet resistance would continue after the fall of Moscow. The Wehrmacht military plan for Barbarossa also assumed Soviet resistance would continue after the fall of Moscow. The direction of Barbarossa (political and military) once it had started suggest that Moscow was not seen by the German High Command as being the critical "schwerpunkt" that would, on its own, change the outcome of the war. At best, a few senior field commanders considered a push on Moscow as being more beneficial operationally - but not even they claim it would have been the defining moment strategically.

At the same time, from the other side, neither the Soviet political and military leadership seem to have considered the fall of Moscow as being the end game. Some of their decisions during Barbarossa itself, eg. sending troops to defend other swectors rather than amassing a defensive screen around Moscow, demonstrate they continued not to see Moscow as a position of such critical importance that it had to be defended at all cost.

Whilst posters here can speculate here till the cows come home what if, the principles at the time did not, it seems, attach so great an importance to Moscow as those wishing to speculate now.

Does anybody have any evidence whatsoever that Red Army commanders would stop accepting STAVKA orders if they were being issued from another location?

Does anybody have any evidence whatsoever that rank and file Red Army troops would desert enmasse if Moscow fell?

Does anybody have any evidence whatsoever that Soviet citizens would have risen up against the Soviet leadership and Red Army after the fall of Moscow and willingly accepted Nazi overlordship?

[abvoronin]

I mean as a psychological/morale center for the public, the loss of which could undermine their faith in the government.

Yes, I understand your point.
The importance of Moscow as a psychological and moral center is a popular point of view in the USSR and Russia.
It can not be completely denied.
However, in 1941 Hitler was compared to Napoleon, and in 1812 Napoleon was in Moscow and was defeated. In other words, the population was partly ready for the fall of the capital.
At the same time, Stalin remained in Moscow and on October 15-16 during The Panic and at the end of November, when the Wehrmacht was really very close to the city's borders. Most likely, Stalin believed that the retention of the capital and the government in it has a great moral impact on the population. Stalin understood the psychology of the masses well.
On the other hand, he understood the economic and logistical importance of Moscow.
On the third hand, if in October he took a risk staying in the city, then in November-December this was already an accurate calculation. I believe that he understood that the Wehrmacht does not have enough troops to capture the city.

[stg 44]

I mean as a psychological/morale center for the public, the loss of which could undermine their faith in the government.

Yes, I understand your point.
The importance of Moscow as a psychological and moral center is a popular point of view in the USSR and Russia.
It can not be completely denied.
However, in 1941 Hitler was compared to Napoleon, and in 1812 Napoleon was in Moscow and was defeated. In other words, the population was partly ready for the fall of the capital.
At the same time, Stalin remained in Moscow and on October 15-16 during The Panic and at the end of November, when the Wehrmacht was really very close to the city's borders. Most likely, Stalin believed that the retention of the capital and the government in it has a great moral impact on the population. Stalin understood the psychology of the masses well.
On the other hand, he understood the economic and logistical importance of Moscow.
On the third hand, if in October he took a risk staying in the city, then in November-December this was already an accurate calculation. I believe that he understood that the Wehrmacht does not have enough troops to capture the city.

Stalin's decision to stay was a big reason for asking this question, because it seemed like he was valuing the morale factor of his presence in the city on the ability of the nation to continue the war or at least under his leadership. You make a good point that it is difficult to disentangle the material and morale elements here, because Moscow was one of the crucial production centers of the nation, as well as the rail hub, so even if morale holds up after it's loss, there are the material impacts of it being lost that would be difficult to overcome. October seems to be when the gamble was, by November-December there were enough troops to hold the city and even if the Germans got close enough to penetrate part of the city they weren't going to be able to take it all or hold it.
In terms of the 1812 comparison, I'm not sure that really is comparable to the situation in 1941, Moscow was much more important in every facet than it was during the period of the Napoleonic wars, if not for any other factor than it was the capital in 1941 and was not in 1812.

[abvoronin]

Does anybody have any evidence whatsoever that Red Army commanders would stop accepting STAVKA orders if they were being issued from another location?

