Kursk Question

[Pips]

How important were the availability of the Tiger and Panther tanks in the decision-making process of the Kursk offensive?

I realise that the above question is bordering on the 'supposition', but am curious if the availability of the two 'super' tanks had any real impact on the decision to proceed with the battle plan. On paper both tanks gave the Germans a substantial lift in quality over quantity - always an issue on the Russian Front.
Looked at another way, would the Germans have considered Zitadelle if the Panzer Divisions had only been equipped with Panzer Mk.IV's?

[Dann Falk]

Greetings,

The issue of the Kursk attack was entirely in Hitler hands. He wanted to wait for the Tigers and Panthers and so the attack was delayed, over and over again. Then, against sound military advice, he launched the attack anyway even when it was hopelessly late and the German forces were outnumbered.

So the availability of Tigers and Panthers was profoundly important in Hitler’s decision-making process.

Most German generals wanted the attack, but only if they could strike quickly early in the spring. Any delay would reduce the slim chance of victory that summer.

[Pips]

Cheers.

[Stiltzkin]

Contrary to popular belief it was not only his idea, though some stated that waiting for equipment upgrades may have been unbeneficial.

Actually, Hitler did not necessarily want Zitadelle to happen, but he was persuaded by other commanders. He considered it too overambitious and instead wanted Operation "Habicht" to happen. http://www.ifz-muenchen.de/heftarchiv/2 ... B6ppel.pdf look on page 353
Despite the initial (teething) problems (and lack of crew training) with the introduction of the Panther, it did show its true potential during Kursk in its ranged and AT capabilities:
(from, Kursk Statistical Analysis)

But the employment of the Panther was not entirely negative. During Kursk it also proved to be a very potent weapon. Up to 15 July XXXXVIII Panzer Corps destroyed or captured 559 enemy tanks. Of these, the Panthers destroyed 269. Thus, Panthers knocked out almost half the Soviet tanks destroyed deployed against XXXXVIII Panzer Corps.

Do note that such an asset has only a marginal impact on the tactical level and cannot be considered as vital (Tigers and Panthers only made up 15% of the German AFV park during mid 1943), thus I do not understand all the attention the "Panther delay" problem receives. Here is what really dictated Kursk: The Soviets decided to stand idle (because they still remembered the previous summer offensives of 41/42), this is why Kursk happened in the very first place (after v.Mannsteins counterstroke), making a question like "did Vatutin err when he decided to defend at Kursk" (there is an interesting article on this topic in the JOSMS) a much more interesting one.

[xsli]

Chris's big "Kursk" book detailed the plan in its Chapter 1 - which is likely the most meticulous description.

In short, there are multiple delays due to various reasons. The 'tank' one is a major factor but it is not only about tiger or panther. The AGC is the weaker pincer and in short of tanks in May. Delaying the date to June 10 will enable AGC have significantly more tanks - all the panthers and ferdinands came in June. - page 66, Hitler's meeting with Guderian on May 3rd - the original start day.

[Pips]

Again, many thanks for the comments. Quite interesting that a weapon (Tiger) could have such an effect in deciding a military strategy.

Mind you it's not the first time. The Mitsubishi Zero is a classic example. Japan's whole concept of war in the Pacific (in the very early stages) was predicated on the performance and range of the Zero, and it's ability to gain air supremacy over Japan's land and sea forces. The power of the Mitsubishi in military minds is well detailed in Akira Yoshimura's excellent book Zero.

And like the Tiger tank, it ultimately failed. There were never enough in the time required.

[Stiltzkin]

And like the Tiger tank, it ultimately failed. There were never enough in the time required.

The Wehrmacht could have had 5000 tigers during Barbarossa or Kursk, still they would have been halted. This is a fundamental misconception of warfare people on the internet have (not to mention about the waste of resources). Once again (I think I keep repeating myself over and over now regarding this topic): Tank production stands in relation to demands, a forces numerical strength, its resource allocations, tactics and the losses they take. You do not produce tanks indefinitely. The Tigers had to fullfill a designated role (Panthers were also chosen as replacements), so it was produced more or less in the required quantity. Tanks itself represent less than 3-4% of an armies firepower (and inflict even less casualties than that, Artillery inflicts the majority of casualties), they lower the casualties of the advancing force, i.e. their primary goal is to help in the advance and penetrate, primarily fighting infantry and not other AFVs (tanks did not duel like Knights, it was not jousting). I usually like to present this example: Does the US Army or USMC have 40,000 M1 Abrams? No. It is around 6,000 AFVs (9,000 total produced with exports) because their focus lies on Naval and Airpower (compare Russia nowdays has approx. 20,000 and is economically weaker than the US).
As for the idea of a weapon having such an importance on the strategical level: That is basically just a product of literature and personal pride, which catalyzes through objects like Tigers, T-34s, Zeros etc. simply because its "cool". Their respective personnel formed less than 1% of the entire armed forces.
They have their role and importance, but they receive too much attention in contrast to all other important aspects and topics. They were not vital for the outcome of Kursk or any other battle, merely impacting the relative effectiveness on the tactical level.
Crippling the Soviet AFV park only meant that they suffered a temporary setback. T-34s were the most destroyed tanks in history, yet the Soviets won the war. The Germans attacked a well prepared force which was on average 2.5x numerically stronger. The Soviet forces grew stronger and were in fact greater after the battle than before the launch of Zitadelle.
Just compare the per capita number of AFVs in each respective Army, you will notice that all armies enjoyed a similar accumulation of AFVs in the spearheads (especially units prepped for an attack).

[jesk]

Germans tried to kill Hitler in March, 1943, then in July, 1944, including because of his strategy with new tanks and for example the V-2 rockets.