Does anybody have any evidence whatsoever that rank and file Red Army troops would desert enmasse if Moscow fell?

Does anybody have any evidence whatsoever that Soviet citizens would have risen up against the Soviet leadership and Red Army after the fall of Moscow and willingly accepted Nazi overlordship?

No
No
No

I think Red Army commanders did not pay much attention to the geographical location of STAVKA. In addition, division commanders received orders not from the STAVKA, but from the commander of Army, and those from the commander of Front. So way, they hardly would see in the order the address of Arzamas or Kazan.

No any evidence. It seems to me that the alignment of troops was such as to preserve and manage them even in the event of the capture of Moscow. Some of the troops already occupied positions east of Moscow, the population actively built defence lines along the Volga near Yaroslavl, Gorky, Kazan and even Astrakhan.

No any evidence. The population was not capable of active action against the Soviet government. The population who did not leave for the evacuation was rather indifferent to what is happening. The population that was in the east depended heavily on the state, for example, receiving food by cards. An uprising under these conditions would lead to an end to their supply. At most, the population could passively await the arrival of German troops.

[abvoronin]

stg 44
Yes, in 1941 Moscow was more important than in 1812.
Attitude to the loss of the city changed from October to December. In October, there were talks about declaring Moscow an open city, like Paris. But at the same time, a trap was prepared - an explosion of buildings, as in Kiev.
In November, there was already a determination to fight actively, even in Moscow's encirclement.
In my opinion. At the same time, small numbers of weakened troops and a minimum of military materials would remain inside the ring. The main forces were placed outside the alleged encirclement.

[MarkN]

Stalin's decision to stay was a big reason for asking this question, because it seemed like he was valuing the morale factor of his presence in the city on the ability of the nation to continue the war or at least under his leadership.

Really?

Whilst I have no problem understanding the morale of the (local) population may have played a part in his decision to stay in the city, do you have any evidence whatsoever that he feared the extreme case that his flight would cause the downfall of the entire country or the loss of his personal authority?

It seems to be a rather enormous leap in understanding that defies both historical evidence and commonsense.

[MarkN]

I think Red Army commanders did not pay much attention to the geographical location of STAVKA. In addition, division commanders received orders not from the STAVKA, but from the commander of Army, and those from the commander of Front. So way, they hardly would see in the order the address of Arzamas or Kazan.

No any evidence. It seems to me that the alignment of troops was such as to preserve and manage them even in the event of the capture of Moscow. Some of the troops already occupied positions east of Moscow, the population actively built defence lines along the Volga near Yaroslavl, Gorky, Kazan and even Astrakhan.

No any evidence. The population was not capable of active action against the Soviet government. The population who did not leave for the evacuation was rather indifferent to what is happening. The population that was in the east depended heavily on the state, for example, receiving food by cards. An uprising under these conditions would lead to an end to their supply. At most, the population could passively await the arrival of German troops.

Quite so. The historical evidence demonstrates that plans were in place and preparations ongoing to continue to wage war even if Moscow had fallen. Not even the Wehrmacht had deluded themselves that Moscow would provide the key to instant victory and glory.

[stg 44]

Stalin's decision to stay was a big reason for asking this question, because it seemed like he was valuing the morale factor of his presence in the city on the ability of the nation to continue the war or at least under his leadership.

Really?

Whilst I have no problem understanding the morale of the (local) population may have played a part in his decision to stay in the city, do you have any evidence whatsoever that he feared the extreme case that his flight would cause the downfall of the entire country or the loss of his personal authority?

It seems to be a rather enormous leap in understanding that defies both historical evidence and commonsense.

https://books.google.com/books?id=M-Fz- ... ic&f=false
What we have to go on is his behavior around the time, because Stalin was not someone that was particular honest about his thoughts and feelings in a particular moment.

http://www.newsweek.com/stalins-tipping-point-100267

The NKVD, as the Soviet secret police was then called, had prepared the first of what promised to be a series of pamphlets. “Comrades! We left Moscow due to the continuous attacks of the Germans,” it declared. “But it’s not the right time for us to weep.” The “Underground Party Committee” that signed the statement vowed that Moscow would be liberated. Since the city held out in the end, this admission of defeat was ultimately buried in the NKVD’s classified files rather than distributed. In fact, much of the story of how close Moscow came to falling—a defeat that would likely have transformed the course of the war—has been obscured by decades of deliberately distorted history.

Any honest account of the battle for Moscow would undermine the Soviet story line of “The Great Patriotic War.” Those sanitized versions, now reinforced in the era of President Vladimir Putin, portray Joseph Stalin as a military genius and his people as heroically united against the German invader.

On Oct. 16, the worst day of the panic in Moscow, Stalin was not yet confident of such an outcome. An Air Force officer saw him sitting at his desk asking himself again and again, “What shall we do? What shall we do?” Two days later, the Soviet leader went to the station where his special train was waiting. As Pavel Saprykin, who was part of the work detail that prepared the train, recalled in his old age, he saw Stalin walk up to his carriage, then pace the platform beside it. But he didn’t board it. Instead, he left the station. It proved a fateful decision, signaling that all was not lost.

Vowing to remain in Moscow, Stalin suddenly took charge again, reverting to the tactic he had always relied on—brute force. He declared martial law on Oct. 19, and NKVD units were ordered to shoot looters along with almost anyone who looked suspicious. Surviving members of those patrols, such as Yevgeny Anufriyev, are cautious in describing what they actually did. “We had an amazing order to shoot spies and deserters on the spot,” he said. “But we didn’t know how to figure out who was a spy.” However many Muscovites were shot, the looting and the unrest stopped.

But the memories of the breakdown of law and order, and how close Moscow came to falling, remain sensitive to this day. Stalin’s mistakes were never mentioned in the official histories. Nor do those accounts admit that if it weren’t for Hitler’s even greater mistakes, Stalin wouldn’t have been able to save his capital—and, quite possibly, might never have prevailed in the larger struggle.

https://www.amazon.com/Stalin-Court-Sim ... 1400076781
In this biography citing Zhukov the author states that Stalin was considering trying to make peace if Moscow seemed about to fall because he was concerned about losing everything.

Earlier in the war when Minsk fell he retired to his Dacha, apparently is despair, telling his inner circle that the Revolution was lost and when they came to coax him back to work, he thought they came to arrest him and remove him from power. At various points of disaster he was concerned that it meant the end. Whether or not it would have actually meant that of course is debateable and clearly they were preparing for resistance to continue, hence the evacuation to Kuibyshev of government offices and personnel as well as resistance plans and hidden bombs like in Kiev.

[MarkN]

Stalin's decision to stay was a big reason for asking this question, because it seemed like he was valuing the morale factor of his presence in the city on the ability of the nation to continue the war or at least under his leadership.

Really?

Whilst I have no problem understanding the morale of the (local) population may have played a part in his decision to stay in the city, do you have any evidence whatsoever that he feared the extreme case that his flight would cause the downfall of the entire country or the loss of his personal authority?

It seems to be a rather enormous leap in understanding that defies both historical evidence and commonsense.

https://books.google.com/books?id=M-Fz- ... ic&f=false
What we have to go on is his behavior around the time, because Stalin was not someone that was particular honest about his thoughts and feelings in a particular moment.

http://www.newsweek.com/stalins-tipping-point-100267

The NKVD, as the Soviet secret police was then called, had prepared the first of what promised to be a series of pamphlets. “Comrades! We left Moscow due to the continuous attacks of the Germans,” it declared. “But it’s not the right time for us to weep.” The “Underground Party Committee” that signed the statement vowed that Moscow would be liberated. Since the city held out in the end, this admission of defeat was ultimately buried in the NKVD’s classified files rather than distributed. In fact, much of the story of how close Moscow came to falling—a defeat that would likely have transformed the course of the war—has been obscured by decades of deliberately distorted history.

Any honest account of the battle for Moscow would undermine the Soviet story line of “The Great Patriotic War.” Those sanitized versions, now reinforced in the era of President Vladimir Putin, portray Joseph Stalin as a military genius and his people as heroically united against the German invader.

On Oct. 16, the worst day of the panic in Moscow, Stalin was not yet confident of such an outcome. An Air Force officer saw him sitting at his desk asking himself again and again, “What shall we do? What shall we do?” Two days later, the Soviet leader went to the station where his special train was waiting. As Pavel Saprykin, who was part of the work detail that prepared the train, recalled in his old age, he saw Stalin walk up to his carriage, then pace the platform beside it. But he didn’t board it. Instead, he left the station. It proved a fateful decision, signaling that all was not lost.

Vowing to remain in Moscow, Stalin suddenly took charge again, reverting to the tactic he had always relied on—brute force. He declared martial law on Oct. 19, and NKVD units were ordered to shoot looters along with almost anyone who looked suspicious. Surviving members of those patrols, such as Yevgeny Anufriyev, are cautious in describing what they actually did. “We had an amazing order to shoot spies and deserters on the spot,” he said. “But we didn’t know how to figure out who was a spy.” However many Muscovites were shot, the looting and the unrest stopped.

But the memories of the breakdown of law and order, and how close Moscow came to falling, remain sensitive to this day. Stalin’s mistakes were never mentioned in the official histories. Nor do those accounts admit that if it weren’t for Hitler’s even greater mistakes, Stalin wouldn’t have been able to save his capital—and, quite possibly, might never have prevailed in the larger struggle.

https://www.amazon.com/Stalin-Court-Sim ... 1400076781
In this biography citing Zhukov the author states that Stalin was considering trying to make peace if Moscow seemed about to fall because he was concerned about losing everything.

Earlier in the war when Minsk fell he retired to his Dacha, apparently is despair, telling his inner circle that the Revolution was lost and when they came to coax him back to work, he thought they came to arrest him and remove him from power. At various points of disaster he was concerned that it meant the end. Whether or not it would have actually meant that of course is debateable and clearly they were preparing for resistance to continue, hence the evacuation to Kuibyshev of government offices and personnel as well as resistance plans and hidden bombs like in Kiev.

I have no doubt morale in Moscow was very low. I have no doubt Stalin spoke sometimes in a defeatest manner. I have no doubt that Soviet authorities had to use strongarm tactics, censorship and many lies to keep the lid on the problem. The British had to do similar when problems got bad in Hull during 1941.

But where does anybody claim that Stalin leaving Moscow or, even worse, Moscow falling to the Germans would bring about an end to the war? That is your gigantic leap in understanding. A leap completely devoid of evidence. Evidencing that morale was low, even very low, is NOT evidence that it would all be all over if Stalin upped sticks or Moscow fell.

Moscow falling would have had a major impact on the course of the war due to its central role in rail communications. But changing the course is NOT the same as saying it's all over. Defeat in the Battle for Moscow is not the same as defeat of the Soviet Union.

[stg 44]

But where does anybody claim that Stalin leaving Moscow or, even worse, Moscow falling to the Germans would bring about an end to the war? That is your gigantic leap in understanding. A leap completely devoid of evidence. Evidencing that morale was low, even very low, is NOT evidence that it would all be all over if Stalin upped sticks or Moscow fell.

Moscow falling would have had a major impact on the course of the war due to its central role in rail communications. But changing the course is NOT the same as saying it's all over. Defeat in the Battle for Moscow is not the same as defeat of the Soviet Union.

I wasn't claiming that Moscow falling would automatically mean the USSR would collapse immediately, rather that the loss of the capital and it being unable to be recovered could have reduced public faith in Stalin's regime and might have resulted in regime change, so beyond just the material factors it seemed that there might have been a tipping point for Stalin to face a public backlash. John Erickson in "the Road to Stalingrad" talks about how Stalin was deeply concerned about public morale in 1942 and regime survival if the German Summer offensive took Stalingrad, which led me to wonder if the capital had the same sort of impact given the lack of willingness for Stalin to leave at the last second (in the article he apparently went to the train station set on leaving, but changed his mind) in October 1941 during the Moscow Panic and evacuation of government officials. We of course can never know for sure or indeed really separate the material from the morale factors in terms of Moscow. The other poster abvoronin has a point though that given the power of the NKVD it is unlikely that Stalin could be easily removed, so seeing the public demand his removal is unlikely and more a figment of Stalin's paranoia than reality.

[MarkN]

But where does anybody claim that Stalin leaving Moscow or, even worse, Moscow falling to the Germans would bring about an end to the war? That is your gigantic leap in understanding. A leap completely devoid of evidence. Evidencing that morale was low, even very low, is NOT evidence that it would all be all over if Stalin upped sticks or Moscow fell.

Moscow falling would have had a major impact on the course of the war due to its central role in rail communications. But changing the course is NOT the same as saying it's all over. Defeat in the Battle for Moscow is not the same as defeat of the Soviet Union.

I wasn't claiming that Moscow falling would automatically mean the USSR would collapse immediately, rather that the loss of the capital and it being unable to be recovered could have reduced public faith in Stalin's regime and might have resulted in regime change, so beyond just the material factors it seemed that there might have been a tipping point for Stalin to face a public backlash. John Erickson in "the Road to Stalingrad" talks about how Stalin was deeply concerned about public morale in 1942 and regime survival if the German Summer offensive took Stalingrad, which led me to wonder if the capital had the same sort of impact given the lack of willingness for Stalin to leave at the last second (in the article he apparently went to the train station set on leaving, but changed his mind) in October 1941 during the Moscow Panic and evacuation of government officials. We of course can never know for sure or indeed really separate the material from the morale factors in terms of Moscow. The other poster abvoronin has a point though that given the power of the NKVD it is unlikely that Stalin could be easily removed, so seeing the public demand his removal is unlikely and more a figment of Stalin's paranoia than reality.

All of the 'evidence' that you have put forward to highlight the low morale in Moscow's general population and the defeatest talk by Stalin himself also point out that the leadership as a body were planning for and preparing in the event of the fall of Moscow. If Stalin was to be removed by his inner circle, it would likely be more detrimental to German efforts than helpful.

[abvoronin]

Last year, the diaries of General KGB Ivan Serov were published, which mentions the events of October 1941.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ivan_Serov
http://militera.lib.ru/db/serov_ia01/index.html

He tells the story of the deputy head of the 9th Directorate of Security of the Politburo members, Alexander (Sasho) Yakovlevich Egnatashvili, who studied with Stalin at a seminary in Tbilisi, and they had a particularly trusting relationship. Egnatashvili conveyed to him the words Stalin had said during the friendly meal: "Today these bastards (members of the GKO) know what they told me? Beria said that an air-raid shelter was built in Arzamas for the Supreme High Command, so they decided that GHQ and I would move from Moscow to there. I said that there is no need. They began to insist. I then got angry and said to them: "If I leave Moscow, you bastards, surrender the Germans to Moscow and themselves run up. Let's go to hell! ', And left. Think, Sasho, what scoundrels! ". I told him that: "You did the right thing, Soso, they run away and Moscow will be given up." We had another drink, and he left. "

Some people (Vasily Pronin - head of Mosgorispolkom) said that he heard as Beria told Malenkov: "Moscow is not the Soviet Union. Defending Moscow is useless. Staying in Moscow is dangerous, they will shoot us like partridges." But I'm not 100% beleive to Pronin.

Stalin was afraid to use the plane. The train was prepared for him, but he never came to him.
The train was not at the usual train station, but in railroad dead ends near the Entsiastov highway. In mid-October, very close to these railroad dead end was the epicenter of panic, less than a kilometer.
Thus, it can be argued that Stalin did not come to this train, otherwise there would be troops. Also, there was no bomb shelter, and the area was bombed, guarding the train had to hide in concrete pipes.

Perhaps Stalin feared that if he left Moscow, he would be accused of treason and arrested. That's why he decided to stay.